The Strategic Management of Policing

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I. Public Administration and Police Management

Long ago, Max Weber observed that the defining quality of the state was its monopoly over the legitimate use of force. (Weber) In doing so, he put police administration at the center of public administration, for the police embody this essential quality. (Bittner) The badge, the nightstick, and the gun are the symbols and tools of state authority, and it is to municipal police departments that such instruments are supplied.

If police administration is so closely tied to the defining purposes of the state, it follows that if there is something distinctive about public administration, it will show up in the theory and practice of police administration, for police management and police operations will necessarily have to express those special qualities. (Allison) And so, I think, they do.

What makes police administration so absorbing, apparently distinctive, and quintessentially public is precisely that it is far more explicitly concerned with the deployment of state authority than most public agencies. Police departments deliver obligations as well as services. That simple fact turns out to have great consequences for many important aspects of police management including: 1)

the terms in which police managers are held accountable; 2) the methods they use to manage their organizations; and 3) the ways they should define their overall purposes, reckon their value to the society, and identify their important customers. It may also have important implications for how we should think about these matters for other public organizations, for all public organizations are tainted to varying degrees by their reliance on state authority.

A. Public Authority as a Resource

To a degree, one can view the authority of the state as nothing more than an additional resource available to the police to help them do their job. As the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force observed:

> The police are entrusted with important public resources. The most obvious is money: $230 million a year flows through the Philadelphia Police Department. Far more important, the public grants the police another resource -- the use of force and authority. These are deployed when a citizen is arrested or handcuffed, when an officer fires his weapon at a citizen, or when an officer claims exclusive use of the streets with his siren. (Task Force Report, p. 129)

By viewing public authority as simply another resource, police organizations can be made to appear similar to many other producing enterprise.

Like other organizations, police departments have purposes they are supposed to achieve. These include reducing criminal victimization, maintaining order in public spaces, and regulating the use of public thoroughfares for the safety and convenience of citizens. (Goldstein) Their performance in achieving these goals can be examined to determine their overall effectiveness.

Like other organizations, the police are entrusted with resources to achieve their purposes. Their task is to minimize the use of these resources. By comparing the overall effectiveness with the resources consumed in producing the results, citizens and their representatives can audit their economy and efficiency.

Indeed, to the extent that public authority is viewed as a resource, the police can be held accountable for achieving their purposes with the least use of that resource as well. Thus, a police force that can make arrests with the least use of physical force, or solve crimes with the least intrustive investigative measures, or regulate public spaces with the fewest restrictions on public behavior is arguably performing better than one that throws its weight

around along with its money. It is precisely in this spirit that the New South Wales Police Force declares that one of its most important values is to "husband public authority".

B. Propriety, Fairness, and Justice

Yet, to look at police organizations in this way seems somewhat forced. It is much more conventional to think about the performance of police departments in terms of how properly, fairly, and justly they operate as well as how effectively and economically. In this view, the job of the police is not primarily to produce substantive results; it is to enforce the law fully and impartially. (Crime Commission) The mark of their distinction lies not in their ability to reduce crime and apprehend offenders, but in their ability to bring the law to bear with precision in individual circumstances, and to make themselves equally available to all. In effect, their task is to produce justice and fairness in and through their operations as well as safety and security.

The reason it is conventional to view police organizations in these less instrumental terms is that, to many, state authority is more than simply a resource. (Mashaw) To these analysts, police use of state authority defines the ends of the organizations as well as provides the means. Even more importantly, use of state authority

powerfully conditions how the entire organization should perform and be evaluated. Because state authority is engaged, one must be as concerned about issues of equity as of efficiency and effectiveness. It is the entrance of this new set of standards that is heralded by the concepts of propriety and fairness.

Of course, to some degree, the concerns for propriety and fairness run parallel to the interests in effectiveness and economy. A police department that invokes state authority properly and fairly may also be economizing on the use of authority in the accomplishment of its mission.

This should not be surprising. After all, the aim of jurisprudence in a liberal society is to minimize and economize on the use of the state authority -- to use it only when it is both necessary and successful in accomplishing state purposes. In this sense, the laws ration the use of state authority just as budgets ration the use of state monies.

C. The Procedural Goals of Policing

But there are some qualities that the public wants in the practice of policing that cannot quite be captured in the instrumental language of economy and effectiveness.

For example, society wants to be sure that the law is brought to bear on citzens only when it is appropriate to do so. The public wants this not only because, in doing so, the use of authority is economized, but also because an individual injustice is avoided. Thus, precision and propriety in bringing the force of public authority to bear is much valued in police operations.

Equally, society wants to ensure that like cases are treated alike. (Winston) Of particular importance is the aim of avoiding bias in the way the law is enforced -- both in individual cases, and in aggregate. Society wants this not only because such a quality might encourage others to comply with the law and have faith in the justice of legal institutions, but also because it is a good in itself. This kind of fairness is something that a democratic society would like to see in the operations of its police departments. Thus, reducing discretion and the scope for individual prejudices to be expressed becomes an important aim of police administration.

It is also important that the protection of the law be available to all without regard to their economic position in the society. (Black) Otherwise, one of the important features of law in a democratic society will have been sacrificed. So, ensuring that the police are in some

important sense equally available to all becomes an important aspect of policing.

D. The Value of Achieving the Procedural Goals

Note that it is not at all obvious who it is that wants these things from the police department, nor who benefits when they are present. (Moore) Of course, one can point to some individual beneficiaries of more disciplined police conduct: the innocent person who was shielded from an unjust charge, the minority youth who was given the same break for shoplifting that would have been available to a white youth caught for the same crime, the poor woman whose battering at the hands of her husband was taken as seriously as the assault on the upwardly mobile young lawyer.

But I think it is possible to say that these features of policing are also enjoyed more broadly through the population. Individuals, thinking like citizens of the society, will the police to behave this way because it conforms to their shared notions of what a just police department would be like. And insofar as the police department's operations as a whole conform to this ideal, arguably some value is created for the entire citizenry.

In principle, then, these procedural aspects of policing may be as important in evaluating the performance

of police departments as their effectiveness in achieving operational objectives.

E. The Practical Importance of the Procedural Goals

This is far more than a theoretical point, however. Indeed, as a practical matter, it has been these procedural aspects of policing that have focused the attention of police theorists, managers, and evaluators for much of the last few decades. (Goldstein) Over this period, more ink has been spilled over the issue of how to control police discretion than on what techniques of policing were effective. Indeed, concerns about the effectiveness of the police in reducing crime or calming fears have come relatively late to the field. (Goldstein) More police chiefs have lost their jobs for scandals related to scandal and misconduct than for ineffectiveness in controlling crime or wastefulness in public spending. Thus, as a practical matter, it has been far more important to produce disciplined, fair, and just police departments than effective ones.

The intense focus on controlling police conduct has caused police managers to adopt particular managerial practices and doctrines that were widely viewed to be the most effective in giving police administrators control over the individual conduct of officers, and the aggregate

performance of their organizations. These management doctines were originally prescribed by Max Weber and then defended and modernized by _____ Taylor..

At the core of this set of doctrines is the claim that managers can achieve both efficiency and fairness by developing extensive written rules to instruct operating level officials in how they should behave. To ensure efficiency and effectiveness, the rules should be based on the best available technical knowledge in the field. To ensure control and fairness in police operations, the rules should be complete and comprehensive, covering all the situations that the officials can be expected to encounter.

Of course, these theorists knew that the rules were not self-executing. To ensure that they would be followed consistently, managers were instructed to establish clear lines of authority and accountability. In addition, narrow spans of control would ensure close supervision of operating level officials. Extensive investment in training, ideally before officials began their jobs, would be necessary to equip and motivate the officials to do their jobs properly and effectively. And, there would be strict accountability and punishment for any wrong-doing or corruption.

The theory also counselled that in order to avoid corruption, it was important to organize operations in ways

that prevented low level officials from getting too close to their clients lest they develop personal relationships with their clients that would bias their handling of the individual cases. In the case of the police, technology, was enlisted to support the goals of reducing personal contact, ensuring equal access, providing close supervision. By building an elaborate communication system that linked individual citizens and their demands for service to police officers through a system of telephones and radio controlled dispatching, police managers succeeded in breaking the close links between individual beat officers and citizens that had characterized the early days of policing (and fostered no small amount of favoritism and corruption). These technical arrangements also allowed all citizens to have immediate access to the police department, and enabled those at the center of the department to monitor the activities of individual patrol officers.

Thus, police departments were initially conceived of and subsequently developed as classic Weberian bureaucracies. They took this form partly to achieve effectiveness in the accomplishment of their mission, but as importantly to ensure that they operated uniformly, fairly, and impersonally -- the key defining attributes of public enterprises. It is in the field of police administration, then, that one should expect to find the strongest commitment to traditional theories of public administration

and management and the greatest resistance to change. And so, to some degree, one does.

F. Lessons of Policing for Public Management

What makes an article on police administration important to a general volume on the important changes that are occurring in public management, however, is that the revolution in managerial thought is beginning to make inroads even in these most traditional of public bureaucracies. In policing, as in other fields of public administration, there are important reasons to be interested in "de-regulating public managment", or "developing a customer service orientation", or "re-inventing police organizations." And these pressures have begun to spawn important managerial changes in police departments.

Partly it is the pursuit for increased effectiveness that motivates the changes. As the police have been held accountable for achieving substantive results as well as merely enforcing the law as fairly and impartially as they can, and as research has revealed the weakness of some of their current methods, managers have been motivated to make changes in both the ends and means of their organizations. (Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy) They have sought to be valuable to the public as well as simply present and reliable in the performance of their duties.

But it has also been important that the success of the Weberian methods for producing disciplined, high quality organizations has been called into question. It is no longer clear that one can produce police organizations that are free of error, corruption, and brutality through the administrative means of tighter rules, closer supervision, and stricter penalites of misconduct. Indeed, increasingly, this elaborate bureaucratic apparatus looks like an expensive way to produce the form but not the substance of a disciplined, effective force. (Moore and Stephens)

Thus, the changes in police administration mark the depth of the discontent with the traditional models of public administration. It is by no means clear yet where the current revolution in policing will go. Nor is it clear that the new forms of organization and control will be more effective than those of the past.

Yet, it does seem clear that we might learn a great deal about the limits and possibilities of new forms of public management and administration by looking closely at the changes that are now sweeping through policing. More importantly, we might learn some important things about why the enthusiasm for "de-regulation" or for "customer service" are, at best, quite imperfect solgans for identifying the true nature of the new kinds of managerial work that must be

done to improve the performance and credibility of public sector organizations.

Specifically, a study of police management will show that we should not be "de-regulating" the public sector as much as working to "change the terms in which public sector organizations are held accountable". The demand for accountability in public organizations will continue to be strong, and a manager's ability to satisfy that demand for accountability will be an important mark of his talent. What needs to change is not the demand for accountability, but instead a wider recognition of the role that senior managers of public enterprises can and should play in shaping the terms of their own accountability. They ought to be authorized to take the initiative in negotiating the terms of their accountability with their political overseers, and in introducing important innovations into their organization. (Moore) This is not "de-regulation", but instead changing the form that the continued regulation takes, and giving the managers a role in defining the terms of their accountability.

Similarly, it will show that the "customers" of the organization are not simply the "clients" of the organization who call on the organization for services, or are exposed to the organization's efforts to impose public responsibilities on individuals, but are also citizens,

taxpayers, and their representatives who may be seen as having a collective view of what, in aggregate, the organization ought to be producing, and what particular features of the organization's performance would be indicative of quality performance. These overseers, evaluating organizations in terms of whether they do or do not embody some idealized general conception of how the organization should operate are in many ways more important "customers" than the clients of the organization who ask it to supply particular services to them, or become the focus of the organization's efforts to impose public obligations.

Nor is it clear that these observations apply only to police organizations. While policing may be an extreme case in the field of public administration in terms of the prominence with which public authority is used, the police are similar to all public organizations in at least one crucial respect: by definition, <u>all</u> public enterprises rely on the use of public authority. This is most obvious in the case of the police and other similar organizations such as regulatory and tax collecting agencies whose job it is to impose obligations on citizens rather than provide services. But even public organizations that provide services to their clients such as welfare or public health agencies do so with the benefit of public authority. After all, it was public authority that was used to raise the money to support their operations, and provide the benefits they dispense. To the

extent that special concerns for propriety and fairness attach to any use of public resources, then, these organizations, too, will have some important things in common with police departments.

In any case, my task is first to first describe the important changes that are occurring in policing. The implications for theories of public administration can come later. The method will be to set out the administrative and substantive ideals that have guided police departments in the past. Then, using an analytic framework drawn from an adaptation of the concept of organizational strategy as it is used in the private sector, we will identify the ways in which these ideals have both improved and limited the capacity of police departments to deal with the problems of today's cities. Next, we will set out a quite different idea of what policing could be that is now developing in the field, and is being guided by quite different principles and ideals. Finally, we will reflect on what these ideas and trends imply for the traditional theory of public administration, and the institutional arrangements designed to hold public bureaucracies accountable that flows from that traditional theory.

II. The Classic Theory of Police Administration

For the last two generations, police administration has been guided by a well developed, coherent concept that defined the important substantive ends, core programmatic means, and key administrative arrangements to be used in managing police organizations. The concept is so powerful that it has produced a remarkable degree of homegeneity in the way that municipal police departments are managed despite the fact that over 17,000 independent departments now exist across the country. (BJS)

A. Professional Law Enforcement

In this conception, the fundamental purpose of municipal police departments is to enforce the law, and to do so in a professional way. What professional meant in this context was both "using the best available technical practices" and "in accord with the laws of the society". Of course, there was some ambiguity about what particular laws were to be enforced.

At the time municipal police departments were created, there were a great many laws on the books. (Monkonnen) Some were the traditional common law prohibitions against murder, rape, robbery and burglary. But others were municipal ordinances prohibiting "offenses

against public order" such as swearing, spitting, and littering.

Initially, municipal police departments accepted the responsibility for enforcing all these laws. Gradually, however, the police narrowed their focus to the enforcement of the most important criminal laws. (Monkonnen) They did so for three different reasons.

First, it seemed in the interest of economy to give the highest priority to the most serious common crimes. The pressures on police forces to provide adequate security to urban residents grew rapidly throughout the fifties and sixties. Resources did not keep pace. Something had to give. The natural response was to de-emphasize the public order offenses to conserve resources to deal with crimes that caused serious victimization.

Second, enforcement efforts targeted on "public order offenses" had always enjoyed less legitimacy and public support than enforcement against the common law street crimes. Many had doubted the wisdom of using criminal laws and scarce criminal justice resources to regulate minor disorder, and "crimes without victims". (Packer; Schur) These doubts were exacerbated by the fact that to enforce these laws, the police often had to act pro-actively. (Skolnick) This left room for police biases to be

expressed. And police statistics showed that it was the poor, and the ethnic minorities who bore the brunt of such enforcement efforts. (Black) It was also in the enforcement of public morality laws that much corruption occurred. (Kornblum) Thus, in reducing their emphasis on disorder offenses, the police could not only save resources, but could avoid a great deal of unwanted criticism.

Third, the development of the FBI's Unified Crime Reports had the unintended consequence of encouraging these trends to concentrate attention on common law crimes. The UCR required local police departments to record and report levels of reported crime in categories that cut across the diverse criminal codes of the different states, and defined different kinds of crime in a consistent way. The aim of the system was to facilitate the aggregation of these individual reports into an overall picture of the crime problem confronting the nation. (_____)

In that system, six crimes were singled out as "Part I Offenses": murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, car theft, and arson. All the other offenses (including many "public order" offenses) were relegated to the status of "Part II Offenses".

Eventually, the UCR began to be used as a yardstick for measuring the performance of police departments as well

as a device for representing a national picture of the crime problem. In particular, changes in levels of Part I offenses began to be routinely used to evaluate the performance of police departments. Inevitably, that focused the attention of police managers and police officers on the common law crimes.

In addition to the laws regulating the conduct of citizens, as the municipal police function developed, a body of law developed that sought to regulate the conduct of the police as well as the citizens. This body of law emerged from interpretations by the Supreme Court of what constitutional protections against unwarranted search and seizure, or cruel and unusual punishment actually meant in the operational context of policing. (_____)

The police were ordered, for example, to abandon coercive methods for gaining confessions, to obtain warrents for conducting certain kinds of searches, and to warn defendants of their constitutional rights when arrested. (_____) And, when the courts became dissatisfied with police compliance with the laws regulating the police searches, they decided to make illegally obtained evidence inadmissable in court to reduce the incentive for the police to conduct illegal searches. (_____) More recently still, citizens have made increasing use of civil laws to hold police officers liable for the violations of their civil

liberties when they overstep constitutional limits regulating their use of authority. (_____)

Predictably, this body of law has never been as enthusiastically embraced by the police as the laws that regulate the conduct of others. Yet, it stands as a body of law that, both in principle and in practice, law enforcement agencies are duty bound to enforce. And there exist agencies inside and outside police departments that bring these laws to bear on individual officers. (_____)

The point of these observations is that while police organizations like to describe themselves as "law enforcement organizations", the particular laws they are committed to enforcing are not all laws, but a fairly narrow set -- those that prohibit the common-law crimes. The laws that regulate conduct in public locations have been de-emphasized as less important and more problematic to enforce. The laws regulating police conduct have never been whole-heartedly embraced by the police as laws deserving enforcement. They have, instead, been viewed as constraints that "handcuffed" police efforts to accomplish their real mission; namely, enforcing the criminal law. Thus, the goal of the police was not, strictly speaking, law enforcement, but using the criminal law to control crime and punish offenders.

B. Principal Operational Activities

To accomplish this central goal, the police developed and relied on three primary operational tactics: patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation of crimes.

From the very beginning, police in Anglo-Saxon countries relied extensively on patrol as a key operational tactic. (Radzinowicz) The basic idea was that if the police could field a generalized force on the lookout for crimes, then offenders would be deterred from committing crimes, crimes in progress would be thwarted, and criminal offenders would be caught quickly and brought to justice.

In the early days, this key function was performed by constables, night watchmen, and foot patrol officers. With the advent of the motorized vehicles, however, the enthusiasm for patrol advanced several notches. Police theorists like Orlando Wilson hoped that the mobility of the police in cars would create a sense of "omnipresence" that would dramatically improve the deterrent value of patrol operations. (O.W. Wilson) Thus, the modern police began patrolling city streets in automobiles and motorcycles searching for crimes being committed in the public spaces visible to them.

Much of this patrol was "random". The claimed virtues of randomness included the idea that by being unpredictable in their patterns, the police would magnify their deterrent impact. Randomness also ensured a kind of equity, or at least the absence of a bias, in the allocation of patrol efforts. Everyone would have an equal chance to have a patrol car pass by.

Gradually, however, the notion of randomness gave way to an interest in "directed patrol." At the most general level, this interest was reflected in the development of "hazard" systems that recorded when and where crimes occurred, or calls from service were originated, and these were used to define the geographic sectors the police needed to patrol intensively, and to shape the schedules that determined when the police would work.

In more particular directed patrol efforts, however, the police would gain an even more focused effort. Officers would be concentrated in very small areas where crimes seemed particularly likely to occur based on past experience. (Pate) Most commonly, the directed patrols were "directed" towards particular times and places where crimes seemed likely to occur. Occasionally, however, the patrols were directed at individuals who were thought to be particularly likely to commit offenses. (Moore, et.al.)

Rapid response emerged from the development of motorized patrol on the one hand, and the development of dense, modern communication systems on the other. Once citizens could be linked to the police headquarters through telephones, and police headquarters could commuicated with individual officers through two way radios, what had originally been developed as nothing more than a mobile police patrol suddenly became a powerful capacity to respond very quickly to citizens' calls for service. The apotheosis of this set of developments has been the development of city wide 911 systems, and the installation of Computer Aided Dispatch systems. Together, these technological developments have created a world in which it is possible for a police car to arrive at virtually any location in any city in less than five minutes after receiving the call.

This capability, like the patrol capability, was thought to be particularly valuable in deterring criminal offenders, thwarting crimes, and allowing the police to identify and apprehend offenders. (Crime Commission Report) Indeed, precisely because it tied the police to individual citizens who called, it extended their potential reach from public locations that could be seen by them from their cars, to private spaces that were being monitored by ordinary citizens. No wonder heavy investments were made in developing this rapid response capability. It seemed sure to be effective in controlling crime and producing arrests.

Retrospective investigation of crimes, like patrol, had long been part of the basic operational repertoire of the police. The idea was that, once a crime had been committed, it was important to identify the offender, and to develop evidence to support the prosecution. The basic tools of criminal investigation had always included such things as interviewing victims and witnesses to help identify the offender, and examining physical evidence associated with the crime. Important developments in fingerprint identification, and the development of more extensive information systems that identified offenders and their favorite methods of operation gradually developed to support criminal investigation.

Indeed, to a great degree, it was the detectives and the prospects for ever more sophisticated methods of solving crime, that came to be the focus of policing's aspirations for a technical kind of professionalism. There were some important technical features of patrol, including the development of sophisticated communication equipment, and the emerging interest in "traffic management" that brought analytic methods to bear on preventing traffic accidents. But it was in criminal investigation that most of the technical, professional aspirations of the police lay. It was there that science could best be applied to making arrests and bringing offenders to justice.

C. Administrative Mechanisms of Control

The organizational structures and administrative systems established to support these operational tactics had several important and distinctive characteristics.

First, from the outset, the police were organized in highly centralized, paramilitary structures with a well defined and highly visible chain of command. Police officers were distributed across formally defined ranks. Those in higher rank were authorized to direct the activities of those at lower ranks. Uniforms displayed the rank of the officers so that everyone would know who could give an order and who had to obey.

The paramilitary form may have been adopted for policing for no deeper reason than that it was available to copy. But it also seemed to be consistent some important functions the police had to perform. (Radzinowicz)

Although most police work is undertaken by relatively small units operating independently, sometimes the police do have to form up into larger units to accomplish their goals. This was particularly important in the early days of policing when they were called upon to handle large scale disturbances. It remains important today

not only to deal with large scale disorder, but also to achieve effective co-ordination of other complex tasks such as the management of high speed pursuits, or the response to civil emergencies such as floods and earthquakes. This needed capacity is facilitated by the paramilitary form.

The paramilitary form also seemed desireable because it seemed to ensure effective control over the conduct of officers, and through that device, guarentee a consistent response to individual cases. By fixing accountability, and providing for intensive, close supervision, the prospects for discipline and fairness were enhanced. The aim was to reduce individual discretion by making everyone in the organization nothing more than an expression of the will of the person at the top of the organization. And the will of that person was expressed in the organization's general orders, policies and procedures.

A second key feature of the structures used to manage police departments was that they eventually favored functional rather than geographic sub-divisions. In the early days of policing, police departments were often organized on a geographical basis, with the different functions (such as patrol and investigation) subordinated to geographically defined units. Because local precinct commanders often had all the police functions reporting to them, they became the functional equivalent of police chiefs

for their local areas. This, in turn, fostered close relationships with locally based political machines, economic elites, and gangsters who did not have to go to any place other than the local captain to get what they needed from the police. That, in turn, fostered uneven law enforcement and corruption. (Fogelson)

To break the power of the local political machines and ensure a more uniform enforcement of the laws across the city, police departments throughout the country gradually shifted to functional rather than geographic organizations. Now, municipal police departments are typically divided into a patrol force, a detective unit, and an administrative support unit. (PERF) The patrol force is usually divided into geographic areas, but both the detective and administrative units retain a city-wide jurisdiction.

The result of these changes is that local groups can no longer get their hands on all the police resources operating in their areas. If they want the police force as a whole to help them out, they must speak to the chief rather than just to the precinct commander. The chief, in turn, can resist their demands by talking to them about the overall policies and needs of the city as a whole.

It is also worth noting that the functional organization aligns with the professional aspirations of the

police. The reason is that the functional specialties recognize, and allow the development of, specialized technical expertise. Thus, for example, both the detective units and the administrative units house many specialist units that require special training and qualifications to join. This also helps to create career tracks inside police departments that allow aspiring officers to move out of uniformed patrol, and enjoy the greater discretion and prestige that go with the department's more specialized units.

Third, because police departments are centralized and hierarchical and obsessed with maintaining control over the activities of the officers, there is an enormous amount of paperwork that must be done to document and account for the organization's activities. Every time the police respond to an incident, a report is filled out. Every time an arrest is made, or evidence seized, reports must be filed. Every time an officer fires or even unholsters his gun, reports must be made out. This extensive demand for paper is judged to be necessary for at least three reasons: 1) to maintain effective internal discipline; 2) to support the processing of cases in the rest of the criminal justice system; and 3) to make police operations transparent to the outside world that holds them strictly accountable for their activities.

Fourth, over the last several decades, there has been a sustained effort to raise the eligibility standards for police recruits, and to increase the amount of training that law enforcement officers received before they hit the streets. In the early days of policing, the police were recruited from the ranks of the uneducated, and the less industrious. Indeed, it was reported that over a third of the London police force was dismissed for drunkenness or sleeping on the job in the first few years of its operation. (Radzinowicz) More recently, as recognition of the importance and complexity of the police job has increased, and as the technical requirements of the job have grown, the police have sought to set the standards for recruitment much higher, and to provide more training. (PERF)

Now, all departments require that applicants have a high school diploma, and a clean arrest record. Many require some college education. (_____) Similarly, most departments now provide a minimum of nine weeks of training before going on to the street. (PERF) The training focuses on understanding the law, and mastering some of the technical arts of policing such as handling a radio, driving fast, and learning when and how to use one's service revolver.

D. Values Maximized or Honored by This Conception

Reflection on the way that the police have defined their mission, developed their core technologies, and administered their organizations suggests the key values that have guided the development of police departments, and some important tensions among these key values.

It is surprising to many to see to what extent the police have been shaped by the concern for embodying legal virtues such as economizing on the use of the criminal law, preserving vast domains of privacy, and assuring both consistency and fairness in the enforcement of the laws. This is perhaps most evident in modern policing's reliance on patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation.

What is remarkable about these particular operational tactics is how superficial and reactive they are. Patrol skims over the surface of social life, regulating only public spaces. The police probe more deeply into social affairs only when circumstances or citizens invite them in, and warrant their scrutiny. It is only when citizens call, or only when a crime has been discovered, that the police really intervene and look closely into individuals and their activities. Because these tactics are superficial and reactive, vast spaces of private life are shielded from public scrutiny.

The concern for the protection of legal values is also evident in the extensive efforts that are made to ensure precision and consistency in the police department's response to individual circumstances. That is what fuels the interest in written policies, in hierarchies and close supervision, and in training. Respect for the value of fairness and equity is also evident in the development of city-wide 911 systems and the use of "hazard formulas" to allocate police resources across a city. All this helps a police department to reasonably claim that it is equally available to all, and that it polices a city equitably as well as effectively.

Of course, many of these features could also be justified in terms of their contribution to economy and effectiveness as well as fairness. Arguably, it is economical as well as protective of privacy to wait until a crime occurs before responding to it; otherwise one would waste a great deal of effort on situations that would not become criminal offenses. Arguably, hierarchies are efficient because they ensure that everyone in the department uses the best available knowledge for dealing with problems as well as capable of producing a disciplined response. Arguably, allocating patrol forces to places where trouble occurs is effective as well as consistent with the principle of allocating to need rather than wealth or status.

Yet, I think any fair reading of the development of policing would have to recognize that police departments have been powerfully shaped by the demand for propriety and fairness as well as for economy and effectiveness in the accomplishment of their mission. In effect, even though the police often talk as though their only important objective was achieving crime control objective, and chafe against legal restrictions, it seems pretty clear that they are also designed and operated to produce common legal virtues as well as important substantive results. The police are a legal as well as an instrumental enterprise.

A sharper and less easily resolved tension in the organization and operation of police departments concerns the status of individual police officers. Indeed, the administrative organization of the police department contains an important paradox. On one hand, the administrative arrangements reflect a very determined effort to blot out the initiative and discretion of individual patrol officers -- to turn them into neutral functionaries who administer the law in a technically sophisticated but completely neutral and unbiased way. On the other hand, there is an emerging trend towards recognizing the independent, professional stature of officers. That is apparent in the efforts to raise eligibility standards, to insist on more education, and to recognize different kinds

of expertise in the functional organization of the departments.

I think it is fair to say that, in the past, police administrative arrangements have blunted the professional aspirations of the police. That has been the effect of the mechanisms of control that have been so widely utilized. That is also evident in the limited progress the police have made in increasing their entry standards and educational efforts despite several generations of work. The simple fact is that to many both inside and outside the profession, policing remains -- in both its organizational form and its recruiting patterns -- a blue collar rather than a white collar job.

Yet, both common sense and research are gradually revealing what has long been true: namely, that there is much about the actual practice of policing that requires a high degree of professionalism. The tasks they encounter are technically complex. The decisions they make are critical to the lives of citizens who are involved. And, despite the strenuous effort to keep them under close supervision, the reality is that they do most of their work unsupervised. Indeed, that is particularly true when it comes to their most consequential decisions -- to pursue or not, arrest or not, shoot or not. In these respects, then, we all depend on the professionalism of the individual officers.

It is also clear that the officers aspire to professionalism. For a generation, they have sought to increase the professional standing of policing. They have done so partly by working hard to increase the technical content of the jobs, and partly by increasing the educational standards for admission to the job.

Yet, the thing that seems most important in the administrative organization of the departments is how firmly they are set against recognizing the professional status of police officers -- particularly patrol officers. The entire aim of the administrative structure is to reduce the discretion and initiative of individual officers -- to turn them into the reliable but essentially passive instrument of the law as it has been encoded into departmental regulations. They are to become neutral clerks rather than skilled workers.

Whether the balance in attitudes towards police officers should continue to be struck in the future the way that it has in the past is one of the key questions facing today's police managers. What has clearly been true in the past, however, is that police managers, acting with the encouragement of the broader society, have tended to view police officers as having more potential to cause trouble than to make significant contributions on their own.

III. A Different Way of Thinking: Strategy and Public Value

Recently, a different way of thinking about the police has emerged. (Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy; Moore and Stephens) This conception is guided less by the principles of law, and more by concepts designed to help managers position their organizations in particular environments to maximize their value to local communities. (Moore, forthcoming) These new ideas about policing are based on both a general theory of public sector management, and a particular application to the field of policing.

A. Organizational Strategy in the Public Sector

The general theory of public sector management adapts the concept of corporate strategy as it has been developed in the private sector literature to the special environment of the public sector. (Andrews; Porter) The simple idea is that the management of a public enterprise should be guided by an overall strategic idea, and that in order for a particular strategic idea to be useful and valuable, it must meet three conditions symbolized by the triangle presented as Figure 1. (Moore)

First, the strategy must define a mission, or a set of goals and objectives, that are plausibly valuable to the public. In essence, there must be a plausible story that explains why it would be worth it for the society as a whole to launch or maintain the enterprise. It cannot simply be a claim that some people will benefit without some additional explanation of why those people are particularly deserving. It may that the organization exists to solve a problem that society as a whole perceives to be pressing and important. Or it could exist to erase some kind of inequity. Or it could exist to exploit an opportunity. The only point is that there must be something that citizens of a society could reasonably value.

Second, the goals and objectives that define the mission of the organization (and therefore the value that the enterprise seeks to produce) must be able to command legitimacy and support from citizens and their representatives who oversee and direct the operations of the enterprise. This includes the political executives who are elected to guide the executive branches of government, the elected representatives who serve in the legislature, and the many others who influence both these groups such as the media, interest groups, and professional associations of various kinds. It also includes the clients and customers of the organization. In effect, the articulated goals of the enterprise must not only meet a <u>theoretical</u> test of

public value, they must also meet a practical, political test of their value.

Third, in order for a given strategy to be useful and valuable, the enterprise must have (or be able to develop) the operational capabilities needed to achieve the desired goals and objectives. Note that this does not imply that all the capacity needed to produce the result must exist within the boundaries of the organization that is charged with implementing the strategy. That would be rare in the public sector, for the success of most public enterprises depends on many individuals and organizations outside the boundaries of a given organization contributing to the overall objective. Children cannot be taught if parents don't help; rivers can't be cleaned if companies don't participate in cleaning up; and the streets can't be made safe if communities don't help defend themselves. So, the operational capabilities that are required for an enterprise to be successful often depend on capabilities beyond the particular public organization that is being managed.

At some level, this concept of an organizational strategy is a fairly trivial idea. All it says is that in order to be valuable, public enterprises must pursue valuable purposes, that are widely supported, and can be achieved. What could be more obvious? Several things make this simple idea important despite is obviousness, however.

The first is that it focuses managers' attention on the problem of making sure that all these different conditions are, in fact, met. This is important because it is tempting for managers to think that their problems are solved if they have lined up one or two of these bases. If only they have the right objective, they will succeed, because the rightness of their cause will ensure their success. Or, if there is broad political support for a goal, they are safe because the technical means for accomplishing the goal will surely come to hand.

The stern reality, however, is that one must have all three of these ducks lined up, or the enterprise will fail. To see that that is true, all one must do is imagine what happens when one is missing one of the key elements of the strategy. If one has an attractive goal, and political support for it, one can still fail if it is impossible to achieve the goal. Similarly, if one has an attractive goal and the capacity to achieve it, but no one wants the goal anymore, then the enterprise will also fail.

Most public managers will testify to the fact that it is very difficult to get these three things lined up. It is even harder to keep them lined up for a long enough time to have a chance of succeeding. So, what makes the idea less than trivial is that it forces a hard-nosed evaluation

of particular circumstances, and establishes a remarkably rigorous test that disciplines managerial aspirations.

Second, this simple strategic idea reminds us that ideas about what would be worth doing can come from several different places. In the traditional theory of public administration, it is assumed that public enterprises would operate with well defined legislative mandates. The laws creating the enterprises would define the specific public purposes to be achieved, and provide the authority and money to do the job. In such a world, the only remaining task for the manager is to deploy the resources provided in the most efficient and effective ways. In effect, two parts of the strategic triangle (gaining legitimacy and support, and defining purposes) can be safely ignored as already resolved, or someone else's business. The manager's attention can be focused <u>downward</u> on the operational management of the enterprise, rather than <u>upward</u> to the political environment that authorizes the organization to continue, or <u>outward</u> to visions of the value that could be created, or the opportunities that could be exploited.

If one takes the notion of strategy in the public sector seriously, however, one must recognize that ideas about what would be worth doing could be initiated by managers, and could come from many different places. For example, it could be that the organization's encounters with

its task environment would reveal an unexpected problem that needed to be dealt with, or an unexpected limitation in the methods they were authorized to use, or an opportunity that could be exploited. The manager might well be in a position to nominate those ideas for new action to those who authorize his enterprise. Or, it could be that parts of the organization's political environment might become alarmed that the organization was sacrificing some value that it thought important in the organization's operations, and might insist that the organization adapt its operations. The manager could become pro-active in responding to this emergent problem.

Perhaps the most interesting case, however, would be one in which the manager of a public sector enterprise noticed that the organization had developed a capacity that was valuable in a use other than that for which it was originally intended, and that it would be a relatively easy thing for the organization to be adapted to this new and potentially valuable use. Thus, for example, a library might turn out to be valuable in caring for latch key children, or a drug abuse treatment program helpful in controlling crime, or the United States Marine Corps useful in training delinquent youth to be accountable and responsible. In such a case, the manager might propose this new use of the organization to his (or her) political overseers.

This last one is particularly interesting because it is much closer to the way that private managers think than the way that public managers do. Because public managers have "mandates" that define their purposes and provide them with resources, they naturally think in terms of deploying the resources entrusted to them as efficiently and effectively as possible. In this conception, there is little room for work outside the boundaries of one's mission. Indeed, it would be a waste and a distraction. In effect, public sector managers are constrained as to ends, and accountable for finding efficient means.

Private sector managers, on the other hand, tend to think differently. They are free to pursue any enterprise that seems valuable to them. Consequently, they often begin by looking at the capabilities of their organizations, and then ask what could be produced that would be valuable with the given capabilities. That would be like a librarian looking at his (or her) enterprise as something like an indoor park that could as easily be used for recreation and conversation as the storage of books, or a marine commandant thinking of a boot camp not just as a place where marines were trained, but where young men were taught valuable skills and a sense of responsibility and team work. In effect, private sector managers are constrained as to means, and free to define their ends.

There are other interesting features of the idea of strategy in the public sector, but it is enough for now to have introduced these four: that managers in the public sector should try to manage their organizations by thinking about an overall strategy; that the strategy should define a mission or purpose that is publicly valuable, politically sustainable, and operationally doable; that these three conditions must all be met in a concrete circumstance in order for the strategy to be useful and valuable; and that one can begin thinking about what is worth doing from any one of the three perspectives.

Interestingly, one can use this strategic conception to analyze both the strengths and limitations of the conception that has guided policing in the past, and to sketch the outlines of an emerging strategy of policing that may well have more promise for the future of today's cities than that old strategy.

B. Limitations of the Traditional Strategy of Policing

The traditional conception of policing has been an enormously powerful and successful strategic concept. It has earned the police widespread public support. (_____) And, it has carried policing from ridicule, incompetence,

and corruption to an image (and to a considerable degree the reality) of discipline and professionalism. Yet, some cracks are now appearing in this formidable pillar of police administration.

First, it is no longer clear that this strategy can succeed in eliminating police misconduct and corruption. The recent beatings in Los Angeles and Detroit testify to the limited success of the current administrative tools for preventing the police misuse of force. (Christopher Commission) The re-emergence of corruption in the New York City Police Department, despite the existence in the department of some of the most aggressive administrative efforts to minimize bribery, suggests the limitations of the traditional methods of controlling corruption. (New York Times) Thus, to the extent that an important promise of the traditional strategy of policing was to minimize official misconduct, the strategy now seems to have been less than fully successful

Second, the strategy seems to have done less to control crime and still fears than was initially hoped. Levels of violent crime have continued to increase over the decades in which this strategy was being adopted and implemented across the United States. (BJS) Fear seems to have increased even more sharply. (BJS)

Of course, the police have explanations for this. Some point to the failures of the other pieces of the criminal justice system on whom the police depend for success. In this account, the police are doing fine in arresting people; it is the timid prosecutors, weak-kneed judges, and crowded prisons that drain the potential crime control power from the contributions that the police make. (____) Others account for increases in crime and fear as the result of much deeper social problems to which the police make little contribution. In this view, it is poverty, or racism, or the collapse of families, or the degradation of traditional moral values that have caused the increased crime and resulting fear. (_____)

These accounts may very well be true, and to the extent they are, it is unreasonable to blame the police for the increases in crime and fear. But by the same token, if it is these other factors that play such an important role in determining levels of crime and fear, it follows that the police should never have claimed a capacity to control crime and fear in the first place. To the extent that the traditional strategy of policing rested its popularity on the claim that the police alone could be successful in reducing crime and fear, it was founded on a dubious claim. It would have been better to say that the police would be effective in arresting offenders and bringing them to justic.

Third, and much closer to home, has been the gradual accumulation of evidence indicating that the core programs on which the police were relying to achieve even these more limited goals were less effective than initially hoped. The first blow came when experiments revealed that motorized patrol was essentially ineffective in reducing crime or reassuring citizens -- at least when varied within imaginable ranges. When patrols in an area were doubled or halved, neither criminals nor citizens could seem to tell the difference. (Kelling, et. al.) Crimes remained at the same level. So did citizens fears. Studies of directed patrol operations -- some directed at locations, others at people -- produced the same results: minimal or no effects on crime or levels of fear. (Pate et. al.)

Even more shattering were studies undermining confidence in the value of the carefully developed rapid response capacity. It had always seemed certain that getting to calls for service more quickly would improve the performance of the police. It was simply assumed (not at all unreasonably) that fast response would allow the police to thwart crimes in progress, catch offenders, and help establish a sense of ominipresence that would both deter offenders and reassure citizens. What the studies of rapid response revealed, however, was first the sad results. This capacity, too, seemed to be ineffective in reducing crime,

increasing apprehensions or reassuring citizens. (Spelman) Then, the studies revealed the reasons why.

The overall response time was composed of several different components including the interval between the time when the crime occurred, as well as the interval between when the crime was reported and the police arrived on the scene. (Spelman) The studies showed that the police had become very successful in arriving at the scene of the crime soon after they received the call. But they also showed that the crucial time interval was not the one between getting the call and arriving on the scene, but instead the one between the crime occurring and the call coming in.

It seemed that many crimes occurred out of the sight of witnesses. Even when they were within the sight of witnesses, the witnesses often did not recognize that a crime was occurring until after the fact, or were otherwise reluctant to call. The victims of the crime were too busy being victimized to call. Indeed, their first call often went to a friend or relative with whom they could share their pain rather than to the police. The net result was that the police rushed to crime scenes not to thwart the crime or apprehend the offender, but to hold the hand of the victim. That may also be important, but it was a different result than the police intended.

The final blow came with a series of studies focusing on the investigative function of the police. What these studies indicated was that the police could solve crimes when witnesses and victims told them who committed the offense. (Greenwood, et. al.) Otherwise, while there was some chance that a crime would be solved, it was remote. The sophisticated forensic methods proved more valuable in nailing a case down for purposes of prosecution than actually identifying the offenders.

These accumulating studies have been taken by some to indicate that the core police programs for controlling crime were completely ineffective. A more accurate view, however, would be that these strategies were effective, and that their degree of success depended on the amount of trust and co-operation the police received from citizens. The police knew this, of course. Even in the nineteen-fifties they were mounting campaigns that urged citizens to "support your local police".

But the police were probably not aware of just how dependent they were on the citizens for their operational success. Nor did they focus their attention on how to ensure that that operational support would be available to them when they needed it. They simply assumed that citizens were interested in assuring justice and crime control, and that they would turn to the police to help them accomplish

that result. This assumption proved partly right in some segments of the community, but importantly wrong in general, and particularly wrong in minority areas of the city where the support was critically needed.

The failure of the police to focus enough attention on measures to increase their contact with and support from individual citizens in their communities produced a fourth major limitation of the traditional strategy of policing: it has gradually become clear that the traditional strategy of policing cannot hold the public policing's "market share" in the wider "security industry". One of the reasons that the police long felt comfortable with the traditional strategy of policing was that they thought they had no competition. They knew that there would always have to be a public police department. The general enthusiasm for controlling crime would ensure that the public police would survive and flourish, and blunt any effective criticism of their efforts. As experts in the field, they could decide what that department should do.

What this complacent view ignored, however, was that the public police did, in fact, face competition. They did not face it in the field of public policing where they were clearly monopolists. But they did face it in the broader market for security. In that broader market, citizens could buy private security as well as public. They could join

together financially to buy private guard services. They could band together operationally and begin to patrol their own communities. They could purchase locks, guns, and dogs to help keep them and their property safe. And they could stay at home to avoid being victimized. Gradually, these private responses to crime grew at the expense of the public responses. Indeed, there are now more than twice as many private security guards as public police officers in the country. (Hallcrest)

Of course, there is much of value in these private responses to crime. Insofar as they are successful in reducing fears and risks of victimization, they contribute to overall social objectives.

Yet, there is also something worrisome about this trend, and not just for the bureaucratic interests of the public police. To the extent that security is privately rather than publicly provided, it will go to those who are most able to pay, or most able to produce it rather than to those who are most in need. To the extent that security is privately rather than publicly provided, the rights of ordinary citizens who wish to travel freely through a city, or have their rights protected even when they are accused of crimes my be circumscribed.

In any case, the fact that private security was growing relative to public policing gave a clear indication that something was wrong with the traditional strategy of policing. The public police continued to be popular as an abstract entity, but when the time came to shell out money for security, citizens were increasingly turning to private suppliers.

C. Community Policing as an Alternative Strategy

These increasingly evident limitations in the traditional strategy of policing have caused some pioneering police executives to begin searching for an alternative paradigm of policing. That search is by no means complete. It is being guided, however, by several important new ideas.

1. Service Quality and Community Relations

The first axiom is that the quality of the relationship that the police enjoy with the community is of paramount importance. It is important to both the legitimacy of the police, and their operational effectiveness. If they are not closely linked to the community, it is impossible for them to do their job

It follows, as a corollary, that the police should make a concerted effort to enhance the quality of the

services they supply to support that relationship. A good relationship with the community is not something that the police either do or do not have as a matter of fate; it is something they can influence. And, given its importance, it is best not to rely only on a good PR office, or a Community Relations Division. The task of earning a strong, supportive link to the community must be built into the day to day operations of the department so that it is available for use.

This axiom has been translated into several important concrete changes in the way that the police are organized and seek to operate.

First, the police have tried to re-establish and strengthen local, geographic accountability. They have re-defined precinct and sector boundaries to coincide with naturally occurring communities; established mini-police stations and storefronts to give them a physical presence in local communities; decentralized initiative and accountability to precinct commanders and to beat cops; gathered detailed information about local areas and compiled them in "beat books" to link day shift operations with the night shift; and re-configured their dispatching systems to give higher priority to maintaining a car in a given geographic area than to minimizing city wide response times so that there will be continuity in who responds to calls

for service. Some departments have even begun returning specialized functions that were once centralized to local patrol commanders for use as they see fit. All this helps to change the focus of policing from a city wide perspective, to a local one; to build detailed knowledge of local communities; and to foster a sense of reponsibility for and accountability to the local areas.

Second, the police have sought to rely increasingly on methods of policing that got the police out of their cars and into closer, more sustained contact with individual residents. In the old paradigm of policing, it was assumed that high quality police service consisted of a quick response to a call for service. This idea survives in the minds of many citizens, overseers, and police executives. Yet, there is an important paradox associated with the aim of producing a rapid response to calls that is perfectly symbolized by a common usage that developed in policing.

What one observes when one patrols with a police officer is that when the officer arrives at the location to which he (or she) has been dispatched, the officer radios the dispatcher and announces that he (or she) is now going "out of service". After meeting with the citizen, and dealing with whatever problem the citizen presents, the officer gets back in the car, radios the dispatcher, and announces that he (or she) is now back "in service". In

effect, this usage declares that the time spent with the citizen is not service, while the time spent in the car waiting for the next call is service.

This is more than a semantic point. If the challenge to the police is to make rapid responses to calls for service, and always have some cars available for emergency calls, then the task of the police is to be ready rather than to supply the service to the citizen. The goal is always to minimize the amount of time one spends with citizens so that one can get back in service to be available to rush to the next call, which can then be cut short to get ready for the next one, and so on. Moreover, to ensure that city wide response times are minimized, the dispatching system tends to use the entire patrol force as a resource, and that results in cars being dispatched across the city, far from their originally assigned territories. And that reduces the knowledge and interest that the officers have in responding to any particular call for service. Thus, by focusing on the speed of the response as the only important attribute of service quality, the police lose other aspects of quality such as the sense among citizens that their problems were taken seriously, or the prospect that the officer who arrived at the scene was someone who was known and trusted by the citizen.

The value of some of these other attributes of service quality have now been demonstrated. Experiments with foot patrol, for example, have shown that citizens greatly value familiar, daily, face to face contacts with officers. (Kelling, et. al.) Unlike motorized patrol, they can tell when levels of foot patrol have been increased or decreased. And foot patrol turns out to be effective in reducing fears. It also turns out to be a more satisfying experience for officers. (Trojanowicz)

The reason seems to be that on foot patrol, the officers have an entirely different experience of the communities they patrol. When they spent their days responding to calls for service, they saw the community at its worst. They only went to places where people were dangerous or pathetic. Once they spent their days walking, they learned that there were responsible and resourceful people in the community. As one hardened patrol officer who made this change explained: "When I did rapid response policing, I thought everyone in the world was an ___hole. Now, I just think most people are." And then he laughed.

Obviously, foot patrol is not feasible in many parts of the country, or in all parts of cities. But the enduring and important lesson of the foot patrol experiments was less that foot patrol was a good idea than that some devices that promoted frequent, continuing, face to face encounters

between officers and citizens were extremely valuable, and that anything that could be done to promote these would pay dividends in terms of the quality of police community relations. This insight has justified not only foot patrol and "park and walk" programs, but also the creation of decentralized police stations modelled on the Japanes Kobans; increased use of surveys, conducted by officers to make contact with citizens; and the use of motorcycles, scooters, and bikes to help officers get from place to place without cutting off their close contact with citizens the way that cars seem to do.

Third, the focus on building strong community relations through improved service quality has led to a re-consideration of how the huge volume of calls for service coming into the police should be handled. One of the consequences of linking police officers to citizens through the 911 systems has been to stimulate a huge increase in the overall volume of calls coming to the police. Many of these calls concern situations that are neither crime related nor particularly urgent. The reason that the police get these calls, of course, is that they are the only governmental agency that is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and can be reached by a phone call. Apparently, the police are valuable to citizens for many purposes other than responding to crimes.

In the old paradigm of policing, the non-urgent, non-crime calls were viewed as a serious problem; a useless claim on police resources that distracted them from their central purposes and reduced their overall effectiveness in controlling crime. The goal was to get rid of these calls as quickly as possible.

The eagerness to reduce the burden of these calls without permanently alienating the citizens spawned some important experiments in "call management" and "differential police response". (_____) Through these experiments, the police, like many service providers in the private sector, learned some important ways of managing citizens' expectations. They learned that they could prioritize their calls; that not every call had to receive the same class of service. They also learned that citizens would accept slower service if they were told what the time frame would be, and those estimates were accurate. And, they learned that citizens would often be satisfied with nothing more than a conversation on the phone with a police representative. While these experiments were originally initiated as a defensive move to protect the police from being swamped by calls for service, it soon became apparent that the methods could be use pro-actively to free up patrol time for other activities.

The new paradigm of policing would approve of these experiments in call management as a way of both improving the service that citizens experience from the police, and increasing the amount of patrol time that would be available for being present in the community. But the new paradigm goes further than call management in re-interpreting the potential value of "nuisance calls". Indeed, instead of viewing the non-crime calls as nuisance calls, the new paradigm views them as an important opportunity to produce value for citizens.

One idea is that these calls should be viewed as the material that can be used to strengthen relations with the community, which should, in turn, increase police effectiveness in controlling crime. In effect, if the police take the non-crime calls seriously, they can build a relationship that makes their response to the crime calls far more effective. Far from being a distraction from crime-fighting, these calls become a help to it because the relationship to the community is now viewed as a crime-fighting asset.

Alternatively, the police can view the non-urgent, non-crime calls as a potential opportunity for crime prevention. Included in many of these calls are situations that could easily escalate into emergency crime calls. A complaint about arguing next door could soon become an

aggravated assault, or a homicide. A complaint about noisy youth could become vandalism or a gang fight. A report of a minor traffic accident can become an assault if the citizens involved in the incident are forced to wait a long time for a response. Thus, good responses to minor incidents might actually prevent crime.

Finally, the police could view the response to non-crime calls as something that is valuable to do even if they make little contribution to their crime-fighting mission. The idea is that it is valuable to respond to citizens' concerns if one has the capacity to do so. In this view, it is not a waste to do something valuable for citizens that is outside one's central mission, as long as mission performance is not badly compromised.

2. Problem-Solving

A second key axiom guiding the development of the new paradigm of policing is that the police should think less in terms of responding to incidents, and more in terms of responding to the underlying problems that seem to be causing the incidents to occur. (Goldstein) This is not the same thing as suggesting that the police should pay more attention to the "root causes" of crime, or that they should become "social workers". It is, instead, a recognition that the police are called back frequently to the same situation

over and over again. Indeed, research has now shown that the a very small number of addresses and locations, dubbed "hot spots", account for a very large proportion of all the calls for service. (Sherman; Pierce) The challenge before the police then, is not to respond mindlessly to these calls for service, but to learn more about what is causing the problem, and what could be done to deal more effectively with the problem. A few examples are useful to give the flavor of this important operational shift.

> In New South Wales, a patrol officer noticed that she was being dispatched to a particular location every Friday night at 11:00 PM in response to calls from a community of elderly people that they were being frightened by bands of marauding teenagers. Mostly, by the time she got there, the area seemed quiet and secure, but the calls kept coming in at the predictable time. Instead of continuing to respond to the calls, she decided to go to the area on Friday night before the calls came in to see what was occurring.
>
> Sure enough, at 11:00, large numbers of teenagers suddenly appeared on the streets. She got out of the car and asked some of the teenagers what was going on. The teenager explained that there was a roller skating rink nearby, and that the owner

routinely provided a bus to a group of teenagers from another part of the city to bring them to the rink for the evening. The rink closed at 11:00 and the teenagers were walking home. The shortest route passed through the elderly neighborhood.

The obvious solution was for the officer to persuade the owner of the skating rink to provide a bus home as well as to the rink. The calls stopped.

In Baltimore Country, Maryland, the police were summoned several times to deal with fights that broke out at a bus stop. A little investigation revealed that the bus stop was being used by both a predominantly white private school, and a predominantly black public school. The fights that occurred were nasty, inter-racial dispustes, fueled by school rivalries as well as racial prejudice.

The police dealt with the problem first simply by separating the bus stops so that the groups would not come into close contact. Then, because that seemed to leave the racial attitudes unaddressed, the police joined with the schools in teaching a program of racial tolerance, linked to the particular problems at the bus stop. Eventually,

the bus stops were put close together again, but the fighting stopped.

These may seem like trivial events, but, in the context of police work, they are potentially revolutionary. What makes them so important is that, in some deep way, the idea of problem-solving changes the basic unit of work in a police department. (Sparrow) In the old paradigm of policing, the basic unit of work was the "incident". The important question was whether a crime had been committed, and if so, who was the probable offender. The job of the police was to make this determination accurately, and to identify and arrest the offender. If no crime had been committed, the police lost interest.

In the new paradigm of policing, the police are encouraged to look through the incident to see what lies behind it. (Goldstein) It is less crucial that the incident be a crime; it is only important that the incident be important to the community. The crucial analytic work that goes into determining the police response is not simply whether a crime has been committed, but what seems to be causing the problem. The response that the police can make is wider than simply making an arrest, it runs to resolving dispute, or mobilizing other agencies like the skating rink and the schools to take steps to help the police deal with the problem.

Of course, activities like those described above as "problem solving" have always gone on in police departments. Indeed, if one presents these examples to experienced police officers, they are astonished to discover that this is new. It turns out that they have long been "speaking prose". What is interesting, however, is that if one then asks them whether they engage in such activities with the official sanction and encouragement of the department's administrative systems, their answer is no. All such activity, that they understand and recognize as good police work, must go on covertly. It exists despite rather than because of the administrative systems of the department. (Sparrow, Moore, Kennedy) In this respect, as an official enterprise, problem solving is new to modern policing.

How to recognize and support problem-solving activities in the administrative systems of police departments is no trivial problem. The simple way to do it, of course, is to divide the police department into a unit that does community problem-solving, and one that does rapid response policing. (_____) That has the virtue of ensuring that at least some of the police will engage in pro-active community problem. It has the liability, however, of creating a potentially divisive conflict in the organization over the question of which kind of policing is the real policing, and whose job is the better job.

Moreover, even if one manages problem solving in this way, one still faces the problem of how to guide, account for, and control the activities of the the problem-solving units. One solution is simply to establish some formal system for identifying particular problems that are to be worked on, the reasons that problem was judged to be important, the particular activities that went into solving the problem, and the ultimate impact of those efforts. In effect, "problems" would be treated in the same way that "cases" are treated in detective bureaus. Each problem would have a file, and efforts and progress in dealing with that problem would be recorded. Quality in identifying and solving problems could be assured through supervisory or peer review of the efforts that were made.

Some important unresolved issues remain, however. For one thing, problems come in many different sizes. Some require lots of resources, lots of elapsed time, and make heavy claims on specialized resources or the assistance of higher level commanders in contacting other organizations. Other problems are much smaller. How to accommodate this variability, and how to have the right distribution of sized problems is an important question.

Another issue concerns what qualifies a problem to be taken seriously. To a degree, of course, problems can be

identified through the examination of information available to the police from their operations. Calls for service can be analyzed. So can levels of reported crime. And the officers will have their own views of what are problems based on their experience with the local communities. But it might also be important to create mechanisms by which individuals or small groups within the community can nominate problems for the officers attention. Making this possible is consistent with the goal of promoting community relations as well as with problem-solving. And because the idea of problem-solving is open-ended, it is possible for the police to accommodate the many different kinds of problems that communities can and do nominate -- ranging from street level drug dealing to abandoned cars. (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy) Ideally, the community's views about what were important problems would be taken into consideration.

A third issue concerns how the success of problem-solving efforts may properly be evaluated. This is partly a technical problem of defining indicators that should be measured and monitored to determine impact. But it is also a conceptual problem in that some problems never get solved, they just get improved. (Colgan, personal communication) And others get solved by being moved to a different location (often with some corresponding reduction in its level or intensity).

By far the most difficult issue, however, is how to widen problem-solving activities beyond the boundaries of a special unit. The reasons for doing this are several. First, one might wish to avoid the divisiveness that inevitably attends the creation of special units. Second, it might seem important to extend the reach and scope of problem solving beyond what could be done by a special unit. Third, one could judge that the synergy that is possible when the problem-solving efforts of the police are informed by experience with the calls for service from the same geographic area is important to develop and exploit. Whatever the reason, when one seeks to make problem-solving part of the dominant culture and operational style of a police organization, one faces a severe management challenge.

One part of the problem is figuring out how to create both the time and psychological room to get off the treadmill of responding to 911 calls. These aspects of the problem can be managed partly by the development and use of call management systems and partly by gaining additional resources for the department. Both create additional time for problem solving.

The experience of police departments, however, is that it is not enough simply to create the time for this

work. What is also needed is some way of administratively recognizing and accounting for the organization wide problem solving efforts. The techniques developed for managing this work can, of course, be extended to the wider organization. But in order for these techniques to be effective, ordinary patrol officers must have a way of nominating problems that they would like to solve to the attention of their managers, and gaining permission to be more or less temporarily relieved of some or all of their rapid response responsibilities to work on these problems. The officers also need a great deal of training and information support to do this job well, and that is difficult to get when one is not part of a special unit.

Probably the greatest difficulty, however, comes from the radical change in the overall conception of how the organization works, and where the locus of initiative and creativity should be. Under the old paradigm of policing, police organizations were structured as "production line" organizations. The notion was that they were producing a standardized product. True, there were many different products associated with the heterogeneous tasks the police had to perform. But for each product, there was a standardized way of producing it. That way was written down in the organization's extensive rules. The rules had been developed by the Chief, typically supported by a staff or some kind of task force, that sought to exploit the

technical knowledge and experience of the police, and to integrate that with the demands and expectations of those who superintended police operations. The result was clear guidance to officers to do their work in as routine and standard a way as possible.

In the new paradigm of policing, in contrast, police organizations may be come to be seen more as "job shops". The expectation is that they face quite heterogeneous problems and situations that might well required customized responses. The units of work will vary in size and in novelty. A reasonable amount of creative engineering might be required to deal adequately with each problem as it arises. The inevitable result of this is that some of the brains and initiative of the organization must shift from the top of the organization to operational levels, and from staff operations to the line managers and patrol operations. The organization must be made flexible enough to allow it to form up in different sized teams to deal with the different sized problems, and encouraged to take the initiative in nominating problems and proposing solutions. This usually means organizations that are much flatter and less hierarchical than the traditional model of policing.

3. Commissioning the Officers

Indeed, it is these requirements that lead to the third axiom that is now guiding police managers: if the police are going to be successful in giving high quality service to their clients, and to participate in creative problem-solving efforts initiated by the operational officers, it is crucial that police organizations recognize and value officer discretion, prepare them to exercise it well, and hold them accountable for their performance after the fact rather than to try to repress it altogether. In short, police officers must be developed as true professionals, and be controlled through the methods that are used to control professionals rather than continue to be treated as blue collar workers, and controlled through traditional supervisory techniques.

This point can be best illustrated, perhaps, by drawing an analogy to the concept of a commissioned officer in the military. John Keegan, a noted military historian, observed that the distinction between commissioned officers and enlisted men is a very old one, but has been continuously maintained in European Armies among others. (Keegan) Throughout this period, there has been another important continuity in how enlisted men and commissioned officers were armed. When the fighting was done without firearms, the enlisted men were armed with long bows, cross

bows and pikes; the commissioned officers had swords and daggers. When firearms appeared on the scene, the enlisted men were armed with rifles, machine guns and bazookas; the officers were equipped with pistols. In each case, the enlisted men had weapons that could reach the enemy and the commissioned officers didn't. This raises the important question of what the officers weapons were for. The answer that Keegan gives is that the officers weapons were designed to help them reach their own men! The fundamental job of the commissioned officer was to make sure that the enlisted men stood and fought rather than ran.

That is an interesting answer, but it leads to still another question: what caused the officers to stand and fight? Part of the answer may be that that it was easier to stand and fight when the enlisted men were between the officers and the enemy. But the more appealing answer was that this was what the commission was for. Commissioned officers could be counted on to do the right thing because they completely identified with the highest values of the society, and would fight for honor rather than fear. Enlisted men, on the other hand, without the same stake in the society, the same sense of honor, or the same training, could not be relied on in the same way. They had to be coerced to do the right thing by the commissioned officer's weapon.

What makes this story interesting in the context of today's policing is that it poses rather sharply the question of who is effectively commissioned in modern police departments. One answer is only the chief. He is the only one who can be trusted, and therefore the only one who is really accountable for the performance of the organization. It is his (or her) vision, skills, and virtue (honed by tradition) that are located in the organization's policies and procedures. And because they have all been thought out, the only task for the officers is to be obedient to those rules. That is essentially the answer that the traditional paradigm of policing gives, and it gives it for the same reason that we have long made the distinction between commissioned officers and enlisted men: there are only certain people who by virtue of their natural virtue and talent can be trusted, and it is up to them to prescribe how others should behave.

A quite different answer is that all police officers are commissioned by the public. When they put on a badge and take up their gun and night stick, they are expected to act as officers of the society and its laws. They are trusted to do the right thing not only because they have the proper technical skills and character, but also because their values and commitments are sound and appropriate. In short, they are professionals.

It is worth noting that what justifies commissioning someone as an officer is not simply their technical skills. Those are important and necessary features of becoming a doctor, a lawyer, or a commissioned warrior. But they are not the only things that the society expects of commissioned officers and professionals who are authorized to act on behalf of others. Such people must also commit themselves to values, and to using their talents to advance important social values.

This is one of the important ways in which the drive for enhancing the professional stature of policing has gone astray. Professional advances can never be made solely by enhancing the technical skills of the profession, though that is often an important part of professional advancement. They also depend on the development and inculcation of proper values. And it is here that the police have worked less assiduously than they might. By continuing to base their legitimacy and standing on their technical effectiveness in fighting crime, and by signalling their resistance to some of society's important values by standing against many laws that seek to regulate their conduct, they have raised suspicions in the minds of the society about whether they can be trusted (i.e. commissioned) to use their substantial powers without someone who could be trusted, such as a judge, a prosecutor, or a superior officer looking over their shoulder.

This is also one of the important reasons that those who are now experimenting with new strategies of policing are trying to manage through the articulation of important values to which officers should make commitments rather than through the detailed development of rules. This is also the reason that they are experimenting increasingly with peer reviews of their own work after the work has been done as a method of training and evaluation rather than trying to avoid any mistakes by insisting that the officers get before the fact approval of any action they should take. Such measures are not only consistent with the professional aspirations of the police, they are also consistent with the operational realities of policing where it remains true that most of the time, and for the most important decisions, the officers work alone without close supervision.

E. Managing the Transition

These axioms point fairly clearly towards a new strategic vision of policing. In that vision:

> The goals of the police have been widened to include crime prevention, order maintenance, fear reduction, and satisfactory responses to social emergencies of various kinds was well as to control crime and regulate traffic.

The legitimacy of the police would be based not only on their ability to enforce the law fairly and equitably, and to effectively control crime, but also on the responsiveness of their operations to the large and small concerns of the communities they police, expressed to the police not only through telephone lines, but also through face to face contacts, and meetings with community groups.

The operational capacities they would need would include the wide repertoire of activities that go under the rubric of problem-solving as well as the ability to patrol, respond rapidly to calls for service and conduct investigations. The mobilization of community groups and other government agencies might become as important to police operations as making high quality arrests.

To support such operational capacities, police organizations will probably have to get flatter and more decentralized than they now are. Officers might advance by adding to their cumulative body of specialist knowledge rather than rising through a rank structure.

What is much less clear is what police executives should do to manage the transition from the old strategy to the new one. Managing the transition is different than managing the new strategy of policing in a steady state because it involves unsettling current expectations and practices. Both demolition and new investment are required as well as on-going maintenance and supervision. Moreover, much of the new investment requires invention since it hasn't been done before. So, starting down the path of experimentation lit only by the axioms and the dim vision of the future can be a harrowing experience. As one police executive described the experience: "I felt like I was jumping off a cliff." In managing this transition, five things seem key.

1. Authorizing through Consulting and Selling

First, in periods of transition, it is important that police executives pay more than the usual amount of attention to the task of legitimating and authorizing their efforts and their vision of policing. This is important because they need the room to experiment and innovate, and because they could also use expressions of outside support or the pressure from outside demands to help them move things forward in the department. If the mandate for change seems shakey, things will be much more difficult to accomplish internally than if the mandate seemed solid. (Moore)

The way to maintain the support for the changes is essentially to keep talking about the need for the changes, and to keep checking in with their overseers to learn what their concerns are and how they might be satisfied. In effect, they must make themselves more accountable and available to the overseers than in ordinary times, and they must make their organization's operations even more transparent. There is no less painful way to maintain support.

Of course, none of this guarentees unanimous, firm support for the changes. It only maximizes whatever potential exists in the setting in which the police executive is managing. And the wise executive will adjust the pace of change to the tolerances of his local authorizing environment. To the extent that the overseers are resistant, the pace of experimentation should be slower. To the extent they are supportive, more can be done.

But even in this case, one must keep in mind that the support will not sustain itself over the long period of experimentation, and through the inevitable mistakes and difficulties that will occur during implementation without continuing attention. The initial enthusiasm must be fed a steady diet of information and explanations. Anecdotes that reveal the power of the new idea and the progress that is

being made in turning the department around must be supplied. So must concrete evidence of improved organization wide performance on measured against traditional or new standards. It may be particularly important to lay out a strategic plan that identifies key investments that must be made, and records progress in making those investments as well as in operating effectively against the traditional or new goals and objectives.

2. Negotiating Terms of Accountability

Second, and closely related to the points made above, is that to be successful, police executives making this transition must they negotiate the terms in which they will be held accountable. To some extent, this flows naturally from the on-going conversations with the department's overseers. Through this device, one learns how those who oversee the department want to look at the department, and what they hope to see expressed in its operations. That will usually be a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence about performance, some traditional and some non-traditional standards, and some aggregate measures recording city-wide performance and some more particular measures about performance in particular circumstances or particular projects.

Ideally, in negotiating the terms in which they will be held accountable, police executives can gradually change the perceptions of what is important about policing, and substitute new measures for old. Thus, for example, they could change some of the traditional measures of policing by reporting response times for only the priority one calls, and develop another statistic that records how often a call was answered by a car assigned to the district from which the call came.

They could also begin reporting on the success of their pro-active problem solving. At first, this might take the form of nothing more than interesting stories and anecdotes, complete with congratulatory letters from local citizens groups. Later, as the systems for performing this activity, documenting it, and evaluating it matured, more aggregate reports could be developed that indicated the amount of time that was now being committed to problem-solving, the kinds of problems that were being solved, and the levels of success that were being produced.

They could also begin relying on surveys of citizens to measure some important results of policing and levels of satisfaction with police performance. Surveys of the general population could reveal levels of victimization in the community, how afraid people were, what self-defense activities they relied upon, and what their experience and

perception of the police had been. Such efforts are quite expensive, particularly if one wants to capture small changes over time across small areas of the city. But they might well be worth it, particularly when one realizes how little is spent on the measurement of performance in the public sector. Less expensive surveys would be those focused on the clients of the organization -- those who call for service, or initiate a problem solving initiative. Some police officers have even suggested that citizens who are ticketed for traffic offenses or arrested for crimes be surveyed. As one tough, experienced police manager observed:

> "Some cops, no matter who they arrest, the guy comes in bloody and mad. Other cops, no matter who they arrest, the guy's clean and reasonably calm. I think that matters to the quality of policing."

3. Organizational Wide Training and Development

Third, throughout the transition, there will be a great deal of pressure on training, and large investments will have to be made in the development of training materials, and the conduct of training sessions to prepare the officers to assume and discharge their new responsibilities. Yet, the way that training will be done during the transition is quite unconventional. Indeed,

there is something a little misleading about viewing the task of preparing the organization to assume its new responsibilities as a "training" issue.

One way in which the idea of training is misleading is that the challenge facing police executives during the transition is not simply to describe the changes, and to give officers the technical skills to carry them out, it is also to justify and sell the changes to the organization. There is a need for internal marketing of the ideas as well as external marketing. People need to be told of the reasons for making the changes, and allowed to express their concerns and misgivings as well as simply trained to do the new jobs. The obvious need to win the consent and support of the officers for the new style of policing is suppressed in favor of the more acceptable idea that people need to be trained due to the authoritarian traditions of the department. In these traditions, police executives are not supposed to have to win the consent of their officers; it is assumed that they can command that on pain of serious penalties for insubordination if the officers don't agree.

In such settings, it is hard for officers to say they disagree with the new direction of the police department even though they do so. It is much easier for them to say that they don't understand what is wanted, or that they need additional training to be able to perform the

new tasks. But make no mistake. What they are really saying is that they are not sure that the new direction is the right one to pursue, and they want reassurance and reminding and the opportunity to discuss the question of whether the department within which they plan to make their professional career is headed upwards or downwards. Thus, part of the need for "training" is for the same kind of continuing justification that the overseers of the organization also demand. Indeed, it helps in selling internally if the troops can also see what is being said about the program externally, and why people on the outside seem excited by the ideas.

A second way in which the idea of training is somewhat misleading is that it pre-supposes that the technologies and methods to be used in the new style of policing are already well developed, and can be easily codified in curriculum materials focused on the development of skills. The reality is that while there are many interesting ideas, and lots of interesting examples to study, the methods of the new style of policing have not yet been developed fully enough to be presented as textbook material. Indeed, they may never be so codified. Medicine and law has never been easily codified in textbooks. Why should we expect something as complex as policing to more amenable?

The hazards associated with pressing for a pre-mature effort to "codify" the new techniques of policing are essentially three. The first is that it will seem like (and actually be) a fraud from the perspective of the officers who are exposed to the learning. Material that is presented authoritatively by instructors will simply be unclear and unconvincing because it has not yet been fully developed. That will undermine rather than strengthen the credibility of the whole effort.

The second hazard is that the field as a whole might lose some of the energy and creativity that would come from the officers' participation in the development of their own craft knowledge. It might well be exciting to at least some officers to know that they were participating in the development of a new style of policing that had not yet been fully worked out.

The third is that the pre-mature codification of the methods might actually stop further development and experimentation. Of course, none of this should be taken as an excuse to avoid being as clear as one can be about what is now known, and to continue efforts to package that knowledge in efficient training materials. The only point is that it would be a mistake not to recognize that the field is still learning while doing.

The last way in which the concept of training might be slightly misleading as a way of thinking about how the organization as a whole can be equipped for the change in strategy and tactics is that it tends to make people think that most of the training will happen in classrooms and be guided by instructors. If this were true, the pace of change in a police department will be very slow indeed, for there is only so much time that departments can commit to relatively long term classroom based training.

The way that most of the training will actually happen in an organization that is moving fast in the transition will be through much shorter, more informal methods rooted in field operations rather than in formal training sessions. The speeches by the commissioner; the discussions at roll call; occasional short courses on problem-solving techniques; the accounts that are given in the department's newspapers of particular activities that are undertaken; the work between sergeants and patrol officers; will be the important loci of "training".

At the outset, then, the task of the trainig staff might not be to develop training materials on their own from academic sources, but instead to build the training materials from the experience of their own organizations, and to find ways to insinuate that material into the on-going conversation about how to police that goes on all the

time in many different parts of the organizations. To the extent that they do offer formal training programs, they should probably be short courses. That is consistent with what is known, and also what can be provided widely across the department.

So, while it is true that "training" is important, the form that training will take will be quite different than its traditional form. It will focus on justification and philosophy as well as technique to help officers understand the need for change. It will be much more interactive and developmental than traditional images of training. And it will happen in the field in short but frequent bursts rather than in classrooms in long sessions. In short, it will be learning <u>while</u> doing rather than learning <u>before</u> doing.

4. Adapting Key Administrative and Technical Systems

Fourth, in managing the transition to the new strategy of policing, police executives will have to adapt some of the important administrative and technical systems that now guide the organization's work. The first question that must be tackled is how the organization will be structured to support the new strategy of policing.

Initially, most will probably get started in community and problem-solving policing by creating some kind of special unit, or experimental area. This move produces a predictable set of problems. Specifically, it creates jealousy and animosity among other units of the department that are not singled out for special attention, and feel threatened by the new ideas. And it creates the possibility that the new style of policing will never spread beyond the special unit, because those who become expert will long to keep the special unit together, and those outside will be determined to avoid the influence of the new poison.

Yet, despite these problems, there seems to be no other easy for the new style of policing to get started in the organization. Unless a special place is created where this style of policing is the norm, the requirments of rapid response and the traditions of the department tend to kill it. As a result, no one develops any knowledge about how to do it, or any commitment to doing it. Thus, the issue become how to minimize the problems created by creating the special units.

One way to avoid the problem that the special units will create jealousy and suspicion among other units is for the executive to make it clear to the organization that anyone who wants to is authorized to experiment with the new style of policing. The special unit has been created to

ensure that at least some experimentation goes on in this domain. But that does not mean that nobody else can participate. If any other unit would like to do community policing, that would be great. All they have to do is announce their intention to do so. That converts the liability associated with designating a special unit into an asset. Suddenly, the other units of the organization are encouraged to compete with the specially created unit to see who can do the new style of policing better. It is not at all clear that the specially created unit will become the best.

The challenge of spreading the new style of policing from the special unit in which it first appears might be partially or entirely solved by authorizing everyone in the organization to initiate experiments. If, however, the rest of the organization hangs back, then the executive should think of the special unit as a valuable place where people knowledgeable about and committed to the new style of policing are produced. The unit should be managed to produce many such people. And, once they have had the appropriate experience, they should be seeded into strategic places in the organization. The last place they should remain is in the special unit, for while they are there, they are taking up a valuable training place, and are failing to spread the valuable knowledge that they have. The people from that unit should be developed as advocates,

trainers, and missionaries to foreign lands as well as skilled operations people in the new unit.

In addition to worrying about the structure of the organization, one must focus attention on some of the organization's technical systems. Key here is the operation of the dispatching system -- both the human piece that takes the calls from citizens, and the automated piece that helps dispatchers dispatch patrol cars. There is a great deal to be said about this subject. Suffice it here to say that the organization will almost certainly have to work on its system for prioritizing calls for service; develop and implement call management systems that set citizens expectations appropriately, and reduce the need for sending cars; and develop dispatching systems that give precedence to answering calls for service with local cars, and that have the capacity to recall officers from lower priority calls to emergency calls so that they do not always have to sitting still in their cars waiting for emergencies to happen, but can still respond when an emergency response is required.

As noted above in the discussion of commissioning the officers, the organizations will probably also have to change their human resource management systems. Mid-level managers will have to shift from being supervisors whose job it is to insist on compliance with rules, to coaches whose

job is to help officers produce quality in the work that they do. Opportunities for advancement in the organization will have to be created outside the rank structure, and outside the specialty units. It should be possible for particularly skilled officers on the beat, who have aquired long experience and a wide variety of technical skills, to be paid as much as supervisors now are, without losing their skills and commitment to street work.

5. Dealing with Resistence

Fifth, police executives will need to focus on and dissolve internal resistence to the changes they are trying to make. Much of this will appear internally. But the internal resistence will eventually be expressed externally. The internal people will find external allies among unions, or reporters, or politicians looking for an issue.

One likely source of such opposition will be the detective units. In the traditional paradigm of policing, the detectives were the elite units. They were the ones who performed the important function of arresting the bad guys, and developing the case for prosecution. They were the ones whose technical skills seemed the most developed. They were the ones that enjoyed higher pay and greater autonomy. And they were the ones who were most committed to the cause of "locking up bad guys". As long as that remained the most

important function of the police, they were the most important parts of the police.

The new paradigm of policing makes much more of patrol units than was made of them in the past. In the new paradigm, they are seen as important, value creating units with important jobs to perform. They are encouraged to develop the technical skills and the initiative that characterized the detectives. They are allowed to work with less supervision, and on more flexible schedules. And, as the goal of policing shifts to crime prevention, fear reduction, and problem-solving, they become central to the mission of the department.

This shift in relative status commonly provokes resistence among detectives. Moreover, they are often well positioned to make their resistence felt externally as well as internally. Because much of the traditional reporting about police has focused on important cases, the detectives often have a wide range of contacts among reporters. Because they have worked closely with prosecutors and judges, they also have contact with these elements of the criminal justice system. And because they remain in charge of an important purpose and function of the police -- namely identifying and successfully prosecuting criminals -- they are in a position to frighten citizens about deteriorating conditions in the department. If they begin talking about a

deterioration in the morale and competence of the detectives, and a corresponding decline in the organization's ability to solve crimes and prosecute offenders, and if they can attribute that to the change to community policing, a powerful coalition against the change can arise.

To a degree, this resistence can be managed by maintaining the support for executing the change in policing in the external political environment through the means described above. If there is widespread external support for the changes, the internal resistences will find it harder to find powerful external allies. Deprived of external support, they might find it prudent to accommodate the demands for change. But there may also be some important ways of including the detectives in the important changes that are occurring. They might be hailed as the people whose initiative and analytical intelligence have created the model for the style of policing that is now being inserted into patrol operations. Alternatively, they might be reassured that the important changes will affect only the patrol units, and that their work will be left undisturbed.

A similar thing can happen among patrol units if they do not see an opportunity for themselves in the new style of policing. And that can easily happen, for, at the

outset, patrol officers are quite reasonably suspicious of the new style of policing. Meeting the citizens seems like a harder job than waiting in the patrol car for the phone to ring. Taking care of peoples' pain and despair is harder than determininig whether a crime has been committed. The evidence so far is that most officers like the new style of policing once they have been exposed to it. They like the broader scope for their initiative, and the sense of satisfaction that comes from being able to stay with a task long enough to make a difference. They also like the contact with the healthy elements of the community that they did not have in their old jobs. But, again, there is the problem of making the transition.

Managing relations with police unions will be an important part of managing resistence from patrol officers. In principle, the police unions should be supportive of the changes that are proposed. There is much in these changes that they have long wanted -- more status for patrol officers, more flexible schedules, more satisfying and challenging work, etc. But they will want to be reassured that if there is increased value associated with this style of policing, they will want to share in that in the form of increased pay and status. They will also want some training and protection from liability to satisfy themselves that management is not putting all the risks of experimentation onto them. It is almost certainly appropriate that this

shift to community policing be an explicit part of bargaining with the union.

6. Remaining Risks

This is a lot to accomplish. Even if all this is done, however, it is not clear that the reforms will occur or that they will be successful. The way forward remains uncertain and risky. The only reason to go forward is the conviction that the current strategy is not performing very well, and that there is more value to be wrung out of today's police departments as they confront today's problems. The successful attack on crime, fear, and despair that could begin the process of saving the nation's cities and the lives of those who inhabit them can begin with improved policing.

IV. Implications for Doctrines of Public Management

If these are the problems facing today's police executives, what general lessons for public management could be derived? Upon reflection, five points seem potentially important.

A. Obligations and Services; Customers, Clients and Beneficiaries

First, the case of municipal policing reminds us that not all of government is involved in the delivery of services. Some important parts of government deliver obligations. These include law enforcement organizations, but also regulatory and tax collecting agencies.

In thinking about the management problems facing these organizations, the idea of improving service to customers is only partially relevant. Indeed, the question of who exactly it is who needs to be satisfied, and what it is that should or does satisfy them turns out to be a complex question.

To a degree, one can find the "customers" for these organizations among those who call to complain to such organizations about the misconduct of others. Some of these, such as victims of crime or those whose health is threatened by casually disposed of toxic wastes, are interested in justice for themselves. Others, like witnesses of crimes or those who know of the tax evasions of others, want justice for friends, neighbors or other citizens. And some, of course, who call to complain about noisy neighbors, simply want to use state agencies to harass people they dislike for inappropriate reasons. Presumably,

good service to such customers means taking their complaints seriously, but also trying to distinguish the meritorious and urgent complaints from those that are more dubious or less urgent. That is part of what "call management" is all about.

One can also find "customers" for these organizations among those who call the agencies for help and assistance. Some call the agencies for help because even those organizations that are mostly law enforcement organizations sometimes provide services that are directly valuable to citizens. Thus, police departments sometimes provide emergency transport, or advice about how to strengthen one's home security, or aid in finding a lost child. Environmental regulatory agencies sometimes provide subsidies to support clean up operations.

Others call the agencies for a specific kind of help that becomes relevant only after they have accepted the idea that they have some kind of social obligation: namely, the kind that helps them come into compliance with the obligations of the law. Thus, citizens call the Internal Revenue Service to obtain tax forms, or to get advice about their liability; they call regulatory agencies to learn how they can legally dispose of old oil; and they call the police department to learn about parking rules, parade permits, and gun licenses. Presumably, service to such

customers is valuable because it helps citizens achieve compliance with the law.

There is another group of "customers" for these organizations: namely, the targets of enforcement actions. These individuals resemble customers in that they "transact" with the organization at its "service delivery" end. Yet, they differ from our usual notion of customers because there is no reason to suppose that they wanted what they got as a result of their transaction with the organization. Instead of getting a service, they got an obligation. In the case of the police, they were arrested, or given a traffic ticket. In the case of environmental protection agencies, they were asked to pay the price of the environmental clean-up. In the case of the tax collecting agencies, they were presented with a bill for public services, or a penalty or jail term for previous non-compliance.

Of course, it may be important that the "obligation encounters" with such people be made as pleasant as possible -- partly to economize on the use of state authority, partly to show respect for them as individuals, and partly to induce compliance rather than resistence. And for these reasons, it may be practially and normatively important for enforcement organziations to think of even their targets as "customers" whom the organization should try to please.

But the fact that many of the clients of these organizations receive obligations that they would have preferred not to have also makes it clear, I think, that the overall success of the organization can't be judged by whether these clients are satisfied with their encounter! If there is value created by the activities of such organizations, it must lie in the satisfactions of other people than those who are the principal targets of the organizations.

When one is looking at enforcement organizations, then, it is particularly clear that the important "customers" of the organization (understood as people whose satisfactions estalish the value of the organization's activities) are not necessarily those that transact directly with the organization. They are not necessarily only the people who call to complain, or who call for help, or who become the focus of enforcement efforts. They are also people who might be thought of as remote beneficiaries of the activities of enforcement organizations such as citizens who are afraid of crime, or worry about the environmental threats to their children. And they are also citizens who have an idea about what their collective life should be like: who desire justice in the society's response to crime, or who long to be reassured that others are paying their taxes along with them.

These desires of the remote beneficiaries or the citizens who have aspirations for justice and fairness in the organization and operations of society's institutions hang in the air as claims that can be activated by advocacy groups, news media, or political overseers of public enterprises when it seems that a public enterprise has sacrificed some of these values. Once activated, these become claims on public managers and public organizations that are at least as powerful as the claims that will be made by the individuals that the organizations encounter at their business end. Indeed, it is these general views of how the organizations should behave that determines to a great extent how the interests of complainants, those who need help, and targets of enforcement will be responded to.

In this sense, it is the abstract demands of those far from the organization's operations that are the dominant claims on the organization's activities. And, to the extent that the important idea behind the idea of the customer is that it is the person whose desires need to be satisfied, these abstract desires of the society as a whole, as best they can be discerned, become the most important expression of consumer demand. In short, the customers of these organizations are citizens rather than clients of the organizations.

B. Accountability for Performance and Fairness

This discussion about customers and clients leads directly into the second key observation about public sector management. The example of policing makes it clear that the determination to hold public sector managers accountable to citizens remains strong and vital even in an age that heralds de-regulation and customer service. In effect, the value of the enterprise that public sector managers lead will be reckoned by citizens and their political overseers as well as by the customers or beneficiaries.

The important question becomes what must managers do to establish political support and legitimacy for their enterprises among citizens and their overseers. To some degree, this end may be pursued by improving "customer service". Satisfied customers who call for individual justice or help of various kinds might express their approval for the organization's operations through political channels. But political support and legitimacy remain a somewhat different concept than customer satisfaction, and an important practical and normative concerns of public executives.

Police executives must be able to represent the performance of their organization not only as an organization that meets the particular needs of those who

call. They must also be able to present their organization as one whose aggregate performance is both effective and economical relative to the resources provided. It must be able to show that it has reduced crime, stilled fears, and reduced traffic hazards. It must show this not only because such evidence proves that individual clients of the organization have been satisfied, but because it indicates that the broader aspirations of the remote beneficiaries and citizens and their representatives have been satisfied. In effect, the organization must achieve its aggregate, mandated goals as well as its obligation to satisfy each caller.

In addition, because the police make extensive use of authority, they must be able to show that their operation was proper, and fair, and just as well as effective and efficient. These, too, are aggregate characteristics of the organization's performance. And, while they may indicate that individual callers have been satisfied, and individual obligatees fairly handled, these characteristics are also important because they satisfy, again, the aspirations of citizens and their representatives who want these aggregate qualities to be expressed in the operations of public organizations.

should negotiate the terms of his accountability with his overseers. That means developing plans and having them ratified, and creating a flow of information that makes his organization's operations transparent to the political overseers. That meets both his obligation to be accountable, and to satisfy the aspirations of the remote beneficiaries and citizens whose only desires for and knowledge of the operation of the organization come from the representation of the organization's performance in the media and in the reports that the organizations file.

D. Making Room for Innovation

The case of policing also makes it clear how important and how difficult it is for public managers to find the room to innovate. It is clear that there is a need for police departments to innovate. They need to experiment with their operational programs, with their technological support, and with their administrative systems. It is also probably true that they need to experiment with their overall strategy of policing.

It is also clear, however, that it is very hard for them to find the room to experiment. There is little recognition by those who hold them accountable that such experimentation is important, anf few avenues for them to pursue in making room for the innovations. There is also

relatively little national support or national organization for the undertaking of a series of experiments that might reveal the value of new programs, technologies, administrative means, or new strategies. As a result, the field learns and changes slowly.

The only way the field does learn is through the initiative and risk of a few executives who are willing to innovate despite the odds. They are willing to go through the extensive work required to authorize and sustain and important change process. And they are willing to face the risk of failure even if they accomplish what they set out to do.

If that is what it takes to produce innovation in the society, it is important that managers be equipped with the special skills and determination that allows that to occur. Alternatively, the systems of accountability that control the price one must pay to experiment should be altered.

E. Encouraging Front-Line Workers

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the case of policing makes it clear how dependent public sector enterprises are on the professionalism -- both the skills and the values -- of the organization's front-line workers.

If they can be counted on to do the right thing, performance goes up and administrative costs decline. If they cannot be trusted, the system gets tied up in knots.

This suggests that much more needs to be done to attract, develop, and retain high quality people on the front lines of public organizations. It also suggests that we have to reconsider the devices that are now used to control public sector employees. Probably much greater use of after the fact evaluations of performance, conducted by peers, is called for. Whether that gives enough assurances to overseers that employees will do the right thing remains to be seen. But the test should be how much control the new methods produce compared with what the old methods actually produced -- not what we imagined the old methods produced.

Policing is another frontier on which creative managers are exploring the possibilities of a post-bureaucratic public sector. With any luck, they will produce a new and better vision of policing. They will also inevitably produce interesting lessons about public management for those who look closely at their experience, for there is no organization that feels the tug of the traditional models of public administration and management more strongly than the police do, and for good reason. The methods they invent to escape from these powerful gravitational fields will almost certainly help others who wish to make the journey.