THE BOTTOM LINE OF POLICING

WHAT CITIZENS SHOULD VALUE (AND *MEASURE!*) IN POLICE PERFORMANCE

Mark Moore
with
Anthony Braga

REDUCING
VICTIMIZATION

CATCHING
OFFENDERS

ENSURING SAFETY

REDUCING FEAR

OPERATING
EFFICIENTLY

USING
AUTHORITY
LEGITIMATELY

SATISFYING
CUSTOMERS

The "**BOTTOM LINE**"
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What Citizens Should Value (and Measure!)
in Police Performance

Mark H. Moore
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**POLICE EXECUTIVE
RESEARCH FORUM**

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INTRODUCTION: POLICE DEPARTMENTS AS IMPORTANT (AND ACCOUNTABLE!) GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Police departments are significant, even essential, public agencies. They are important in the practical results they try to achieve, the social relations they seek to secure, the specific actions they take as the means to their desired ends, and in the quantity and character of the assets they deploy as they go about their work.

The Police as the Guarantor of Ordered Liberty

As the organizations that enact the state's "monopoly on the legitimate use of force,"[1] the police are counted on to protect life, liberty, and property from criminal attack. In doing so, they help ensure that life will not be, as Hobbes described it, "nasty, brutish and short" (*The Leviathan*. Part i. Chap. Xviii). But the police aim to do more than keep citizens free from threats of criminal attack; they also seek to protect their political and civil rights, and help commerce proceed in an orderly way. In short, the police are a key part of the state apparatus that helps to "promote domestic tranquility" and "assure justice" (Preamble to the U.S. Constitution).

Because we are so fortunate that the United States has both a well-settled political culture and well-developed professional organizations, it is easy to take the police contribution to the creation of "ordered liberty" for granted. But it doesn't take much experience in a foreign country with less well-developed traditions and less competent and honest police organizations to discover how much is lost from the quality of individual, political, and economic life if the police cannot be relied on to be honest, fair, and effective.

What the Police Produce: The "Outputs" of Police Agency Operations

The police are important not only because they embody the state's efforts to achieve important practical results and assure just relationships among free citizens, but also because they generate a particular set of concrete activities and

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[1] See, e.g., Weber 1994.

services.[2] They patrol the streets, respond to calls for service, investigate crimes, arrest suspected offenders, regulate traffic, respond to citizen requests for assistance, handle crowds and demonstrations, and provide a variety of emergency medical and social services (Goldstein 1977). These concrete activities—often involving specific transactions between police employees and citizens—could be described as the "outputs" of policing. By "outputs," I mean the particular concrete actions the police take right at the boundary of the organization.

Viewed from one perspective, these individual transactions between individual police and individual citizens can be important and valued as *ends in themselves.* Their quality can be directly observed and evaluated. If the police are courteous, resourceful, and skilled in responding to requests for assistance, we can say (as we do about commercial organizations) that the police have succeeded in *satisfying their customers.* Similarly, if the police are successful in apprehending those they suspect of crimes, and in doing so, respect the rights of those accused, then, without knowing anything more about the consequences of police action, we can say that the police have helped society in *producing justice*—the kind of justice that requires individual offenders to be called to account for their crimes, as well as the kind that requires the police to respect individual rights as they go about their business. Thus, simply by looking at the *outputs* of policing, we can say something about the *value* of police operations. We can say that the police have or have not produced "customer satisfaction." And we can say that the police have or have not "produced justice," and done so in more or less just ways.

What the Police Produce: The "Outcomes" of Police Agency Operations

Viewed from another perspective, however, the outputs of policing are valuable not as ends in themselves, but instead as the means to achieving other desired results that occur farther down a chain of causation. To many, it is these results

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[2] The distinction I am making here is between organizations whose value relies primarily in their ability to enforce laws and regulations, and those whose value lies in the production of goods or services. The first might be viewed as legal organizations, the second as producing organizations. With legal institutions, we tend to focus attention on the goal of ensuring fairness and justice. We are not after more material consumption, but rather the just resolution of disputes, and the proper ordering of relationships in society. People are supposed to get what they deserve, and justice is the intended result. We note that such institutions use state power as a key resource, but tend to look past the fact that they also use state money, because we think they should have whatever money is required to ensure the just handling of cases. The logic that guides

that constitute the ultimate justification for policing, and the ultimate basis for evaluating police performance. For example, among the reasons citizens invest in public policing is that we think that police activities and outputs (such as patrolling the streets, responding to calls for service, investigating crimes, regulating traffic, and dealing with social and medical emergencies) are steps along a path toward the production of a set of desired social outcomes. We believe that the police can control crime and reduce criminal victimization by both threatening and actually arresting criminal offenders.[3] We believe that the police may be able to save lives not only by controlling crime, but also by reducing traffic accidents, and/or operating as part of a general emergency response system. We believe that reducing the risk of criminal victimization can enhance the sense of security that citizens feel, increase the usefulness of public spaces to citizens, and even raise individual property values. We believe that if the police act fairly and effectively in investigating crimes and arresting offenders, the overall quality of justice in society might be enhanced. And so on.

The *desired outcomes* of policing differ from the *observed outputs* of a police organization in that *desired outcomes* occur farther down a chain of causation than *organizational outputs.* They are more distant in space and time from the police activities that occur right at the boundary of the organization. *Organizational outputs* are the specific things that the police do; *desired social outcomes* are the valuable results that occur in society as a *consequence* of what the police

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expenditure decisions and activities is the logic of principle, not of utility. When we think about producing organizations, in contrast, we are much more interested in the relationship between expenditures and results. We focus on precisely how they do their work, and search for improved technologies that can improve the relationship between the quantity and quality of results, and the cost of inputs used to produce those results. The ends are evaluated in terms of their impact on social well-being and individuals' satisfaction, not on justice or the structure of relationships that have been reinforced or altered. Of course, once one looks closely at this distinction, it begins to break down. It is quite possible to look at legal organizations as producing organizations. They are interested in producing results, including but not limited to fairness. They use money as well as authority to accomplish their results. In contrast, many producing organizations in the public sector have to be interested in justice and fairness as well as efficiency and effectiveness. Getting comfortable moving across these conceptual and linguistic divides is one of the challenges in beginning to think accurately and usefully about how we should measure police performance.

[3] For a review of the empirical evidence about whether and how the police are successful in controlling crime, see Sherman 1995.

do. (An important implication of that fact is that the police may have more control over *outputs* than they do over *outcomes,* because police organizations control many of the factors that create outputs, while many of the factors that shape outcomes lie outside the boundaries of the organization.)

Outcomes also differ from outputs in that outcomes are often *directly valued* by society as ends in themselves, while outputs are more often conceived of as means to an end. This doesn't mean that outputs aren't valued directly. As noted above, certain characteristics of outputs—for example, the quality of the experience citizens have when they call the police and ask them for service—might be valued intrinsically. But the point is that outcomes are *always* valued as ends in themselves, while outputs are sometimes valued as means to important ends, and sometimes as ends in themselves.

Police Legitimacy as a Means and an End

One particular social result of policing must be viewed simultaneously as an end in itself as well as a means to other desired ends. It must also be viewed as both an output and outcome of police operations. That quality of policing could be described as *police legitimacy*—the standing that the police enjoy in the minds of the citizens and the community that they police.[4] Such a quality could be measured through surveys that ask citizens about their perceptions of the police. Such surveys would allow a community and its leaders (including the leaders of police departments) to gauge whether individual citizens (differentially situated in the society) judge their police department to be fair, honest, or competent, and whether they feel that they can trust the police to deal fairly and justly with an issue that concerns them.

To a degree, police legitimacy can be viewed as a desired ultimate result of police operations. It is not hard to imagine that the specific quality of individual transactions between police and citizens can, across many transactions, strengthen or erode the legitimacy the police as a whole enjoy with the

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[4] There is a second, different definition of legitimacy. In that definition, police legitimacy lies in the degree to which the police conform their operations and activities both to the spirit and the letter of the law that regulates their conduct. We can call this idea of legitimacy "objective legitimacy" to indicate that it relates to how closely the police conform to external, social and legal standards of conduct. We can distinguish this idea from the more "subjective" idea of legitimacy used above that finds legitimacy not in the relation of the behavior of the police to objective standards, but instead in the subjective feelings that citizens have about the police. In an ideal society, of course, the two concepts would be virtually identical. That is, citizens would form their subjective

citizenry as a whole (Moore 1997). If police services are offered courteously and responsively, then those who receive the services will presumably value the police more than they would if the police services were rude and/or ineffective. If the police do their enforcement work in a way that feels fair to the citizens who are the focus of the police operations, those who are witnesses to them, and those in whose name the police act, then the police are likely to enjoy a greater degree of legitimacy than if they are seen as brutal or callously indifferent to the rights of those suspected of crimes (Tyler 1990). In essence, the thousands of individual transactions that the police have with individual citizens can aggregate up to a social perception of the police as a legitimate or illegitimate force. That, in turn, is valuable as an important social result of police operations. All other things being equal, society is better off if the police are viewed as a legitimate and fair instrument of justice than if they are viewed as illegitimate and unfair.

But it is also important to note that however valuable it is for the police to enjoy legitimacy with citizens as an end in itself, police legitimacy is also valuable as a *means* of becoming more effective in controlling crime. The reason is simply that the success of the public police in preventing and controlling crime depends crucially on assistance from individual private citizens. If citizens do not trust police motives or capabilities, they will withhold their support. They will not call when they are victimized, they will not cooperate in investigations, and they will not show up as witnesses in court hearings. That, in turn,

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views of the police based on how closely their conduct corresponded to the objective standards set by the society. And to a great degree, empirical evidence shows that citizens form their views of legitimacy in rough accord with the spirit of the general standards. Citizens want fairness in the sense of like cases being treated alike, and in the sense that the use of force and authority should in some way be proportional to the magnitude and urgency of a given situation. These ideas seem to lie in our shared moral intuitions as well as in our laws. But we must also acknowledge the difference between the objective and subjective views of legitimacy—particularly if we are going to measure the legitimacy of the police. The reason is that the different ideas impose quite different measurement burdens. To determine the subjective legitimacy of the police, we have no choice but to ask citizens. To determine the objective legitimacy of the police, we have no choice but to observe their detailed activities and to compare what we can see to established legal standards. The first requires surveys of citizens. The second requires field observations of police operations. For further discussion, see the forthcoming publication by the Committee on Police Policies and Practices (Skogan and Frydl eds.).

will weaken the overall effectiveness of police operations. As a result, the police have to be interested in the quality of the individual transactions with citizens as both a valuable end and as a valuable means.

In short, the police are important not only because of their general contribution to the state's efforts to achieve justice and tranquility by regulating social relationships, but also because they produce specific outputs and outcomes valued by those citizens who support the police with their tax dollars. Insofar as the police produce certain outputs and outcomes valued directly or as means for achieving valued ends, they can be viewed as "producing" organizations that "create public value," as well as "regulating" or "rule-enforcing" organizations that ensure just and appropriate relationships among citizens (Moore 1995).

The Assets and Resources of the Police: Money and Authority

To produce the valuable results of policing—reduced crime, enhanced security, a certain kind of justice, physical safety, economic progress, and political freedom—the police use resources and assets entrusted to them by the citizens who authorize and support their operations. Police departments are expensive enterprises to create and maintain.

The most obvious cost of the police is the tax dollars used to support their operations. The police chew up public assets as they train intensively to do their jobs; maintain a capacity to respond to calls for service 24 hours a day, seven days a week; meet strict demands for accountability through close supervision; and maintain an expensive infrastructure of cars, communication equipment, and information systems that support their investigative and administrative efforts. The average taxpayer in a metropolitan area pays about $250 annually for police services, and police departments account for about 10 percent of the budgets of local municipalities (U.S. Census Bureau 1999a). This is more than what taxpayers pay to support parks and recreation, ensure public health, or care for the poor and needy, but it is less than they pay to support public education.[5]

A less obvious cost of the police is the claims that they make on individual liberty and privacy. This cost arises because we citizens give the police something more than our money; we give them the right to interfere with our private lives. As the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force (1987) observed,

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[5] Both police and parks are local functions, while health, welfare, and education often have a large component of state funding. To see total state and local expenditures, see U.S. Census Bureau 1999b.

The police are entrusted with important public resources. The most obvious is money: $230 million a year flows through the Philadelphia Police Department. Far more important, the public grants the police another resource—the use of force and authority. These are deployed when a citizen is arrested or handcuffed, when an officer fires his weapon at a citizen, and when an officer claims exclusive use of the streets with his siren.

Just as the money that public police use comes from money that would otherwise be used for private consumption, so the extensive authority that the police use in their work comes from the stock of private liberty that we, as citizens, enjoy as a matter of right. We are as reluctant to part with our liberty as we are to part with our money.

The fact that the police can abuse as well as properly use the power of the state makes police departments important for another reason: We all understand in our bones that the police can do as much harm as good. Badly managed, the police can become as great a threat to life, liberty, and property as the criminals from whom they are meant to protect us.[6]

MEETING CITIZENS' DEMANDS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Because the police are fundamental state institutions, because they produce much that is publicly valuable, because they use valuable public assets, and because they have the capacity to threaten as well as protect social welfare, it is natural for citizens and taxpayers to demand accountability from them. On one hand, citizens have the *right* to demand accountability. After all, it is their money and liberty that is being used by public police departments to make the community safe and just. As a matter of principle, then, police departments owe citizens an accounting of the resources they use to operate, and the results they produce.

On the other hand, citizens and their representatives might also think it *useful* to demand accountability from their police departments. The demand for accountability becomes an important instrument for creating the pressures and incentives that lead to improved overall performance and fewer egregious errors in police operations.

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[6] For a discussion of problems associated with police corruption and brutality, see Geller and Toch 1995; Delattre 1996.

Citizens' demands for accountability are now satisfied through several different mechanisms (Moore 2002). For example, elected representatives review both the policies and procedures of the police, as well as their performance in particular incidents that become notorious. They try to understand whether the police are using "profiles" to guide decisions to stop suspected offenders, and, if so, whether that is an effective or ineffective, good or bad, just or unjust practice (Ramirez, McDevitt, and Farrell 2000). They review the ways in which the department uses overtime, and make judgments about whether it is being misspent or used appropriately to give the police the flexibility they need to do their work. Alternatively, the media publicize notorious incidents, e.g., the failure to solve an important crime, a botched operation that leads to the escape of suspected offenders, a brutal attack on an offender in custody, and so on. Finally, criminal courts prevent illegally gathered evidence from being presented at trial, and civil courts hear complaints when the police have abused the civil rights of citizens (Walker 1992a).

These ways of holding the police accountable, powerful as they are, have an important weakness. They typically focus attention on *single incidents,* or particular *policies and procedures.* They do not seek to summarize (through numbers and statistics that constitute some kind of a "bottom line") the overall performance of the department as a whole. Furthermore, they provide a picture of the department at one point in time, rather than an account of how the organization has been performing over the long run. As such, these anecdotal methods of holding the police accountable do not work particularly well to meet citizen demands for accountability; they give an uncertain picture of the overall performance of the organization as a whole. Nor do they work very well to create appropriate incentives for managers; they encourage managers to avoid dramatic errors rather than to work hard to improve the average, overall performance of the enterprise.

To hold the police *effectively* accountable, then, citizens, taxpayers, and their elected representatives want and need something analogous to the private sector's famed "bottom line." They need some relatively simple and accurate ways of numerically summarizing the accomplishments of the police, and the price they are paying to produce the observed results.

The purpose of this paper is to take a step toward accomplishing this goal. My aim is to identify the appropriate terms in which the police should be held accountable, and to suggest some measures that would allow citizens to do so effectively. In this, I am trying to take both inspiration and technical instruction from how the private sector makes organizations accountable to their shareholders and owners.

Difficulties in Constructing a "Bottom Line" for Policing

While I take both inspiration and technical advice from the ways in which both investors and society as a whole hold private sector firms accountable, I recognize important differences between public and private sector enterprises. These differences, in turn, pose serious difficulties when one seeks to transfer useful managerial concepts from the private sector to the public sector.

The most obvious problem is that it is difficult to capture the "value" produced by a police department in financial terms. We can measure the *financial costs* of policing as easily as any private organization can measure its costs. We can find out how much we are spending on what activities through standard cost accounting systems. The difficulty comes when we try to assign a financial or economic value to the outputs and outcomes of a police department's activities. Exactly how much is it worth in financial terms (either to an individual victim or the society as a whole) to have made efforts to avoid a criminal attack, or to catch the person who did it?[7] We lack this information because individuals do not pay directly for these services as they do in the private sector.

A less obvious, but equally important problem is that it is by no means clear what the valued outputs and outcomes of policing are, or should be. Obviously, we are all interested in preventing and controlling crime, and in deterring and apprehending criminal offenders, and we rely heavily on the police to help us achieve these objectives. But the police do more than accomplish these goals (Goldstein 1977). They reassure us by their presence when we are merely afraid, not actually victimized. They keep public spaces—including roads, parks, shopping districts, and places of public assembly—safe and civilized so that they can be used with confidence. And, as a mobile public agency operating on a 24/7 schedule, they inevitably end up providing a wide variety of emergency medical and social services. The value of these activities is not fully captured by either the crime statistics, or the operational measures that the police use to record their activities (Moore 2002; Alpert and Moore 1993). Yet, in evaluating and managing the police, it is important to decide whether these activities are valuable in themselves, or valuable only insofar as they contribute to the crime control activities of the police, or some combination of the two.

Least obviously, but perhaps most importantly, it is not at all clear who should be considered the "customers" of public police departments—i.e., the

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[7] For efforts to estimate the "costs" of crime and therefore, presumably, the value of preventing crime, see Cohen 1987.

people whose values, preferences, or desires should be seen as the important ones to satisfy in managing a public police department. Is the important "customer" of the police the "client" who calls for service and wants a fast, attentive response? Or, is it the taxpayer who is interested primarily in minimizing taxes, and therefore wants a limited police service? Or, is the "customer" the crime victim who wants the police to catch the offender who attacked him and recover his property? Or, are the "customers" those citizens who are swept up in police investigations and operations—those who are stopped and questioned, the suspects who are interrogated, or those who are arrested for offenses? Presumably, these particular "customers" would have preferred to avoid contact with the police altogether! Or, is the "customer" of policing some disinterested "citizen" who has some general idea of what good and effective policing would be, and just wants the police to behave consistently with this ideal? Obviously, individuals in these different positions (or, more precisely, individuals who are viewing the police from these different vantage points) might want and value quite different aspects of police performance.[8] An important question for those who would measure the value that police create for their communities is which of these different stakeholders' preferences should be honored as the important arbiters of value in judging the overall performance of the police.

In a monograph that is a companion to this paper, I work my way through the questions of who should be considered the important "customers" of the police (Moore 2002). In that paper, I conclude that the most important "customer" of the police, whose values ought to be reflected in police operations, is a particular notion of a "citizen"—a member of society who decides what kind of policing would be valuable to his or her community without considering what particular position he or she will occupy in the society: a victim or an offender or a taxpayer.

In that monograph, I also work my way through a discussion of the many important kinds of contributions that public police agencies can, should, and do make to their communities. An important conclusion is that, while controlling crime is the single most important core function of the police, there are many other dimensions of performance that are valued and should be measured. Those readers who want to understand the basis of the ideas I offer in this paper about how best to measure the performance of the police should refer to that monograph (Moore 2002).

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[8] For a more extended discussion of these issues, see Moore 1995.

In this paper, I take up the difficult task of outlining a set of measures that could be constructed to monitor police performance on seven different dimensions that seem important. In some cases, the measures can be constructed from information that is already available, but not widely analyzed or reported. In other cases, the measures require efforts to collect new information as well as report and analyze old information. I offer these ideas to help communities, municipal leaders, and police chiefs decide whether and how they can move to improve the measurement of police performance, and in doing so, increase the accountability of the police, the legitimacy they enjoy with the population, and their own performance over time.

I begin with a brief review of how we might best understand the mission and valuable purposes of the public police, and how that might be translated not into a single "bottom line" for policing, but instead into a "public value scorecard" that includes multiple measures of police performance. I outline seven dimensions of police performance I think ought to be measured as the important dimensions of value in public policing. I then explore the possible ways of measuring these seven dimensions of performance. I conclude with a summary of the kinds of investments that police departments could make in their measurement systems, offer my views about the most valuable of those investments, and outline a plan for incrementally improving police performance measurement.

DEFINING THE MISSION AND
PUBLICLY VALUABLE DIMENSIONS OF POLICING

To many people, particularly those impatient with academic quibbles, the mission of the police is simple and straightforward: it is to reduce crime. Period. Full stop. To talk about any other valued purpose of the police, or to focus attention on the costs required to achieve this objective, is to distract the police from their central mission, and their ability to achieve it.

Defining the Mission of the Police:
Strategic Planning in Public and Private Sectors

For most citizens and their elected representatives, there is no doubt that reducing crime is the single most important purpose of the police. In business parlance, controlling crime is job number one. Yet, in my view, to measure the value of the police only in this single dimension is to make a serious mistake.

The most important mistake is to fail to recognize that we have a strong interest in the *costs* that the police impose on us in pursuit of this mission, as

well as the *benefits* we gain from their success. As noted above, the police use up valuable resources in the pursuit of this mission. The resources include money that could otherwise be used for private consumption or for other public purposes such as schools, public health, fire protection, or economic development. All things being equal, we would like the police to focus on keeping costs low, or at least staying within budget, as well as reducing crime and catching offenders.

But the police use public resources beyond money to achieve their results. They use the authority and force of the state—the right of the state to interfere with our individual liberty. Again, all things being equal, we would like the police to focus carefully on just how they use our freedom, as well as how they use our money. Just as it would be wrong to think that private sector firms should maximize revenues without paying any attention to costs, it would be a mistake to monitor the crime control effectiveness of the police without also paying attention to the costs of achieving that result.

A second mistake is to fail to recognize that the purposes of the police—the contributions that they can, should, and do make to the quality of our individual and collective lives—go beyond their ability to control crime. Herman Goldstein (1977:35), for example, defined eight important functions of the public police:

1. To prevent and control conduct widely recognized as threatening to life and property (serious crime).
2. To aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm, such as the victim of a criminal attack.
3. To protect constitutional guarantees, such as the right of free speech and assembly.
4. To facilitate the movement of people and vehicles.
5. To assist those who cannot care for themselves: the intoxicated, the addicted, the mentally ill, the physically disabled, the old, and the young.
6. To resolve conflict, whether it be between individuals, groups of individuals, or individuals and their government.
7. To identify problems that have the potential for becoming more serious problems for the individual citizens, for the police, or for government.
8. To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community.

An important question for those evaluating police performance is whether these various police functions should be considered potentially valuable results that ought to be measured and managed for—in effect, important components of the *mission* of public policing—or whether they should be viewed as dangerous distractions from a public police department's "core mission" of reducing crime. One can answer this question through two different methods.

The first relies on history and tradition to decide whether these activities should or should not be part of the police mission. In the case of public policing, this method gives an unequivocal answer: such activities have long been considered important parts of the mission and goals of public policing (Monkkonen 1992). Indeed, the man who is widely recognized as the architect of modern policing, Sir Robert Peel, held a broadly expansive view of the police mission. In his view, the job of the public police was to do those things that any citizen would do to make the society safe and just if they had the time to do so (Walker 1992b). More contemporary writers also agree that the functions of the police are broader than simply reducing crime (Goldstein 1990; Bayley 1994; Skogan and Hartnett 1997; Skogan et al. 1999). In short, society has long seen value in public policing that goes beyond crime control. Indeed, it is only relatively recently that the police have given as much emphasis as they have to the crime-fighting aspect of their mission, the ultimate goal of reducing crime, and crime statistics as the proper measure of their performance.

The second method for considering whether these wider effects and diverse activities ought to be part of the police mission is to rely on "strategic planning models" that have been developed to help both public and private sector managers find the highest value use of their organizations in particular environments. The idea behind these models is that the right mission or strategy of an organization is not a fixed, permanent thing. It is, instead, something to be chosen by those who own and lead the organization in light of environmental circumstances—both the "task environment" of problems that the police confront, as well as the "authorizing environment" of public expectations and demands of the police (Moore 1995). The challenge for such stewards of the organization is to find the highest valued use of an organization's capabilities in its existing environment, not to assume that its mission and strategy remain what they have always been. It is worth noting, however, that there is an important difference between the way that public and private sector managers are advised to think strategically.[9]

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[9] For further discussion, see Moore 1995. Also Kaplan and Norton 1996:37, or Bayley 1994.

In the public sector, strategic planning typically begins with the organization's mission already defined and established. It is assumed that this is written in some statute, or is sanctioned by some tradition. The goal of public managers, then, is to stay true to that mission, and to build and operate an organization that is efficient and effective in pursuing it. Indeed, strict adherence to the mission is considered the *sina qua non* of public sector performance. Once a mission is created, it becomes the goal of public sector managers to achieve that mission, and *only that mission*. The organization's value is judged entirely in terms of its ability to achieve the particular results specified in the mission. If the organization happens to be producing valuable effects outside the boundary of its assigned mission—for example, a public library happens to be useful in providing after-school programs to latchkey children—that effect goes unvalued, unmeasured, and unmanaged (Moore 1995). If the organization happens to have a set of capabilities that would make it valuable in an alternative use—for example, if a national defense radar system happens to be capable of identifying drug smugglers—that is viewed as a dangerous distraction, an unwelcome opportunity for "mission creep" to set in (Dickert 1992). In short, in the public sector, an obsessive focus on mission is considered key to success, and it is only success in achieving the established mission that counts.

In the private sector, on the other hand, maintaining a focus is also considered important. But the focus is on sustaining profitability over time. That result is achieved by finding ways to exploit the "distinctive competence" of the firm in the face of changing circumstances (Andrews 1980). One way to do that is to get better and better at producing the same thing. But that strategy can fail if market conditions change so that consumers no longer want the firm's current product. A different way for a private sector firm to succeed is to engage in constant efforts to "reposition" the firm in its market environment. The aim is to find the best use of the firm's assets and capabilities in changing market conditions. That often requires firms to *stop* producing some things they used to produce, and *begin* producing new products and services that are within their distinctive competence but more highly valued than their old products and services. Thus, the characteristic of a successful private firm is not that it keeps the same products and production processes and refines them over time, but that it keeps changing what it is producing as well as how it is producing its products and services (Peters and Waterman 1982).

Given the importance of being able to adapt to changing environments, the private sector begins with a lesser commitment to a particular set of products and activities. Instead of starting with fixed, well-defined purposes that are used

to value the organization's performance, private sector organizational strategists begin with the idea that their task is to find valuable uses of an organization that exists, and has acquired a certain *distinctive competence* (Andrews 1980). To be sure, the firm's distinctive competence is based on the things that the organization is now doing—the particular products and services it now offers, the particular technologies it relies on, the particular managerial systems it uses to manage its work. But the organization's distinctive competence is also seen as something larger and more abstract than what the organization is now doing. It is seen in the ability of the organization to use what it now knows how to do and is good at doing in exploiting new market opportunities. In effect, instead of starting with well-defined purposes and then building an organization that stays confined to those purposes, a private sector manager begins with an organization that has a certain distinctive competence, and then asks how many valuable things could be made by exploiting that distinctive competence (Kaplan and Norton 1996: 37).

Private sector models also take quite seriously the idea that there might be important "synergies" among an organization's diverse "product lines." (These are also called "economies of scope" as distinguished from "economies of scale.") The synergies might lie in being able to take advantage of a production process created for one purpose that turns out to be valuable in an alternative purpose. For example, many organizations that have developed computing capabilities to service a large customer network as part of their core mission—say, the telephone company, a large retail operation, or an airline—have found it relatively easy to convert that capability into the ability to offer credit cards linked to their core business as a new product line. Or, the synergies might lie in exploiting a relationship that is developed with a particular customer. For example, once a designer has developed a reputation with a customer for providing stylish clothes, that firm might go on to produce perfume or other toiletries as part of an effort to support the customer's commitment to a particular lifestyle. Of course, a company can fail by diversifying too much, and straying too far from its distinctive competence. But the point is that there might be many different products and services a company could provide that are within its distinctive competence, and that one product line might help another product line succeed.

To understand the significance of the distinction between these ideas, consider two different views of a police department. In the traditional public sector conception, we might start with the idea that the important mission of the police department is to reduce crime by arresting and threatening to arrest

criminal offenders. In pursuit of that goal, we might then build organizations that consist of a very large, well-trained, mobile force, carrying the authority of the state, available to citizens for the price of a phone call 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and able to reach any location in the city in less than five minutes. We might then value that organization only in terms of its impact on crime.

The problem from a public sector perspective, however, is that once society had built such a capability, it would soon discover that the organization's distinctive competence was broader than simply controlling crime or calling offenders to account. The society would recognize that the police department could be valuable in a wide variety of other uses. The force could end up enforcing traffic and parking laws, settling disputes, generally reassuring citizens, and providing both immediate emergency services and referrals to longer run treatment for troubled individuals.

Moreover, there might be some important synergies among these different activities. The relationships that the police could build with citizens by performing some of these other roles could have value in supporting their crime control function. Because the police depend on the help of citizens in controlling crime, it could be very important to build good will among the citizens. Because responding to these other demands helps to build good will, the efforts could be understood as contributing to the overall goal of crime control.

From a private sector perspective, the fact that the capability one had built to control crime had value in other uses would hardly be viewed as a problem. It would, instead, be viewed as a significant opportunity. It would be good news, not bad, that the police were both *valuable* and *valued in uses other than controlling crime.* Moreover, the extent to which there were important synergies among the varied uses of the police would make the varied activities even more valuable.

If the police were to be guided by private sector principles, then, they would not hesitate to respond to the many demands made on them. Each would be considered an opportunity to create value, and an opportunity to build a valuable relationship for the future. So, wisdom from the private sector in helping managers position their organizations suggests there are many reasons for the police to accept the public expectation that they perform these other functions, and to begin managing themselves to ensure that they perform these additional functions well. Indeed, observations such as these provide a large part of the justification for community policing as an overall philosophy or strategy of policing (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990).

Seven Dimensions of Value in Police Performance

In the companion paper to this one (Moore 2002), I develop the argument that to avoid embracing too narrow a view of the benefits that the police produce for society, and to recognize that the police impose costs on the society as well as produce benefits, communities should evaluate police departments along seven different dimensions, each observed for the department as a whole, over time, and (ideally) in comparison with other departments. Each of these dimensions is meant to suggest a broad concept invoking some important dimension of value that can and should be used by citizens to evaluate their police departments. To help keep these different dimensions of performance in mind, I have suggested an icon for each dimension. The seven dimensions and their icons are summarized in Table 1 (see next page).

Reducing Crime and Criminal Victimization. The first dimension of performance, symbolized by the image of a wounded victim, is the concept of safety from criminal attack, or reduced criminal victimization. We all want the police to act in ways that reduce the real, objective risks of criminal victimization, i.e., the crime rate. This is the most important and the most distinctive contribution that the police make to our individual and collective well-being. And even though we understand that the police cannot accomplish that important social goal alone, it is important to keep their attention focused on doing what they can do (with others) to achieve that result.

Calling Offenders to Account. The second important dimension of performance, symbolized by an offender with his hands raised, focuses on the police role in achieving a particular idea of justice—namely, holding offenders to account for their crimes. As noted above, many citizens think of this value as being virtually identical with the first goal. In this view, what is important about calling offenders to account for their crimes is that such actions are thought to be the principal way that the police can reduce crime. Citizens believe that these actions deter and incapacitate criminals (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978).

It is worth keeping in mind, however, that to many citizens, *justice* is as important as achieving the practical effect of controlling crime. To many, the idea of justice includes the idea that people ought to be held accountable for their crimes. It would be wrong for them to be excused, even if we could be assured that offenders would commit no future crimes. Conversely, to many it seems fundamentally unjust to put people in jail on the basis of some kind of prediction that they will commit crimes, even if such an act would be successful in reducing crime. In short, one kind of public value produced by a police

Table 1. Valuable Dimensions of Policing

Reduce Crime and Victimization

Call Offenders to Account

Reduce Fear and Enhance Personal Security

Ensure Civility in Public Spaces (Ordered Liberty)

Use Force and Authority Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively

Use Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively

Quality Services / Customer Satisfaction

department is ensuring the kind of justice that holds individuals accountable for their crimes.

It is also worth noting that there are many things that the police can do to reduce crime that do not necessarily depend on calling offenders to account, or threatening to do so. In recent years, the police have broadened their repertoire of responses to crime problems. They now do a great deal more than threaten offenders with arrest and imprisonment. Through "situational policing," they find ways to prevent as well as respond to crimes. There is not much justice at stake in persuading bartenders in bars that have reputations for aggravated assault to substitute plastic glasses for traditional mugs and bottles. Nor is there much justice in "ticketing" drivers who leave their cars unlocked when there is property to be stolen. But both have been shown to reduce crimes without necessarily producing any additional arrests. They work through mechanisms other than arresting, deterring, and incapacitating offenders.

Reducing Fear/Enhancing Personal Security. The third important dimension of performance, symbolized by a cozy home, is the idea that the police should be interested in reducing fear. Again, many citizens might object to this as a distinct dimension of performance on grounds that this effect will occur as a natural consequence of achieving the first two objectives of controlling crime and calling offenders to account. But what the police have learned (to their discomfort) is that reducing crime is neither necessary nor sufficient for reducing fear.[10] We have learned that the things that trigger fear are different than the objective risks of crime (Skogan 1990). Citizens react to *signs* of disorder—things that they associate with increased risk, such as public drunkenness, prostitutes openly soliciting, and rowdy groups—rather than to real objective risks of victimization. Furthermore, we have learned that the police can do things that are successful in reducing fear *even if they leave the objective risks untouched.*[11] Because reducing crime turns out to be somewhat disconnected from enhancing the sense of security that citizens feel, whether the police should take responsibility for reducing fear in addition to controlling crime becomes an important strategic question.

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[10] Reducing fear is different from reducing crime. See Moore and Trajanowicz 1988; Skogan and Hartnett 1997.

[11] For a discussion of how police foot patrols can reduce fear but not reduce crime, see Police Foundation 1981.

Citizens might object to the idea that the police should be responsible for reducing fear on several grounds. First, they might be concerned that if the police focus on reducing fear rather than real victimization, the police might be tempted to fall back on mere "feel good" measures that make citizens feel safe while leaving them no safer than before. Although one can argue that reducing fear is an important objective in itself, it seems wrong to encourage the police to produce that result through any other method than the old-fashioned way—actually reducing crime. Alternatively, citizens could object to including reduced fear as an important measure of police performance on grounds that it is technically difficult to measure subjective levels of fear. Finally, both citizens and the police might object to this measure on grounds that the levels of fear are influenced by many things other than what the police do, and therefore that they should not be held accountable for helping the citizenry feel secure.

I include this dimension despite these objections because I think that the subjective experience of security from criminal attack is one of the most important ultimate objectives of the police. We want the police to produce a sense of security as well as the reality of reduced risk of criminal victimization. If they produce real, objective security, but leave us feeling afraid, they have not accomplished what we really want them to do—allow us to go about our lives with a reasonable degree of security. Further, the relationship between reduced crime on one hand and increased security on the other is complex, not simple. It is important for us to explore the relationship between success in controlling crime and in enhancing security, and we cannot do that if we do not analytically distinguish and separately measure the two distinct goals.

Ensuring Civility in Public Spaces. The fourth dimension of performance, indicated by a park bench, is the idea of safety and civility in public spaces. Again, one might say there is no difference between this idea and those that have come before. But what seems important and distinctive about this idea is that the public police might have some special responsibility for our "commons"—the places where we meet as members of the public with responsibilities to one another, and strong interests in being sure that we will live up to those responsibilities. The crime control function of the police draws them into private, intimate spaces as well as to the public streets. After all, many crimes happen in private domains. But, under our constitutional rules that give extraordinary protections to private spaces, the police enter those private spaces only to enforce society's strictest rules, and only when invited or legally authorized to do so. In public spaces, in contrast, they have a somewhat different role. There, they operate with greater freedom, and focus on lesser as

well as more serious problems. They do so to protect the safety and civility of these spaces, and in doing so, protect the quality of our public and collective, as well as our private and individual lives.

Including this performance dimension is necessary if for no other reason than to recognize and accommodate the important role that the police have long played in producing traffic safety and regulating the use of other public spaces. I would go further, however, and say that such a concept is important because it helps citizens understand the important role the police play in keeping parks, schools, public transit, even shopping malls safe for strangers to be with one another. In today's anonymous cities, where the informal social controls of years past no longer operate, we need the police to provide assurances that the reasonable expectations we have of one another will be reliably filled. Whether such a concept can be measured will be discussed below.

Using Authority and Force Fairly and Economically. The fifth dimension of performance, symbolized by a nightstick, is meant to capture our concerns with the ways that the police use the force and authority of the state. On one hand, it is important to recognize that state authority is one of the most important assets we citizens grant to the police. Indeed, we give them this power precisely because we think it is crucial to their ability to accomplish the important purposes we want them to achieve. We need them to have certain kinds of investigative and arrest powers so they can achieve the objectives of reducing crime, calling offenders to account, enhancing the subjective experience of security, and ensuring that public spaces are civil and accommodating to citizens.

Because I think of authority as an asset available to policing, however, I believe it is important to think quantitatively in terms of *how much* authority police are using as well as whether they are using it properly or not. Ideally, a police department would make minimum use of force and authority in accomplishing its purposes. If it can find means of preventing crime that do not depend on arrests, then that would be more valuable than using arrests to reduce the same number of crimes.[12] If it can find ways to arrest offenders that make less use of physical force and pose fewer risks to defendants, police

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[12] Lawrence Sherman once proposed that we impose a limit on how many arrests the police would be allowed to make. His aim was not to save money, but instead to avoid overwhelming the courts and jails. Still, his proposal points to the same idea—that we might assign more value to a police department that kept crime low with fewer arrests, and less value to one that kept crime low with lots of arrests. See Sherman 2002.

officers, and citizens, then those ways are preferred to those that rely on more force or pose greater risks to those involved in arrest situations.[13]

In addition, the fact that police use state authority means that we have to be committed to certain kinds of fairness and equality in the way the police do their work as well as efficiency and effectiveness in the results they are trying to achieve. We have to be sure that there is some *proportionality* in the way they use force and authority—that they do not use much more force and authority than seems necessary to deal with given criminal events or larger crime problems. We have to be sure that like cases are treated alike, that officers are neither suborned nor bribed in their efforts to enforce the law, and that no individual or group is discriminated against (Mashaw 1985).

The commitment to producing objective fairness in the way that the police use the force and authority of the state must also be accompanied, I think, by a concern for sustaining citizens' *subjective* belief that the police are operating in a fair and restrained way (Moore 1997; Tyler 1990). This subjective component of legitimacy is different from the kind of objective legitimacy the police might have by virtue of following proper procedures in all that they do.

Measuring subjective legitimacy, and holding the police accountable for producing it, has many of the same problems as measuring fear. The reason is that subjective legitimacy describes a feeling that citizens have. Many things other than the concrete behavior of the police may produce that feeling. Thus, just as in the case of fear, it is not clear that subjective legitimacy can be objectively measured. Nor is it clear that the police should be responsible for producing it.

Yet, I want to include the idea of subjective legitimacy as a potentially important dimension of police performance for two different reasons mentioned in the introduction to this monograph. First, a higher level of subjective legitimacy is valuable in itself. All other things being equal, citizens would prefer to live in communities policed by organizations they trust to be fair, rather than by organizations they think are biased. Second, subjective legitimacy is valuable as an operational asset to the police in their primary tasks of reducing crime, apprehending offenders, and enhancing security. If citizens trust the police, they will be more likely to cooperate, and that, in turn, will make police operations more effective. If citizens trust the police, the police will allow citizens to cross at least one worry off their lists—namely, that they have to be as afraid of the police as they are of criminal offenders.

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[13] It is this idea that justifies searches for more effective nonlethal weapons, and for more effective means of keeping reluctant arrestees under restraint.

Using Public Funds Efficiently and Fairly. The sixth dimension of police performance, symbolized by a piggy bank, is meant to capture our interests in having the police operate economically as well as fairly and effectively. We want the police to spend as little as possible to achieve their objectives, and, in any case, not to spend more money than they have been authorized to expend. We want them to control discretionary expenditures on such things as overtime and payments to informants, and make sure that they are not spent for purposes other than those that were intended. We want them to experiment with new methods of organization, new kinds of staffing, and new technologies that reduce the costs of providing the services and producing the results that they now achieve. Such aspirations are nothing more than those that we have for any organization in which we are an owner or shareholder.

Producing Quality Service to Clients. The seventh dimension of performance, symbolized by a smiling face, focuses on the quality of service delivered by the police. On one hand, treating this as a separate dimension of performance reminds us that there are many services the police render that cannot be viewed directly as crime fighting. These are the moments when the police respond to the medical needs of heart attack victims, offer shelter to homeless citizens sleeping on freezing park benches, respond to calls of frightened elderly people who need reassurance, or simply provide information to tourists who need directions. Such services are valuable at least in part because doing them well might help the police develop the kinds of relationships with citizens that allow them to become both more effective and more legitimate in controlling crime. But they are also valuable as contributions to social welfare in and of themselves. It would be a shame not to recognize such value when the police produce it.

A more interesting question is whether we should be concerned about the "satisfaction" that those who are "obliged" by the police as well as those who are "served" by the police. Arguably, the "satisfaction" of those who are stopped, cited, or arrested by the police in the course of their enforcement activities should not be a concern. The police are certainly not obligated to make such people happy. But it does seem important to recognize that the police engage in "obligation" encounters with citizens as well as in service encounters, and that the quality of those obligation encounters might be measured in part by whether those obliged felt they had been treated fairly and respectfully. This is important as a matter of right—we want the police to respect the civil liberties of citizens even as they enforce the law. (Indeed, we allow those who have been wrongfully obliged to sue the police.) It could also be important as a way of ensuring that the person being obligated "complies" with the officer's requests

without resistance (which increases the risks and economic costs to everyone). Or, it could be important in producing the overall sense of legitimacy that a democratic citizenry might have for its police. It is very hard for citizens to accord the police much legitimacy when they have been badly treated by the police in a personal encounter. Any of these reasons might be sufficient to motivate citizens to measure the "satisfaction" of those individuals who are *obligated* by the police as well as those who are *served*.

These seven dimensions, I suggest might be useful to citizens as they try to get an accurate and comprehensive picture of the value that public police departments are producing for them as citizens of a local political community. If citizens focus on these dimensions of performance, and demand that the police continually improve their performance with respect to these attributes of policing, that intense outside scrutiny might actually help police managers insist on and get improvements in performance along these various dimensions from the organizations they lead. One can add or subtract from these seven dimensions, of course. But, I would argue that the price of subtracting any one of these dimensions is to ignore a dimension of police performance that is arguably important in weighing the overall contribution that the police make to the society. It would be wrong to ignore the contribution that the police make to controlling crime, wrong to ignore the important role the police play in calling offenders to account, wrong to ignore the importance of using the authority and force of the state with economy and fairness, and so on.

At a minimum, ignoring one or another of these dimensions means failing to recognize an important value that the police are contributing to the society. At worst, it means skewing the incentives of the police so that the police focus on producing one attractive result at the expense of another. For example, the police could become so focused on reducing crime that they fail to notice the costs they are inflicting on the society, and the hostility they are generating. Alternatively, the police might become so afraid of corruption or other abuses of their power that they forget all about the important jobs of controlling crime and calling offenders to account.[14]

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[14] This might seem unlikely, but an anecdote from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) following the investigations of the Knapp Commission illustrates how officers can adopt this perspective. An NYPD police captain who attended the Kennedy School recalled an incident when he was a sergeant and observed two patrol officers standing idly on a street corner. He asked them what they were doing. They quickly said, "Nothing, sir!" as though inaction was the preferred state of the NYPD.

On the other hand, the price of *adding* dimensions of performance to this set is to increase the overall conceptual complexity of the system, and the costs of measuring and analyzing police performance. Because a measurement system works best when it is conceptually simple and straightforward, one cannot continually add measures without hurting the performance of the measurement system itself in guiding police performance.

In the end, then, I think it is useful to think of a police department as an organization that

- reduces crime,
- calls offenders to account,
- reduces fear,
- ensures civility in public spaces,
- uses the force and authority of the state both economically and fairly,
- uses public funds efficiently and fairly, and
- delivers quality service to its clients, both those who call the police, and those who have duties imposed on them.

A Bottom Line or a Public Value Scorecard?

The fact that police departments can produce many different kinds of value for citizens and the communities in which they live makes it technically difficult—indeed, virtually impossible—to construct a simple "bottom line" for policing. By a "bottom line," I mean a single, simple, summary measure of the net value that the police create for their communities. The difficulty in creating a simple bottom line for policing lies in four important observations about the value produced by public policing:

- First, the police produce value along *multiple dimensions of performance,* not just one. While much of the value of policing lies in their efforts to prevent and control crime and call offenders to account, police departments also make important contributions to reducing fear, guaranteeing the safety and civility of public spaces, and providing emergency medical and social services.
- Second, the important dimensions of performance sometimes *seem to conflict with one another.* It seems that the goals of reducing crime and enhancing security conflict with the goals of

reducing the financial costs and overall intrusiveness of police operations; it seems we cannot get more of one valuable effect without taking a loss on some other valued result.

- Third, the different dimensions of performance seem *difficult to measure* in both objective and quantifiable ways. It is not obvious that one can objectively measure subjective experiences such as fear, nor such an abstract concept as the use of state force and authority.

- Fourth, even if one can find ways to develop measures or indicators of these different dimensions of performance, it is impossible to know how to add the positive and negative effects together to get a net bottom line *because the values are incommensurable*. Even if one could measure units of crime reduction that could be achieved by allowing the police to use somewhat more coercive and intrusive investigative methods, it is not clear how one could decide whether such a change was, on balance, worth it.

The good news, however, is that these difficulties do not make it impossible to construct a performance measurement system for policing that can serve the important functions of helping police departments become accountable to their citizen/owners, and improving their performance over time. Indeed, on close examination, it turns out that private sector firms have faced and resolved similar problems. All we have to do is borrow their experience in constructing measures for policing.

Take first the issue of multiple, and potentially conflicting values. We sometimes imagine that the goals of private sector firms are comfortably aligned. We say, for example, that private sector enterprises seek to maximize profits as though that were a consistent goal. But profits are themselves a function of two values that, in principle, compete with one another. On the one hand, the firm wants to generate significant revenues by making and selling products at high prices. On the other hand, to *make* money, they have to *spend* money and incur costs. They have to buy materials and pay employees to build the products and services. They have to buy advertisements to make their products known and desirable. They have to pay for outlets, each with their own expensive inventories, to ensure that customers will find their products accessible. They have to decide how much quality to put into their products, and the kinds of guarantees they are willing to offer. And so on. Each of these decisions is designed

to *make* money, but each decision also *costs* money. In making these decisions, they often do not know how much any of these costly decisions will add to their revenues, and whether the expenditure will be adequately rewarded with higher prices or brisker sales. But they know for sure that their expenditures will show up negatively as costs when it comes time to calculate their profits. And that seems inconsistent with the goal of maximizing profits.

The way we harmonize the values of increasing revenues on one hand and reducing costs on the other into a simple, coherent statement of purpose is by specifying a particular functional relationship between these two competing values; namely, profits equal revenues minus costs. The goal of a private sector firm is not really to maximize revenues nor to minimize costs; it is to maximize the *difference* between revenues and costs.

In principle, in policing, we can find things that are analogous both to revenues and costs. The equivalent of revenues are the valuable results of policing such as reduced crime, more offenders called to account for their crimes, enhanced security, and improved services to callers. The equivalent of costs are the financial costs of providing the service, and also the amount of state force, authority, and scrutiny engaged to produce the results. The functional equivalent of "profit" would be the "net public value" produced. That would consist of the difference between the value of the desired results achieved by the police on one hand, and the costs of producing it on the other.

In principle, then, all we need do to create a functional equivalent of profit for the police is to specify a function that describes the rate at which we are prepared to exchange units of performance on one dimension with units of performance on other dimensions; more concretely, how much we would be willing to pay in both money and diminished liberty to secure a 10 percent reduction in crime, or a 20 percent increase in the level of security we all feel. The way that we can transform a set of multiple measures into a single "bottom line" is simply to write down a "social utility function" that describes not only in what direction we value different dimensions of police performance (crime rate down, financial costs down, use of authority down, sense of security up), but also at what rate we are prepared to trade units of improvement in one dimension to another (Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa 1998).

While such a thing is logically possible, as a practical matter, constructing a clear "social utility function" that values the different dimensions of police performance relative to one another is extremely difficult. It is particularly hard to do in the abstract. Typically, the way that we make such choices is not to decide in advance how much we value each of the dimensions of perfor-

mance. Instead, we react to different conditions we confront, and move incrementally toward a satisfactory conclusion. At one moment, it seems that we are experiencing too much crime and insecurity, and we ought to be willing to give up more money and freedom to enhance our security. At other times, we feel pretty secure from criminal attack, but have become a bit indignant about corruption and/or brutality in our local police department. In short, it is only by reacting to certain conditions that we can reliably learn what we, as a polity and community, value (Lindblom 1965).

But this discussion makes it clear that the problem in constructing a "bottom line" for policing is not just multiple and potentially conflicting values. It is also the importance and difficulty of 1) being able to measure real performance along the different dimensions of value, and 2) finding a currency that can be used to make the values commensurable. Because revenues and costs are both easily measured in the private sector, and because they are measured in the same currency, it is relatively easy to measure the important relationship between these variables. We can simply subtract the costs from the revenues to determine the profitability of a business enterprise.

This is much harder in policing. We can calculate *financial costs* of policing readily enough. But it is much more difficult both to *quantify* and *monetize* the valuable *results* of policing. And it is extremely difficult even to quantify, let alone monetize, the value of such abstract ideas as the use of force and authority, or the overall fairness and legitimacy of the police. We cannot simply tote up the amount of value we got from policing and subtract from that value the costs we incurred to produce the result and show the net value. In short, the problem of measuring police performance is not just that there are multiple values, not just that they seem to compete with one another, but also that they are hard to measure and combine together in a simple bottom line.

The difficulty of finding a common metric to use in relating the different dimensions of value to one another may seem to be an insuperable obstacle to efforts to construct a useful set of police performance measures. But the problem of incommensurability is less important than it might first seem. While we cannot measure one variable against another, *we know in which direction we would like each variable to move*. That is, although we can't measure in financial terms the *net* value we get from spending more of our money and liberty to reduce crime, we know that, all other things being equal, we would like to have less crime, and spend less money, and use less forceful and intrusive measures. In short, we know what constitutes an *improvement* in performance, even if we

don't know whether on balance the results we are getting are worth more than the costs we are expending, nor whether we are operating "optimally."

Now, to many, it seems unreasonable to imagine that we could simultaneously improve on all dimensions of performance. It seems that, in principle, there ought to be tradeoffs among at least some of these values. We cannot simultaneously have less crime, more civil liberties, more offenders called to account for crimes, less use of force and authority, and more fairness.

Yet it is important to remember that that is precisely what Detroit thought when it was challenged by Japanese competition to produce cars that were both higher quality and lower cost. They thought there was a tradeoff between quality and cost, that they would have to decide whether they wanted to produce high-quality, high-price cars, or lower quality, lower priced cars. They thought they couldn't produce a high-quality, low-cost car.

What they discovered, however, when they began looking closely at the ways they were working, was that there were many things that could be done to improve their performance on *both dimensions simultaneously*. They found that they could produce "quality for free." They didn't need to argue about whether quality or cost was more important; all they needed to do was examine and change their processes to produce more of *both* valuable results.[15]

This means that while in *principle* there is always a tradeoff that must be faced among competing values, in *practice* that tradeoff might not exist. While one has to make such choices when one is operating with a fixed set of operational procedures or technologies, it is possible that there are better methods that would allow the organization to perform better on both dimensions simultaneously. The challenge in holding organizations accountable and helping improve their performance is to find ways to keep them focused on improvement *on as many dimensions of performance as seem valuable.*

Thinking and acting in this way might be a valuable approach to measuring police performance as well. Instead of arguing about how much we should value crime control over the protection of civil liberties, we might be wise to concentrate our efforts on developing operational policies and procedures that could do better than our current approaches in producing *both* valued results. Ideally, a high-performing public police department would keep improving with respect to *all* these values; i.e., it would find ways to be more cost effective in reducing crime, calling offenders to account, reducing fear, and providing

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[15] I am indebted to my colleague Robert Leone for this observation.

responsive services to individual callers, as well as to economize on the use of force and authority, and earn support and legitimacy for the way that they operate with as many members of their communities as possible (Senge 1990). An ideal performance measurement system would focus public and organizational attention not only on the extent to which the police department is achieving these values, but also whether and how it is improving over time.

While it seems difficult to rely on many nonfinancial measures rather than the single financial measure represented by the bottom line, we ought to take heart from the fact that private sector companies are shifting away from simple measures of profitability, and increasingly relying instead on a large set of nonfinancial measures organized in a "balanced scorecard" (Kaplan and Norton 1996). The "balanced scorecard" includes measurements that focus on the efficiency of operational methods and the quality of customer and employee relations, rather than single measures of financial performance. They focus on these measures because the measures help them look behind their financial performance to find the reasons for their success, and keep them focused on the things they need to do to ensure their success in the future. Presumably, there are all kinds of complicated, unknown tradeoffs among these different measures. But the important thing about each of these measures is we know in which direction we would like them to move.

Following the lead of the balanced scorecard in the private sector, I think that we could use the seven dimensions of policing as a "public value scorecard" with which citizens could monitor police performance. The ideal performance measurement for a police department does not record performance on only one dimension, but reliably measures multiple, nonfinancial dimensions of performance.

So, the crucial difference between accounting for organizational performance in the private and public sector is not the fact that one has to move from a single financial measure to multiple, nonfinancial measures. The private sector has to do this, too. The greater problem is finding ways to quantify the organization's performance on the different dimensions of performance. That is the effort we make below.

MEASURING PERFORMANCE ON THE SEVEN DIMENSIONS

At a conceptual level, the seven dimensions of performance answer the question of what citizens *should value* in policing. For these ideas to be practically useful to citizens in holding the police accountable and guiding improvements in police operations, however, it must be possible to develop concrete performance measures for these conceptual dimensions.

Ideally, it would be possible to construct just one, perfect measure for each of the seven dimensions, and that measure would say precisely how well the police were performing with respect to that dimension of performance. Fortunately, however, this ideal state is not a necessary condition for constructing practically useful measures of police performance. (If it were, we would be in real trouble, for this seems well beyond our current capabilities or future imaginings!) In fact, for each conceptual dimension of value, there might be several operational measures that could be used to suggest whether the department was getting better or worse on that particular dimension of performance. In short, we don't need one precise measure for each dimension; we can get along with several less precise measures that might give us some rough sense of whether things are getting better or worse with respect to that particular dimension of performance.

Because citizens have long held the police accountable for their performance, a significant amount of work has already gone into the construction of operational measures for some of the most important dimensions of value in policing. Importantly, however, the measures and systems that now exist are rooted in a relatively narrow (some might say properly focused) view of the important ends and means of policing (Alpert and Moore 1993; Moore and Poethig 1999). These established measures include

1) crimes reported to the police,
2) crimes cleared by arrest, and
3) (more recently) response times to calls for service.

It is clear that these measures reflect a particular strategic idea of policing. The end of policing is to reduce reported crime. The principal means for achieving this result is making arrests of offenders through investigation, patrol, and rapid response to calls for service (Alpert and Moore 1993; Moore and Poethig 1999).

It is also clear that these measures can and should be incorporated in the broader framework I have suggested here. Reductions in crimes reported to the police can be an important indicator of police effectiveness in reducing criminal victimization. Increased success in solving crimes can be an important indicator of police success in producing a certain kind of justice—the kind we associate with calling offenders to account. We can view rapid response to high-priority crime calls as an element of high-quality service to citizens who call for police assistance, as well as a feature of policing that we think increases the likelihood that they will succeed in calling offenders to account.

The important difference between these three measures and the framework I am developing, however, is that these three measures neither fully reveal the value produced by police departments, nor exhaust our curiosity about police performance. For this reason, I propose that the police report *additional* measures to present an accurate picture of the benefits they produce and the costs they impose on local communities.

The data to construct many of these additional measures already exist. The new work, then, is often nothing more than to collate existing data into reports, and make the reports more regularly and widely available. This strains the reporting and analytic capacity of a police department (as well at its political courage), but does not unduly strain its pocketbook.

Other measures, however, require *new* data collection efforts by the police that go beyond their current administrative practices. This requires the police to spend money to design, build, and continuously operate new systems of data collection and reporting. This is a more ambitious and expensive enterprise, but potentially quite rewarding for police departments that wish to be accountable and to improve their performance.

In discussing how the various dimensions of performance could actually be measured, I will point out where I am talking about using *existing* measures, and where I am proposing *new* measurement systems. At the end of the section, I will indicate which of the proposed *new* systems of measurement would be particularly valuable and not too difficult or expensive to develop, and which of them would be useful but less valuable and more expensive. That should give citizens an "investment schedule" to consider as they reach for improved—more complete, more accurate, more useful—measures of police performance.

Measuring Criminal Victimization

Because reducing crime is the core function of the police, citizens have long demanded that the police develop and report some measure of their success in achieving this objective. They want to know how much and what kinds of crimes are being committed in their communities, and whether the objective risks of criminal victimization are going up or down.

Historically, the easiest way to answer that question was simply to record the crimes reported to the police. This local interest was given a federal boost in the 1930s when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sought to develop a picture of the national crime problem (Senna and Siegel 1993). Instead of developing a separate system for collecting this information at the national level, the FBI decided to rely on the network of police agencies that already

existed. To make the information useful at the national level (and incidentally, to help citizens of local communities compare the performance of their police with the performance of others), it was necessary to standardize (at least to some degree) the definition of crimes, and the organizational systems that ensured the consistency and validity of the data collection efforts. This was a delicate matter because it required the federal government to impose standards on local governmental agencies.

Nonetheless, over several decades, the system of Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) was developed.[16] This system is in place today, and gives us detailed and consistent information about crimes as they are reported to the police. It provides basic information on levels of crime reported to police jurisdictions throughout the country. It has been operating more or less continuously and consistently for more than half a century. It allows each city to analyze levels of crime at citywide, district, and even street address levels (Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger 1989). It is a cornerstone, but not the entire edifice of a useful system of police performance measurement.

In addition, the FBI in collaboration with the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics recognized the limitations of the Uniform Crime Reporting system. As a summary or 'snapshot' of only the most *serious* crimes known to the police, it provides limited information (although it does give an easily understood glimpse of crime). During the 1980s, a new system was developed to address the new information needs that both police and policy makers had for more comprehensive information. This system, the "National Incident Based Reporting System" ("NIBRS") collects incident-specific crime data on a wide range of offenses.

The data reported to state and federal authorities contains information on the date, time and location of the incident; basic demographics on victims, offenders and arrestees; and specific information on the type and value of property stolen and recovered. With this detailed data set, more useful types of administrative analysis are possible. The system, in contrast to the old summary UCR system, also allows updating of already submitted data as new information comes to the attention of the police (property recovery at a later date, arrests that occur after the initial data submission, etc).

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[16] For critiques of the UCR system at conceptual and operational levels, see Biderman and Lynch 1991.

By 2002, according to the FBI,[17] 22 state crime reporting programs were certified by the FBI, signifying that they have met the Bureau's data quality standards for the collection and submission of local agency data to the national program. Within these 22 states, 3,479 police agencies were submitting all of their crime data in the NIBRS format.[18]

As noted above, the most important limitation of these ways of measuring objective risks of criminal victimization is that they measure only those crimes that are reported to the police. The most important supplement to this measure of performance would be the addition of citywide crime victimization surveys (Biderman and Lynch 1991). This new measurement system would provide a more accurate picture of all crimes—not just those reported to the police. While there are some important practical and technical difficulties in using victimization surveys to produce accurate estimates of criminal victimization, used in combination with the UCR data,[19] they get us closer to an estimate of real criminal victimization than the UCR alone (Biderman and Lynch 1991). (Note that observed differences between crimes reported to the police on one hand, and crimes reported on victimization surveys on the other provide an indirect measure of the confidence that citizens have in police responsiveness—particularly if we record information about the reasons that citizens give for not reporting their victimization to the police.)

The principal reason to resist citywide victimization surveys as a supplement to the UCR data is simply cost. Importantly, the police get information about reported crime as a routine part of their operations, just as business firms get information about the value that customers assign to their products and services as a routine part of their business. Of course, it takes effort to *record* the information, even more to *organize* it in specific reporting formats, and still more to *analyze* the reported crime numbers to determine what is happening to crime in a given community. But one doesn't have to pay extra money, or organize special efforts to *collect* the information on reported crime in the first place. It comes in willy-nilly as a result of routine operations.

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[17] Telephone conversation by Daniel Bibel with Mr. Christopher Enourato of the Education, Training and Support Unit, FBI, Clarksburg, West Virginia, April 8, 2002.

[18] For more information on the efficacy of NIBRS, see Faggiani et al. 2002.

[19] To simplify matters, all references in the text to the UCR would also apply to NIBRS.

A victimization survey, on the other hand, has to be specially designed and fielded. The costs of doing this will be highly visible—at least in part because it is most commonly done through a contract rather than through department personnel. Of course, once one has designed the survey, the department can simply repeat the effort over and over again and make it routine. Moreover, there is no particular reason why a unit of the police department couldn't be charged with the responsibility for conducting the survey on a routine basis. This suggests that victimization surveys could eventually come to look as routine to the police as the reporting of UCR data now does.

But the fact still remains that if local police decide to survey the general population to determine victimization rates, they will have to make an explicit expenditure decision to do so. That decision will be highly visible. Its most immediate effect is nothing more than increased information, not any immediate operational impact. Absorbing a significant cost that produces information but not certain service gains is a hard pill for most communities to swallow. Why spend money just to collect information when one could spend the same money to provide higher levels of service?

There is an answer to this question, of course. It is simply that we cannot be sure that the police department is, in fact, providing useful or valuable services if it does not collect information about the impact that the organization is having. Moreover, it is quite possible that the increased focus and productivity that could be produced if we had accurate information about results (produced through some combination of increased effort due to increased accountability, and increased performance due to continuous learning about what works) would more than pay for the cost of collecting and analyzing the new information. But we cannot be sure that either of these claims is correct. So, an investment in this information is something of a gamble.

It is also worth noting that the private sector pays an enormous amount of money to produce information about their operations and results. They now measure quite intensively. And they do so despite the fact that they routinely get for free the crucial information that is missing from police departments—namely, the revenue information that records the value that individual consumers attach to the products and services the private firm offers.

Given that police departments are missing information about the impact they are having as well as some important characteristics of the ways they are now operating, one might expect police departments to spend even more on measurement than private sector enterprises to compensate for this weakness. To meet the demands for accountability, to reveal the value of what they are

doing, and to learn how to perform better, they have to work harder at gathering information than private firms do. And yet, it seems that police departments actually spend less on measurement than private sector firms.

None of this makes the political decision to spend money on special efforts to measure police department performance any easier. Such expenditures still look like wasted overhead rather than value-creating operational expenditures. Moreover, the problem gets worse if one plans to use these surveys not on an *ad hoc,* one-time basis, but instead as a regular part of a performance management system that monitors conditions over time, and at the district level as well as the citywide level.

To go from a one-shot survey to a regular series, one has to make a much different kind of commitment. The commitment to do a *series* of such surveys over time (say five to 10 years) increases the anticipated costs of a one-time survey by approximately the number of years one plans for the series (in this case, by a factor of five to 10). If one wanted the information to come in on a quarterly basis so that there would be more consistent and rapid feedback about how the police were performing, that also would increase the costs by a factor of four for any given year, and by a factor of 20 to 40 for the five- to 10-year series. In short, the commitment to continue the surveys over time, and to do them more frequently, transforms a small *project* decision into a large *investment* decision—analogous, perhaps, to buying a new computer system.

A commitment to use the surveys to measure levels of crime at *district* as well as citywide levels, to allow citizens and department management to make comparisons across neighborhoods within a city, also increases the total number of people who must be surveyed each year, and does so by a substantial amount.[20] If, for example, one wanted to have a sample of about 250 people in each of five districts to produce a reasonably accurate measure of the most

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[20] One of the major ideas in community policing is that police ought to respond to problems that are smaller than citywide problems, but larger than individual, one-time problems. That is, they ought to respond to problems affecting particular neighborhoods within the city. To a degree, the police are administratively set up for looking at neighborhood-level problems. They have geographically defined units at the "district" or "precinct" levels. Unfortunately, the boundaries of these administrative units do not always correspond to citizen perceptions of their neighborhood boundaries. In any case, to be able to both respond to neighborhoods, and to hold district commanders accountable for performance, it is generally valuable to look at conditions and activities for areas smaller than the city as a whole. This always entails additional costs.

common crimes, then the total number of people interviewed would be 1,250 people. If one wanted to look at 10 smaller districts, the total number of people interviewed would increase to 2,500. So, the difference in the cost between a one-shot citywide victimization survey on one hand, and a continuous victimization survey that has enough resolution to tell us what is happening at the district level, is probably two orders of magnitude—or roughly 100 times more expensive. One could pay $60,000 for a one-time citywide survey, and $6 million for a continuous, district-level survey.

For this reason, the idea of using a continuous victimization survey capable of showing performance at the district rather than the citywide level is probably unfeasible. Note, however, that the cost increase is a function of two characteristics: 1) a commitment to continuous rather than one-shot surveys, and 2) district-level resolution rather than city-level resolution. Facing budget restrictions, it would probably make sense to stay with the idea of continuous surveys and forego the district-level resolution. The reason is that it is very important to have continuous measures so that we can observe trends over time at the citywide level. It is simply too expensive to make the same observations at the district level. And, there are other ways we can both observe performance, and provide incentives for improvement at the district level. On the other hand, failure to produce continuous measures of victimization at the citywide level leaves us with only the reported crime measures to go by—a dangerous situation.

There is one other way we could improve our estimates of the overall level of criminal victimization in a city. It does not provide an overview of *all* kinds of crime (including property offenses), but affords a special insight into the nature of physically violent criminal victimization. The method depends on capturing information from coroners' offices and hospital emergency rooms. As it turns out, the United States Department of Public Health monitors deaths from all causes through the system that records the nation's "vital statistics" (see, e.g., Fingerhut and Kleinman 1990). In some places, these public health surveillance systems have been extended to focus on traumatic injuries such as gunshot wounds and knife attacks that show up in emergency rooms. Of course, it is a bit difficult to distinguish criminal attacks from self-inflicted wounds resulting from suicide attempts or accidents. But one could get a better look at criminal violence—particularly that occurring within families, and in communities where victims are afraid to report to the police—if we reported this public health data along with the reported crime or victimization data.

To summarize: Measuring overall levels of criminal victimization, and observing how those levels are changing over time, at both the city and the district level, is probably the single most important performance measure for police departments to collect. Currently, police departments rely heavily on *reported* crime numbers to accomplish this goal. These numbers have the great *advantages* of being inexpensive to collect, and of providing a continuous series that can be observed at citywide, district, and street address levels. They have the great *disadvantage* of revealing only the criminal victimization that victims and witnesses decide to share with the police. To get at the "dark figure of crime," one must go to victimization surveys, or to public health data systems (Biderman and Reiss 1967). Victimization surveys are expensive, particularly if one tries to use them as a routine management system for observing conditions at the district level. But they are not too costly if one commits to doing them at a citywide level on an annual basis.

One additional important point about victimization surveys: Much of the cost of the victimization surveys is associated with setting up the system and carrying out interviews with a representative sample of citizens. That cost is probably justified if it does no more than tell us more than we now know about the character of criminal victimization. But, as we will see below, once we have invested in developing a system that allows us to interview a representative sample of citizens, we can use that system to *answer many other important questions about policing.* Specifically, we can learn a great deal about citizens' fears and their self-defense efforts, as well as their criminal victimization. We can learn about their general attitudes toward the police and how those attitudes are formed. So, in deciding whether a community can afford an investment in victimization surveys, that community should remember not only that such information is crucially important in producing an accurate picture of criminal victimization, but also that the same kind of survey is essential for measuring other important aspects of police performance. Finally, it is important for the police to make use of the public health surveillance systems in their communities to get an accurate picture of the physical attacks that happen behind closed doors, or are otherwise not reported to the police.

Measuring Success in Calling Offenders to Account

The principal measure the police rely on to characterize their success in calling offenders to account is their "clearance rate." This number records the fraction

of all crimes reported to the police that are successfully "cleared" by the arrest of an alleged offender. It measures how many crimes are "solved."[21]

Conceptually and practically, the clearance rate is a very important number because it reveals the effectiveness of police patrol, rapid response, and investigative activities in solving crimes and apprehending offenders. Such activities are considered very important in the current strategy of policing, both as a means for controlling crime, and as an important end of justice in itself. The clearance rate might also serve as an important indirect measure of the strength of a police department's relationship with a community, because it is often citizens' willingness to call the police and cooperate in criminal investigation that spells the difference between success and failure in solving any given crime.

Despite the importance of this number, and despite its ready availability, it is not much discussed when considering police performance. This is a puzzle. Three reasons why the number is not much discussed come quickly to mind.

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[21] Part I offenses reported on the Return A of a UCR report can be cleared either by arrest or exceptional means. (UCR Handbook, p. 41) An offense is "cleared by arrest" or solved for crime reporting purposes when at least one person is (1) arrested, or (2) charged with the commission of the offense and turned over to the court for prosecution (whether following arrest, court summons, or police notice). Although no physical arrest is made, a clearance by arrest can be claimed when the offender is a person under 18 years of age and is cited to appear in juvenile court or before other juvenile authorities.

Several crimes may be cleared by the arrest of one person, or the arrest of many persons may clear only one crime.... (UCR Handbook, Pgs. 41–42)

In certain situations, law enforcement is not able to follow the steps outlined under "clearance by arrest" to clear offenses known to them, even though all leads have been exhausted, and everything possible has been done in order to obtain a clearance. For crime reporting purposes, if the following questions can all be answered "yes," the offense can then be cleared "exceptionally."

1. Has the investigation definitely established the identity of the offender?
2. Is there enough information to support an arrest, charge, and turning over to the court for prosecution?
3. Is the exact location of the offender known so that the subject could be taken into custody now?
4. Is there some reason outside law enforcement control that precludes arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender? (UCR Handbook, p. 42)

One is that the numbers are discouragingly low. Nationally, we solve about 63 percent of the murders, 26 percent of the robberies, and 13 percent of the burglaries reported to the police (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2000). Perhaps clearance rates are not widely discussed because they offer too much reassurance to offenders. They make it seem as though crime might, in fact, pay, and that offenders will not have to face the consequences of their offenses. This could lead to increased crimes.

An alternative explanation is that clearance rates make the police look less effective in this crucial aspect of their role than we need them to be, and than they would like to be. If our expectation is that every crime will be solved, it is hard for the police to report that they routinely fail to achieve this result. We all agree not to discuss this number to avoid embarrassment and worry.

A third reason not to discuss the numbers, however, is that the clearance rate numbers are not very accurate, and therefore not worth talking about. The reason the numbers aren't particularly accurate is that they reflect a police department's policies and judgments, rather than real information about how many crimes are going unsolved, and how many offenders go unpunished. In many police departments, clearance rates can be artificially improved by persuading offenders who have been caught red-handed in one crime to confess to other (previously uncleared) crimes with the understanding that the offender will only be charged and prosecuted for the original crime. This improves the clearance rate, but with uncertain implications for whether the other crimes have really been cleared or not.

Other times, the police will be content to file the charges against an offender that will guarantee an effective prosecution, and not make much additional effort to find out whether that offender committed other offenses. The police know that the additional crimes will not necessarily be charged, and that even if the offender is charged, prosecuted, and convicted for these additional crimes, they will not necessarily affect sentencing very much. If the police have solid evidence to convict an offender of a robbery, they have enough to get him off the street for a long time, and they do not need the additional work or additional complication of investigating, charging, and prosecuting other crimes that the offender might have committed. It is only the very rare police department that will make a serious effort to investigate, solve, charge, and prosecute offenders for all the crimes they might have committed rather than focus on the one that seems ripest.

The casual stance the police take to clearing offenses makes practical sense. They get the result they want (an offender off the street) with less effort and

less complexity than if they actually tried to prove other crimes against the offender. Moreover, they know that most repeat offenders do not "get away" with their crimes. They will not necessarily be successfully prosecuted for every crime they commit. They will, however, spend large parts of their lives in jail or prison, because sentences are long enough for individual offenses to ensure that result even if the offender is successfully arrested, charged, and prosecuted for only a fraction of his offenses (Moore et al. 1984).

Over the long run, however, there are two bad consequences of not taking clearance rates more seriously. The first is that the public cannot determine how successful the police really are in solving crimes, and apprehending and successfully prosecuting those who commit offenses. Because this is an important function of the police, ignorance about how successful the police are in achieving it makes it hard for them to be held accountable, and hard for them to get better at this important part of their job.

The second consequence is that, by failing to try to clear all crimes, the system as a whole loses some capacity to distinguish frequent and chronic offenders from those who are only intermittent and short-lived (Moore et al. 1984). If we can't tell the difference between a "dangerous offender" who commits 20 robberies or street muggings a month when he is free on the street, from a person who "repossessed" his TV from an estranged wife by threatening to hit her if she didn't let him take the TV to his new bachelor pad, then the system will lose some of its capacity to do justice and to control crime. While some of the differences among these offenders will be visible from the character of individual incidents in which they are charged, far better information will be obtained through a more serious investigation into how many other crimes they might have committed.

The fact that police departments take much different stances toward the importance of clearing offenses, and have much different standards for judging when an offense has been cleared, means that it is very hard to compare departments on this important dimension of performance, or to observe improvements within a given department over time. What is needed, then, is much clearer, more consistent standards for judging whether a crime has been cleared, and an audited review of clearance reports to determine what portion of the crimes have actually been cleared. Of course, one does not have to have a single threshold to be used in distinguishing a cleared crime from one that has not been cleared. One could, for example, report that a crime was charged to a particular offender with strong evidence and successfully prosecuted; or that a crime could have been charged with strong evidence, but was not to avoid complicating the case; or that the police strongly suspected the offender

of other crimes and had evidence to support their suspicions; and so on. In effect, the police could create a system in which they could get "partial" as well as "full" credit for clearing a crime. But the point is that they ought to be able to tell us something important about how many crimes are more or less successfully cleared by investigation, arrest, and prosecution.

Note that the best evidence of whether a crime has been cleared is not simply whether the police think they solved the crime, but also whether a prosecutor, a court, and a jury think so too. Thus, one might say that cases are cleared not just when an arrest is made, and not just when a prosecutor agrees to file the charge, but also when an offender is *convicted*. Imposing this standard on the police would probably be unreasonable. One reason is that the police cannot control what the police and prosecutors and juries do. All they can do is to make the best case they can against an offender. Another reason is that the standard of proof that a court demands for a guilty conviction is quite different than the standard that the police need to make an arrest, or the prosecutor needs to charge. A court is supposed to find guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt;" the police may arrest on "reasonable suspicion"—a distinctly lower standard. So, the police may be doing their job well even if the prosecutors don't charge and the courts don't convict in the cases that the police bring forward.

What these observations remind us of, however, is that the police ought to be interested in and held accountable for the *quality of their investigations and arrests* as well as for the ultimate results of these activities. By quality, I mean three somewhat different things: first, the professional skill the police show in developing evidence and making arrests; second, the extent to which their methods of investigating and arresting can stand up to legal scrutiny, and therefore count as a "good bust;" and third, the extent to which the investigation and arrest can be expected to produce a conviction.

Again, while it might be difficult to construct such a measure, there is research showing that it can be done for both robberies and burglaries—by far the most common crimes (Eck 1992; Eck 1983; McElroy, Cosgrove, and Farrell 1981). Further, there is evidence showing that if the police are *managed* to produce quality investigations, they can, in fact, increase the quality of their investigations (Eck 1992). Further, there is evidence that increased quality translates into higher rates of conviction (Eck 1992). So, the important question is whether the police will make an effort to measure the quality of their investigations, and use those measures to grade the extent to which they are successful in clearing all crimes, as well as the ones that are charged and proceed to prosecution.

There is one last idea to be discussed that fits within the concept of calling offenders to account. One of the best-kept secrets about the criminal justice system is the number of offenders that are free in the community despite the fact that they have outstanding arrest warrants against them (Howe and Hallissy 1999). This can occur for many different reasons. The most common is that defendants fail to appear for trial. Another is that offenders have been indicted, and arrest warrants issued, but the police have not yet been able to find them.

In the past, it was not considered a particularly high police priority to arrest those with outstanding warrants. If the police happened across such offenders in traffic stops, or in conducting investigations, they would execute the warrant. But it was rare for the police to focus specific efforts on arresting those with outstanding warrants.

More recently, special efforts have been made to step up the success of warrant enforcement (Martin and Sherman 1986; Marx 1988; Hermann and Youssef 2000). Special "warrant squads" have been created who are charged with this responsibility. Special operational methods—such as sending letters to those who have warrants against them announcing that they have won a prize and should come to a certain location to accept it—have been developed that have been successful in netting many scofflaws (O'Keeffe 1998; Marx 1988). And the U.S. Marshals have found a special role in controlling crime throughout the nation by enforcing warrants against "career criminals" and "dangerous offenders" (Nadelmann 1993).

Such efforts are valuable precisely because they seem so close to the principle that offenders should be called to account. It makes no sense to ordinary citizens that, the police having done the hard work of attributing a crime to a particular individual, and having brought legal proceedings against that person, the person is still free to move about the community and go on with his or her life. Conversely, the more effective the police are in successfully executing arrest warrants, the more effective the department seems to be in holding offenders to account for their crimes. Again, this seems important both as a matter of principle (people ought to pay for their crimes and have justice visited upon them), and as an important way of controlling crimes (bringing offenders to justice reduces crime through the mechanisms of deterrence and incapacitation).

To summarize: The police can measure their ability to call offenders to account through improved measures of clearance rates, improved measures of quality investigations and arrests, and measures of their success in enforcing

outstanding warrants. All of these measures can be constructed from existing records with new systems installed for grading and evaluating the activities of the police. Whether improving these measures is worth the investment depends a great deal on how important the goal of calling offenders to account seems to be, and how much improvement can be made in the way that police departments do this work. Because this is an important dimension of performance, and because there are reasons to believe we could make substantial improvements in our efforts to hold offenders to account, it seems hard to imagine that the investment in improved measures wouldn't be valuable. But only experimentation will tell the tale.

Measuring Fear and the Subjective Sense of Security

Enhancing personal security, including the subjective experience of how safe people feel against the threat of criminal attack, is surely one of the most important goals of a police department. Indeed, one can reasonably argue that producing a widespread sense of security against criminal attack is the true outcome of policing—the result that comes from arresting offenders and reducing crime, and that constitutes the ultimate purpose of the police. To be rid of the fear of a criminal attack is to live much more happily than to live with an ever-present or intermittent fear.

The difficulty, of course, is that fear, as well as a sense of security, are subjective states. They exist in the minds of citizens, not necessarily in the objective conditions they confront. Even worse, levels of fear are probably affected by many conditions over which the police exercise little control. For these reasons, it seems difficult to measure levels of fear, and to hold the police accountable for the goal of reducing fear.

Despite the difficulty, over the last decade or so, we have made significant strides in constructing measures of the subjective experience of fear (Ferraro 1995). Principally, the measures rely on asking individuals about how safe they feel in relative terms—whether they feel safer this year than last, whether they feel safer in their own neighborhoods or in more alien territory, and so on. We have to worry, of course, that these measures lack some of the properties we would like them to have.

It is not at all clear, for example, that we can compare one person's fear with another's, any more than we can compare one person's happiness with another's. This makes it difficult to add subjectively reported levels of fear up into some total amount of fear that a population experiences. But even though it is difficult to add up levels of fear across individuals, it is possible to determine whether a population as a whole seems to be getting more or less fearful.

Somewhat more problematic is that the subjective experience of fear (or security) is highly unstable in individuals; it changes from day to day, and it is difficult for individuals to report on their average level of fear over the last month or quarter or year. A related problem is that fear may not be consistently salient. Citizens do not check in on their level of fear each day. They do so intermittently, when something happens that increases or relieves their fears, or when someone asks them questions about their fear.

Finally, citizens may use their responses to questions about levels of fear not to report accurately on how they feel, but instead strategically to accomplish a goal. They may want to send a message designed to get them more policing. Or, they may use the question as an occasion to show how brave they are, or how self-reliant they can be. Such features tend to increase the variability in reports of fear, and make them less useful as measures than they otherwise would be.[22]

While all these problems exist, it still seems to be important to get some measure of the fear of crime in a community, whether it is going up or down over time, and whether it seems greater in some parts of the community than in others. This follows simply from the fact that enhancing the sense of security from criminal attack has to be one of the important reasons to have a public police department. Still, the technical problems are sufficiently daunting that it might not be worth doing this work if it could not easily be piggy-backed onto other measurement efforts. Fortunately, it can be.

As noted above, if a city decides to do an annual criminal victimization survey to gauge overall levels of victimization, and uses those numbers as a supplement to the information they get from the Uniform Crime Reports, it would not add much to the cost of the survey to add questions about levels of fear. Indeed, in many victimization surveys, questions about victimization and fear are already combined. As important, questions could be asked about the level of effort that citizens make to protect themselves from crime, and the form that such efforts take. This provides useful information about whether citizens are fearful enough to actually act on their fears as well as simply report them. It also helps the police understand how much of the burden of self-defense citizens are taking on, and the form that such efforts take. To the extent that the society as a whole would like to lighten the burden of self-defense, and shift the form of self-defense to

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[22] An example of the complexity of the police role in this context is provided in Kenney et al. 1999 in regard to conflicts at abortion clinics.

more collective rather than individual forms, it would be possible to see how successful the police were in producing these results.

To summarize: The technical problems involved in turning an individual subjective state (fear of crime) into an objective aggregate measure (the level of community security) are such that any objective observer would have to take each answer from each citizen with a large grain of salt—perhaps even a kilogram! But the responses of thousands of citizens, taken over time, should provide a useful indication to the police of whether their efforts to control crime and call offenders to account are producing the effect they ultimately desire—a widespread sense of security against the threat of criminal victimization. There remain other threats in the world that are worth worrying about—accidents, disease, fire, hurricanes, and layoffs. But one of the most important values created by police departments is freedom from fear of criminal attack, and a reduced burden on individuals to defend themselves against such attacks. Both of these can be measured.

Measuring the Level of Safety and Civility in Public Spaces

Closely related to the idea of reducing individuals' fears of criminal attack is the idea that the police have a special responsibility for reducing fear in "public spaces." Of course, the police know that the greatest threat of a criminal attack on citizens does not come from strangers in public locations, but from those near and dear to the victim in private spaces. Moreover, the police are duty-bound to respond to such intimate attacks when called in to do so, and increasingly even when the victim prefers that the police remain uninvolved (Sherman 1992). There are, after all, mandatory reporting laws for those who observe the abuse and neglect of children, and many police departments have adopted mandatory arrest policies in instances of domestic violence (National Research Council 1993; Sherman 1992).

Yet, despite the importance of private, domestic crimes, it remains true that such crimes are, in many ways, harder for the police to deal with than the crimes that occur in public spaces among strangers. There are important rules that keep the police from going into private spaces until called in to do so (Walker 1992b). Both society and the police feel properly reticent about intervening too much into private, domestic affairs. The proper handling of such cases is more complex both legally and technically than the handling of crimes committed among strangers in public locations.

In contrast, the police have much more capacity to deal with the crimes that occur among strangers in public locations. They are not only allowed,

but expected to monitor and patrol public spaces. They have the right to stop individuals and ask them questions about their business (Kamisar 1980). They are set up to respond quickly to situations where one individual sees another individual attacking a third. And so on.

Further, the police may have some special responsibilities for protecting the public infrastructure of a city, and making it available for easy, safe use by citizens. We need the roads to be safe and passable, and the police play an important role in producing that result. If they did not, the sizeable public investment in roads would be less valuable than when the police do their work. We would like our public transportation also to be safe and convenient. The transit authorities do part of this work. But the police play an important role in keeping subways and stations, buses and bus stops safe for citizens to use (Clarke 1996). In doing so, they help amortize the huge investment that cities have made in such efforts. Parks, too, are made increasingly valuable to citizens if they seem secure, so that parents with children, teenagers interested in basketball, and elderly people interested in birds can all use the park together without fear. Public housing can be a nightmare for its residents if the housing becomes dominated by drug-dealing gangs, and a real oasis for needy citizens if the police can keep the violence out (Weisel 1990). And among the most important sites to keep safe are public schools, playgrounds, and the routes to the school traveled by children and their parents (Kenney and Watson 1998). It is one thing to feel safe in one's home; it is quite another to feel safe in moving freely about a community and taking advantage of its publicly owned and operated assets.

Finally, the police have an important, but intermittent and rarely noticed impact on a different kind of public space—the public space in which politics are conducted. Police responsibility in this domain shows up in the vestigial requirement that the police guard polling places on election days to ensure that voters can cast their votes without intimidation, and prevent partisan violence from breaking out. It is often a bit more visible when the police do or do not grant permits for parades and demonstrations, and then police the mass gatherings that occur. It is also apparent when riots occur, and the police are called in both to restore order, and explain the causes of the disorder. The political role of the police is very important when the police deal with extortion or terrorism justified by some political ambitions. A democracy depends on individuals being able to settle their deeply held political disagreements peaceably, and it is among the most important challenges facing police to play an important role in keeping public deliberative spaces open and safe, as well as keeping public physical and recreational spaces safe.

If preserving the safety of public spaces for commerce, recreation, and politics is an important goal of policing that deserves special recognition and attention, it is worth thinking a bit about how one might measure the level of safety in public locations. One can start, of course, with the crime statistics, and make a distinction between crimes committed in private spaces by people who know one another from crimes committed in public spaces by strangers. One can also use the victimization survey to learn whether people feel safe in public locations, and which particular public locations seem particularly safe and which unusually dangerous.

It would be possible to go beyond these already collected data, however. In some cities, the police have used changes in residential and commercial property values to indicate changes in the overall level of security enjoyed by a city, on grounds that security is a highly valued attribute of a physical space, and its perceived level will show up in market-assigned property values (Moore and Poethig 1999).

Performance in some other nonpolice functions—for example, the repair of streets—has been monitored by direct observational studies. New York City has a vehicle fitted with a measuring device that goes over the roads and records the number and size of potholes it finds. In principle, it might be possible to pay individuals to walk a city's streets, play in a city's parks, or use a city's subways and record how afraid they feel at any given moment.[23] Alternatively, one could simply have individuals monitor levels of use of key public sites, and/or interview those who use the public locations about their levels of fear. With respect to the police role in keeping a public space open for democracy to occur, we could ask the police to report on the policies and procedures they use in granting permits for parades and demonstrations, and ask them to file after-action reports on what happened in these affairs. We could also ask for after-action reports on their responses to spontaneous demonstrations and riots.

All of this has a dissatisfying *ad hoc* quality. It is *ad hoc* in two different senses. First, the measures are quite imperfect. Second, it is not clear how one should define the universe of public spaces to be monitored, and how that universe might usefully be sampled to ensure that the spaces being monitored are, in fact, representative of all such spaces in the city. Should we place a "recorder"

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[23] This method was suggested to the New York City subway as a method for observing levels of fear.

in all streets, parks, schools, and public housing projects, or just some? If only some, how should those sites be selected? Should observations be continuous, or only intermittent? If intermittent, how should we choose the periods in which we observe?

At the outset, these seem like daunting technical questions. Over time, however, if we thought this was an important performance characteristic of policing, the measurements could undoubtedly improve and become more systematic. Then, we could see whether the police were getting better or worse at creating conditions of "ordered liberty" in our public commons. In my view, this would be an important piece of information to add to our overall evaluation of the police.

Measuring Fairness and Economy in the Use of Force and Authority

So far, we have been looking principally at the "goods" that a police force can produce for its community—its success in controlling crime, enhancing the security that citizens feel, and ensuring the safety of public places. We have also looked at one important aspect of justice—namely, the success that the police are having in calling offenders to account for their crimes.

What we have so far avoided, however, is some of the "bads" that a police department can do to a community. We have also avoided any recognition of a police department's special responsibilities to use its resources and powers fairly and justly as well as effectively. As noted above, because police departments use the authority of the state as well as money raised through taxes to produce their results, they are obligated to use their resources fairly and justly as well as efficiently and effectively. Citizens may and do properly demand an accounting of how fairly and justly the police behave, as well as how efficient and effective they are in using public funds for controlling crime and reducing fear.

Let's begin with the idea of fairness. Fairness is a complicated idea. On one hand, we can talk about fairness as a quality that is or is not present *in an individual transaction* between a particular police officer and a particular citizen. Did this particular citizen get the kind of service from the police that he or she deserved? Did the particular individual who was stopped and questioned by the police deserve to have his or her life inconvenienced and intruded upon by the official inquiry? And so on.

But we can also talk about fairness as a more *aggregate* characteristic associated with the *overall policies and procedures of a department*. Does this department allocate its resources and services fairly among neighborhoods? Does this department enforce the law equally across a city's diverse population?

We can also talk about fairness as a quality that exists *objectively*, independent of peoples' perceptions (e.g., we did this the right way, so that it was fair regardless of what those involved in the police operation felt). Or, we can think of fairness as (at least partly) a subjective impression (e.g., I *felt* fairly treated by the police without really knowing whether they followed all the procedures designed to ensure fairness). It might be useful to think of the objective part of fairness as the "procedural rectitude" of the police, and the subjective part of these judgments as the "perceived legitimacy" of the police.

The police feel mostly accountable for producing procedural rectitude, because that is both the right thing to do, and the one that they can control. They hope and expect that procedural rectitude in their actions will produce perceived legitimacy in the minds of citizens. But this does not always or necessarily occur. Indeed, if citizens do not believe police accounts of their procedural rectitude, or if they think the procedures are themselves biased or unjust, then a wide gulf will remain between police confidence in their procedural rectitude and public views of their legitimacy.

In principle, of course, these different ideas should all be closely linked. The way that we produce aggregate fairness should be ensuring that each individual encounter is fair. The way that we produce perceived legitimacy is by ensuring the procedural rectitude of each encounter. But the fact of the matter is that these concepts differ slightly from one another and need to be measured separately.

Three different aspects of fairness at the aggregate level seem particularly important to consider, and to find the means for monitoring them.

Fairness in the Allocation of Resources. First, it seems important to measure the extent to which the police fairly allocate their resources across a community. For the most part, when we talk about fairly allocating police resources, we follow the principle that police resources should be allocated according to "need." This idea found its concrete operational expression in the creation of "hazard formulas" that measured the differential "need" for police services across different parts of the community, and allocated police department personnel and equipment accordingly (Police Executive Research Forum 1981). It was also important in establishing the dispatching rules that determined which kinds of calls would be treated as high priority (Farmer 1981). In both cases, the police were systematically opposing two other principles that could determine the allocation of police services. The *market* principle says that police services should go to those with the means to pay for them (regardless of their need). The *political* principle says that police resources should go to those who have the power and political influence to command them.

The decision to create *publicly* supported police departments (rather than rely on individual self-defense and private security measures) has to be seen at least in part as an explicit decision by citizens to reject the idea that the level and distribution of security against criminal victimization should be determined by market principles. If we had thought it fair to use market principles to provide security from criminal attack and access to justice, we would not have created publicly financed police departments. We would have left the work of defending against crime, and finding and prosecuting offenders, to private individuals, as we did up until the mid-nineteenth century.

The decision to create a *public* police department was not simply a decision to achieve economies of scale in producing community security, and not just to increase the even-handedness with which justice was dispensed. It was also, arguably, a decision to *provide at least a minimum level of security to everyone in a community regardless of their ability to defend themselves, or to pay others out of their own pockets to defend them from criminal attack*. At that moment, the idea that it was fair to provide public police services according to one's ability to pay was set aside in favor of an alternative principle that it was fair to provide at least a minimum amount of protection to all at public expense.

It was an equally important moment in police history when the police gradually succeeded in insulating themselves from the kind of political interference that would allow powerful politicians to claim more than their fair share of police resources for the benefit of their constituents. In the reform era, the police increased both their determination and their ability to resist political interference, and developed the technical systems that directed resources to need and desert rather than to political ambition.[24]

Of course, there continue to be pressures to allocate police resources to specific geographic districts, or to distribute particular kinds of services on the basis either of "ability to pay" or "political influence" rather than "need." We often hear now, for example, that taxpayers ought to "get the level of service they paid for." The idea is that support of public police is much like a private market transaction in which the taxpayer pays for a certain level of service, and

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[24] Kelling and Moore (1988) have suggested that the history of policing can be divided into three "eras"—the political era, during which the police were controlled by political machines and became famous for corruption; the reform era, during which the police developed policies and procedures that could ensure both fairness and effectiveness; and the community era, in which the virtues of having the police be accountable and responsive to citizens were rediscovered.

is allowed to stop paying for the service if he is dissatisfied with the benefits he individually received. This contrasts rather sharply with the nonmarket idea that the entire community is interested in controlling crime and producing ordered liberty, and that there are both economies of scale and improved prospects for justice if we agree to tax ourselves to produce a public police department. We also note that the "squeaky wheel" does continue to "get the grease" when it comes time to allocate police resources to specific districts, or to commit police resources to special units devoted to dealing with problems that are of concern to special, and specially influential, political constituencies. But it is precisely for these reasons that it is important to monitor the allocation of police resources across districts, across special units, and in responding to particular kinds of calls to make sure that a public resource is not being used primarily to advantage the rich and powerful against the poor and weak.

Specific measures that might be important in monitoring the level of fairness in the allocation of police resources include 1) reports on police staffing and spending relative to demands for police service by neighborhoods, and 2) reports on different levels of service in different communities. It might also be important to periodically review special units that have been set up, or special operations that have been conducted, to see whether these important resource allocation decisions respond more to citywide need, or the influence of particularly wealthy or influential groups. It might also be important for the police to focus some of their attention most specifically on the question of what they have done to protect their community's weakest and poorest citizens from criminal attack, as that might be one of the particularly important responsibilities of a *public* police department.

Fairness in the Use of Force and Authority. Second, in examining how fairly the police use their authority to intrude into private life, it would be important for the police to examine their policies and procedures to ensure that they were fair both on their face and in their effect. It would be important to consider the department's policies governing proactive police methods such as field interrogations, traffic stops, and arrests for quality-of-life offenses. It is possible that the "profiles" used to guide such activity are unfair.[25] For example, the police may have explicitly adopted racial characteristics as part of the "profile" that guides drug enforcement efforts. Or, it may be that a given

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[25] For a preliminary discussion of the statistical and ethical issues related to profiling, see Applbaum 1996.

profile doesn't explicitly use race or class characteristics, but relies instead on characteristics that turn out to be highly correlated with race and class characteristics (such as wearing a particular type of clothes, or driving a dilapidated car), making the policy appear biased even though it is not explicitly so. It is also possible that the explicit policies are fine, but that they are ineffective in guiding or controlling actual conduct in the field, and that the real practices are objectionable even if the policies are not (Fridell et al. 2001).

It is also clear that one would want to be able to say something about how the police were controlling police corruption. Importantly, there are at least two kinds of police corruption. The first (which we could somewhat imprecisely call "bribery") involves situations where the police fail to arrest someone that they could have and should have in exchange for a cash payment to overlook the offense. The second (which we could also imprecisely call "extortion") involves situations where the police threaten to arrest someone whom they are not legally entitled to arrest, and demand money from the citizen to escape the undeserved arrest. Both kinds of corruption result in the unfair enforcement of the law. The difference between them, however, is that in the first case, the arrested citizen may feel lucky that he escaped arrest and therefore be unmotivated to report the offense to anyone else, while in the second case, the arrested citizen will feel angry and inclined to complain to anyone who will hear him.

These differences have implications for the relative importance of the two different sorts of corruption, as well as for the ease with which they can be controlled. In principle, it ought to be both (slightly) more important, and (a great deal) easier to deal with extortion than with bribery simply because there is a specific person who has been injured by the police and knows he has been injured. Bribery is much tougher to deal with because it lacks a complaining victim. For extortion, the police can be aided in their efforts to control corruption by the anger of the victim. All they have to do is open some channel for them to complain. For bribery, they will have to use more proactive methods to find the level of and successfully root out corruption (Ivkovich 2002).

It is not easy to measure either abuses of discretion in field operations or levels of extortion and bribery committed by officers, yet it is possible to construct methods for doing both. For example, if citizens were sufficiently insistent, and police managers sufficiently determined, one could establish a systematic way of "challenging" the department's operations. The method would be to set up situations that invited abuses of discretion, extortion, or bribery, and then record how the police behaved.