SECURING OUR CHILDREN'S FUTURE

New Approaches to Juvenile Justice
and Youth Violence

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Editor

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Creating Networks of Capacity: The Challenge of Managing Society's Response to Youth Violence

THE RECENT EPIDEMIC of youth violence has created a crisis in many of the nation's communities. The problem is both frightening and disheartening.[1] The drive-by shootings that have become emblematic of the problem have frightened those living near the epicenter of the violence. Repeated funerals of fifteen-year-old gang members have made many others despair of the kind of country ours has become. What makes the crisis feel especially urgent, however, is not just that the problem itself is bad; it is also that the institutions we rely on to deal with the problem do not seem up to the task. Their failure may stem from the fact that, as a society, we have failed to invest enough in efforts to raise our children—that, in an important sense, "America hates its children."[2] How else could we tolerate the conditions in which children are now being raised? Yet, a fair appraisal would reveal a wide array of institutions—some private, some public; some federal, some local; some dedicated to social service, some to criminal justice—that are now helping children navigate the transition from infancy to adulthood without being victimized or victimizing others.[3]

That array of institutions begins with the family—with parents who naturally assume (or guardians who are assigned) the responsibility for raising children. It includes the admittedly imperfect network of welfare support, including prenatal care and early childhood education, that helps the nation's neediest children to get off to a reasonably healthy start.[4] It

includes an array of laws and institutions designed to guard children from abuse and neglect.[5] It includes publicly financed educational and recreational opportunities. And when all else fails, it includes the agencies of the criminal justice system—the police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, courts, and correctional agencies, including the specialized parts of that system that deal with juvenile offenders and with abuse and neglect of children.

So there is at least a wide if not a dense network of institutions in which society has invested a substantial amount of hope, public money, and state authority to guide children toward responsible citizenship. That network can fail to produce satisfactory results, of course. And when it fails, one reason for the failure may be that the overall social investment in the institutions is too small or is badly allocated across the network, with too much going to reactive criminal justice interventions and too little to preventive social service investments. But there may also be a problem in the *performance* of those institutions.

The performance problem comes in two different forms. On one hand, each institution may be failing in its own sphere of operations and on its own terms. Faced with today's economic pressures, parents and guardians may not be giving their children consistent enough attention and guidance to make sure that they develop properly. The welfare system may not have figured out how to combine assistance with incentives to enable poor but competent parents to give their children the time and attention they need.[6] Prenatal care may fail to reach enough young mothers to ensure that their children are born with a reasonable chance for success.[7] The child protection system may not only fail to respond appropriately to children who have been abused and neglected, but it may also fail to do what is necessary to prevent abuse and neglect in the first place.[8] Preschool programs may fall short of preparing kids for learning in school.[9] The schools themselves may be bad.[10] The criminal justice system may respond both ineffectively and unjustly to crimes committed by and against children.[11] And so on.

On the other hand, the institutions may not be coordinating and combining their efforts in ways that could magnify their separate effects. It may be that public agencies are not intervening in the lives of children in ways that support rather than erode the competence of caretakers and their motivation to do their work. It may be that service gaps yawn wide along the path of child development, with the result that investments at both early and later stages of development are lost because nothing is available at some particular stage—say, the ages between one and four or between ten and fifteen. It may be that instead of working collaboratively to both

prevent and respond to youth violence, social service, public health, and criminal justice agencies are struggling with one another to establish their separate approaches as the only effective and just responses to the epidemic of violence.[12]

All is not lost, however. In the tradition of Americans facing a serious national problem, individuals, associations, governments, and agencies have made efforts to respond to the challenge of escalating youth violence.[13] Many communities have rededicated themselves to the effective care and guidance of their children. Many government agencies—federal and local, social service and criminal justice—have begun the painful process of searching for more effective responses to youth violence.[14] Throughout the country, individuals and groups, acting on their own or prompted by political and public sector leaders, have sought to build "networks of capacity" that can respond effectively to youth violence precisely because they cross the boundaries of existing organizations. Assembled in these networks of capacity are

—public-private partnerships that link community-based and government organizations in new ways;

—interagency collaborations that restructure working relationships among government agencies at a given level of government; and

—federal/state/local government partnerships that seek to create more effective partnerships vertically across levels of government.

The aim of these networks is not just to create a broader response to youth violence, but a more considered and effective one—one that uses all the capacities at hand more effectively and that meets the distinctive needs of particular clients in particular contexts.

The purpose of this chapter is not to answer the question of whether these new networks and the strategies they adopt are more or less effective in dealing with youth violence than those that came before. We will assume that they are, and point to the many examples offered in the other chapters of this book as plausible evidence, if not proof, of that claim. The aim, instead, is to explore the managerial challenges in creating and using these networks as either a supplement or an alternative to more traditional aggregations of single-agency responses. Those challenges are significant. As one wag commented, "Interagency collaboration is an unnatural act undertaken by nonconsenting adults." In the case of youth violence prevention, the difficulty of acting across agency boundaries is compounded by the difficulty of operating across the boundaries that divide community groups from government and one level of government from another.

Yet, a body of literature and some accumulating experience offers guidance on how to meet those challenges. This chapter reviews that literature and experience, beginning with a more analytic approach to the problem: why it is that we are now trying to address youth violence through networks of capacity rather than single organizations? The chapter next reviews literature on cross-functional teams in business organizations and experience with community-based crime prevention efforts here and abroad; it then concludes with suggestions on how to maximize the effectiveness of the emerging networks.

Youth Violence as a Managerial Challenge

To size up the managerial challenge posed by animating and sustaining an effective social response to youth violence, one has to understand what makes the problem of youth violence so difficult. The answer is straightforward, I think: both the problem and the institutional arrangements through which we try to address it are complex. The problem is complex because it has many different parts that interact in unknown and unpredictable ways. As a result, it is hard to know which part of the problem offers significant leverage to those trying to solve it. The institutional arrangements are complex because many different agencies feel that they have sole or primary responsibility and capacity to deal with the problem of youth violence. That may be valuable insofar as it means that many different actors are committed to making a contribution. Yet, problems can arise if the efforts they make are so uncoordinated that the ultimate impact is less than the sum of its parts. And the price of coordinating the efforts can be very high—particularly when, as is often the case, the actors come to the problem with widely varying values and ideas about what constitutes a humane, effective, and just response.[15]

The Complexity of the Problem

Both natural intuition and social science investigations tell us that youth violence is a complex problem that arises from varied causes at many different levels. For example, when one gang member kills another in a drive-by shooting, we can see the causes of that event in

—the individual propensities of the "shooter" (including psychological attributes that make him particularly aggressive or leave him numb to the consequences of his actions).

—the family and social background of the youth, which may have contributed to that that propensity. For example, the youth may have been a victim or witness of violence in his own family, or he may have experienced with his parents the painful and shameful experience of being poor and unemployed and discriminated against.

—the influences of a gang culture that makes such violence a virtue and sets up powerful norms that require gang members to play out particular roles on pain of excommunication if they fail to do their "duty."

—the past failures of social service agencies to transform the conditions in which families are living, working, and raising children by providing both economic opportunities and protection from abuse and neglect.

—the present failures of criminal justice agencies to deal effectively with recurrent disputes among gangs, to make themselves a reliable instrument of justice for gang members who feel that they have been wrongly victimized by others, or to establish a powerful normative order that is intolerant of violence and imposes just punishment if its norms are broken.

We can also sense that the causes operate not only at different levels of society but also with varying degrees of force and generality. The "root causes" of youth violence might lie in economic and educational factors, such as the lack of prospects for economic advancement in unskilled jobs; in a national culture that exalts competition and violence as a means for achieving one's ends; or in the rage engendered by relentless racial discrimination. Yet, a particular violent incident may have been triggered by far more local and temporary events: a chance meeting of two rival gang members at a time when tensions were high because of an unavenged attack by one gang on another.

The fact that different causes are operating at different levels with different degrees of force and generality raises the important question of which of those causes is the "best" target for intervention. Note that in this context "best" has a complex meaning. By 'best" we often mean "most effective"—the intervention that is likely to produce the most and the most enduring effect, regardless of the cost of mounting the intervention. But "best" could also mean the response that is fairest, or most just, or most humane. It could also mean the response that produces the most value for the money—the biggest "bang for the buck." The cost, in turn, could be measured in terms of either money or state intrusiveness in citizens' private affairs.

To many, it seems obvious that the best responses to youth violence are those that focus on the root causes of the problem because such responses lead to the broadest and most enduring effects. Those effects, in turn, con-

stitute a "real solution" to the problem rather than a "mere palliative," and a "real solution" relieves society of the necessity of maintaining the capacity to cope with the problem in the future. Yet, it is at least logically possible (and, given recent experience, it seems increasingly plausible as an empirical reality) that interventions that focus on less fundamental causes can also have an important effect. For example, a community-based or criminal justice intervention that focused specifically on the immediate circumstances of a gang shooting might have been effective in preventing that particular shooting. Enough of such microinterventions in minor occasions for violence could well produce, in the aggregate, a level of violence far below the level expected given the broader social factors that shaped the aggregate propensity for violence.[16]

The difficulty is that we really do not know enough about the interactions of these variables. It is natural to make a simplifying assumption—that the causes of violence are independent and additive, with each variable contributing its particular influence to the overall level of violence. It is also natural to assume that some of the variables will have bigger effects than others and that those constitute the best target for intervention. But however satisfying those assumptions might be to William of Occam—and to social scientists who would like to rely on the techniques of multiple regression to understand the root causes of crime—the reality may be quite different. It may be that the causal variables interact in complex rather than simple ways, so that the effects of a change in one variable may be either significantly reduced or exaggerated by changes in other variables. For example, a community could get a lot poorer but still have less violence if its members shared a strong cultural commitment to nonviolence sustained by a strong partnership among community groups, faith-based organizations, schools, and criminal justice agencies. In contrast, a few violent incidents, occurring almost accidentally within a short period of time, could so traumatize a community that violence could temporarily spin out of control despite the fact that nothing much had changed in the overall socioeconomic condition of the community.

If youth violence has many causes, operating at different levels in society and interacting in complex and nonlinear ways, then it becomes apparent why a "portfolio" of interventions becomes the favored social response. First, if it is true that the causal variables interact in complex ways, then the effects of combinations of interventions—of strategies consisting of bundles of programs—may be quite different from the effects of single programs. For example, while a school-based program for teaching children

techniques of nonviolent conflict resolution may have little impact if the children are continually exposed to violence in their homes, it could have a large impact if it was paired with programs to reduce domestic violence. In a similar manner, a program designed to protect infants from violence in their homes may have little impact if they are later exposed to violence in schools, but programs that work to control violence in both places throughout childhood could have a significant cumulative effect.

Second, because we cannot be sure which programs will actually reduce violence, it may be prudent for a community not to put all its eggs in one basket. Uncertainty about future economic returns motivates many investors to accumulate a portfolio of diverse investments rather than invest in a single stock or economic sector. Similarly, uncertainty about the effectiveness of different youth violence interventions leads communities to invest in portfolios as well. There is a price to be paid for depending on a portfolio, of course. Just as some stocks will not perform, so some programs will not work, and we will regret having spent money on the things that did not pay off. Moreover, if a portfolio of interventions seems to produce a result, it may be difficult to determine which of the interventions did the job. But, given the state of uncertainty about what would actually succeed and the belief that the system is a complex one, it is probably wise for communities to invest in portfolios despite those costs.

Third, portfolios of responses are valuable because they allow many different people and agencies to contribute. A broad strategy consisting of many different components has the desirable effect of increasing the overall scale of the effort. Variety also guarantees that many potentially promising avenues of attack will be explored. It also tends to increase the overall legitimacy of and political enthusiasm for an intervention. All that is to the good. But many people worry that broad responses to a problem are potentially wasteful and run the risk of losing their focus. The alternative they imagine is one in which, instead of attacking a problem scatter-shot, we commit our main force to an approach that we know will work. In their view, what is missing from many social interventions is precise knowledge of "what works" and, rather than try many things, we should wait until we have a great deal of knowledge.

That idea, too, makes sense. But it makes sense in a context in which we view resources and knowledge as the factors limiting our ability to effect social change. From that point of view, because resources are scarce, we have to develop knowledge about what works to ensure that our limited resources are used most effectively. But one can also imagine a context in

which the scarce resource is not knowledge of what works, let alone what works best. Instead, what is scarce is the will and capacity to act. In this view, if there is enough will and capacity to act, limitations on both resources and knowledge might be overcome. In effect, we can solve the problem with the scale and urgency of our action—doing lots of things that do not work, but also many things that do.

Obviously, if many people are willing and able to act on a problem but want to act on the problem in different ways, then a framework that authorizes and enables them to act in a more or less coherent way is more valuable than one that discourages them from making the contribution they want to make. Their contribution to the scale and development of an intervention that targets a previously neglected variable might be just what is needed to tip the system toward a significant reduction in violence. In the country of the blind, a one-eyed person might be king, but that king might be enormously aided by many others groping with their hands.

The Complexity of Institutional Arrangements

The institutional arrangements through which society addresses the problem of violence are equally complex. One must recognize at the outset that much of the work of raising children is done by the private institutions of family, community, and church. Indeed, so much of that work is performed by those institutions that very small decreases in their productive capacity could result in very large increases in the portion of work done by public agencies. The work of public agencies therefore must be to ensure that the work of keeping children free from violence remains primarily within private institutions, while strengthening those institutions when they falter and substituting for them in the small number of cases in which they fail completely.[17] This is no mean feat. Efforts to aid struggling families may end up either strengthening the family by providing additional assistance or weakening the family by relieving them of the full responsibility for the care of their children.

The public agencies that have a role to play are distributed across all levels of government. At the federal level, money raised through income taxes is spent on both direct operations and transfers of funds to different levels of government. Direct operations sometimes focus on altering national conditions that create the context for local problems, such as federal efforts to control the national supply of drugs and guns, and sometimes they attack local problems directly, such as through federally supported enforcement programs that target serious, habitual youthful offenders. Transfers

sometimes come in the form of block grants allocated by formula, sometimes in the form of discretionary grants allocated according to the merits of the proposals received. The state and local levels of government have their own revenue sources, and they can tap voluntary contributions of time and money from foundations, corporations, and individuals. With those funds, they pay agencies to do work that has an effect on youth violence, whether or not that is its primary purpose. They also support networks of community-based organizations (and, increasingly, church groups) that also contribute to the prevention and control of youth violence.

Public agencies also are distributed across the functions of government. One way to think about the functions of government is to consider their purpose and target populations. Some government programs focus on the economic development of poor neighborhoods, some on preparing workers for employment, some on providing income support to those who are temporarily or permanently out of the job market, some on preventing domestic violence and spouse abuse, some on maternal and child health, some on guarding against child abuse and neglect, some on preschool readiness, some on schooling, some on prevention and control of juvenile delinquency, some on providing recreational opportunities to young people and teenagers, some on managing the transition from school to work, and some on dealing with gang violence. Obviously, some of those functions focus much more directly on the problem of youth violence than others, and some are more closely tied to the individuals who become involved in youth violence, either as victims or perpetrators. But all might play an important role in preventing as well as responding to instances of youth violence.

A slightly different way to think about the functions of government, however, is to divide programs into those that deliver *services* to clients and those that impose *obligations*. Much of government is involved in the delivery of services to particular clients whose needs are considered important to fulfill. We provide low-interest loans to community-based organizations that want to start businesses or build housing in poor neighborhoods. We provide employment training to those who are unemployed. We provide income support to those who are unemployed or unemployable. And so on.

But another part of government is involved in imposing duties on citizens.[18] Through the child protection system, we remind parents and caretakers that they must refrain from abusing and neglecting their children or lose their parental and custodial rights or even face jail terms if they fail to perform their duties. Through the juvenile justice system, we remind both

children and their parents that it is wrong for children to attack the lives and property of others and to engage in conduct, such as truancy or promiscuity, that threatens their future as independent and resourceful citizens.[19] Through the adult criminal justice system, we respond to acts of violence committed by young people as crimes and impose significant jail terms on those who commit such crimes.

In one tempting conception of government crime control programs, one approach to youth violence is primarily social science oriented; it both provides services and prevents violence. A second approach, more law enforcement oriented, both imposes obligations and reacts to violations of them. A little reflection suggests that this is not quite accurate or useful, however. After all, imposing obligations has a potentially important *preventive* effect—not only on the person who becomes the subject of state attention, but also on others, through the example set. The "thin" version of this preventive effect is "deterrence," the altering of the behavior of an individual by threatening punishment for misconduct.[20] The "thick" version of the effect includes "norm creation" and "informal social control." The idea of "thick deterrence" comprises a determined effort to rationalize and legitimize the principles behind the threats that constitute the thin form of deterrence. "Thick deterrence" also seeks to engage many others in the community in imposing more frequent, milder, and more informal sanctions against those who are edging toward serious offending.[21]

There might also be an important role for "service delivery" in *reacting* to instances where misconduct has occurred. The response to a family that has abused and neglected its children might well include significant service components: alcohol treatment for dad, treatment for depression for mom, baby-sitting to provide parents some relief from the rigors of raising children, and special after-school education programs for the kids. The response to a juvenile offender can and usually does involve services as well as jail sentences. Although such interventions come only after at least one offense has occurred (and in that sense have failed to be fully preventive, even with respect to the particular individuals involved, to say nothing of society as a whole), they are nonetheless capable of preventing future offending.

The public health community has a useful way of classifying programs that points up the idea that some programs are preventive and some reactive. They distinguish among "primary," "secondary," and "tertiary" prevention programs. Primary prevention programs target the broad social conditions that enable but do not directly or automatically cause a particular problem. Secondary programs focus on individuals who are at

particularly high risk of being affected by some social or health problem. Tertiary prevention programs come into play after an event has occurred or a condition has emerged, and they seek to both minimize losses and guard against recurrence of the problem.

In the context of youth violence, a primary prevention program might be one that reduces social disadvantages in communities, strengthens maternal and child health services, transforms a culture that favors violence, or reduces the general availability of guns. A secondary program might be one that seeks to reduce the level of violence in families that have a history of violence between spouses or between parents and children or one that works to mediate emerging conflicts among gangs. A tertiary prevention program might be one that responds to gang conflict with a sustained effort to incarcerate the "shooters" and engage the community in counseling the others to refrain from future acts of violence, in their own and the community's interest.

So one can usefully think about the array of government programs along several different dimensions: which level of government finances or operates them, what their focus is and who their client populations are, whether they deliver services or impose obligations or do both in some combination, and where they stand in the chain of prevention. Given the complexity of the problem of youth violence and the virtue of having a portfolio of approaches to deal with it, the complexity of the government structure is a potential aid rather than a hindrance. There are different platforms and approaches that will inevitably produce a portfolio of responses in any given locale. The challenge, of course, is to find some way to use the capabilities of different government programs, in conjunction with those of private institutions, to mount the most effective social response to youth violence.

Building and Deploying Networks of Capacity

The challenge of developing the most effective response to youth violence becomes in turn the challenge of building self-conscious "networks of capacity" that can take the uncoordinated operations of different agencies and turn them into a more or less coherent and well-understood strategy for action that can be implemented successfully. Of course, one can have different degrees of ambition in building a network. The degree of ambition can be measured in terms of the *scope* of the effort and the *depth* and *intensity* of the coordination achieved across agencies.

With respect to scope, for example, one could, at one end of the continuum, try to coordinate the full array of programs that have any impact on youth violence in a city. Somewhere in the middle, one might try to coordinate the activities of community groups, school officials, and criminal justice officials in responding to violence among junior high school and high school students. At the opposite extreme, perhaps, one might try to coordinate the activities of criminal justice agencies responding to emergent gang violence. While these conceptions involve some degree of cross-boundary coordination, the first idea involves a far greater need for coordination than the second, and the second is probably much more demanding than the third. In general, the greater the number of agencies involved, the more distant their relationship to the problem of youth violence, the more ideologically diverse their commitments and professionally diverse their approaches to the problem, and the greater the challenge of coordinating the efforts.

With respect to the depth and intensity of the coordination desired, one can rely on a framework developed by Steven C. Wheelwright and Kim B. Clark that distinguishes four different levels of integration in team structures designed to cross organizational boundaries.[22] Level 1 is the status quo: independent agencies act alone, without explicit or self-conscious coordination, affecting observed levels of youth violence. Level 2 is the "lightweight team structure": a project manager emerges who is responsible for some kind of coordination across agency boundaries but has influence with only a few of the agencies that are supposed to be part of the network. Level 3 is the "heavyweight team structure": the project manager has effective working relationships with all agencies that are defined as important in the network. Level 4 is the "autonomous team structure": the parts of the independent agencies that are particularly important to the amelioration of the problem are essentially independent of the explicit control of their agency and fully integrated in a coherent operation led by the project manager.

Obviously, there is a huge difference in the leadership and management required to create the kind of "parallel play" that occurs at level 1 and that required to create the kind of focused, sustained, and largely autonomous effort that characterizes level 4. One might assume that the goal is always to reach level 4, and once having reached level 4, never again to retreat to level 1. But that need not be true. How closely a cross-boundary enterprise needs to collaborate depends crucially on how much synergy exists among the components of the network. If much of the desired effect on youth

violence comes from having a certain number of programs operating at about the right scale—with little need to make fine adjustments in how each component operates or to integrate their operations at particular times or in the lives of particular clients—then one can get away with the loosest forms of coordination. On the other hand, if the desired effects can be achieved only by integrating the diverse components tightly with one another, then higher levels of coordination are required. If one needs high levels of coordination for a long time, then it might make sense to create a new organization that combines the various components under one unified authority.

For purposes of this analysis, we will assume that the scope of the effort and the depth and intensity of the coordination needed to deal effectively with youth violence lie somewhere between the extremes outlined above. This means that we are squarely in the realm of looking for some of the benefits of cross-agency collaboration, for a long enough time to make a difference in the problem, but we are not committed to creating a special new office for youth violence prevention and control. It is the managerial challenge of constructing this kind of coordination that we need to address.

The Management Literature on Networks of Capacity

Fortunately, over the last several decades, some literature has developed on managing networks of capacity. It has come from the business world, from the world of public administration and management, and from the more specialized world of crime prevention.

The Business Literature: Cross-Functional Project Teams

In concept and perhaps in operation, private sector management has always been a bit simpler than public sector management. In the private sector, we know what is to be managed: the assets of a particular firm. We know who is to manage those assets: the chief executive officer. We also know the purposes for which those assets are to be managed: to maximize the wealth of those who own the assets. And, although uncertain judgments have to be made about the specific products or market strategy that would best achieve that goal, the private sector has always had the advantage of being able to rely on its bottom line to tell it relatively quickly whether the bets it made paid off.

In contrast, the object of management in the public sector is much less clear. Public sector organizations exist, of course. And, to some degree, they

look like bundles of assets to be managed just like those in the private sector. In the public sector, however, we tend to think that the focus of management should not be on how best to use an organization but instead on how best to deal with particular problems. We focus on the management of *policies* to deal with problems, rather than on the management of *organizations* to get the most value from them.

It is significant, I think, that the relationship between managing organizations and managing policies is not entirely clear. Sometimes, we think of public sector organizations as nothing but bundles of policies and programs initiated to solve particular problems. In this view, public sector organizations have no life, no reason to exist apart from their role as implementers of the policies and programs they were created to implement. They are not pieces of capital built up over time that might serve purposes other than those for which they were originally created. They are simply the means to certain ends. Other times, we think of policies and programs as activities that cut across the boundaries of organizations. Indeed, to the extent that this is true, one can understand immediately why cross-boundary partnerships might be important in government.

Not only is it unclear what is to be managed in the public sector, it also is unclear who is in charge of managing. Again, there are people who are designated as "managers" of public sector organizations. But their grip on their organization is far looser—and the amount of discretion they are granted in managing it much less broad—than that of their counterparts in the private sector. They expect to be "micromanaged" by elected officials, who may be motivated to interfere in their affairs by stories in the press.[23] Since often the terms of appointed public sector managers are short, they expect their organizations to be a little less responsive to them, and their employees have many ways of resisting their leadership.[24]

It is also unclear for what purposes public sector organizations are to be managed. Their purposes are supposed to be set out in the legislative mandates that define the policies and programs to be administered by the agency. But legislative mandates typically leave important conflicts about the purposes of the organization unresolved and hand them over to the manager to solve as best he or she can.[25] But because the resolution will always be imperfect, the manager will always be vulnerable to criticism from one quarter or another that weakens his or her control over agency operations. Finally, while it is possible to construct measures to evaluate the performance of public sector organizations, typically those measures are less precise and the evaluations less persuasive and far more expensive to

arrive at than the private sector's bottom line.[26] As a result, public sector managers learn later and less perfectly about what they have accomplished than private sector managers do.

Given the relative simplicity of private sector managers' job, it is particularly significant that one of the problems they have found difficult to handle is that of the cross-boundary team. Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch heralded the problem in an article in the *Harvard Business Review* in 1967.[27] In a study of ten firms, they discovered that the firms were having a hard time coping with the need to respond quickly to changing market conditions and to exploit new technologies. The firms had committed themselves in the past to developing and refining specialized capabilities used to achieve economies of scale; when it became necessary to adapt the old processes to exploit new opportunities, the firms were sluggish and slow. Since the typical problem was to bring a new product on line in a functionally based organization, the authors described the problem as one of "integrating" the different functional units to develop new products or to exploit new production technologies. They defined "integration" as

> the achievement of unity of effort among the major functional specialists in a business. The integrator's role involves handling the non-routine, un-programmed problems that arise among the traditional functions as each strives to do its own job. It involves resolving interdepartmental conflicts and facilitating decisions, including not only such major decisions as large capital investments, but also the thousands of smaller ones regarding product features, quality standards, output, cost targets, schedules and so on.[28]

They also noted that the integrator's role was being performed by individuals with many different titles, and they took the proliferation of titles as a clear indication of the need for this particular function to be performed:

> In recent years there has been a rapid proliferation of such roles as product manager, brand manager, program coordinator, project leader, business manager, planning director, systems designer, task force chairman, and so forth. The fine print in the descriptions of these jobs almost invariably describes the core function as that of integration as we define it.[29]

Other business writers picked up the theme, focusing not only on the function but also on the techniques that managers were using to perform

the function. One technique that attracted a great deal of attention at that time was "project management," an elaborate method of planning and scheduling the steps required to execute a project. John Stewart, a McKinsey consultant, describes the problem to which "project management" was the solution:

> The essence of project management is that it cuts across and in a sense conflicts with the normal organizational structure. Throughout the project, personnel at various levels in many functions of the business contribute to it. Because a project usually requires decisions and actions from a number of functional areas at once, the main interdependencies and flows of information in a project are not vertical, but lateral.[30]

He also noted that while some private sector organizations operated wholly in a traditional functional mode, there were others—specifically, in the construction and aerospace industries—that operated entirely in the project mode.[31] Stewart then went on to define three guidelines for successfully managing projects that cut across the functional boundaries of private firms:

—*Guideline 1.* Define the objective: characterize the intent, scope, and desired end result of the project.

—*Guideline 2.* Establish the project organization: Identify and authorize the project manager; limit the team to work with the manager to the smallest number needed to accomplish the task.

—*Guideline 3.* Install project controls: Develop a detailed schedule of activities with assigned responsibilities and deadlines.

Both articles noted the difficulty that the designated project manager would have in carrying out the project successfully in organizations dominated by functional organizational structures. The managers would be temporarily outside the ordinary lines of organizational authority; they also would take themselves off the established career track in the organizations for which they worked. They would be held accountable for achieving a result without exclusive control over the resources needed to achieve it. They would be in a position to make trouble for their colleagues who remained in charge of functional units by taking resources from them, interfering in their operations, or complaining to top management about their unwillingness to cooperate on the project. All those factors made the job somewhat risky and the individual who took it vulnerable to internal attack.

Lawrence and Lorsch then examined some of the temperamental attributes and interpersonal skills that distinguished successful from less successful project managers. They concluded that successful "integrators" were those who were seen as "contributing to important decisions on the basis of their competence and knowledge rather than on their positional authority" and who demonstrated a well-developed "capacity for resolving interdepartmental conflicts and disputes."[32] They thought that the key personality traits of successful integrators included a higher need for affiliation than for achievement but a high need for both. They were people who liked working with others and were willing to share the credit for the team's accomplishments. They took the initiative and were aggressive and confident, but they also were persuasive and verbally fluent, flexible, and humorous.[33]

The authors also identified three distinct modes of behavior in resolving the inevitable conflicts that arose in executing a project.[34] One was "confrontation." In this mode, the integrator put all the facts on the table and kept the team working until members reached an agreement about how they were going to proceed. The second was "smoothing." In this mode, the integrators emphasized the importance of maintaining friendly relationships among team members and avoiding conflict. The third mode was "forcing." In this mode, the project integrator used all his formal and informal authority to decide the matter. In the authors' view, "confrontation" seemed to work best.

Subsequent authors have examined the development of project teams that cut across organizational boundaries in private companies and come to similar conclusions about the importance of project teams to the success of organizations, the difficulties of creating and sustaining such teams, and the personal styles of leadership and collaboration that make the teams successful. Richard Hackman, reviewing the literature on project teams in business, identified the following conditions as important in ensuring their success:[35]

—A *real team* whose task and composition remains bounded and stable over time, that understands that it is working interdependently for a common goal, and that has the authority to manage its own work and internal processes.

—A *clear, engaging direction* that focuses on ends to be achieved rather than the means to achieve them.

—An *enabling team structure* that includes a motivating team task; a small number of people with the right combination of knowledge and

skills for the task and demonstrated interpersonal skills; and clear norms of conduct that keep attention focused on the work and promote the accountability of team members to one another.

—A *supportive organizational context* that includes a reward system for performance; an educational system that provides for training and assistance; an information system that supports planning and performance; and sufficient material resources to perform well.

One last thing to note about the literature on teams in business enterprises: teams have been used to manage many different kinds of projects. Most commonly, they have been used to overcome the weaknesses of functional organizations in making the investments necessary to bring new products to markets quickly.[36] As that need has become more widespread, organizations have changed their structures: they have shifted from *functional* organizational structures to organizational structures focused on *products* and *customers*. Currently, teams are used most often to improve production processes in order to guarantee quality in existing products and services. Less common is the need for a project team to ensure the quality of an individual product or transaction. The image here might be that of a hospital in treating a patient. The team is required to ensure not only the quality of an individual service (say, coronary bypass surgery) but also that of a stream of subsequent services to the patient (drug therapy, exercise regimen, instruction of the family in the care and support of the patient, and so forth). To do that, sometimes a manager of the capabilities of the hospital as a whole is needed to ensure the quality of the product to the individual consumer.

The Public Management Literature: Cross-Boundary Management

A large and eclectic literature on "cross-boundary management" in the public sector has grown up alongside the literature on "cross-functional teams" in the private sector. While the literatures are similar in many respects, an important difference lies in the nature of the organizational boundary to be crossed. As noted above, the literature on private sector project teams begins with a *firm* as the unit of analysis. The firm may be smaller or larger; it may be a start-up or a well-established enterprise; it may be operated as a "production line" or a "job shop"; it may be highly centralized with tight controls or decentralized with independent profit and loss centers; it may produce a single product or be a multiproduct conglomerate. Nevertheless, the unit of analysis is usually the same—the firm. And one important characteristic of a firm is that somebody is in charge:

somebody with the accountability and authority to manage all the firm's
assets.[38]

In the private sector, the key boundaries to be crossed are usually those
that divide functionally defined subunits within the organization. Those
boundaries typically are crossed when, first, top management recognizes
the need to do so and then acts on that need by appointing project man-
agers, providing fungible resources to the project team, and pledging its
support of the project manager's efforts to enlist the efforts of subunits
within the firm.

In the public sector, however, the unit of analysis is not necessarily a sin-
gle organization. More commonly it is a social problem to be solved or a
policy to be enacted. The work to be done to solve the problem or enact
the policy is not the responsibility of a single organization, but of multiple
organizations, including private and public entities. Here, three different
types of organizational boundaries must be spanned: the boundaries that
divide different levels of government, those that divide government from
the private sector, and those that divide agencies of government at the same
level. Those entities usually do not have a common superior; no coherent
hierarchy of authority spans them; and no single person can command or
authorize their joint effort. In principle, I think, that presents a harder
management problem than the one faced by private enterprises trying to
get new products to markets.

The managerial problem posed by the fact that many social problems
cut across organizational boundaries became manifest in the late 1960s
and early 1970s as the federal government undertook major initiatives to
"keep the world safe for democracy" in the international sphere and to pro-
duce the "Great Society" at home. That problem continues to bedevil the
successful management of large public sector enterprises, including efforts
to respond to youth violence.

THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS. The
first important boundaries are those that divide different *levels* of govern-
ment from one another: the federal from the state, the state from the local.
Those boundaries, of course, were created in the Constitution, and they are
more important in domestic policy (where the federal government typically
is only one player on the field) than in foreign policy (where the federal
government has more of a monopoly). But in the late 1960s, as the federal
government sought to create the Great Society, its inability to operate suc-
cessfully across these boundaries came to be seen as a major impediment to
social progress.[39]

That, at least, was the major finding of a series of studies that examined
the success of federal agencies in "implementing" national policies through
state and local governments.[40] In studies of crime control, education,
employment training, and welfare policies, it became clear that policies
conceived and funded at the federal level looked very different when they
emerged at the local level after crossing the many boundaries that divided
the federal government from the state and local implementing agencies.
The reason was simply that the federal managers of those programs had rel-
atively little formal or informal power to insist on compliance with federal
policies. Nor was there enough time and money to monitor implementa-
tion. Even when monitoring occurred and "problems" were found, lower-
level governments could successfully resist federal intervention through
both political and legal means. In essence, federal policy did not survive the
passage from federal funding and policysetting agencies to state and local
implementing agencies.

Analysts who studied the process of implementing federal polices
searched for ways to ensure their more faithful execution. Some recom-
mendations called for simplifying and clarifying policies that were to be
implemented so that there was less room for confusion and obfuscation.[41]
Others focused on closer monitoring and on the imposition of rewards for
compliance and penalties for noncompliance. But the analysts gradually
realized that their premise might have been false—that "success" in the
implementation of a federal program did not necessarily mean faithful
compliance with federal intentions and directives. Instead, success meant
pushing things at the state and local levels in the direction that the federal
government wanted to move, while negotiating with lower-level govern-
ments on what they thought was important to achieve and taking into
account their judgment about the best means of accomplishing the desired
ends.[42] In effect, the relationship between the federal government and the
lower-level governments was not one of superior and subordinate; it was
instead a relationship among partners in which each partner had its own
purposes and each had its own resources and capabilities.

The challenge, then, was for federal, state, and local managers to figure
out how far they were prepared to go in accommodating the others' inter-
ests and commitments. They learned to talk in terms of federal-state-local
partnerships rather than in terms of the implementation of federal man-
dates. The inevitable result was a much more varied approach to a problem
than the federal government first imagined. That variability strained the
federal government's sense of propriety and accountability, and with that,

its confidence that the states and localities were performing well. At the same time, it accommodated the constitutional reality that the states and localities were independent entities. It may also have produced local policies and programs that reflected local priorities better, took greater advantage of local capabilities, and responded more precisely to local needs. In effect, the different levels of government rediscovered the virtues of the "loosely-coupled" structures of federalism.[43]

MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PARTICIPATION, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS. The second boundary is the one that divides government from the private sector, including both community groups and businesses. Private partners are key to the success of public sector initiatives for several different reasons. First, to some degree, private partners often are the ones who are supposed to benefit from government efforts. When, as a matter of public policy, we decide that we would like to promote the economic or political development of a poor community or that we would like to help private enterprise maintain its competitive edge, we make private sector entities important "customers" and "intended beneficiaries" of government programs. It makes sense, then, for public sector organizations to attend to the private sector's needs and respond to its demands—in effect, to let its demands flow across the boundaries of public sector organizations. In this case, the satisfaction of the private sector is the public sector's goal.

Second, private sector agencies often are important "coproducers" of the results that government agencies are trying to achieve. If the government is trying to make communities safer, for example, its policing efforts will be magnified if it can partner successfully with community groups that are willing to accept some of the responsibility for defending their own communities against crime.[44] If the government is trying to educate children, it benefits from the cooperation of PTAs in mobilizing parents to commit themselves to supplementing classroom instruction at home. If the government is trying to reduce pollution without paying too high a price in terms of economic development, it needs to engage private sector firms in finding and implementing ways to do so.[45] To take advantage of opportunities for coproduction of desired results, public sector organizations have to find ways to develop formal and informal partnerships with the private sector.

Third, private sector entities are important in providing the legitimacy and financial support that government enterprises need to stay in business.[46] If citizens, acting as individuals or in groups, do not believe that the

public enterprises they support create value, they will stop supporting them. With that, public organizations will become less effective. They will lack the money they need. They will fail to get the cooperation they need from citizens in pursuing their goals. And they will fail to enjoy the popularity that comes from being responsive to the needs of their "customers"— citizens who would like to use government enterprises for their individual and collective purposes.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, those ideas were embodied in the notion of "maximum feasible participation" by poor communities in the design and execution of policies that affected them.[47] Putting that notion into practice turned out to be a struggle for local government agencies as they tried to learn how to simultaneously evoke an authentic community voice and respond to it. More recently, the idea has emerged that government should form "public-private partnerships" for everything, from child protection services, to education, to environmental protection.[48] Sometimes partnerships are structured as consulting groups of interested citizens attached to single- or multiple-agency initiatives. Other times, government agencies explicitly contract with private entities to accomplish public purposes through the process of privatization.[49]

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATIONS: MODEL CITIES AND SERVICES INTEGRATION. The third boundary to be managed successfully in public sector enterprises is the one that divides agencies of government at the same level from one another: for example, the gap that yawns wide between diplomatic, intelligence, and military organizations in the foreign policy domain; or the one that separates police departments, schools, and recreation departments at the local level. In many ways, the problem of interagency cooperation within the same level of government most resembles the problem faced by private sector managers. The fact that these agencies operate at one level of government suggests that they can be viewed as part of the same organization. Presumably, the state department, the CIA, and the defense department all work for the president, the "CEO" of the federal government. Similarly, the police department, the school department, and the recreation department all work for the mayor. Yet, even here there are important differences. For example, at the federal level, the president's command often is threatened by Congress, aided and abetted by agency interests of one kind or another. At the local level, mayors have their own struggles with city councils. In addition, however, they may not even have direct control over local schools, which often are guided by separately constituted and elected independent school boards.

Again, the difficulty created by the lack of interagency coordination was first identified in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when discussions began regarding the complexities of the "interagency process" in formulating and executing foreign policy and the role of the National Security Council in managing (as opposed to advising) foreign policy operations.[50] Foreign policy increasingly consisted of more than maintaining diplomatic relationships with individual countries on one hand and fighting declared, conventional wars on the other. Instead, in the diplomatic sphere, foreign policy consisted of trying to accomplish U.S. purposes overseas through increasingly complex multilateral agreements. In the military sphere, foreign policy increasingly relied on operations that were less than all-out, declared wars and that seemed to require a demanding blend of diplomacy, intelligence, and diverse military capabilities to succeed. In short, foreign policy initiatives increasingly combined diplomatic, intelligence, and military capabilities, and each initiative required significant cross-boundary coordination. The whole set of initiatives taken together also had to be coordinated across the boundaries of the state department, the CIA, and the defense department. No wonder the National Security Council became active as the "integrator" of U.S. foreign policy.[51]

At the state and local level, two different concerns animated efforts to encourage interagency coordination. One, closely associated with the Model Cities program, was the idea that resources were misallocated across agencies at the city or neighborhood level.[52] In this view, some problems were more urgent than others, yet funding decisions failed to reflect their urgency. Another view was that the productive synergy that could result if government agencies interacted was being ignored. For example, the provision of new public housing required development of new social service programs to ensure that the full benefits of the housing would be experienced and maintained over time. Yet, such important technical relationships were not captured in budgeting decisions. A housing program would be undertaken without necessarily providing for the social services needed to ensure that the families occupying the housing would be able to build a social as well as a physical community. Efforts were therefore made (often in conjunction with efforts to engage community groups) to improve the allocation of resources.

A second concern was that services were not well integrated at the level of the individual client, whether the client was an individual or a family. The lack of integrated social services could be viewed from the client's perspective as a "service delivery" problem; in that view, it was needlessly expensive and degrading for clients to have to find their way from one

office to another and to submit multiple applications for different programs. But it also could be viewed from the government's perspective as a performance problem. Costs could be reduced if space costs could be shared, application processes could be consolidated, and so forth. Performance in achieving social purposes could be improved if, instead of receiving separate, unnecessary services, clients could get the specific set of services they needed most to improve their social functioning.

To take advantage of opportunities to improve services to clients, lower costs, and improve outcomes valued by society, social service agencies sought to "co-locate" their services in the same building and to institute "one-stop shopping" for their clients. They also sought to simplify the application process for individual programs and to see the individual client not simply as a client of a single program, but as a recipient of benefits from many different programs who had a history with different government organizations. In many respects, the challenge of producing integrated social services by assembling services from many different agencies is analogous to the problem that hospitals face in delivering high-quality care to individual patients. It also is similar to the problem that the foreign policy apparatus faces in trying to mount a successful foreign policy initiative. To succeed, they both have to integrate capacities distributed across different organizational units to deliver a particular product that serves a unique purpose. In this, they can also be likened to the "assembler" in a McDonald's restaurant who moves across the separate production lines to select the drinks, french fries, and sandwiches that constitute a particular customer's order.[53]

Eugene Bardach completed a significant research project examining nineteen cases of interagency collaboration in the public sector in order to determine to what extent interagency collaborations were necessary to the effective performance of government; what conditions favored the creation and operation of successful interagency collaborations; and what kinds of "craftsmanship" went into creating them.[54] Bardach found that such collaborations were often undertaken by government agencies, but he worried that the emphasis on collaboration was animated by general enthusiasm for that particular style of management, not necessarily by its value in improving performance.[55] Still, on reflection, he concluded that it was likely that interagency collaborations were, in fact, much needed in government.[56]

Given that interagency collaborations were needed, it became important to think about how they might be created and sustained and about what would constitute a successful collaboration. Here, Bardach departed from conventional thinking, focusing his attention not only on the specific

activities undertaken by the collaboration but also on its continuing capacity to mount initiatives of one kind or another. He called this the development of "interagency collaborative capacity" (ICC).[57] An enterprise with that capacity was in many ways like an organization in that it had a mission and might even have tangible resources such as personnel and money assigned to it. Yet, Bardach thought the ICCs were better viewed as "virtual organizations," because "when it is functioning properly, an ICC also has intangible resources such as the cooperative dispositions and mutual understanding of the individuals who are trying to work together on a common task."[58] He also noted that ICCs typically had both objective and subjective components:

> The objective component includes formal agreements at the executive level, personnel, budgetary, equipment, and space resources assigned to collaborative tasks; delegation and accountability relationships that pertain to those tasks . . . . The subjective component is mainly the relevant individuals' expectations of others' availability for and competence at performing particular collaborative tasks. These expectations, in turn, are often built around beliefs in the legitimacy and desirability of collaborative action directed at certain goals, the readiness to act on this belief, and trust the other persons whose cooperation must be relied upon for success.[59]

The fact that such collaborations were much needed did not mean that they would inevitably arise. Indeed, significant obstacles to their development existed. Bardach observed:

> [One] major barrier to taking on the collaborative challenge is that resources [such as talented and purposive people and flexible funding] are always scarce . . . . Agencies do not want to give up control over these resources lest their own traditional missions be compromised. Moreover, if a manager wants to work on creating value, creating collaborative capacity may not appear as promising a way to invest time and energy as fixing agency capacity to do its own internal, self-contained tasks better.[60]

He also noted that once a manager or an organization made a commitment to collaborate there was no guarantee of success:

> Working cooperatively is often much more complicated than it sounds. It involves reconciling worldviews and professional ideolo-

gies that cluster within agency boundaries but differ across them. Moreover, it is often difficult to align agencies' work efforts in the face of governmental administrative systems that . . . favor specialization and separateness down to the smallest line item."[61]

A central problem in creating and managing effective interagency collaborations was overcoming the problem of distrust. In his view, distrust was a "corrosive presence in the creative process that ICC partners are necessarily engaged in." Further, distrust often "stood in the way of legitimating a leadership role and sometimes of legitimating the entry of particular persons into a leadership role."[62] In his view, one of the key ingredients necessary to establish an effective interagency collaboration was the emergence of leadership:

> Finding and motivating talented individuals to do the leadership job is a big and important challenge . . . . [Indeed] One might say that in many of the cases when ICCs do not arise, it is not just because agencies do not wish to give up resources and protect turf, but that leaders have not arisen to help organize the potential partners.[63]

Yet, it was by no means obvious where such leadership would come from. As he observed:

> Public management and public administration have no theory about what evokes purposiveness—a combination of public-spiritedness and creativity—in some situations but not in others, or what form it takes when it is invoked.[64]

Bardach's research indicated a significant gap between the number of interagency collaborations established and the number of those sustained within government, and it located the reasons. Bardach also concluded that the most effective single factor in ensuring that collaboration would develop was the emergence of a kind of collective leadership in which a group of individuals, for no particular reason other than that they shared a sense of urgency about dealing more effectively with a problem, took on the substantial risks and burdens of engaging in collaborative problem-solving efforts.

The Crime Prevention Literature: Interagency Collaboration

More recently, and closer to the subject at hand, experience with interagency efforts to prevent crime, including youth violence, has developed as

criminal justice agencies have looked for ways to prevent as well as respond to crime. When they turned their attention to preventing crime, they quickly found that they needed to reach beyond their individual boundaries if they hoped to succeed. In order to do so, they had to both reshape their organizations and build their overall capacity to manage relationships across organizational boundaries. It is worth exploring each of those steps: the shift to crime prevention, the need to reshape criminal justice institutions, and the keys to success in managing interagency initiatives.

THE CHANGING PARADIGM OF CRIME CONTROL. Throughout much of history, the social response to crime has been largely reactive: we have waited for crimes to occur and then sought to find and punish the perpetrator.[65] That approach was consistent with the aim of doing justice: it called offenders to account for their crime. It was also consistent with the valued goal of minimizing state intrusiveness: the substantial power of the state to interfere in private affairs—to stop citizens on the street, to investigate their activity, to bring charges against them, and so forth—would be used only when an actual crime warranted its use. It may even have been effective in preventing some crimes—by incapacitating offenders who would otherwise continue to commit crimes, by deterring potential offenders with the prospect of punishment, or by rehabilitating offenders who were caught.

To many, however, that response did not fully exploit the potential for preventing crime. Initially, the drive to prevent as well as react to crime focused on the importance of eliminating its "root causes," which were thought to lie in the very structure of American society: in its economic inequity, its racism, its cultural predilection for violence, and so on.[66] Indeed, it was important to solve those problems for many reasons besides the wish to reduce crime, but the root causes proved stubborn. Gradually, then, different approaches to crime prevention emerged that lay somewhere between the reactive and the root causes approaches to crime control.[67] As the crime prevention movement developed, three different ideas took hold.

The first was the idea that crime could be prevented by intervening in the social processes that produced future offenders, which is closest to the traditional idea that the root causes of crime should be eliminated.[68] Prevention would involve intervening in the lives of young people who were growing up in adverse circumstances in order to make their lives better by protecting them from domestic violence, providing them with more immediate access to a good education, giving them appropriate role models and mentors, and so forth.

This approach differs from the root causes approach in that its focus—children at risk of becoming future dangerous offenders and their families—is narrower. What made this narrower approach possible were two factors. The first was the development of indicators to help identify children and families that are particularly at risk.[69] Some of those indicators focus on the background of the children, such as living in poverty, coming from a broken home, or having antisocial or abusive parents.[70] Others focus on the behavior of the children themselves at early stages, such as misconduct in school or substance abuse.[71] The second factor was the development of interventions that seem to reduce the probability that such children would become offenders in the future. Both prenatal care and early childhood education seem to be able to deter at-risk children from taking paths that lead to dangerous offending.[72] It may also be true that mentoring programs and certain kinds of juvenile justice programs can succeed in deflecting the trajectories of these children.

The second preventive idea focuses not on intervening in the social processes that produce offenders but in the social processes that produce occasions for offending.[73] In this conception, criminal offending (and perhaps even the development of criminal offenders) can be reduced by reducing opportunities for offending. This approach focuses on intervening in "hot spots" where crimes seem to occur—such as bars, drug markets, housing projects, or disputed gang turf[74]—and an intervention could be any action that seems to be plausibly effective in controlling crime at a particular place and time. It could be a "directed patrol" to ensure a police presence at places and times where and when crimes are likely to be committed. Or it could involve a deeper, more preventive effort, such as using the licensing power of the state to insist on safer, more orderly conditions in bars; demanding that abandoned buildings that serve as shelters for drug dealers be razed; or evicting tenants whose violence has turned a housing project into a threatening place.[75] Crime prevention also could involve efforts to mediate the festering disputes within families, between landlords and tenants, between warring gangs, or between racial groups. It could involve other kinds of creative problem-solving initiatives that make situations that were once criminogenic less so.[76]

The third crime prevention idea focuses not on the target of the intervention (future offenders or opportunities for offending) but on the character of the intervening agent. This idea suggests that crime prevention can best be accomplished not through the formal social control exercised by the agencies of the criminal justice system but through the informal social control exerted by community residents, groups, and associations.[77] In one

limited manifestation of this idea, the community becomes the eyes and
ears of the criminal justice system, broadening and reinforcing its response
to crime. In the broader view, however, it is the power of the members of
a community to establish norms and sanction misconduct when they see it
that actually does the work of regulating most social behavior.[78] If that
energy can be mobilized and channeled to meet crime prevention objec-
tives, then there may be less need for formal social interventions, whether
they come from criminal justice or social service agencies.

Taken together, these three approaches add up to a paradigm for crime
prevention that differs markedly from both an attack on root causes and a
criminal justice response restricted to catching offenders. We have, instead,
the idea of using community groups, social service agencies, and criminal
justice agencies to intervene early in the lives of at-risk children and to use
their collective powers to resolve problems that seem to be occasioning
crimes in the community.

Organizing to Act in Accord with the New Paradigm

Because these new crime prevention opportunities involve collaborations
across government agencies and between government agencies and com-
munity groups, they require new organizational forms. At the outset, that
is a serious problem, for, as a British Home Office report on crime preven-
tion observed, "At present crime prevention is a peripheral concern for all
the agencies involved and a truly core activity for none of them."[79] Efforts
to develop crime prevention capabilities face a dual challenge. On one
hand, they have to build an interest in and capacity for focusing on crime
prevention within existing organizations; on the other, they have to build
the structures that keep the partnerships going. ·

With respect to building the necessary structures to prevent crime
through existing agencies, criminal justice organizations are probably the
most advanced. Among criminal justice organizations, the police are prob-
ably more advanced than prosecutors, courts, or correctional agencies.
Most social service and community-based organizations do not start with
a well-developed focus on crime prevention because that is not their prin-
cipal purpose. On the other hand, many criminal justice agencies have
begun to take an interest in finding ways to prevent crime besides arresting
offenders. The police, in particular, have taken up efforts to prevent as well
as respond to crime. They have focused on serious juvenile offenders, hop-
ing to interrupt their progress toward adult serious offending.[80] They have
concentrated problem-solving efforts on hot spots that seem to generate

criminal activity.[81] And they have reached out to form community part-
nerships under the banner of community policing.[82]

Recently prosecutors and the courts also have experimented with efforts
to prevent future crime as well as process the cases that come to them.
Prosecutors have developed special offices to deal with family violence, and
they have begun to consult communities to discern the impact that partic-
ular kinds of crime have on the community in order to adjust their prose-
cutorial priorities.[83] Judicial authorities have turned to drug courts and
community courts to supplement the standard case processing that goes on
in adult felony courts in an attempt to be more effective in preventing
crime and reducing fear than they would be by relying on traditional mod-
els.[84] Now, corrections and probation officials also are considering the
potential of crime prevention—not through more effective rehabilitation
of offenders but through partnerships with communities that can help
them both monitor and support offenders following their conviction or
release from prison.[85] As a result, criminal justice agencies now have the
inclination and the capability to lead and join crime prevention enterprises.
But what kind of enterprises are available for them to join? England's
Home Office has spent the last decade studying crime prevention efforts
initiated under the Safer Cities Program, established in 1991. Nick Tilley,
who evaluated many of those programs, described their typical adminis-
trative and organizational structure:

> Each project (27 Safer Cities Programmes) has three members of staff
> including a co-ordinator, an assistant co-ordinator, and a personal
> assistant. All are temporary appointments of people with a good
> knowledge of the area. In addition, each project has a steering group,
> drawn from local authorities, the private sector, voluntary organiza-
> tions, and government agencies active in the area, though there are
> quite wide variations in who is included within this general frame-
> work. Care was taken to ensure where possible that there was ethnic
> minority representation. The project staff service the steering group
> . . . . [The steering group's] terms of reference are: a) to act as a focus
> for the local multi-agency crime prevention partnership; b) set prior-
> ities for the project and oversee the implementation of community
> safety measures; c) to facilitate contact and co-operation between
> local agencies and interests.[86]

Those responsible for initiating and leading cross-agency partnerships
found the same difficulties that many others before them had found:

[P]articipants in multi-agency work are usually quick to recognize [that] agencies having an interest in crime prevention seldom share the same priorities, working practices, definitions of the problem, power, or resource base. While interagency relations . . . can obviously be both positive and productive, our research . . . suggests that they are also highly complicated, seldom static, and influenced by a variety of institutional, individual, and local/historical factors.[87]

For purposes of analyzing how the interagency initiatives were structured and worked, the British researchers Liddle and Gelsthorpe relied on five models of a cooperative relationship, each one representing a higher level of integration:
—the communication model (parallel play)
—the cooperation model (parties agree to work on a problem together)
—the coordination model (parties combine their resources but retain individual control of them)
—federation model (services are integrated)
—merger model (collective resources are pooled and allocated according to the purposes of the integrated group).[88]
They also made the important observation that levels of cooperation could vary dramatically across and between hierarchical levels in the partnership as well as across the different agencies. They noted that

a spirit of cooperation among representatives on a strategic level . . . might coexist with acrimonious relations at the line worker level . . . . Research conducted at the Cambridge Institute of Criminology . . . suggests that productive cross-agency links are sometimes accompanied by lack of support at higher levels, while in some crime prevention schemes of a more 'top down' sort high-level resolutions concerning interagency cooperation in a few cases ran into major difficulties at implementation levels.[89]

On the basis of several years of experience with these various initiatives, Liddle and Gelsthorpe presented their conclusions regarding the kinds of structure that were consistent with successful interagency collaborations, the number and types of participants to be included in the initiatives, the forms of leadership that were necessary, and the stages of development that many of the initiatives went through.[90]
With respect to *structure*, the team reached four important conclusions:

—Effective multiagency crime prevention cannot be undertaken in the absence of some form of structure, although that structure can vary in its level of formality.
—Informal multiagency structures can have the advantage of allowing for quick response, but they also tend to be less durable and less well-adapted to policy coordination than formal structures.
—Crime prevention measures delivered throught informal multiagency networking tend to be difficult to monitor and evaluate. Informal networking can also give rise to questions concerning accountability and confidentiality.
—Top-tier multiagency groups having jurisdiction throughout a local authority can maximize the benefits of multiagency crime prevention initiatives.[91]
With respect to the *number and character of participants*:
—Membership should be just broad enough to facilitate the intended crime prevention effort.
—Questions about community and ethnic representation require careful consideration by participants; those questions affect both the identity of the group and subsequent ownership of group actions.
—Imbalance in the bureaucratic rank of members can lead to tensions in the group and to higher-level members dropping out.
—Front tier (high-level) representatives are preferable, since they have the authority to commit resources. Lower-level actors are valuable in action/implementation, but they need support from upper levels if their engagement is to remain solid.[92]
With respect to *authorized leadership* :
—Perceptions about which agency is in the lead often vary considerably among participants; leadership tends to change over time.
—The concept of lead agencies sits uneasily with the more recent notion of "partnerships" in multiagency work because it suggests the creation of a hierarchy instead of a partnership.
—Some current crime prevention work is best described in terms of a corporate model, in which coordination, decisionmaking, and implementation of work are regarded for the most part as being the responsibility of the multiagency group as a whole.
—The corporate approach seems to be becoming more popular in the field of crime prevention?[93]
Liddle and Gelsthorpe were particularly interested in how leadership

was sustained over time and in the way that the leadership acquired full capability in coordinating (in the sense of directing and controlling) the operations of a group whose members remained accountable to their home organizations. They judged this kind of direction and control to be "essential for effective multiagency crime prevention work" and the lack of adequate coordination to be "one of the most common difficulties encountered." They also thought that while coordination is "ideally provided through a dedicated individual, it can also be taken on by members of a multiagency group on a rotating basis, or by the group as a whole."[94]

The problem of creating and sustaining leadership in the initiatives studied was particularly difficult since many of the programs did not emerge organically from the communities in which they were operating. They were established by the Home Office. A crime prevention coordinator was then appointed, who faced the difficult problem of establishing himself or finding someone else who could exercise effective leadership of the group. Nick Tilley reached back to sociologist George Simmel's notion of a "stranger," someone who would have special advantages and disadvantages in exercising leadership, to hold the crime prevention initiatives together:

> According to Simmel, a stranger is someone who is in but not of a particular social setting, close and far at the same time. The stranger can achieve, and be seen to achieve a kind of objectivity. The stranger enjoys the freedom which flows from independence from the restraints of membership in indigenous institutions. The stranger is often asked to arbitrate disputes. The stranger can act as a go-between. The stranger can enjoy trust, being detached from the interests at play inside a social setting. The stranger is not part of the hierarchies of those amongst whom he or she moves and can thus connect with them at various levels. What is not entailed by this, however, is any particular behavior on the part of the stranger; rather the position presents different opportunities and constraints from those which obtain for the insider . . . . Safer Cities Projects can be understood as stranger institutions, and their staff as embodiments of that stranger status.[95]

This model also influenced Tilley's understanding of how crime prevention initiatives might develop over time. He saw five distinct phases:

—1. The suspicious incomer: building trust
—2. The honest broker: building motivation/capacity

—3. The necessary catalyst: building structure
—4. The faithful servant: nurturing structure/strategy
—5. The guest who stayed too long: exiting.[96]

Finally, Tilley developed a "set of guidelines [drawn from the experience of sixteen Safer Cities sites] formulated for the sake of clarity and directness as 'rules'."[97] In publishing the guidelines as rules, he cautioned the reader to bear in mind three important limitations: "First, that to date progress everywhere is limited—no fully worked-out exemplars were found among the Safer City areas; second, that only Safer Cities were examined; third, this was a quick piece of work."[98] The guidelines for developing local crime prevention strategies are summarized and paraphrased below for an American audience:

—Do not expect immediate acceptance.
—Make and maintain contact with key policymakers.
—Foster network development among agencies.
—Take special care not to alienate local political authority or the police.
—Diagnose the local setting in terms of politics, personalities, structure, and finance.
—Expect and accept the commitment of agencies to their particular mission.
—Become substantively knowledgeable in crime prevention.
—Develop the credibility of the idea of crime prevention.
—Start with "low-hanging fruit."
—Keep in touch with operations at point of delivery; be aware of actions, not just agreements.
—Engage the public.
—Use a pincers approach: both bottom up and top down.
—Frame approaches to align with agencies' existing goals.
—Be alert to situations in which the potential for effective joint action is undermined by lack of confidence that a necessary partner will cooperate, and when such situations are found, move to ensure trust.
—Work with existing crime prevention partnerships.
—Develop competence and interest in partner agencies through discussion, shared work, and training.
—Get publicity and share credit.
—If the initiative gets stuck, either because partners cannot figure out what works or because they become locked in conflict, bring in new outsiders.
—Exploit opportunities at the national level.

—Align sources of data.

—Be patient in developing the strategy to be pursued by the partnership.[99]

Lessons for the Management of Strategies for Preventing and Responding to Youth Violence

What does all of this literature have to say about the managerial task of mounting an effective response to local outbreaks of youth violence in communities across the country? The general conclusion is that it is hard. It is hard not just because no institution by itself can solve the problem; it is hard primarily because it is difficult to mount and sustain an initiative that draws on assets and capabilities distributed across different institutions. The literature reviewed above provides many hints about how to maximize the chances of success, however. It might be helpful to organize those different ideas in a simple, overarching conception to guide those who manage such initiatives.

The Strategic Triangle

In other work on public sector management, a relatively simple concept has proven to be remarkably useful—the "strategic triangle," first developed at the Kennedy School of Government.[100] It was originally created as a guide on how to position an entire public organization in its particular environment. It turns out to be equally useful, however, when used to position a subordinate unit of an organization or, more relevant to our purposes here, to consider the feasibility of a particular policy initiative and the steps needed to ensure its effective implementation. The triangle, illustrated in figure 12-1, points to three calculations that leaders and managers must make as they commit themselves and their organizations to particular purposes. One point of the triangle focuses attention on the "public value" that they are seeking to produce. In the case of youth violence, it would be a reduction in the rate at which young people become victims or perpetrators of violence. It might also be a reduction in any events that contribute to violence, such as drive-by shootings (regardless of whether anyone is injured), or perhaps even in the existence of violent gangs. One could also think of the value of reducing the level of fear in both the youth and adult populations, including those close to the violence and those further removed. Those things might be valued as means to the end of reducing violence through prevention, or they might be valued as ends in themselves because they are intrinsically more pleasurable than their opposites.

Figure 12-1. *Strategy in the Public Sector*

The second point of the triangle focuses attention on the legitimacy of and support for a particular initiative. The diagnostic question is simply this: where will the resources—the money, the people, the energy, the continuing support—needed to achieve the goal come from? Often, money is the important issue. But in many initiatives to control youth violence, the important resources may be instead the willingness of partners to contribute resources that they already have to the goals of the initiative. Families have to refocus on supervising their children and preventing easy access to weapons. Church leaders have to use their considerable powers of moral suasion to help mobilize informal social controls designed to reduce violence. Schools have to stop denying the reality of violence in their classrooms and schoolyards and find effective ways of responding to it, with or without the help of police departments. And so on.

It is hard to legislate coalitions into existence. It is easier to put some money on the table to start a coalition or for someone in authority to authorize someone else to organize one. But those are hardly foolproof methods. Many antiviolence initiatives that begin with a grant or the

appointment of a violence prevention czar will fail. Many others will succeed without that kind of support. It is by no means obvious what resources are required to sustain the commitment of a loose coalition. However, what seems to be crucial in sustaining an enterprise long enough to make a difference is the effective use of information about the scope and nature of the problem. That information is important first in dramatizing the significance of the problem and galvanizing people into action. It is important second in finding plausibly effective points of intervention. And it is important third in monitoring the coalition's efforts and accomplishments in dealing with the problem. In effect, it is the promise of the value to be realized through a sustained initiative that is crucial in mobilizing support, and a vivid display of that value, based on solid information, does the work of mobilizing the required material resources.

Public initiatives often need more than money and other kinds of material resources; those focused on responding to youth violence, in particular, often need the authority of the state to make arrests and prosecute those accused of civil and criminal violations. And if the formal authority of the state is complemented by the emergence of informal social controls whose aims are closely aligned with those of the state, the impact of an initiative often can be reinforced. It is one thing for an alien police force to sweep through a housing project arresting people whom the police judge to be threats to the community. It is quite another for the community itself, because it feels responsible for maintaining order within its own sphere, to ask the police for assistance in protecting it from an individual whose drug dealing and extortion have terrorized residents for months.

To magnify the effect of state action, whether that action provides services to or imposes obligations on citizens, it is necessary to earn the consent and support of the community as well as to have a continuing flow of money, material, and people. In effect, the enterprise needs legitimacy in the eyes of those affected, and it needs the capacity to exert formal and informal social control as well as to provide services of various kinds.

The third point of the triangle focuses attention on the operational capacity of an initiative to achieve the desired results. It is one thing to have an attractive purpose; it is another to have enthusiastic support and a supply of resources dedicated to achieving that purpose; and it is quite another to build the actual operational capacity needed to get the job done. This is partly a matter of knowing which interventions might have an effect; it is also a matter of using that knowledge to turn the flow of fungible resources into actual operations that produce results. Note that this point of the tri-

angle is labeled "operational capacity" rather than "organizational capacity" because in the public sector, managers nearly always must try to supplement the capabilities of the organizations they lead with contributions from other agencies. For example, if one is trying to keep the streets clean, one can deploy a fleet of garbage trucks and street sweepers. But it is also valuable to persuade citizens to take their garbage to the curb in sealed containers, to refrain from littering, and to sweep their own sidewalks. Similarly, if one is trying to educate children, one can concentrate on classrooms, teachers, and curriculums. But those efforts are nearly always more effective if parents can be engaged to persuade children to do their homework faithfully. If it is important for a single organization to enlist outside agencies in the "coproduction" of its mission, it is particularly important to do so when one is trying to assemble a coalition to prevent and control youth violence. In this case, no single organization has the principal "operational capacity" needed. Instead, the required operational capacity is distributed across various organizations, and the managerial challenge is to consolidate and apply it to achieve the desired results.

The strategic triangle indicates that in initiating an antiviolence initiative, it is important to address the value to be produced (and how to measure it); the legitimacy and support needed to mount and sustain the enterprise; and the operational capability necessary to achieve the result. But *all* of those issues must be addressed in a consistent way or the enterprise as a whole will fail. There may be significant public value to be produced by mounting an antiviolence initiative, but that does little good if those with the resources needed for the effort do not agree. Similarly, the purpose may be attractive and the resources necessary to produce the result may be plentiful, but without an effective program, the enterprise will fail.

The Locus of Initiative and Leadership

In presenting the strategic triangle as a simple planning and management tool, I have implicitly assumed that someone or some group has taken or accepted the responsibility to do something to control youth violence—that leadership has emerged or managerial accountability for undertaking an initiative has been established. Yet, as noted above, one of the problems that must be overcome in creating such initiatives is to find someone, or some group, to take that kind of responsibility.

A leader, or a leadership group, could arise spontaneously among those concerned about the problem. That leadership could emerge among the people most affected by the violence—the families of the victims or the

youths themselves—or it could emerge among those who feel close to them—for example, community or church leaders, schoolteachers, or coaches. It also could emerge among people who feel a professional responsibility for the problem, such as city council members, mayors, police officers, or prosecutors. Alternatively, the leadership role could be assigned to someone by a responsible government official. The attorney general of the United States, for example, could ask U.S. attorneys to take responsibility for mounting a youth violence program in their areas of responsibility, or a mayor could establish a youth violence task force. However the leadership emerges, one could say that leadership is a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, component of an effective antiviolence initiative. We are accustomed to thinking that leadership is essential and that only an individual who has been formally and informally authorized to exercise leadership can do so. Yet it may be unreasonable to expect that form of leadership in producing youth violence initiatives, and it may not be particularly helpful.

It is important to consider how concentrated, stable, and formal the leadership must be for the enterprise to succeed. The evidence seems to suggest that successful initiatives are produced by groups whose leadership changes over time rather than those that have only one stable leader. There may be a need for a continuing presence and sufficient institutional memory to support the work of an interagency initiative, but that comes more often from someone in a staffing and enabling role than from someone who stands out front as the formal leader. One can hypothesize that the strongest form of leadership for an interagency initiative would be one in which

—the chairperson has significant formal and informal authority but not a particularly strong agenda of his or her own;

—enabling staff record the agreements reached by the group and check on the execution of the agreed-upon actions; and

—a group of people with purposes and resources of their own voluntarily commit themselves to a combined effort in the belief that it will be more effective than they would be on their own.

In effect, leadership takes the form of a forum in which value-creating deals can be struck among independent actors. The glue that holds the enterprise together, in the absence of formal authority, comes from

—some degree of shared commitment to dealing with the problem;

—some recognition of operational interdependence; and

—a whole lot of creative deal making, in which the deals are public and the parties' reliability in living up to the deals is made apparent.

Individual members' sense of accountability to the team for doing what they say they will do to deal with the problem takes the place of the formal authority of a "boss."

Creating the Governing and Operating Structures

Once a leader or leadership team takes or is given the responsibility for action, the leadership must figure out who else needs to be involved, either as authorizers or as doers. This is an important strategic calculation that focuses on

—the number of principals in the enterprise

—the hierarchical level of the principals

—the cultural divides that exist within the team.

Obviously, if one wants to mount a truly comprehensive attack on the problem of youth violence, one is tempted to reach for a large number of high-level people. One is also tempted to view cultural divides—such as those that might exist among community groups, business leaders, and government officials or between social service and criminal justice agencies—as problems to be solved rather than as fundamental differences that might actually threaten the effectiveness of the initiative. But, again, the evidence seems to indicate that there are real limits to the number of people that can be involved in a coherent partnership, especially when it is getting started. The basic operating principles seem to be the following:

—First, the partnership should include those people who can commit the kind and level of resources needed to make some significant dent in the problem. Otherwise, the partnership will find itself unable to act.

—Second, if one is tempted to create a large and diverse group of principals, one must recognize that the cost of staffing and sustaining the partnership will increase dramatically and the speed with which it can act will decrease. That is probably especially true if the partnership has its own resources to allocate, because conflicts over funding priorities may threaten the cohesiveness of the group.

—Third, it may be best to balance the interest in authorization with the desire for fast action and reliable execution by creating different partnerships at different levels. In the foreign policy world, for example, it is customary to pair a high-level group of principals who commit their collective authority to support an interagency initiative with a lower-level working group that actually implements the initiative.

Because potential participants might be committed to both a particular purpose and a particular way of achieving it, the desired overall strategy of

the partnership guides the leadership group in deciding which principals to include. For example, if a youth violence task force is composed largely of police, prosecutors, and judges, in all likelihood the problem will be defined as one of dangerous offenders and youth gangs and the most appropriate intervention as the arrest and prosecution of those involved. If, on the other hand, a youth violence initiative is rooted in the school system or in community groups, the definition of the problem and the solution might be quite different. However, once the members of the group begin to work with one another to solve the problem, the overall strategy of the group might begin to change. As the strategy changes, the group may decide to include different people; it may even decide that some people who were originally included are no longer needed. So, while the initial set-up is important and probably exercises a profound effect on the path that a youth violence initiative takes, it is not set in stone. It adapts and changes over time.

Negotiating and Coordinating Interests and Actions

If a youth violence initiative is in fact a group of interdependent actors held together by a more or less shared commitment to the group's goal and some sense of operational interdependence in achieving that goal, then much of the effectiveness of the group will depend on the skill that each member has in negotiating agreements with his or her colleagues about what they will do to achieve it. Negotiating agreements with peers is different from both directing and controlling subordinates and being directed and controlled by a boss. Negotiating in front of an audience that expects a good-faith negotiating effort and reliable execution also is challenging. Creating favorable conditions for making deals and reliably executing them is probably the primary task of those who assume the responsibility for keeping the enterprise going.

   While this sort of mutual contracting capability may be difficult to create in the beginning, it may very well get easier over time and as the partnership records some successes. At the outset, the parties to the negotiation may not know what they can count on from one another, in terms of either negotiating style or reliability in living up to agreements. Some may enter the negotiating process with a great deal of suspicion; that suspicion, in turn, may drag out the negotiations and prevent valuable deals from being struck. Once a few deals are done, however, the overall contracting capacity of the group might go up significantly. Members may become more adept at coordinating their negotiating styles and more confident

that, once made, a deal will be honored. Indeed, over time, the group's approach might change from deal making to joint problem solving. At that stage, the overall performance of the group should dramatically improve and the rate at which it adapts, innovates, and shares resources should go up dramatically.

The Role of Information Systems

An information system that can monitor both the state of the problem and the efforts made to solve it is essential to the success of an interagency partnership. Accurate information about the state of the problem helps keep the problem in sharp focus, reminding the partners why they came together and what they are trying to accomplish. Partnerships also need some evidence of success to stay together. To the extent that the data describing the problem reveal some desired results, the feedback helps sustain and expand the capacity of the group to act. Information on actions taken by the partnership to deal with the problem also is important because each member needs to know what other members are doing in order to be confident that everyone is pulling his own weight and living up to the agreements made. Both kinds of information may have external importance as well. Public initiatives such as a youth violence partnership are always broadly accountable to the public, and their actions and accomplishments will be reported by the media. If the partnership has been funded by foundations, other donors, or higher levels of government, the funders may demand an accounting of the group's actions and accomplishments—or they may simply respond favorably if that information is provided. In addition, the partnership itself may value the public's favorable perception of its work and benefit from making itself publicly accountable. For all these reasons, the partnership must pay special attention to the development of its information processing capabilities.

Project Management Skills

The development of significant project management skills, like the development of negotiation skills and high-quality information systems, is important in an interagency partnership. Project management requires the ability to translate negotiated deals into a set of scheduled activities to be undertaken by members of the team. Ideally, these activities could be shown in some sort of chart. The chart would provide a handy way of indicating what key pieces of information would have to be collected to show whether members of the partnership had in fact taken the steps they

promised to take to further the goals of the partnership. Such a chart would also provide a graphic illustration of the interdependence of the independent members of the group. A strong sense of interdependence, in turn, would help create the sense of mutual accountability that substitutes for formal authority in the group. It is hard work to create and keep a schedule of activities, with assigned responsibilities, up to date. But such a device is very effective in keeping an interagency team focused on the work that they need to do *together* instead of the work that their home agency plans for them to do in addition to their interagency work. Along with the creation of a first-rate information processing capacity, the development of a schedule might be the most important job for those who staff the interagency collaboration over time.

Conclusions

There are strong reasons for relying on collaborations that span the boundaries dividing levels of government from one another, agencies of government from one another, and private agencies from government agencies in efforts to deal with youth violence. Such collaborations are necessary to legitimize, fund, equip, and operate the complex strategies that are most likely to succeed in both controlling and preventing the problem. The difficulty, however, is that collaborative efforts are expensive, fragile, and unreliable. Moreover, their development and management requires not only a different outlook, but also different managerial skills from those needed in established, hierarchical organizations. They need people who take responsibility rather than wait to have it assigned to them; people who are good at finding and exploiting value-creating deals among peers rather than supervising subordinates; people who are committed to using information about efforts and results instead of complying with procedures; and people who are fanatic about operational details and living up to agreements rather than people who cover up conflicts and disagreements by being vague about their commitment. If such people can be recruited or developed, then the cost of interagency partnerships will go down and their robustness and effectiveness will be dramatically enhanced.

The United States has always been able to rely on its citizens and officials to respond to important public problems when they emerged. It has always been able to rely on a resourceful commitment to practical experimentation to find solutions to problems that initially seemed intractable. We have plenty of evidence that such an approach can work as we face the

problem of dealing with youth violence. The challenge facing those of us who care about and act upon the problem is to accelerate the rate at which we are able to learn from our experience. We must document what we have done, share it with others, and reflect upon and talk about what we have learned—not only about which programs seem to work, but also about the leadership and management questions that face those who try to initiate and sustain complex, interagency problem-solving initiatives.

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