"Problem-Solving Policing and Crime Prevention"

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October 2, 1997

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(DRAFT: References to Be Supplied)

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A Paper Prepared for the International Conference on:

Problem-Solving Policing as Crime Prevention

Sponsored by the Swedish National Police College,

September 10-11, 1996

(DRAFT: Not to be Cited or Quoted without Permission of Author)

I. Introduction

Police have long thought they were in the business of preventing crime -- not just reacting to it.[1] After all, their primary practical goal has been to reduce criminal victimization. To accomplish that goal, police strategists relied on two important preventive ideas:1) dissuading those contemplating crimes from committing them by confronting them with the imminent threat of arrest and punishment (general deterrence);[2] and 2) preventing those who had already committed crimes from doing so again through specific deterrence, incapacitation, and (to the degree possible) rehabilitation.[3] Of course, to achieve the latter goals (specific deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation), the police had to depend on other parts of the criminal justice system doing their jobs. But the police could at least usefully begin this process by arresting offenders and developing credible evidence against them. To threaten and produce arrests and effective prosecutions, the police relied predominantly on three operational tactics:1) patrol (both random and directed); 2) rapid response to calls; and 3) retrospective investigation.[4]

A. Proactive Patrol as Crime Prevention

Recently, however, police have become much more keenly interested in a broader idea of crime prevention; one that relies less on arrests produced by patrol, rapid response and retrospective investigation, and more on other more proactive tactics. Indeed, the profession has come to recognize just how reactive their current tactics are. They chafe against the fact that their current tactics keep them at the surface of social life and allow them to intervene only after a crime has been committed. Of course, reliance on reactive tactics such as patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation has the important virtue of guarding privacy and keeping citizens free from too intrusive a police presence. But reliance on these tactics also limits the capacity

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[1] See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. 1967. *Task Force Report: The Police.* Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office; Orlando W. Wilson and Roy McLaren. 1977. *Police Administration,* Fourth Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.

[2] For a classic discussion of deterrence, see Zimring, Franklin and Gordon Hawkins. 1973. *Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. For a more recent discussion of "thick deterrence," see David Kennedy. 1997. "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention." *Valparaiso Law Review* 31: 449-484; also Kennedy, David, Anne M. Piehl, and Anthony A. Braga. 1996. "Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59: 147-196.

[3] For discussion of incapacitation, see Blumstein, Alfred, Jacqueline Cohen, Jeffrey Roth, and Christy Visher. 1986. *Criminal Careers and "Career Criminals."* Volumes I and II. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. For a discussion of Rehabilitation, see Lipton, Douglas, Robert Martinson, and Judith Wilks. 1975. *The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluations.* New York: Praeger; Martinson, Robert. 1974. "What Works-- Question and Answers About Prison Reform." *The Public Interest* 35: 22-54; Sechrest, Lee, Susan White, and Elizabeth Brown (eds.) 1979. *The Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: Problems and Prospects.* Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

[4] Sparrow, Malcolm, Mark H. Moore and David M. Kennedy. 1990. *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing.* New York: Basic Books.

of the police to prevent crime to those limited effects that can be wrung from the unreliable mechanisms of deterrence. That has always seemed an uncertain bet -- particularly when the police were dealing (as they often were) with impulsive or irrational offenders. Moreover, waiting for crimes to be committed seemed inconsistent with the kind of aggressive, determined efforts to reduce crime that many police would like to provide. So, it has come to seem obvious that significant crime reduction benefits could be gained by adopting less reactive and more proactive strategies.

This general idea was expressed first, perhaps, in more proactive patrol tactics. These included what the Chicago Police Department called "aggressive preventive patrol." Officers in the Chicago Police Department explained this tactic when Moore was conducting interviews and field observations to learn how Chicago police officers were able to seize more guns than other municipal police departments.[5] Aggressive preventive patrol, they explained, meant "sticking your nose in other peoples business." It also meant being willing to "mix it up with the bad guys." Outside of Chicago, aggressive patrol tactics also included "directed patrols," i.e. patrol operations directed at particular places and times that were particularly likely to contain criminal offenses, or targeted on particular individuals who were thought to be active offenders.[6] And such tactics also included "decoy" and "sting" operations in which the police posed as potential robbery victims or "fencing" operations in an effort to get potential robbers and burglars to reveal themselves in the act of committing crimes.[7]

Note that while these tactics all differ from the predominantly reactive tactics (in the sense that the police take the initiative in anticipating when and where crimes might occur and positioning themselves at the scene before the crime is committed), they resemble traditional tactics insofar as they are all focused on producing arrests. Of course, such efforts may always produce preventive, deterrent effects as will as arrests. But the basic logic behind the design of these operational tactics is to position the police to catch offenders as they are proceeding to commit a crime.

B. Problem Solving as Crime Prevention

The general idea that proactive efforts to prevent crime might constitute an important element of police operations got an important (and transforming) boost with the publication of Herman Goldstein's classic article

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[5] For the results of this and other investigations into the ways that police enforced weapons laws, see Mark H. Moore. 1980. "The Police and Weapons Offenses" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 455: 92-109.

[6] For a discussion of directed patrol operations, see Pate, Anthony, Robert Bowers, and Ron Parks. 1976. "Three Approaches to Criminal Apprehension in Kansas City: An Evaluation Report." Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

[7] For more on sting operations, see Klockars, Carl. 1980. "Jonathan Wild and the Modern Sting." In *History and Crime: Implications for Criminal Justice Policy*, edited by James Inciardi and Charles Faupel. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications; Marx, Gary T. 1988. *Undercover: Police Surveillance in America.* Los Angeles: University of California Press. For decoy operations, see Marx, 1988. See also Mark H. Moore. 1983. "Invisible Offenses: A Challenge to Minimally Intrusive Law Enforcement" In *ABSCAM Ethics: Moral Issues and Deception in Law Enforcement*, edited by G.M. Kaplan. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

on the police as problem solvers.[8] In that article, Goldstein complained that the police had far too long focused too much attention on their internal processes -- the way they were organized to do their work -- rather than on the substantive problems they were expected to solve.[9] He also observed that when the police began focusing on their substantive work, they would find not a single, homogenous problem called "crime," but instead a wide variety of problems that the police were called upon to handle.[10] In his view, effective responses to such a wide variety of problems would not necessarily always be the arrest of someone. While arrests would, in many cases, be justified, legally required, and useful in controlling crime; in other cases, different responses such as conflict mediation, or the mobilization of other government agencies to deal with recurrent problems would turn out to be more valuable and effective in accomplishing important social objectives such as preventing future crimes, or reassuring citizens that things were under control.[11]

The concept of problem-solving was similar to aggressive patrol operations in that it encouraged the police to take the initiative in defining a problem and devising an operational response. In this respect, it fed the police desire to become more proactive. But it was remarkably different from aggressive patrol operations in that it broke the basic frame of patrol thinking about proactive police efforts. It did so in at least four respects.

First, problem-oriented policing was not exclusively concerned with producing deterrence and incapacitation through arrests of offenders. It did not assume that these were the only ways that the police could act to prevent crimes. Instead, it suggested that crimes could be prevented by such actions as: 1) reducing the vulnerability of victims,[12] or 2) by altering physical conditions to make them less hospitable to crimes,[13] or 3) by enforcing ordinances against forms of conduct that did not themselves constitute serious crime, but somehow contributed to the overall level of crime.[14]

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[8] Herman Goldstein. 1979. "Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach." *Crime and Delinquency* 25: 236-258.

[9] Ibid, p. 239.

[10] Ibid, p. 242.

[11] Ibid, p. 250.

[12] This idea has since been developed extensively in the literature on repeat victimization. See, for example, Farrell, Graham and Ken Pease. 1993. *Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: Repeat Victimization and Its Implications for Crime Prevention*. Home Office Crime Prevention Unit Paper 46. London: Home Office; also Farrell, Graham. 1995. "Preventing Repeat Victimization" In *Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention*, edited by Michael Tonry and David Farrington. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[13] See Oscar Newman. 1972. *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design*. New York: Macmillan; also Ronald V. Clarke. 1995. "Situational Crime Prevention." In *Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention*, edited by Michael Tonry and David Farrington. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[14] See James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety." *Atlantic Monthly* 249: 29-38; and George Kelling and Catherine Coles. 1996. *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities*. New York: Free Press.

Second, while much of this work continued to rely on the use of police authority, the authority was not necessarily focused on the arrest of serious offenders. Moreover, some of the work advised by problem-solving did not rely on police authority at all, but only their informal leadership in organizing and mobilizing the work of others. In these respects, the concept of problem-solving changed the conventional view of the important "distinctive competence" of the police. In this new view, the valuable "distinctive competence" of the police lay not only in their ability to enforce the law and make arrests of bad guys; it also lay in their capacities to identify important neighborhood problems, figure out what was causing them to occur, and design an intervention tailor-made to resolve or ameliorate the problem.

Third, problem-solving policing encouraged a different way of thinking about the causes of crime, and therefore the points of intervention that could become suitable targets for police action. In conventional police tactics, the common assumption is that crimes are caused by the willful intentions of offenders.[15] Thus, the best way to prevent crime is for the police to threaten offenders with arrest; or to station themselves in places and times where crimes are particularly likely to occur; or to concentrate on arresting those who persist in committing offenses despite the threat of arrest. This caused the police to organize proactive efforts around places and times where crimes were likely to occur (location-oriented directed patrol operations), or around individuals who were suspected of being active offenders (perpetrator-oriented directed patrols, or career criminal investigative efforts).[16]

With problem-solving as a conception, the images of what might cause crimes were significantly widened. It became possible to imagine that crimes emerged from "situations" in which individuals with ambivalent commitments to criminal offending nonetheless found themselves committing crimes. This could be true, for example, in the classic barroom assault situation where a combination of liquor, men, and glassware could produce a rash of aggravated assaults -- despite the fact that many in the bar were far from violent offenders.[17] It could also be important in dealing with gang violence, where the on-going conflict among gangs engaged many somewhat reluctant gang members in violent assaults in the interests of solidarity.[18] To the extent that was true, interventions to make the <u>situations</u> less criminogenic could be counted

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[15] On the general idea of prevention, and the role that intentions of criminal offenders play in shaping criminal justice conceptions of prevention, see Mark H. Moore, Deborah Prothrow-Stith, Bernard Guyer, and Howard Spivak. 1994. "Violence and Intentional Injuries: Criminal Justice and Public Health Perspectives on an Urgent National Problem." In *Understanding and Preventing Violence*, Volume 4, edited by Albert Reiss and Jeffrey Roth. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

[16] Spelman, William. 1990. *Repeat Offender Programs for Law Enforcement*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum; Martin, Susan and Lawrence Sherman. 1986. "Selective Apprehension: A Police Strategy for Repeat Offenders." *Criminology* 24: 155-173.

[17] Ross Homel and Jeff Clark. 1994. "The Prediction and Prevention of Violence in Pubs and Clubs." *Crime Prevention Studies* 3: 1-46; Timothy Hope. 1985. *Implementing Crime Prevention Measures*. Home Office Research Study Number 86. London: HMSO; Scottish Council on Crime. 1975. *Crime and the Prevention of Crime*. Scottish Home and Health Department. Edinburgh: HM Stationery Office.

[18] For example, see the police role in street worker mediations of gang disputes in Klein, Malcolm. 1971. *Street Gangs and*

on to prevent crime as well as efforts to arrest offenders.

Third, to some degree, the concept of problem-solving allowed for the possibility that the police could become interested in and take responsibility for dealing with problems other than serious crime-- this despite the fact that the principal responsibility of the police remained the reduction of serious crime. The extension of police interest to less serious offenses could be justified in several different ways. If, for example, crime prevention was acknowledged as an important goal of the police, and it was known that situations that began as minor problems tended to escalate into serious crimes if left unattended, then it might be important for police to intervene before the situation got out of hand. Thus, responding to complaints about youth hanging around on street corners could (sometimes) turn out to be a way of avoiding more serious gang conflict. Similarly, if it was recognized that an important goal of the police was to enhance security by reducing fear as well as by reducing objective levels of criminal victimization, and if it turned out that the police could reduce fear by concentrating on situations that frightened citizens that were not instances of serious crime such as noisy kids, graffiti, and abandoned cars, then police efforts to focus on non-crime problems would be justified. This, of course, is the basic idea behind the "broken windows" strategy of policing.[19] Finally, if citizens were concerned about non-serious crime problems as well as crime, and if it was considered desirable for the police to be responsive to citizens concerns and provide quality services (either because that was a good in itself, or because it helped build a relationship with the community that made the police more effective in dealing with serious crime), then it would make sense for the police to be proactive with respect to the problems that concerned citizens even when these were not serious crime problems.[20]

Thus, the concepts of problem-solving transformed an interest in proactive crime prevention and mightily expanded the domain of plausibly valuable police activities. In effect, it confronted police executives with interesting new choices about what kinds of "product lines" and new "production processes" should be introduced into police organizations. Should they add crime prevention, fear reduction, and quality service to their basic goal of controlling serious crime? Should they add "problem-solving" as a tactic to patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation? If so, how much of their resources should be committed to these new objectives and activities?[21]

C. Crime Prevention versus Crime Control

At the same time these concepts were making headway <u>inside</u> the police profession, a different set of

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Street Workers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. For more recent examples, see, e.g. Michael Walker and Linda Schmidt. 1996. "Gang Reduction Efforts by the Task Force on Violent Crime in Cleveland, Ohio." In *Gangs in America*, Second Edition, edited by C. Ronald Huff. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications; also Deborah Lamm Weisel and Ellen Painter. 1997. *The Police Response to Gangs: Case Studies of Five Cities*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

[19] Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1996.

[20] Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990.

[21] Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990.

ideas about crime control were making headway <u>outside</u> the world of policing in broader political discussions of crime control. Significantly, these ideas were pushing in the same direction. Gradually, in the United States, confidence in the efficacy of traditional crime control methods was eroding, particularly among those on the left of the political spectrum. Loss of faith in rehabilitation was soon joined by equal concerns about the effectiveness of deterrence and incapacitation. Moreover, with more than a million people in prison, and with the prospect of a very large number of children reaching the "high crime years" following childhoods burdened with significant "risk factors" for future criminal offending, citizens in the United States at least, were longing for some response that could reduce the number of future criminal offenders as well as the overall number of criminal offenses.[22]

In this context, a general idea of "crime prevention" (as opposed to "law enforcement") had enormous appeal.[23] It held open the possibility that society could respond to its crime problem in a more hopeful and cost effective way than by warehousing criminal offenders. Perhaps by intervening earlier in the lives of children who were "at risk" of becoming criminal offenders, society could not only prevent the crimes such children would commit, but also the problem of having to continually manage the criminal offenders.[24] Perhaps by intervening in the situations that produced crimes and criminal offenders before they got so serious, society could prevent crimes.[25] Perhaps by mobilizing informal community responses to crime, society could get more and more effective and less intrusive crime control than if it had to rely only on criminal justice agencies.[26] Perhaps by more intelligently and strictly regulating those things that seemed to be closely linked to crimes such as guns and drugs, crime could be reduced without having to imprison so many people.[27]

These hopeful ideas for more effective crime control were put before a desperate country by an impressive group of advocates. Among the most interesting were public health practitioners who had become concerned about violent crime once it showed up as one of the most important causes of death and morbidity

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[22] See, for example, "Reno, Law Enforcement, Crime Victims Urge Juvenile Crime Prevention." Press release by the US Department of Justice, September 10, 1997; BOTEC Corporation. 1996. *Criminal Justice in Massachusetts: Putting Crime Control First.* Boston: The Massachusetts Institute for a New Commonwealth; Coramae Richey Mann. 1997. "We Don't Need More Wars." *Valaparaiso University Law Review* 31: 565-578.

[23] Crime Control Statute included provisions for crime prevention as well as for crime control, but these were taken out.****

[24] On prospects for deflecting future offenders, see Loeber, ed. Forthcoming****

[25] Clarke, 1995.

[26] See Rosenbaum, Dennis (ed.). 1986. *Community Crime Prevention: Does It Work?* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

[27] Moore, Mark H. 1983. "Controlling Criminogenic Commodities: Drugs, Guns, and Alcohol." In *Crime and Public Policy*, edited by James Q. Wilson. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.

among poor ethnic groups in the United States.[28] But the banner of "crime prevention" was also taken up by criminologists -- particularly those interested in "situational crime prevention." These criminologists had started to analyze criminal offenses in ways that viewed offenders and their settled intentions as less decisive in determining how much and what kind of crime society would experience. They had begun, instead, to look at other features of the world that could increase or reduce levels of criminal offending such: 1) as physical characteristics of urban spaces;[29] 2) the presence or absence of informal "guardians;" and 3) the ways in which "routine activities" did or did not create occasions for criminal offending.[30] All this gave additional impetus to police interests in proactive crime prevention and problem-solving.

It is important to see that this movement never went so far as to establish a commitment to crime prevention through work on "root causes."[31] That form of "primary prevention" remained beyond the ambitions of the police, and contrary to at least some of their ideological commitments. But the important question facing the police and society now is not the familiar ideological question of whether crime can best be attacked by dealing with "root causes" such as poverty, racial discrimination, inadequate employment opportunity, the collapse of families, or the erosion of community institutions on the one hand; or more effective deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation carried out by criminal justice agencies on the other. The important question, instead, is whether there exists a domain of activity that lies between attacks on "root causes" on one hand and reactions to crimes through arrest and prosecution on the other that could be mounted by police in partnership with other social agencies that could be effective in reducing crime.[32] An important related question is: if so, what institutional arrangements could support and sustain and give point to this valuable work?

These are the questions we face when thinking about the police and crime prevention, and the questions to which we would like to give a tentative answer. To do so, we will start with the concept of prevention. Then, we will turn to the concepts of problem-solving policing. Finally, we'll discuss the kinds of institutional arrangements that would be necessary for effective prevention through police problem-solving to go forward.

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[28] Moore et al, 1994.

[29] Newman, 1972; Eck, John and David Weisburd. 1995. "Crime Places in Crime Theory." In *Crime and Place*, edited by John Eck and David Weisburd. New York: Criminal Justice Press.

[30] Cohen, Lawrence and Marcus Felson. 1979. "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach." *American Sociological Review* 44: 588-605; Felson, Marcus. 1994. *Crime and Everyday Life*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

[31] President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. 1967. *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office; Ramsey Clark. 1970. *Crime in America: Observations on Its Nature, Causes, Prevention, and Control*. New York: Pocket Books. For a rebuttal, see James Q. Wilson. 1983. *Thinking About Crime*. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books.

[32] See Sherman, Lawrence, Denise Gottfredson, Doris MacKenzie, John Eck, Peter Reuter, and Shawn Bushway. 1997. *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising*. A Report to the United States Congress. College Park, MD: University of Maryland, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice.

II. The Concept of Crime Prevention

"Crime prevention" is now often presented as an alternative to more "law enforcement" as a method for controlling crime.[33] In some respects this seems peculiar. It seems particularly so to criminal justice officials, since law enforcement agencies have long believed their enforcement actions contributed significantly to the goal of preventing crime. Their most obvious contribution to crime prevention lies in the claim that crime can be reduced through the deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation of criminal offenders. That is the practical aim of much of what criminal justice agencies do. But police and criminal justice agencies also believe their ordinary law enforcement operations are contributing to crime prevention through other means as well.

For example, insofar as the criminal law can be understood as a set of social norms; and police and criminal justice efforts to enforce those norms as a kind of civic education about the kinds of conduct individuals in society owed to one another; then criminal justice agencies can be seen as contributing to the creation of a social climate in which crime is justly condemned as a matter of informal social norms as well as law. In short, the police and criminal justice agencies backstop and support a general social commitment that it is wrong for citizens to attack others' lives and property.

Police and criminal justice agencies may also believe that they help to prevent crime through actions that create conditions supporting private "mediating institutions" such as family, church, and community.[34] By protecting such institutions from external and internal attack, the institutions might be enabled to provide the kind of informal social control that complements and extends the efforts of the formal criminal justice agencies. They do so partly by increasing the number of neighborhood guardians and watchers, and also by increasing the weight of the social obligation to behave in law-abiding ways.[35]

A. New Approaches to Crime Prevention

Despite this view that criminal justice agencies were importantly engaged in crime prevention through ordinary law enforcement operations, it gradually became clear that there were a variety of other approaches to crime control that were viewed more as "crime prevention" than "crime control" or "law enforcement" measures. Moreover, these new approaches did differ from traditional criminal justice approaches in several crucial ways. For one thing, they were less focused on the problem of attributing and assigning blame for criminal offenses that had already been committed, and more interested in finding ways to prevent offenses

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[33] See Us Department of Justice Press Release, 1997; BOTEC, 1996.

[34] Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus. 1977. *To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy.* Washington, DC: AEI Press. For role in crime control and crime prevention see, Mark H. Moore, forthcoming. "Security and Community Development." In *Community Development: What we Know and What We Don't Know*, edited by Ronald Ferguson and William Dickins. Washington, DC: Brookings.

[35] Langley Keyes. 1992. *Strategies and Saints*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.

from being committed in the first place.[36] For another, they were less interested in incapacitating and rehabilitating individuals who had committed themselves to criminal careers, and more interested in finding ways to reduce society's production of new criminal offenders. Lastly, the new "preventive approaches" were less inclined to attribute the cause of a crime entirely to the intentions of an offender, and more inclined to see crimes as emerging from complex situations whose path toward crimes could be altered through many different kinds of interventions.

These alternative approaches to crime prevention were, in many ways, more hopeful than the traditional methods of crime control. This appeal lay partly in the fact that these approaches seemed to act before a crime occurred, and could therefore avoid the pain of criminal victimization, and the fury it tended to produce. These approaches also promised to reduce offenders as well as offenses, and thereby to relieve the society from the continuing problem of managing a convicted criminal offender. The new "crime prevention" approaches also seemed to rely less on state authority and punishment, and more on informal social control and social assistance to achieve their crime prevention results. And the new crime prevention approaches appealed because they drew less on the energy of moral indignation and more on the use of rational intelligence in formulating a social response to crime. All of these features combine to make the new concepts of crime prevention potentially more attractive than the old -- at least to some parts of the body politic.

Broadly speaking, these alternative approaches to crime prevention can be classified in three broad categories. The first are interventions designed to reduce the number of offenders by intervening early in the development paths that cause (or increase the likelihood that) individuals to become criminal offenders. The second category are interventions focusing on situations that lead to criminal offenses. A third category are interventions designed to reduce the impact of what could be called criminogenic commodities -- namely, alcohol, drugs and guns.[37]

Many would add to these categories a fourth approach: namely, a category that emphasizes "community" efforts to prevent and control crime.[38] Such an addition makes sense if the concept of "community crime control" adds an important substantive idea about the particular ways in which a community might act to prevent crime. For example, if the concept of community crime control points to the important fact that aggregate community conditions create the context in which children develop, opportunities for criminal offending emerge, and criminogenic commodities are more or less available, and therefore the only way to prevent crime is to find some way to alter those aggregate community conditions, then this is an important idea. Similarly, to the extent that this concept emphasizes the importance of relying on a portfolio of prevention programs (some focused on intervening in the development of offenders, some focusing on reducing situations that lead to crime, and some focused on criminogenic commodities) rather than just a single approach, this

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[36] Moore, et al., 1994.

[37] Moore, 1983, "Controlling Criminogenic Commodities."

[38] See Hope, Tim. 1995. "Community Crime Prevention." In *Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention*, edited by Michael Tonry and David Farrington. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; and Rosenbaum, Dennis (ed.). 1986. *Community Crime Prevention: Does It Work?* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

concept belongs in the same list as the other three. In these cases, the concept gives substantive advice about important potential causes of crime (aggregate conditions) and important methods of intervention (portfolios rather than individual programs).[39]

But the concept of "community crime prevention" can also be understood as a conception about <u>who</u> (in the sense of what institutions and people) will be assigned the work of preventing crime as well as the sort of substantive work that is important to do. This idea of community crime control is that the work of crime prevention belongs to the "community" rather than, say, to criminal justice agencies working alone, or to social service agencies. Of course, the concept of community is ambiguous in this context. It could mean the full array of institutions located in a particular geographic area including: 1) criminal justice agencies such as the police, prosecutors and courts; 2) other government agencies such as schools, public housing agencies, or departments of parks and recreation; and 3) formal and informal community groups such as community development corporations, neighborhood watch groups, or groups of friends and neighbors who can make claims on one another and expect to have them fulfilled. Another meaning of "community" in this context would be limited to only the third category of formal and informal community groups.

To the extent that the concept of "community crime prevention" referred to an actor rather than a substantive idea of something to be acted upon, the concept would be orthogonal to the list of kinds of interventions described above. It would describe who it was society was counting on to act to prevent crime, not the particular kind of action to be undertaken. Obviously, in any serious effort to develop crime prevention initiatives one would have to answer the question of who will act as well as what should be done. So, it is important to keep reminding ourselves of whether our crime prevention measures are relying on the police, other criminal justice agencies, social service agencies, other governmental agencies, or voluntary community groups, or different partnerships among these different actors as well as the particular programs that seem desirable to mount. It is only by keeping both questions in mind that we can get a true sense of how the work of crime prevention can be accomplished in society, and in particular, what the particular role of the police might be.

B. Intervening Early to Deflect Children from Criminal Careers

A great deal of social science research has been devoted to learning more about the factors that incline children toward criminal offending and criminal careers.[40] This research has shown that some children are more likely to become involved in serious criminal offending than others. And it has shown what particular factors tend to put children at particularly high risks of becoming serious offenders. These "risk factors" are then nominated as the focus of programs designed to prevent children from advancing to serious criminal careers. Interventions targeted on the risks factors that increase the likelihood that children will become serious, sustained criminal offenders constitute one very important kind of prevention strategy.

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[39] Both these ideas are implicit and explicit in National Research Council, Committee on Law and Justice. 1994. *Violence in Urban America: Mobilizing a Response*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

[40] For a review, see David Farrington in this volume.

Such strategies tap several sources of appeal. One claim is that they are far more "cost-effective" than interventions that happen late in life after children have already committed themselves to criminal careers.[41] The basic idea is that if the interventions can be made before commitments have hardened, a smaller intervention will have a larger effect. These claims have recently been supported by specific calculations that compare the cost of avoiding crimes through imprisonment with the cost of avoiding crimes committed through several different kinds of early intervention programs.[42]

Beyond the cost-effectiveness arguments, however, these programs seem appealing because they are consistent with common notions of what children have a right to expect from society. In this conception, all children should have a chance to grow up to be responsible, resourceful citizens. Having such an opportunity depends on living in certain kinds of conditions such as being free from parental abuse and neglect, having nutritious food and good health care, being able to attend quality schools, and so on. Thus, a just society would guarantee that all children lived in conditions that were above at some minimum standards.[43] Unless such conditions are met by parents and the broader society, it seems somehow unfair to hold children accountable for their crimes when they reach adulthood: they were not given a chance to develop the kinds of moral capabilities that would have allowed them to become responsible citizens.

Despite the obvious appeal of these prevention programs, there are some reasons to be concerned about their practical value, and their impact on proper relationships among social institutions. Although the evidence is favorable on the crime reduction impact of programs such as parental training, pre-school education, and so on, the evidence comes from specially designed and managed experimental programs.[44] It is less clear that these programs could be effective if fielded on a mass basis. And a mass basis is what would be required to produce the large effects on levels of crime and fairness in society. One could also worry that public oversight of families and public support for programs that used to be provided privately by families might result in greater public intrusions into family affairs than is considered just or appropriate. So, it is by no means clear that the best preventive response would be massive social service programs supplied to families struggling to keep children on the path to resourceful citizenship.

It is also worth noting that if society were committed to intervening in the processes of socialization that kept children from criminal careers, some of the important interventions might well involve the use of state authority and the engagement of criminal justice agencies as well as the use of tax dollars and the involvement of social service agencies. For example, if we are interested in reducing the "risk factors" that increase the likelihood that children will take up criminal careers, it might be important to devise effective measures against

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[41] Peter Greenwood et al., 1996. *Diverting Children From a Life of Crime: Measuring Costs and Benefits.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

[42] Greenwood et al, 1996.

[43] Moore, Mark, with others. 1987. *From Children to Citizens, Volume I: The Mandate for Juvenile Justice.* New York: Springer-Verlag.

[44] Tremblay, Richard and Wendy Craig. 1995. "Developmental Crime Prevention." In *Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention,* edited by Michael Tonry and David Farrington. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

domestic violence in situations where children are present. It is almost certainly important to have effective policies against the abuse and neglect of children.[45] It is quite likely that the police and the courts will be important in identifying and responding appropriately to instances of intrafamily violence as well as community-based social service agencies.[46]

Similarly, it may be developmentally valuable to impose some kind of accountability on youthful offenders early in their careers not just in the interests of deterring them from future offending, but also in the interest of restoring relationships between them and their victims, and helping them to develop the kind of empathy that restrains people from attacking others. Recent experiments with "restorative justice models" have shown that accountability can be created under the auspices of a juvenile court even while young offenders are being protected from the full rigors of adult prosecution and punishment for their offenses.[47]

Finally, if some of the conditions that must be met to help children become resourceful citizens include the creation of safe communities as well as safe families -- if it is important, in short, that mothers be able to take their children to parks and for children be able to walk to school without passing drug dealers and gang members threatening one another, and if it is important that the schools themselves be relatively free from violence so that teachers can teach confidently and children can concentrate on learning -- the police and criminal justice agencies may have an important role to play in creating the aggregate conditions that support successful youth development. After all, part of their responsibility is to support institutions such as families, community groups, and other public agencies in their work: to help mobilize them to undertake important public tasks, and to protect them from both external attack and internal corruption. In short, the criminal justice officials may not be wrong to imagine that one of the important contributions the criminal justice system as a whole makes to individual and community life is to establish the standards and help mobilize the institutions that can do the work of socialization as well as deterrence.[48]

C. Intervening in Situations that Lead to Crimes

Trying to deflect children from serious criminal offending and sustained criminal careers constitutes one important kind of prevention. A different kind of prevention is focused on intervening in situations that are

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[45] Cathy Spatz Widom. 1989. "The Cycle of Violence." *Science* 244: 160-166.

[46] Wilson, James Q. 1977. "Foreword" in *Domestic Violence and the Police: Studies in Detroit and Kansas City, by the Police Foundation*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation; Delbert Elliott. 1989. "Criminal Justice Procedures in Family Violence Crimes." In *Family Violence*, edited by Lloyd Ohlin and Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Buzawa, Eve and Carl Buzawa. 1996. *Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response*. Second edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

[47] Moore, David B. 1993. "Shame, Forgiveness, and Juvenile Justice." *Criminal Justice Ethics* 12: 3-25; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 1994. *Balanced and Restorative Justice: A Call to Action*. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice; Braithwaite, John. 1989. *Crime, Shame, and Reintegration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[48] Moore, Forthcoming, "Security and Community Development."

likely to produce crimes. This kind of prevention is based on a different set of assumptions and a different kind of logic than the preventive approaches focused on altering developmental trajectories of children. In an important sense, it views criminal offenders as less important in causing crimes than potentially criminogenic situations that more or less ordinary people confront. In this view, many people could commit a crime if sufficiently tempted or provoked by a situation. Thus, the interesting prevention opportunity lies not in trying to reduce the number of people committed to or willing to commit criminal offenses, but instead in trying to reduce the number of easy opportunities that determined offenders can find to exploit in the society, or other kinds of opportunities that will tempt or provoke more ordinary people to commit crimes.[49]

Of course, it is easy to imagine how a ready supply of tempting or provocative situations could have a long run impact on the underlying distribution of individuals' determination or willingness to commit offenses. If it happened, for example, that an ordinary individual not unusually inclined toward criminal offending, found himself in a situation that repeatedly exposed him to tempting or provocative opportunities, and he took advantage of them, and he was officially "labeled" a criminal offender as a consequence, it is possible that the cumulative experience with criminal offending would gradually alter his orientation of crime.[50] In this sense, more or less accidental criminal experience would help to create a sustained criminal offender. It is also easy to imagine that if an individual found himself in a situation where not only he but many of his peers were being exposed to tempting or provocative situations, and many of them were taking advantage of these opportunities, then, again, the cumulative effect of the situations would gradually erode the individual's inhibitions against offending, and support the development of attitudes and skills that supported criminal offending.[51] So, it is not easy to draw a strict line between the preventive effects of interventions focused on altering individual developmental trajectories and those designed to reduce situations that tempted or provoked crimes.

Still, the distinction between focusing on offenders on one hand and focusing on situations on the other has some validity. It is operationally different to target preventive efforts on situations rather than on the developmental trajectories of individuals. How much difference there is, however, depends a little on what we mean by a "situation." If the concept of a "situation" includes broad, durable "social conditions" such as the level of poverty, unemployment, racial discrimination, and cultural supports for violent behavior, then the idea of situational crime prevention merges into the general idea of reducing the "root causes" of crime. In principle, these conditions affect the developmental trajectories of youths as well as the kinds of situations they encounter in the reality of their daily lives on the streets and the expectations they have for their future.[52] Thus, in order to

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[49] Philip J. Cook. 1986. "The Demand and Supply of Criminal Opportunities." In *Crime and Justice: an Annual Review of Research*, edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris. Vol. 7. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[50] This was, to some degree, the view of "labeling theorists." See Howard Becker. 1963. *The Outsiders*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. See also William Spelman. 1986. *The Depth of a Dangerous Temptation: Crime Control and the Dangerous Offender*. Final Report to the National Institute of Justice. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum; William Spelman. 1994. *Criminal Incapacitation*. New York: Plenum Press.

[51] Reiss, Albert J. 1988. "Co-Offending and Criminal Careers." In *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Volume 10, edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Zimring, Franklin. 1981. "Kids, Groups, and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Secret." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 72: 867-85.

[52] For a compelling account of how aggregate circumstances affect individuals, see Kotlowitz, Alex. 1991. *There are No*

preserve a distinction, many of those interested in preventing crimes through situational interventions define situations as conditions that are less broad, less durable, and easier to change than a "social condition."

In distinguishing "situational" approaches to crime prevention from efforts focused on broad "social conditions" on one hand and youth development on the other, it is also useful to think of "situations" as something that exists outside the mind of an individual, and invites a response rather than something that is inside the mind of an individual and motivates an action -- in effect, interventions that work on the supply of opportunities rather than the underlying distribution of individuals' motivations and willingness to commit offenses. The basic assumption is that total number of criminal offenses in society is determined by the supply of opportunities as well as the demand to commit offenses.[53] If the number of opportunities increases, then crimes will increase even if the underlying distribution of criminal proclivities remains constant in the population. Indeed, hard-earned reductions in numbers of committed offenders could be offset by an increase in criminal opportunities.

Note that if this were true, then one could treat the whole of the operations of the criminal justice system as an important "situational crime prevention" intervention. The reason is that the whole criminal justice system is specifically designed to reduce the ease with which people can commit offenses with impunity. Of course, there are many other things that can be done, and many other actors who can be involved in opportunity blocking efforts. And these are important to acknowledge and encourage specifically as alternative forms of crime prevention. But it is important to see how the criminal justice system's efforts to deter fit into a larger conception of crime prevention.

It is also important to note, however, that a situation could be something other than a passive, environmental opportunity: one can imagine situations that could "provoke" or "motivate" or "require" as well as simply "allow" or "facilitate" offending. Of particular importance here are festering disputes that could arise between spouses, between parents and children, landlords and tenants, warring gangs, or economically and culturally competitive ethnic groups. Another particular category of festering disputes could be those that arise out from criminal attacks where victims and relatives have not been satisfied by the justice that was done in the state's formal systems of justice, and have decided to take matters into their own hands.[54]

Note that these kinds of situations can happen in many different places and have different kinds of histories. Some, such as barroom brawls or fights over parking spaces can flare up among complete strangers and end within a short period of time. Others, such as gang wars or ethnic hostilities, can exist among relative strangers, but take on a durable, institutionalized form. Still others, such as domestic disputes, involve people who are closely related to one another but go on for long periods of time. Obviously, these different kinds of festering relationships represent different kinds of preventive opportunities, and require different kinds of

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Children Here. New York: Anchor Books. For statistical support, see Robert Sampson, Stephen Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. 1997. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study on Collective Efficacy." *Science* 277: 918-924.

[53] Cook, 1986; Cohen and Felson, 1979.

[54] Donald Black. 1983. "Crime as Social Control." *American Sociological Review* 48: 34-45.

interventions to resolve. Still, these can all be viewed as situations which can, with some kind of appropriate intervention, be re-routed away from the violence that would otherwise occur.

Again, it is important to see that a well-functioning criminal justice system would be important in exploiting the preventive potential of intervening in such situations. Insofar as the justice system can resolve disputes, or assure victims that their victimization will be acknowledged and properly avenged, some important crimes may be avoided. Indeed, to the extent that festering disputes are a potentially important cause of crime, and to the extent that the criminal justice system or other legal institutions could resolve these disputes satisfactorily, those systems could be viewed as primary preventive methods for controlling violent crime! In any case, situations (understood either as passive opportunities for criminal offending or as dynamics that motivate as well as create an opportunity for criminal offending) can be seen as important causes of crime. Efforts to reduce them could prevent crimes. The reduction or elimination of criminogenic situations might even prevent the development of criminal offenders.

D. Reducing the Impact of Criminogenic Commodities

A third preventive strategy focuses on finding ways to reduce the impact of things that might be called "criminogenic commodities."[55] By "criminogenic commodities," I mean particular commodities that have some useful purposes for society, but are problematic because their presence and use in the society is thought to increase the overall level and/or seriousness of crimes. The most important of these are alcohol, drugs, and guns.

There is a great deal to be said about the role that each of these commodities plays in influencing the overall level and seriousness of crimes and what might be the best way of reducing their impact. Disputes continue about the magnitude and character of the causal impact such commodities have on the level and seriousness of crimes, with some judging their impact to be large, and others viewing the established link between these commodities and crime as a mere correlation rather than an established causal mechanism.[56] Generally speaking, the most common approach to dealing with these criminogenic commodities is to try to reduce their overall availability, or to restrict their availability to individuals who can be expected to use them responsibly and have special needs for them. Other approaches to these commodities include regulating uses, and teaching people about their dangers and appropriate uses.[57]

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[55] Moore, 1983, "Controlling Criminogenic Commodities."

[56] On the relationship between crime and alcohol and other drugs, see Fagan, Jeffrey. 1990. "Intoxication and Aggression." In *Drugs and Crime*, edited by Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Roth, Jeffrey. 1994. "Psychoactive Substances." *Research in Brief.* Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice; and Paul Goldstein. 1985. "The Drugs-Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework." *Journal of Drug Issues* 15: 493-506. On the relationship between guns and crime, see Philip J. Cook. 1981. "The Effect of Gun Availability on Violent Crime Patterns." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* 455: 63-79; Gary Kleck. 1991. *Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.* New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

[57] On drugs, see Mark Kleiman. 1992. *Against Excess.* New York: Basic Books. On guns, see Philip Cook and Mark H. Moore. 1995. "Gun Control." In *Crime*, edited by James Q. Wilson and Joan Petersilia. San Francisco: ICS Press. On alcohol, see Mark H. Moore and Dean Gerstein (eds.). 1981. *Alcohol and Public Policy: Beyond the Shadow of*

There is not enough space in this short paper to review the vast literature on these important issues, but it is important to recognize once again that the agencies of the criminal justice system will end up playing an important role in exploiting whatever crime prevention potential exists in regulating these criminogenic commodities. It is criminal justice agencies that will enforce whatever regulations are established to influence the overall level and distribution of opportunities to acquire these commodities. And it is criminal justice agencies that will enforce whatever regulations are established to guide uses of these commodities away from patterns that increase the likelihood of violence, or that increase the likelihood that individuals will become committed to criminal careers.

E. Summary:

Even though criminal justice agencies focused on arresting offenders produce important crime preventive effects, there are lots of reasons to be interested in alternative approaches to crime prevention. These include efforts to reduce the number of offenders in the society by intervening early in youthful development processes, reducing opportunities that allow or stimulate criminal offending, and controlling the impact of criminogenic commodities such as alcohol, drugs, and guns. Yet, a quick review of these options reminds us that criminal justice agencies, including the police, have important roles to play in exploiting the potential of even these newly conceptualized preventive opportunities. It is not true that the new preventive approaches will be the sole province of social work agencies or community organizations. What is true is that the effective exploitation of these new opportunities for preventing crime through means other than deterrence and incapacitation of offenders will depend on complex partnerships between criminal justice agencies and other government and community institutions. This represents the frontiers of crime prevention that were are learning how to exploit. The next question is whether and how police organizations are positioned to contribute to this important social effort.

III. Crime Prevention, the Police, and Community Problem-Solving

Twenty years ago, it would have been hard to imagine the police committing any significant portion of their managerial focus, operational imagination, or resources to preventive efforts that worked on any basis other than producing arrests. True, most police departments fielded specialized juvenile units whose task was to find appropriate responses to juvenile offenders who didn't seem to deserve routine prosecution.[58] Other police departments supported a Police Athletic League.[59] And many individual officers volunteered their time to act as mentors for kids in the neighborhoods. And all this could have been interpreted as police contributions to preventive efforts designed to interrupt the developmental trajectories that led kids to lives of crime.

Prohibition. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

[58] Kelling, George. 1987. "Juveniles and Police: The End of the Nightstick." In *From Children to Citizens, Volume II: The Role of the Juvenile Court*, edited by Francis X. Hartman and others. New York: Springer-Verlag.

[59] Kelling, 1987.

True, also, many police departments were then fielding directed patrols and mobilizing neighborhood crime watch groups in efforts to reduce opportunities for offenders to commit crimes with impunity.[60] Some were also involved in efforts to resolve gang disputes or providing training to officers on how to mediate domestic disputes in an effort to prevent crimes that would emerge from festering disputes.[61] And these efforts could have been seen as preventive efforts designed to stop situations from escalating into serious crimes.

True, finally, that the police were spending a great deal of time trying to reduce the availability of drugs in hopes that this would reduce levels of property and violent crime by discouraging many from becoming addicted to drugs.[62] Some police agencies were also focused on keeping guns off the streets and out of the hands of bad guys.[63] And many police agencies made special efforts to enforce against drunk driving.[64] All these could have been seen as preventive efforts focused on reducing the impact of criminogenic commodities.

Thus, even twenty years ago, one could have found the police engaged in activities that were exploiting the potential of crime prevention activities. Yet, for the most part, these activities were viewed as at the margins of policing -- not central to it.[65] Further, these activities were not collected in any overall, coherent conception of crime prevention. The central operational idea in policing remained for the police to respond to crimes committed by offenders by arresting and prosecuting offenders. The crime preventive effect was limited to what could be wrung out of the mechanisms of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.

Recently, however, it is far easier to imagine the police making an important commitment to crime prevention as a distinct concept, and in a great many new and distinct ways. Part of what makes this possible is a growing frustration with the effectiveness of the current strategy of policing. But it also has to do with a growing sense that there is more that the police can do.

A. The Changing Strategy of Policing and Police Roles in Crime Prevention

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[60] Betsy Lindsay and Daniel McGillis. 1986. "City-Wide Community Crime Prevention: An Assessment of the Seattle Program." In *Community Crime Prevention*, edited by Dennis Rosenbaum. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications; Garrett O'Keefe. 1986. "The McGruff National Media Campaign: Its Public Impact and Future Implications." In *Community Crime Prevention*, edited by Dennis Rosenbaum. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

[61] Bard, M. 1973. *Training Police in Family Crisis Intervention*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. For an example of early gang mediation efforts by the police, see Klein, 1971 .

[62] Mark H. Moore. 1990. "Supply Reduction and Drug Law Enforcement." In *Drugs and Crime*, edited by Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Chaiken, Marcia (ed.). 1988. *Street-Level Drug Enforcement: Examining the Issues*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.

[63] Moore, 1983, "Police and Weapons Offenses."

[64] Jacobs, James. 1989. *Drunk Driving: An American Dilemma*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[65] Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990.

Much has been written in the United States about the changing strategy of policing.[66] The change in strategy involves a redefinition of ends as well as of means. Increasingly police in the United States feel responsible not only for reducing criminal victimization (which remains their number one priority), but also for reducing fear and providing responsive, high quality services to citizens. They also have begun to experiment with operational concepts beyond patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation: specifically with concepts of "community mobilization" and "problem-solving."[67]

These trends, taken together, elevate the importance of and change the meaning of crime prevention in police departments. The changes are not so extreme that the police see crime prevention in quite the same way as a crime prevention specialist would.[68] For example, given the history and nature of their operations, the police would be far more inclined than a crime prevention specialist to see preventive value in the standard mechanisms of deterrence and incapacitation, and also more inclined to see crime prevention as subordinate to the goal of responding to crimes. Moreover, the police would be far quicker to see the preventive potential of intervening in situations than in developmental trajectories; and of intervening to reduce the availability of drugs and guns more than of alcohol. But the point is that there is far more overlap in police conceptions of what constitutes effective practice in controlling crime with the conceptions of prevention specialists. And it is the changing overall strategy of policing that has made that true. They are far more open to and interested in the concept of crime prevention than has been true in the past.

It is a good thing, for our quick survey of various crime prevention strategies reveals important opportunities for the police to prevent crimes that go well beyond even their current thought about this matter, and perhaps even beyond the thought of the crime prevention specialists. For example, it seems likely to me that the police might have a very important role to play in preventive efforts designed to affect the development trajectory of children. They have this role obviously and directly when they arrest young people for offenses and are forced to make some kind of response. But they also have this role more indirectly in the ways in which they involve themselves in enforcing laws against domestic violence and child abuse and neglect.[69] Insofar as their interventions in these areas affect familial relations, and particularly the extent and character of violence in these relations, they are having a very big effect on some of the most important risk factors influencing the future criminal offending of children.

As noted above, the police and criminal justice agencies can also have a big impact on the neighborhood conditions that confront children as they grow up. They can affect how dangerous the parks and streets and schools both are and seem to be. Insofar as they can restore order to a community, they can help

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[66] Kelling, George and Mark H. Moore. 1988. "From Political to Reform to Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police." In *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality?*, edited by Jack Greene and Stephen Mastrofski. New York: Praeger.

[67] Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990.

[68] Moore et al., 1994.

[69] Wilson, 1977; Elliott, 1989; Bard, 1973.

parents communicate a message about responsible citizenship that is important to youth development. The police role in other preventive efforts directed at reducing opportunities for criminal offending and the availability and misuse of criminogenic commodities is far more obvious.[70]

B. Principles of Community Problem Solving Policing

Whether, and how successfully, the police can exploit the crime prevention potential of these different strategies depends crucially on how widely and imaginatively they understand and use the operational concepts of "community mobilization" and "problem-solving." The key principles of these operational concepts are widely known and familiar, but it is worth restating them here.

At the most general level, the concept of "community mobilization" is meant to remind the police that they are not the only ones who have the responsibility and capability to prevent and control crime.[71] Indeed, most of the work of preventing and controlling crime is done by other social institutions including both private mediating institutions such as families, community groups, and churches, and government agencies such as welfare agencies, schools, and recreation departments. The job of the police, then, is at least partly to support these other institutions in the crime control work that they must do -- to bolster their confidence, keep them safe from external attack and internal corruption, and mobilize them not only to respond to specific criminal attacks, and not only to exercise vigilance in the interests of extending deterrent effects, but also to deal with important community problems when they arise. The task is to form effective working partnerships with these other institutions in the interests of preventing and controlling crime. Among the most important ways of forming such partnerships is to become responsive to concerns that are expressed by representatives of these institutions as well as what concerns individuals.

At the most general level, the concept of "problem-solving" is meant to remind the police that they should stay focused on the substantive goals of policing not the processes, and to use creative thought and tactical imagination in considering how the substantive goals might best be achieved.[72] Of particular importance is the idea that the focus of police work should change from "incidents" that occur to a focus on the "problems" that lie behind the incidents and cause them to keep recurring. Also important is the idea that arrests and threats of arrest can play important roles in an effective operational response to problems, but that these are not the only things the police can do to help a community deal with a problem. Often mediation, the mobilization of governmental services other than policing, or the enforcing civil ordinances are as important as arresting serious offenders.

More particularly, the concept of "problem-solving" has been developed as a particular analytic method that encourages the police to "Scan, Analyze, Respond, Assess." It is worth looking at each of these steps in

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[70] Moore, Forthcoming, "Security and Community Development."

[71] Rosenbaum, 1986.

[72] Goldstein, 1979. For more extended treatment, see Herman Goldstein. 1990. *Problem-Oriented Policing.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

turn.[73]

1. Scanning for Problems

The first step, scanning, involves the police in efforts to identify problems that are worth working on because they are important and amenable to solution. This is a non-trivial step. Consider, first, how problems might be nominated for police attention. One possibility is simply for an officer, relying on his own informal knowledge of the community, to identify problems that he or she thinks are important to the security and well-being of the community. This is, perhaps, the most common way in which community problems are identified. It is a particularly valuable method of identifying problems if officers have been assigned to permanent beats in a community, and have therefore had an opportunity to get to know a community fairly intimately.

A second more abstract possibility is to identify problems worth solving from an examination of the calls for service coming into a police department. This is the approach that is implicitly recommended by those who advocate "repeat call analysis," or the identification of "hot spots."[74] The notion is that citizens will let the police know what problems are concerning them by making calls as individuals. By examining those calls, and grouping them in ways that point toward a common cause or a common solution, the police may be able to find a more permanent and general solution to the problem that is generating the calls. This would have the advantage of not only solving the problem, but also of reducing the operational call load in the future -- both important police objectives.[75] This approach also has the advantages of working off existing police procedures and capabilities, and leaving the initiative with the police in defining what problems are to be solved.

A third approach is to identify problems not through the analysis of the police workload, but through consultation with community groups of different kinds, including other government agencies. This differs from analyzing individual calls for service because the demands come from groups, not individuals. If the police are trying to forge partnerships with groups as well as individuals, it might be important for them to open up some channels through which groups can express their concerns. This could take the form of community advisory councils, or simply regular meetings held by the police to which all members of a community are invited.[76] This would have the advantage of allowing the community's views about what is important shape the police views about what is important rather than leave the important question of nominating problems to be solved to

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[73] For a close look at the SARA model, see John Eck and William Spelman. 1987. *Problem Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

[74] Sherman, Lawrence.1987. "Repeat Calls to Police in Minneapolis." *Crime Control Reports Number 4*. Washington, DC: Crime Control Institute; Sherman, Lawrence, Patrick Gartin, and Michael Buerger. 1989. "Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place." *Criminology* 27: 27-56.

[75] Whether such efforts succeed in reducing calls for service remains an important question. For evidence that they sometimes do, See Trojanowicz, Robert. 1982. *An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center.

[76] See Wesley G. Skogan and Susan Hartnett. 1997. *Community Policing, Chicago Style*. New York: Oxford University Press.

police analysts.

Obviously, the best approach would be to combine these efforts. There is enormously valuable information about what individual members of a community are concerned about in the calls for service that come into police departments. It would also be possible, and indeed has long been recommended by the originators of the problem-solving idea, that police judgments about the most important problems to be solved in local areas should be vetted with a variety of community groups to ensure that police judgments about relative importance are accurate, and that the police would have the active support of the community in taking on particular problems.

2. Analyzing Problems

Consider, next, the role of analysis. The aim of analysis, of course, is to understand the causal mechanisms that are leading to a particular problem that has been nominated in hopes of finding a target for intervention that could decisively and permanently resolve the problem. The challenge to the police in this respect is to go beyond the analysis that naturally occurs to them: namely, to find the places and times where particular offenses are likely to occur, and to identify the offenders that are likely to be responsible for the crimes. The first leads to directed patrol operations; the second to a focus on repeat offenders. Both of these are important ideas and have produced operational successes.

But the idea of analysis championed by problem-solving is designed to go beyond this. Goldstein describes this as the problem of "ensuring adequate depth" in the analysis and offers the following example to convey what he means:

> "A study of the problem of theft from merchants by shoppers illustrates the need. It is easy, accepting how we have commonly responded to shoplifting, to become enmeshed in exploring ways in which to increase the number of arrests -- including more efficient processing by the police. If one digs deeper, however, it becomes apparent that shoplifting is heavily influenced by how the merchandise is displayed, and the means used to safeguard it. The police often accept these merchandising decisions as givens and are resigned to processing as many shoplifters as a store chooses to apprehend and deliver into their hands. More in-depth probing raises questions about the effectiveness of arrests as the primary means to reduce shoplifting and the propriety of delegating to private interests the judgment of who is to be arrested. The police may then focus on ways to curtail theft and on the use to be made of arrest, including the criteria to be employed in deciding who to arrest. If the analysis of the problem of shoplifting had been superficial, limited to exploring ways to increase the number of arrests, the whole purpose of the enterprise would have been lost."[77]

The recent "hot spots policing" movement would benefit by adhering more closely to Goldstein's recommendations on careful problem analysis. Advocates of hot spots policing point to insightful research on the importance of places in criminal events (the salience of crime clustering, facilities, site features, and

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[77] Goldstein, 1990: 98-99

offender mobility),[78] but, to date, most interventions developed to control hot spot locations have been limited to deploying patrol officers to the space-time nooks designated as hot spots. The analyses have not focused on the particular local conditions and dynamics that cause crime to cluster at places.[79] Hot spot interventions have moved the police response forward by focusing traditional tactics at high risk times and locations; for example, optimizing patrol time in hot spots,[80] conducting aggressive *Terry* searches for guns in high risk areas,[81] and implementing systematic crackdowns in drug markets.[82] Although these interventions produce crime control gains and add to law enforcement's array of tools, police could be more effective if they focused on the criminogenic attributes that cause a spot to be "hot." In other words, adding an increased level of guardianship at a place by optimizing patrol is a step in controlling crime, but reducing criminal opportunities by changing site features and facilities at a place (e.g., razing abandoned buildings, adding streetlights, and mobilizing residents) is likely to have a more profound effect on crime.

Ronald V. Clarke's work on "situational crime prevention" offers both a sophisticated method as well as many important examples of how crime problems may be closely analyzed, and through that analysis, means found to more effectively prevent crimes by making crimes harder to commit, reducing the rewards of criminal acts, or increasing the burden of shame and humiliation offenders would actually feel if caught offending.[83] Indeed, at the level of specific actions taken to control crime and disorder problems, the situational crime prevention and problem-solving policing paradigms converge; these approaches share the same action research model underpinnings which require data to be collected on the nature and dimensions of specific crime problems, and the detailed analysis of situational conditions that permit problems to exist.[84]

3. Developing Alternative Responses

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[78] For a discussion on the importance of place, see Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989; Eck and Weisburd, 1995.

[79] For a more complete discussion on this point and an evaluation of a hot spots policing program which attempted to use problem-solving methods to control places, see Anthony A. Braga. 1997. "Solving Violent Crime Problems: An Evaluation of the Jersey City Police Department's Pilot Program to Control Violent Places." Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI.

[80] Christopher Koper. 1995. "Just Enough Police Presence: Reducing Crime and Disorderly Behavior by Optimizing Patrol Time in Crime Hot Spots." *Justice Quarterly* 12: 649-672; Lawrence Sherman and David Weisburd. 1995. "General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial." *Justice Quarterly* 12: 625-648.

[81] Lawrence Sherman, James Shaw, and Dennis Rogan. 1995. *The Kansas City Gun Experiment*. National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.

[82] David Weisburd and Lorraine Green. 1995. "Policing Drug Hot Spots: The Jersey City DMA Experiment." *Justice Quarterly* 12: 711-736.

[83] Clarke, 1995.

[84] Clarke, 1995.

Developing a plausibly effective response to a problem is closely related to but not identical with the analysis that is performed. The reason, of course, is that it is the analysis that reveals potential targets for an intervention, and it is at least partly the idea about what form the intervention might take that suggests important lines of analysis. Thus, the reason that the police often look at the places and times where crimes are committed is that they are already imagining that an effective way to prevent the crimes would be to get officers on the scene through directed patrols; and the reason they look for the likely offender is that they think the most effective (and just) response to a crime problem would be to arrest and incapacitate an offender. The concept of "problem-solving," calls on the police to make a far more "uninhibited" search for possible interventions and not limit themselves to getting the police in the right places at the right times, or identifying and arresting the offender (though both may be valuable).[85] Effective responses often depend on getting other people to take actions that can reduce opportunities for criminal offending, or mobilize informal social control to drive offenders away from certain locations.

Goldstein offers the following suggestive list of general alternatives that the police might consider in making a response to a neighborhood crime problem -- some closely linked to current police practices, and some much farther afield:

Concentrating attention on those individuals who account for a disproportionate share of the problem

Connecting with other government and private services through referral to another agency, coordinating police responses with other agencies, correcting inadequacies in municipal services, and pressing for new services

Using mediation and negotiation skills to resolve disputes

Conveying information to reduce anxiety and fear, to enable citizens to solve their own problems, to elicit conformity with laws and regulations that are not known or understood, to warn potential victims about their vulnerability and advise them of ways to protect themselves, to demonstrate to individuals how they unwittingly contribute to problems, to develop support for addressing a problem, and to acquaint the community with the limitations on the police and to define realistically what may be expected of the police

Mobilizing the community and making use of existing forms of social control in addition to the community

Altering the physical environment to reduce opportunities for problems to recur

Increased regulation, through statutes or ordinances, of conditions that contribute to problems

Developing new forms of limited authority to intervene and detain

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[85] Goldstein, 1990.

Using civil law to control public nuisances, offensive behavior, and conditions contributing to crime. [86]

Ronald V. Clarke, working from the idea of "situational crime prevention," develops a related but somewhat different list of ideas including:

Increasing the <u>effort</u> that offenders must make by hardening targets, controlling access to sites, deflecting offenders, and controlling facilitators of criminal offending

Increasing the <u>risks</u> that offenders would face by establishing systems for screening entry and exit, increasing formal surveillance, encouraging surveillance by employees, and facilitating natural surveillance

Reducing the <u>rewards</u> of criminal offending by removing targets, identifying property, removing inducements to crime, and setting rules.[87]

Obviously, these lists are partially overlapping. Obviously, too, the lists are presented in somewhat abstract language. And there is a certain ad hoc quality to the ways in which the lists are developed and presented despite the obvious effort that has been made to be systematic and comprehensive. It does no disservice to Goldstein and Clarke to make these observations because they would be the first to admit that the methods of problem-solving and situational crime prevention are still developing. Moreover, it is we who have taken these abstract ideas from their work and separated them from the many specific concrete examples that help to give these abstract ideas more content, and to make their utility more plausible.

Indeed, one often gets more inspiration and more useful ideas from looking at concrete examples of problem-solving and situational crime prevention than one gets from trying to understand the general principles.[88] The reason is that, in the end, these techniques depend on a great deal of creativity and imagination from practitioners. The need for creativity now may be partly due to the fact that the field has not yet developed adequately for us to know the methods. But it could also be true that the work of problem-solving policing will never be entirely routinized. It is quite possible that even after we have had long experience with the techniques of problem-solving, developed a high degree of self-consciousness about the methods, and even learned a great deal about how particular kinds of problems are best solved generally, effective problem-solving may still require a great deal of imagination and creativity to deal with the

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[86] Goldstein, 1990: 102-147.

[87] Clarke, 1995: 109.

[88] For problem-solving policing, see examples in Eck and Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990; Braga, 1997; New York City Police Department. 1988. "Problem Solving and the Community Patrol Officer Program." New York: NYPD photocopy; Timothy Hope. 1994. "Problem-Oriented Policing and Drug Market Locations: Three Case Studies." *Crime Prevention Studies* 2: 5-32; the Police Executive Research Forum's *Problem Solving Quarterly* series; and the St. Louis (Missouri) Police Department's *Keys to the City* series. For situational crime prevention, see 22 case studies in Ronald V. Clarke (ed.). 1992. *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies.* New York: Harrow and Heston Publishers; also the *Crime Prevention Studies* series edited by Ronald Clarke.

peculiarities of a new situation.[89] Just as it has proven difficult to convert the practice of medicine into a cookbook because there are often unique characteristics of individual patients that need to be accommodated in a medical intervention, so it may turn out that problem-solving policing cannot be quite reduced to a textbook because of the uniqueness of some situations. That is good news for those who think there is a great deal of creativity in the world of practice, and who wish to construct institutions and organizational arrangements that will allow that creativity to be developed and expressed. It is bad news for those who think that such talents are limited, and who long for the development of more routinized methods that can substitute for individual creativity and imagination in particular circumstances.

4. Assessing Problem Solving Efforts

The crucial last step in problem-solving policing is to assess the impact that the intervention has had on the problem it was supposed to solve. Assessment is important for at least two different reasons. The first is to ensure that the police remain accountable for their performance, and their use of resources. Citizens and their representatives will want to know how the money and freedom they surrendered to the police are being used, and whether important results in the form of less crime, enhanced security, or increased citizen satisfaction with the police has been achieved. A second reason assessment is important is to allow the police to learn about what methods are effective in dealing with particular problems. Unless the police check to see whether their efforts produced a result, it will be hard for them to improve their practices.

The need to account for performance and to learn are to some degree closely aligned. If every police problem-solving initiative could be evaluated through the most rigorous state of the art techniques of program evaluation, the police department's assessment efforts would be meeting the most stringent demands for both accountability and learning. The difficulty, however, is that the most rigorous state of the art techniques of program evaluation are very expensive. They not only cost a great deal of money to make all the appropriate measurements, they also soak up a great deal of the organization's managerial talent and blunt initiative in the department by organizing the department's operations to ensure that experimental conditions are maintained.

Moreover, problems differ in terms of their size and overall importance. Some problems that are serious, large and recurrent, and for which police organizations do not have an adequate current response such as the control of street level drug trafficking or the handling of domestic disputes deserve serious experimental examination. Other problems that are less serious, or less common, or where police techniques now seem adequate, are not worth such close examination. Thus, it is possible that not all problem-solving initiatives in a police department can or need to be assessed through the most rigorous techniques of program evaluation.

The need for the police to account for their performance is general, and it requires them to have something to say about the success of all their problem-solving initiatives. Thus, all problem solving efforts would probably require the police to describe the intervention they made, and something about the effects that seemed to result from their efforts. In short, they need to measure inputs, activities, outputs, and whatever can be said about outcomes of the initiatives. This would meet the demands of accountability.

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[89] David M. Kennedy and Mark H. Moore. 1995. "Underwriting the Risky Investment in Community Policing: What Social Science Should Be Doing to Evaluate Community Policing." *Justice System Journal* 17: 271-289.

What they may not have to do all the time is arrange for the rigorous experimental and quasi-experimental designs that would allow them to reliably attribute what appeared to be outcomes of their interventions to the interventions. That is essential if they are hoping to learn what works. And it would be desirable even to ensure appropriate accountability. But if something has to give because it is impossible to apply the most rigorous techniques of program evaluation to all problem-solving initiatives, then what should be sacrificed is the special measures that need to be taken to ensure accurate attribution of causation for those activities that are too small or too unimportant in the field to justify the expense of learning whether a particular technique does or does not work. What should <u>not</u> be sacrificed is the goal of measuring results however crudely, and however uncertainly related to the particular intervention that is taken. This will help keep the police focused on results rather than means, and that is one of the most important contributions of the idea of problem-solving policing.

The value of situational crime prevention strategies, such as specific applications of problem-solving policing, has been questioned by the threat of crime displacement. This phenomena is the notion that efforts aimed at eliminating specific crimes at a place will simply cause criminal activity to move elsewhere, be committed in another way, or even be manifested as another type of crime; thus negating any crime control gains.[90] This perspective developed from dispositional theories of criminal motivations and the view of these skeptics were supported by early studies of opportunity-reducing measures indicating ensuing displacement.[91] Recent studies, however, have indicated that the purported inevitability of displacement was very much overestimated. Several reviews of situational crime prevention measures have concluded that crime displacement was absent or never complete.[92] In fact, some scholars have suggested that crime prevention efforts may result in the complete opposite of displacement—that anticipated crime control benefits were greater than expected and "spill over" into situations beyond the target. Generally referred to as "diffusion of benefits" these unexpected gains have been reported by a number of studies on crime prevention measures.[93]

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[90] Repetto, Thomas. 1976. "Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon." *Crime and Delinquency* 22: 166-177.

[91] Gabor, Thomas. 1990. "Crime Displacement and Situational Prevention: Toward the Development of Some Principles." *Canadian Journal of Criminology* 32: 41-74; Clarke, Ronald V. 1980. "Situational Crime Prevention: Theory and Practive." *British Journal of Criminology* 20: 136-147; Chaiken, Jan, Michael Lawless, and Keith Stevenson. 1974. *The Impact of Police Activity on Crime: Robberies on the New York City Subway System*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand; Mayhew, Patricia, Ronald V. Clarke, and J. Michael Hough. 1980. "Steering Column Locks and Car Theft." In *Designing Out Crime*, edited by Ronald V. Clarke and Patricia Mayhew. London: HMSO.

[92] Hesseling, Rene. 1994. "Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature." *Crime Prevention Studies* 2: 5-32; Clarke, Ronald and Patricia Mayhew. 1988. "The British Gas Suicide Story and Its Criminological Implications." *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Volume 10, edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Poyner, Barry and Barry Webb. 1992. "Reducing Theft From Shopping Bags in City Center Markets." In *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies*, edited by Ronald V. Clarke. New York: Harrow and Heston.

[93] Hesseling, 1994; Clarke and Weisburd, 1994. "Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of Displacement." *Crime Prevention Studies* 2: 165-184; Chaiken, Lawless, and Stevenson, 1974; Weisburd and Green, 1995; Poyner, Barry. 1988. "Video Cameras and Bus Vandalism." *Security Administration* 11: 44-51.

Although the measurement of displacement and diffusion effects are difficult to assess,[94] both formal evaluations and simple assessments of problem-solving efforts should attempt to assess the possibility of displacement and diffusion, or risk underestimating or overestimating the true crime control benefits of the intervention.

C. Summary: Community Problem-Solving and Crime Prevention

Obviously, the principles of community problem-solving are broadly consistent with engaging the police in more active crime prevention efforts. It is worth recognizing, however, that while these principles are generally consistent with the idea of crime prevention, they are not identical to the concept. Some of the problems that the police find themselves engaged with may not be directly crime-related. The techniques continue to rely on mechanisms of arrest and deterrence as well as other devices. Justifications for problem-solving efforts include fear reduction, improved quality of service as well as crime prevention. Still, one might well imagine that some of the most important problems a modern police department might take on would be improved methods of preventing crime.

IV. Organizing For Crime Prevention through Problem-Solving Policing

If crime prevention represents an important new general approach to dealing with crime and the fear of crime, and if community problem solving represents an important operational concept that will guide police efforts towards an important contribution to crime prevention, then it becomes important to find ways to organize and sustain the valuable partnerships and activities included under these different mandates. Three goals seem particularly important to achieve in this respect.

A. Breaking Down Ideological Barriers

Perhaps the most important initial goal is to do what can be done to break down ideological barriers that now divide "crime preventers" from "crime controllers." Because the old ideas of "root causes" versus "crime control" were linked to ideological debates about the causes of crime and who should be held accountable for criminal offending, and these, in turn, were linked to institutional interests in building up either the social service system on one hand or the criminal justice system on the other, it has been difficult to develop an appropriate new idea about crime prevention that lies somewhere between these ideological poles.

I think it is fair to see that the idea of crime prevention that is now being developed, and the role of the police in supporting crime prevention activities does, in fact, lie between these old ideological positions. Many of the new ideas about prevention stop well short of dealing with the root causes of crime. Moreover, many of them take advantage of the basic ideas of deterrence, opportunity blocking, and the creation of additional legal authority to control conditions that lead to crime. And yet, they are also quite different from the limited criminal justice view that the only just and effective way to control crime is to apprehend and control offenders, and that the only institutions that can do that work are criminal justice agencies. So, an important middle

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[94] Barr, Robert and Kenneth Pease. 1990. "Crime Placement, Displacement, and Deflection." In *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

ground is being created, and it needs to be supported by people who understand it as a middle ground, and not destroyed either by claims that what is being proposed is more "social work" on one hand or more "reactive crime control" on the other. That is not trivial task.

B. Forging Partnerships Across Boundaries

Equally important and related is the crucial importance of forming effective partnerships across organizational boundaries. Key to the new ideas of prevention are effective partnerships between community institutions and government agencies on one hand, and between social work agencies and crime control agencies on the other. The police must increase their openness and responsiveness in the interest of building relations with important community institutions. Their problem solving efforts that rely on cooperation from other city agencies must be supported by governing arrangements that allow the police to act as important parts of municipal government as well as the first step in criminal justice system processing.[95] Citizens must see the chance of working on their collective problems through responsive government agencies including both social service and criminal justice agencies. The focus of all has to be on doing whatever is necessary to produce results rather than worrying about whether something is or is not within one's purview to handle.

C. Supporting Initiative and Leadership in Police Organizations

In the short run, however, the most important institutional arrangements that must be made are those that would support community problem-solving initiatives in police departments. I say this for the simple reason that police organizations are best situated to lead a community-wide effort to prevent crime. That is their explicit mandate. The citizens expect them to play this role. They have most of the information about where crime is occurring. The new concepts of community problem-solving offer some important guidance about how to use their distinctive resources and capabilities to lead community-wide crime prevention efforts.

It is no easy task, however, for police organizations to be organized to take up this important opportunity. Much about the way they understand their purposes and methods needs to be changed to allow them to become culturally comfortable with the work that is to be done. Much about the way they organize their work also needs to be changed to create the organizational room for community wide crime prevention efforts to be conceived, planned, carried out, and evaluated. Much about their relations with external agencies needs to be changed to allow them to act as effective leaders of cross-boundary working teams.

One of the most important first steps in supporting these efforts in police organizations is to construct administrative systems that both authorize such actions to be taken, and recognize it when it is being done.[96]

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[95] Mark H. Moore and Margaret Poethig, Forthcoming, "The Police as an Agency of Municipal Government: Implications for Measuring Police Effectiveness." In *Measuring What Matters: The Measurement of Police Effectiveness*, edited by Robert Langworthy.

[96] Mark H. Moore, Malcolm Sparrow, and William Spelman. 1997. "Innovations in Policing: From Production Lines to Job Shops." In *Innovations in American Government: Challenges, Opportunities, and Dilemmas*, edited by Alan Altschuler and Robert Behn. Washington, DC: Brookings.

This is necessary to give community problem-solving efforts standing within the organization. One way to do this, of course, is to create a special unit devoted to crime prevention, or to community problem-solving, or some combination of the two. But special units always create problems in police departments.

A different, more adventurous way to support problem solving would be for the chief executive of the organization simply to announce that everyone in the organization was authorized to nominate an important community crime prevention effort to be undertaken under his leadership. In making the nomination, the police officer (at whatever rank) would have to say why he thought the problem was important, and his tentative ideas about what could be done to solve it. The problems would then be graded by size: the smallest problems (those that required the fewest resources, and the least amount of time, and the least amount of extra-organizational representation) would be called "problems;" those that were the largest (those that required lots of resources, time, and co-operation with other agencies) would be called "programs;" and those in the middle would be called "projects." Committees would be established at the beat, precinct, and organization wide level to consider the nominated "problems," "projects," and "programs," respectively, and to decide which were promising enough to be undertaken. Limits on the total number of such initiatives would be established to ensure that there were adequate police available to perform their traditional response functions. Once a project was approved, however, the person who nominated it would be responsible for leading the initiative, and reporting back regularly on the progress that was being made. If the problem was solved, or no further progress was being made, the "problem" "project," or "program" would be ended. Some of these initiatives would be considered important enough to merit a detailed evaluation, but most would simply be given an assessment. At the end of the year, the police would report not only on their reactive crime control efforts, but also on their proactive efforts to prevent crime by simply reporting on the various initiatives that had been launched.

V. Conclusion

Crime prevention is an important goal to achieve. It is particularly important now to explore means of preventing crime that do not depend so heavily on threats of arrest and prosecution from criminal justice agencies, but instead use these agencies and mechanisms in broader partnerships designed to reduce the rate at which criminal offenders are being produced, the number of situations that lead to crime, and the impact that criminogenic commodities such as drugs, guns and alcohol are having on the crime problem. The police are well positioned to play important roles in such crime prevention efforts. The concepts of community policing and problem-solving policing point them in the right direction, and give them some operational guidance as to how they can take up their important role. To fully exploit this opportunity, however, they must transform their organizational strategies, and find ways to administratively recognize and support the crime prevention efforts.