Case Studies of the Transformation of Police Departments:
A Cross-Site Analysis

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I. Introduction: The Aims of the "Case Study" Component of the COPS Evaluation

The COPS Program was (for sure) designed to increase the *scale* of policing in America: "to put 100,000 additional cops on the streets." But the federal program was also designed (at least in part) to change the *predominant strategy and operations* of American policing: from a strategy that emphasized reactive law enforcement, to one that emphasized proactive community problem-solving. To the extent that the expenditure of federal dollars, and the use of federal prestige and authority was justified by the aim of producing this strategic change in American policing, the success of the COPS program in achieving this result necessarily becomes an important part of the program's evaluation.

The best way to measure the impact of the COPS program on the field of policing is through surveys of police departments conducted by the Urban Institute. These surveys offer reliable evidence on the extent to which a representative sample of American police departments have changed their strategy and operations over the last several years, and the role that the COPS grants played in effecting these changes. What these surveys report about the magnitude of the change wrought by the COPS program is reported elsewhere.

In addition to this survey, however, the evaluation design called for a separate effort to be carried out by the Kennedy School of Government's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management. That effort focused intensive scrutiny on a small number of police departments. The close scrutiny, in turn, resulted in the development of "case studies" that described how a particular police department changed over the period in which it applied for, received, and then implemented one or more COPS grants. The "case studies" were designed to complement the survey data in four important ways.

First, because the cases were prepared through extensive on-site interviews and the examination of records, they offered a kind of "ground truth" for the survey results. Inevitably, the accuracy of the survey data depends on the knowledge and commitment to accuracy of the person who fills out the form. That is potentially highly variable. The accuracy of the cases, on

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the other hand, depends on the observations of the case writers who interviewed multiple participants, reviewed records, and observed conditions and operations in the field. While errors can be made in this method of observation as well, there is probably a greater degree of accuracy and consistency in the observations.

Second, the cases "enrich" our understanding of the survey results by adding concrete, particular images of what it might mean for a department to "increase its commitment to proactive, problem-solving initiatives" or to "increase its reliance on working partnerships with communities." Of necessity, the survey results – powerful as they are in showing how prevalent a set of effects are – tend to be a bit abstract in characterizing the concrete nature of the changes that occurred. The cases, on the other hand, can show us detailed instances and examples of the more abstract concepts – we can see what it meant to "shift to a geographically focused patrol strategy" from the perspective of those who did the shifting and then had to work in the new context.

Third, the cases present a contextualized, narrative account of the changes that occurred in police departments. This feature allows us to consider the question of what role that the COPS program and the COPS grants played in independently producing changes in the overall strategy of a department. After all, if we observe an important change in an organization's operations, it is possible that there were other factors operating in the external environment or history of the Department, and that it was these forces that produced the change rather than the COPS program or the COPS grant *per se*. Indeed, we might imagine that it was these other factors that caused the Department to seek the COPS grant. In these respects, the COPS grant would become a "dependent" rather than an "independent" variable. The cases help us isolate the special role the COPS grants play in a broader context and sequence of events that influence the direction, speed, and scale of the changes that occur.

Fourth, insofar as the cases allow us to get inside the minds of those who were managing the police departments, they allow us to see how the COPS program and COPS grants were used by the managers and leaders of the organization to help them achieve their objectives. (Those objectives may or may not have included the idea of transforming the strategy and style of their organization.) Of particular interest in examining the thought processes of the leaders and managers of the change efforts was to learn how these managers explicitly used the grants, and the process of applying for them, give them leverage in transforming their departments.

These features of the case studies imply that a cross-site analysis of the cases could make two important contributions to the overall evaluation effort. The first is to provide additional, detailed, but anecdotal evidence on the extent to which the COPS program was successful in helping to change the field of policing. This supports one of the principal goals of the evaluation. The second is to give us some important clues about how change-minded police managers could make the best use of the COPS grants to leverage a shift in the overall strategy of their organization.

These are the objectives of the cross-site analysis of the case studies. Below, we present the analytic framework we used to carry out the cross-site analysis. We then present our conceptual and operational definitions of the "dependent variable" in our study: namely, the size and character of the "organizational change" we observe across our sites. Next, we try to attribute the changes we observe to the important independent variables in our study: namely, the history and context of the organizations studied; the impetus for change; the leadership of

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change; the particular intervention techniques that were used to produce change; the particular sequences of interventions; and the unique role played by the process of applying for, receiving, and implementing the COPS grant. Finally, we present those conclusions we think our data will support about the ways in which managers used the COPS grants to leverage broader change efforts, and the role of the COPS grants in generating change.

II. Methodology

A. The Conceptual Framework
    1. The Dependent Variable: The Magnitude of Organizational Change
    2. An Important Independent Variable: The COPS Grant
    3. Other Independent Variables: The Context of the Organization
    4. Other Independent Variables: Managerial Uses of the COPS Grant
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    1. Site Selection
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II.   Methodology

A.   The Conceptual Framework

At one level, the conceptual framework for the cross-site analysis is simple and straightforward. We are interested in determining whether, to what extent, and how, COPS grants changed the overall strategy and operational methods of those police departments that received the grants.

1. The Dependent Variable: The Magnitude of Organizational Change

To put this in an analytic framework, the important *dependent* variable in our analysis is the magnitude of the change we can observe in the organizations that received COPS grants. We assume that this effect is a continuous variable that can range in magnitude from small to large.[1] For the purposes of our analysis, we followed the work of John Eck and Daniel Stern, who observed that changes in police departments toward the strategy of "community problem-solving" could be observed by changes along two different dimensions: improved efforts at "problem-solving," and improved efforts at developing and sustaining "community partnerships."[2] We also assume that the magnitude of the change we observed could also be characterized in terms of how likely it seemed that the changes would be sustained over time. This could be judged by gauging how widely the changes were understood and accepted outside and inside the department, and how administrative systems within the department had been "re-engineered" to be consistent with the new strategy and operations of the department. At one end of this range of variation, one would say that the change was relatively superficial – that the observed changes were both small, and unlikely to persist beyond the period of federal funding. At the other end of the range of variation, one could say that the changes were "significant" and "institutionalized" -- that they involved large parts of the organization, and were embedded in ongoing administrative systems and cultural understandings, and therefore likely to persist in the future even without federal pressure and support.

2. An Important Independent Variable: The COPS Grant

A key *independent* variable in our analysis is the COPS grant. By this, we mean not simply the grant itself, but also: 1) the mere existence of a federal grants program that not only provides a funding opportunity to police organizations, but also throws the weight and prestige of the federal government behind a particular set of changes to be produced in police

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[1] We do not assume, for purposes of measuring the magnitude of change that occurs in a police department, that there is some threshold that a police department crosses where it becomes widely and permanently committed to a strategy of community policing. We do hold open the possibility that, for purposes of understanding what makes a COPS grant, or a broader change effort more effective, that there might well be some discontinuities in the processes of change: some minimum scale of effort that is necessary for a particular operational approach to stay alive in an organization, and some key changes in administrative systems that have a relatively large and permanent effect on the operations of a department.

[2] John E. Eck and Daniel Stern. "Revisiting Community Policing: A New Typology," paper presented to the National Institute of Justice, 1992.

organizations; 2) the process of deciding to apply and putting the proposal together; 3) the efforts made to implement the particular COPS grant; and 4) the expectation that the organization will be held accountable for the expenditure of COPS funds.

We think that each of these different points of interaction with the COPS office could have an impact on the change created within the organization. The existence of the federal program, and specifically its sponsorship of the changed strategy of policing, could influence police managers throughout the country to think that "community policing" was the "new wave" – a wave they needed to ride if they and their department wanted to stay on the "cutting edge" of police professionalism.[3] The process of making an application could be used as part of a strategic review or planning process within the Department, and that could help introduce or sustain some important changes in the way that an applying department thought about itself. The process of implementing the project could not only change the Department by creating the specific new operational capacity that the grant supported in the department, but also by providing project management and substantive experience to those involved, and giving them a platform for future leadership in making subsequent changes. The anticipation of a review of their use of the COPS grants could force them to experiment with programs encouraged by the federal government even if they were not initially inclined to do so, and that experience could change the views of the organization. To the extent that the ripples set in motion by these features of the COPS program tended to increase, speed up, or widen any particular organization's commitment to a change in strategy, these effects must be counted as valuable effects of the program.

3. Other Independent Variables: The Context of the Organization

An important difficulty in the evaluation, however, is that the COPS grants are not the only things that are shaping the behavior of local police departments. Police departments are always operating in a broader context than that circumscribed by federal funding. In this sense, the COPS grant is like a stone dropped in a river of broader, more durable, more powerful forces.

By a broader context, we mean several specific things. First, we mean *the external environment* of the organization; both its external *political* environment (which contains the expectations and demands of citizens and their representatives), and its external *task* environment (which shapes the magnitude and character of the work the organization must do).[4] Second, we mean the past *history* of the organization.[5] We think both the external environment and the history of the organization exercise an important effect not only on the way an organization is currently operating, but also on its future trajectory and potential for change. In effect, these factors create a certain "envelope" of possibilities. Depending on how these factors are set, a COPS grant could have a larger or smaller effect on an organization. No matter how large the grant, or how skillfully it was used, there is only so much room for maneuver.

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[3] Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." In *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48 (1983): 147-160.

[4] James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why.* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Mark H. Moore. *Creating Public Value.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1995), Chapter 4.

[5] Richard Neustadt and Ernest May. *Thinking in Time: Uses of History for Decisionmakers.* (New York: · The Free Press, 1986).

We assume that these characteristics of the wider context are potentially powerful in determining the changes that can be observed in the organization, and the impact that the COPS grant could have (making it essentially irrelevant, or giving it unusually powerful catalytic properties). Moreover, we assume that these features of the environment could be characterized as more or less favorable to the particular direction of change that is favored by the COPS program: i.e. more or less supportive of a shift from traditional reactive policing to a more community-oriented, problem-solving approach. This much is pretty obvious.

What is less obvious, however, is that these features of the broader context can be both dynamic, and working at cross-purposes. Thus, for example, it may well be that, with respect to the external *political* environment, a community is divided on the question of whether it wants traditional reactive policing or the new form of community oriented problem-solving. As a result, city-wide elections produce mayors that sometimes favor one and sometimes favor another. Or, it may be that, with respect to the external *task* environment, at one particular point a community feels relatively secure and confident that the police are doing a good job in dealing) with serious crime. Their only ambition is to improve the speed and courtesy of a police response. Then, drugs hit the community, the community becomes frightened, and it wants a more proactive approach to open air drug markets. The point is that the external environment of a police department may be both changeable, and contradictory in its expectations and demands. To the extent that this is true, the range of variation one can imagine observing in what police departments do ought to be wider than would be true in a world that was more stable and more ordered.

It is easy enough to imagine that a police department's political and task environment would be somewhat volatile, but one might think that its history, at least, would remain constant. After all, history is what it is. It doesn't change after the fact. That is true, of course, and helps to explain the important inertial forces that hold organizations in fixed patterns of behavior.[6] In effect, an organization's history acts as a kind of "sea anchor," or (to change the metaphor) a "dead hand" that keeps the organization stable and focused despite the changes around it.

Yet it is also worth noting that much of what is important about an organization's history is the way in which that history has been constructed as part of the development of an organizational culture. What the organization knows about and understands from its history is often a social construction that is used by factions of an organization to advance one vision of the organization over another.[7] It is sometimes even used by leaders of organizations to shape the future culture of the organization.[8] So, it may be that an important part of an organization's history – the way that the organization understands its lessons and meanings – is also full of conflict and change. To the extent this is true, the organization has more paths to the future than it would have if the organization's understanding of its own history were more stable and widely shared.

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[6]Graham Allison. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* (New York: Harper Collins, 1971).

[7] Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time.*

[8] Edgar Schein. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2d. ed. (San Francisco : Jossey-Bass, 1997).

So, the COPS grants may be dropped into contexts that are dynamic, volatile, and conflict ridden as well as in environments that are either rigidly and consistently hostile to or supportive of the changes favored by the COPS program. In effect, the pebble that is the COPS grant can be dropped into a placid pond, or a rushing torrent. And the torrent could be rushing in the direction of the aims of the COPS grant, or against them, or simply roiling in cross-currents. Depending on which of these conditions obtain in a particular environment, one would expect the organization to show more or less change, and for the COPS grant to have larger or smaller effects in determining the size of those effects.

4. Other Independent Variables: Managerial Uses of the COPS Grant

So far, our analytic scheme has been based on the idea that there is an important effect that interests us: namely, the extent to which an organization changed in directions mandated by the COPS program. We assume that one of the factors pushing in this direction is the organization's engagement with the COPS program as a grant applicant and recipient. But we also understand that the COPS office is only one small part of the police department's external political environment, and that the experience of getting the COPS grant is only a small piece of organizational history. Consequently, when we are looking at a change in organizational behavior, we are not looking only at the effect produced by the COPS grant, but at that in addition to the (positive and negative) effects exerted by other factors operating in an organization's context. Those other variables include: 1) the organization's external political environment; 2) its external task environment; and 3) its organizational history (as it actually occurred, and as it has been interpreted in the creation of an organizational culture).

One additional factor is of particular interest to us, and has been accommodated in our analytic scheme: namely, the idea that there are purposeful individuals in positions of authority who use the COPS grant for purposes that they think are important to achieve. Those purposes could include many different things. They could include the aim of winning the grant to enhance their own prestige in their town or in their profession. They could include the aim of shifting costs that the city would pay to the federal government, or simply increasing the amount of money the organization has to work with. They could include making the particular investment, or experimenting with the particular operational idea that is supported by the COPS grant. Or, they could include using one or more COPS grants to help leverage a broader effort to change the overall strategy and operational style of the organization.

It is this last idea that is of particular interest to us. We understand, of course, that an important part of the evaluation of the COPS program must be focused on the question of whether the federal funds did or did not buy either a scale or a kind of policing beyond what the locality would have supplied with its own resources. We also understand that it is important to know whether the organizations did or did not implement the particular program that the COPS grant supported in an administratively and operationally recognizable way, and what the impact of that program might have been. But, because we are interested not only in the process of organizational change, but also how managers might lead their organizations through these processes, we are particularly interested in the ways that purposeful, influential people used the COPS grants to make larger changes in their organizations.

For purposes of analysis, it is important to understand that viewing the COPS grants as an instrument used by purposeful managers in a broader process of organizational change transforms the status of the COPS grants in the analytic framework. Instead of viewing the COPS grants as *independent* variables exerting a separate effect on organizations, they are viewed as *dependent* variables, grasped by purposeful managers, and exploited for the managers' purposes. This doesn't mean no effects could be attributed to the COPS grant itself. The COPS grants may still be viewed as having an important effect. Indeed, their real effect may well be greater if they are actively used by strategic managers than if they simply landed within an organization and did whatever they did. It does suggest, however, that to the extent that we find some important changes that can be attributed to the COPS grant independent of contextual factors, some portion of that must be attributed to the ways in which leaders and managers made use of the grants as well as to the grants themselves. This fact is of particular interest to us because one of the things we are trying to learn through the case studies is how skillful change managers used the occasion of the COPS grants to leverage a wider change in their police department.

5. The Nature of the Causal System

Figure 1 sets out schematic diagram that presents the basics of the analytic scheme that have been discussed so far. It says that the observed level of organizational change is a function of: 1) the context of the organization; 2) the COPS grant; and 3) the managerial interventions that are being made through and alongside the COPS grant. In much of the rest of this report, we will be refining and adding detail to the basic variables in this model, trying to measure the variables in particular organizations in our study, and develop inferences about which of the independent variables seem particularly important in determining the magnitude of the organizational change. In these respects, we are carrying out the usual analytic processes of social science.

It is important to understand, however, that in many respects the analysis is not and cannot be a straightforward process of data analysis and inference. Part of the difficulty comes in trying to develop operational definitions of what we mean by variables such as the "change in the strategy and operations of a police department" or the "context of the organization," or "managerial purposes and interventions." We think we have done a pretty good job of operationalizing those abstract concepts in more detailed characterizations that can actually be observed in the world. Still, there is plenty of room for argument in whether our operational definitions capture the true meaning of these abstract concepts.

Another difficulty comes in accurately measuring whether a variable was or was not present in a particular case, and if present, to what degree, or in what quantity. This is partly a question of what counts as evidence, and partly a question of how we looked for and gathered the evidence. Suffice it to say here that we constructed the cases guided by a template that required us to search for the same variables and make the same kind of observations from case to case. Moreover, we relied both on interviews and documents to construct the cases. And all the cases were checked for accuracy through a review by the participants. Nonetheless, we have to admit to some uncertainty about the consistency and accuracy of the observations. As noted above, history is a somewhat slippery thing because it is always being used by people in the present for their own purposes. Further, in reviewing the cases for this cross-site analysis, we prepared

simple summaries of the cases looking at the key variables that interested us, and some errors may have crept in during this process of summarizing and looking across cases.

A third difficulty comes in making causal inferences about the extent to which the magnitude of an organizational change can be reliably attributed to a particular variable. Our design called for us to look mostly at organizations that had achieved some degree of change. Thus, we committed the sin of "sampling on the dependent variable." Eight of our cases were chosen because they seemed to be high change organizations. At the same time, we did write cases on two departments that were closer to the average level of change that occurred. These organizations were selected to provide a contrast for the other cases, and to allow us to determine whether the factors we wanted to use to explain high rates of change were also present in organizations that produced little change (therefore casting doubt on our attribution). Perhaps the best way to think about this methodological approach is that it is similar to the "case control" method used by public health researchers. We compare cases where an "epidemic" occurred (i.e. a relatively large rate of change in the strategy of policing) with cases that seem roughly similar where the epidemic did *not* occur. Factors that show up consistently in the "epidemic" sites and only rarely or not at all in the non-epidemic sites are the factors that are most likely to be the causes of the "epidemic." This method is not strong enough to establish an ironclad conclusion about causes, but it is strong enough to shape one' guesses about the causes.

Still, even though we have been careful about collecting the facts about 10 cases, even though there is some variability in the dependent variable among these cases, and even though we can take advantage of the "case control" approach, the fact remains that we cannot use ordinary statistical methods to establish the importance of one causal variable over another. We will have to rely on: 1) judgment, disciplined by the facts that we can observe; and 2) some variability in degrees of organizational change that can be more or less reliably linked to the presence or absence of some of the explanatory variables of interest to attribute the changes we can observe to one or more explanatory variables.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty, however, comes from the fact that we are by no means sure that the causal system we are examining is one that is well modeled by a simple linear, additive system. That system would be drawn like Figure 1, but with arrows pointing only in one direction. We think the arrows go in both directions in this causal system. Moreover, we think that there might well be odd discontinuities in the process. For example, it may well be that the size of the COPS grants' impact on an organization could be highly variable depending on the organization's context – that the very same COPS grant could be highly catalytic and powerful in one organization and its context, and inert in another. The same thing could well be true for the relationship between a COPS grant and a managerial intervention: the same COPS grant could have a huge effect in an organization that is strategically managed, and little effect in an organization that is not. We also think that there might be various "critical mass" phenomena at work. For example, we think it might be true that a particular combination of context, grants, and management might have little effect, or remain extremely vulnerable in an organization where all these factors are pushing toward a change with force 99; but if the combined force gets a little above 100, that the same feedback processes in the system that we working to dampen the influence of the 99 level effort, suddenly reverse and begin exaggerating the effects of the intervention.

If the causal system were like this – with causation running in several directions, with many critical mass effects, and so on – then it becomes very difficult, and probably wrong

conceptually, even to talk about, let alone measure, the separate, independent effects of the COPS grant. The size of the effect depends on the grant and the state of the particular system in which the grant is dropped rather than on the grant itself. The same grant will produce very different results depending on the context in which it is inserted.

We think that this is, in fact, true. We will work hard at trying to separate out the particular effects of the COPS grants on the observed level of organizational change, but we think that the size of this effect does, in fact, depend crucially on the state of the system as a whole. That is one reason why the cases are a good kind of data to use in investigating the question of what impact the COPS grants had. They do present a contextualized and narrative account of the state of the whole system, and thus allow us to see the effect of the COPS grants in an interactive, dynamic system.

B. Empirical Methods

It is worthwhile to say a few words here about how the case studies that underlie this analysis. Two methodological issues are particularly important for a proper appreciation of the scope and limits of this analysis: How we selected the ten cases discussed here, and how we developed our portraits of each of them.

1. Site Selection

The case studies aim to understand at a more detailed level than the surveys can what factors enable COPS-funded police departments to change into community-oriented police departments. Out of the thousands of COPS-funded departments across the country, our challenge was to select 10 that would provide the most evidence for answering that basic question, subject to a few practical constraints.[9] Because part of our mandate for the evaluation was to help get at the "ground truth" behind the survey of COPS-funded agencies (described elsewhere in this report), we only considered the approximately 1,600 COPS-funded departments that were surveyed. Because we judged that a single case writer could not do a good job investigating how an entire organization changed if that organization were very large, we zeroed-in on medium-sized municipal departments (those serving cities of 100,000 to 500,000 population). Because we thought that that changes beginning *too* recently would likely not be far enough along to be interesting, we decided to focus on departments where change had started some time ago. But, because we were dependent on interviewee recollections, and judged that interviewees might have trouble recalling change in the distant past, we wanted departments that had changed relatively recently. Consequently, we limited our attention to organizations that had changed in the recent but not-too-recent past (those where change commenced between 1992 and 1994).[10] These three criteria define the population from which we chose our sample of 10.

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[9]Our initial plans called for 12 cases rather than 10, but timing interfered and forced us to abandon our final two sites. Consequently, the site selection description that follows is slightly inaccurate: In fact we chose 12 cases (9 high achievers and 3 representative cases), and we simply did not get to the final two (one high achiever and one representative case). For clarity of exposition, this section focuses only on the 10 selected cases that we actually carried out.

[10] This timing criterion is somewhat problematic: First of all, we mostly used survey information to gauge the onset of change, and in several cases this information turned out to be misleading—thus we wound up

a. Site Selection for Comparative Analysis

The study was designed as a comparative analysis, one that, in the words of Theda Skocpol, "tries to establish valid associations of potential causes with the given phenomenon one is trying to explain." [11] Specifically, we want to demonstrate that a certain style of leadership—including certain ways of using federal funding—is necessary if a police department means to effect organizational change. [12]

The comparative method is at its strongest when it relies on two complementary sorts of comparisons. First, Skocpol explains, "one can try to establish that several cases having in common the phenomenon one is trying to explain also have in common a set of causal factors, although they vary in other ways that might seem causally relevant." To facilitate this comparison, we chose 8 departments that seemed to have changed a great deal, but that varied in many other ways—often in ways that might seem to make change impossible. [13] In our analysis,

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with several departments where change got started before 1992. Second, the 1994 cut-off date all but ensured that COPS itself (which began in 1994) would not "cause" change in the sense of exerting the first push down the road of community policing. This latter problem is serious but, we felt, unavoidable: We had no good way to identify more recent reformers; and in any case, we felt that it simply would not be productive to guess at the extent and causes of change in young efforts that might well die off before taking root. To mitigate it, we hope the reader will indulge us in speculation about the effects that other federal grants had on our agencies when their reforms were young—effects that COPS may well have duplicated in newer change efforts that we excluded from our sample. In any case, we believe that the major role of a federal funding program is not that of the initial catalyst but that of a booster to locally-driven efforts; thus it is wrong to dwell too much on the possibilities for federal funding to set change in motion.

[11] For simplicity, this discussion will rely on Theda Skocpol's description of the comparative method (which is based on the ideas of John Stuart Mill) in her *States and Social Revolutions*. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 33-43; all the quotations are on p. 36. But the logic is mostly compatible with other treatments of the case study method, *e.g.* Robert K. Yin's description of multiple-case research in his *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), pp. 47-53. The major caution against it comes from Charles Ragin, who rightly argues that causal complexity (*e.g.*, the interactions among causes to produce an outcome) undermines a literal application of Mill's methods: Rather than comparing cases with respect to *individual* variables, they must be compared with respect to *combinations* of variables (and it is possible to benefit from this insight without necessarily using Ragin's own formalization of the comparative method). Indeed, a major thrust of our argument above hinges on the interaction of distinct "causes." See Charles Ragin. *The Comparative Method*. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1987).

[12] The phrase "means to," though somewhat ambiguous, is important: We only intend to study departments in which some influential group sincerely intends to change the organization. The study does not, therefore, ask the academic question "what makes organizations change?"—a question in which individual intention need play no role at all. Instead we ask the practical question, central to public administration, "how and under what conditions can a leader who wants to change an organization succeed?"

[13] For some, *external* environments seemed ambivalent to change or even hostile to it, in that they exhibited low "social capital", weak ties to national policing networks, or simply lukewarm support from city government, community organizations, and other local partners in surveys. Other departments seemed to face an unpromising *internal* environment, beginning their attempts to change with conservative cultures and structures (something we gauged from survey responses about the degree of internal resistance, and also from regional location: For example, West Coast departments, which started late, tend to be more "progressive" than their counterparts in some other parts of the country). Others did not seem to face any

we will try to show that competent leadership is the common factor that underlies change in these otherwise diverse departments, and we will try to explicate what it consists of.

Skocpol explains the second type of comparison as follows: "One can contrast the cases in which the phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesized causes are present to other cases in which the phenomenon and the causes are both absent, but which are otherwise as similar as possible to the positive cases." Taken literally, this description calls for a comparison of success *versus* failure; but it is also possible simply to compare various degrees of success, which is the strategy we have chosen.[14] Our eight high-achievement cases are in fact among the most progressive police agencies in the nation. As realistic foils for these eight, we sought to identify two departments that would be representative of community policing in most mid-sized American police departments. These departments provide fit comparisons to the eight high-achievers. Regardless, the two comparative cases are decidedly *not* the "usual suspects" for studies of community policing, and case studies of them can hopefully help expand the field's view of what community policing involves.

b. Looking for Variety in Community Policing

So far we have talked as if "change" was a unidirectional thing: everyone is moving in the same direction, even if they aren't all getting there at the same speed. But in fact police departments change in different ways. The most notable typology is the one some have tried to draw between problem-oriented policing and community policing.[15] On one hand, there are departments that emphasize problem-solving without necessarily involving the community in the definition and solution of problems. On the other, there are departments that emphasize community involvement without necessarily focusing on problem-solving. (As stated this distinction implies a third logically-possible type: the mixed department that does both.) Whatever the actual variety of community policing is, we can summarize it abstractly: organizational change towards community policing can be described as a vector of a certain *magnitude* (how much change occurs) and *direction* (what type of community policing the department is trying to implement).

In any case, lessons about changing a department in the direction of one form of community policing may not apply directly to departments that aim in a different direction. Some forms may be easy to implement, others hard. Some forms may require special resources or environments. And so on. Consequently, in order to make the cases useful to a variety of departments moving in a variety of directions, we tried to select departments that represent the full range of community policing. In other words, we overlaid another criteria over those described in the previous section. Within our three categories of sites (positive cases with benign environments, positive cases with hostile environments, and representative cases), we tried to vary the *direction* of change (or intended change).

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of these problems to any great degree. By choosing three cases in each category, we have tried to select eight high-change cases with maximum variance on potentially important causal factors. We then use Mill's method of agreement to identify the common factor all share.

[14] As Charles Tilly puts it, the basic imperative involves "finding variation;" see his *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons.* (New York: Russell Sage, 1984).

[15] *Cf.* Eck and Stern, "Revisiting Community Policing."

c. Applying the Criteria

The discussion to this point has assumed that we could know in advance what sort of changes occurred and why, which of course is not true. But two sources of information helped us approximate such prior knowledge: 1) the Urban Institute's survey of some 1,600 COPS-funded police departments (which was undertaken as part of the evaluation effort, and asked a number of questions about what the department is doing as well as the history of its changes); and 2) a number of experts in policing who are familiar with the national scene. [16] Though neither of these sources of information is perfect, some of their weaknesses are complementary.

The survey was used to create a crude and simple index that sought to capture how completely a department had implemented community policing. Specifically, the index reported how many of the following four key reforms had been accomplished: 1) designating certain recurring patterns as problems; 2) using a team approach for problem-solving; 3) maintaining beat integrity in dispatching officers; and 4) providing some in-service training on community policing. We used this index for two purposes. First, we chose our two "representative" departments by taking a random sample of all agencies that had implemented either two or three of these reforms.[17] Second, we generated a list of "overachievers" by selecting those departments that had implemented all four reforms

The second list was supplemented with nominations from our experts—unlisted departments which *they* believed had undergone the most change in recent years. The resulting catalog contained dozens of potential candidates. To whittle it down to the eight sites we needed, we looked to three goals.

First, as explained above, we wanted to select high-change departments with maximum variance on potentially important causal factors, so that we would be able to apply Mill's method of agreement. To this end, we used additional information from the survey to classify the high-change candidates into three categories based on the nature of their "environments" (the three categories were unpromising external environment, unpromising internal environment, and benign environment; see footnote 13).[18] By selecting sites from all three of these categories, we tried to ensure variation with respect to potential causes of change.

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[16] Specifically, we wish to thank William Geller, Herman Goldstein, George Kelling, David Kennedy, and Rana Sampson for their generous help selecting sites.

[17] The mean number of reforms implemented among departments in our population was three, so as a whole, our candidates had implemented slightly fewer reforms than average. We chose to undershoot the mean in order to ensure that our comparisons would have enough variation to exploit effectively.

[18] The survey contained several questions about external and internal support that made this classification fairly straightforward; see especially the discussion in footnote 13. But we also used expert knowledge—or rather, *lack* of knowledge—to identify cases with unpromising external environments. Specifically, if the experts knew nothing about a department, we took this as evidence that it had weak ties to the national policing network—which is an important force for change through the support and guidance it offers police agencies as they reform. We do not mean to argue that the five experts we spoke with are themselves the only source of change in the police profession: We are simply arguing that if none of these 5 people have

Second, we wanted to maximize our probability of selecting truly outstanding departments. To do this, we supplemented the survey information with our experts' advice, asking them what *they* knew about those candidates that they themselves had not nominated. We then selected the two to three candidates we needed from each category by choosing the departments that we knew the most about. We had the most confidence in departments about which the experts and the survey agreed. But we also felt confident about departments if an expert was particularly enthusiastic about it, or if multiple experts nominated it. (One exception is described in footnote 18: In order to select some departments outside the national networks, we chose one department that our survey screen identified but that the experts reported that they had heard little or nothing about.)

Third, as described above, we wanted to capture maximum variety in the types of community policing. To realize this goal, we used the survey to gauge community policing "style" in our preliminary list of eight candidates (mostly by guessing at the relative emphasis each department seemed to place on problem-solving *versus* community participation). If all the departments in a particular category reflected the same "style" of community policing, we threw one out and substituted another that reflected a different style (returning to the original list to do so).

Now that the departments have been visited, these "guesses" about their experiences are no longer the best sources of information we have about them—our analysis must rest on the case studies themselves. It is important, however, to keep in mind what these cases do and do not represent: they are *not* a random sample of all police agencies, so they do not accurately portray the typical experience of community policing today. In some ways, the two "representative" departments *do* get at that mythical mean, in that we randomly selected them from departments whose progress appeared to be about the norm. But the eight "high-achievers" are just that: departments chosen precisely because they have distinguished themselves in some way (and furthermore because they did so against varying backgrounds). The analytic task is to determine what these eight cases have in common, and what distinguishes them from the other two (and by implication, from the bulk of the field).

2. Developing the Case Studies

What we can expect from our research is further constrained by the methods we used to produce each case study. For each department, we tried to understand how the organization changed and why, so that the cases try to characterize: 1) any changes the departments went through; and 2) a variety of factors that may have led to those changes. The categories we used

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heard much about a department, it is likely that other "experts" would not have had contact with them either (the experts do, after all, talk to each other); thus the agency is likely to be somewhat peripheral to the national network. In any case, we selected two departments identified by the survey as "overachievers" but that the experts reported that they had heard little or nothing about. At best, such departments present an interesting puzzle: How could a place with such apparently minimal connections to national circles change as much as the survey suggests it did? At the very least, this strategy offers one more way to avoid rounding up the usual suspects. In the end, one of these two departments was among our casualties of timing, so we only studied one department chosen because of its apparently weak ties to national policing · networks.

in each of these areas developed to some extent as we went along, but many were settled early on—after our pilot case (of Lowell, Massachusetts), considerable background reading in community policing and organization theory, and much discussion in the research team. They are described below as we begin filling out the details of our conceptual framework.

The concepts we have used are complex—things like "the technical core of an organization," "administrative systems," or even "leadership." They cannot, as a result, be completely captured through standardized instruments or quantitative summaries. Instead we have turned to case study research based on in-depth interviews, direct observation, and primary documents to create a detailed portrait of how certain events transpired and what effects they had.[19] Though we believe that this approach is appropriate given the conceptual framework we are using and the complexity of the phenomena we are studying, it is appropriate to mention its limitations.

In particular, by relying heavily on in-depth interviews with participants, we run the risk of missing the same things that they themselves missed, and of being caught up in their enthusiasm. Where possible, we have tried to guard against these potential problems by pressing our respondents to be concrete, verifying their impressions with archival data, and fully considering the range of opinions that differently-situated informants provide us (no generalization in the cases is based on the opinion of a single interviewee). Finally, to reduce the even greater possibility that we misunderstood our informants, we have insisted that they comment on our drafts at various stages.

Despite these strategies, qualitative case study research is inherently limited in the firmness of the causal connections it describes. We will, of course, try to make *some* statements about the power of the COPS grants, contextual factors, and various management strategies to influence change, and our comparative research was designed to give us some ability to do this. First, we can avail ourselves of Mill's method of agreement: There is some reason to believe that combinations of strategies and factors present across all eight of the overachievers are loosely associated with change—or at least that combinations of strategies and factors *not* present in very many of them are inessential (in that some departments were able to succeed without them). Second, we can avail ourselves of Mill's method of difference: The combinations of strategies and factors that seem to distinguish the overachievers from the more representative departments have some tentative claim to the status of key causal factors. All else being equal, departments that have or use them seem to do better than those that do not.

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[19]In each site, we carried out from two to three dozen interviews and focus groups with relevant individuals, including various police employees (focusing on groups like officers, managers, civilians, union representatives, and those who resisted community policing) as well as important outside groups (including employees of outside agencies, elected officials, and community representatives). We also tried to observe patrol activities, management meetings, interdepartmental meetings, and community meetings at each site (and in no case did we fail in more than one of these categories). Finally, we made the same document request of each department, asking for grant applications, annual reports, strategic plans, budgets, personnel sheets, and general orders and other policies or bulletins relevant to community policing. Many departments were still willing to cooperate after this barrage of requests, and provided us with considerably more idiosyncratic but eminently useful documentation. In any case, the site visits were guided by a rough protocol that left room for serendipity. The overriding aim was to understand what had changed in a department and why.

Nevertheless, given the basic vulnerability of small-n comparative research, it is worth stressing that an equally important and more firmly-based contribution we hope to make involves not causation but explication: Through detailed portraits of these ten intriguing cases, it is possible to enrich our understanding of what things like "effective management," "contextual constraints," and the even the COPS grants themselves consist of. In this way, the analysis helps to <u>stimulate</u> our imaginations as well as <u>discipline</u> them.

III. Defining Organizational Change

    A. Measuring the "Shift Towards Community Policing"
        1. Community Policing as "Problem-Solving" and "Community Partnerships"
        2. Commitment to Change and the Future Trajectory of the Department
        3. Measuring the Quantity and Quality of Problem-Solving Activity and Capabilities in a Police Department
        4. Measuring the Capacity to Establish "Community Partnerships"
        5. Gauging the "Institutionalization" of the Changes
    B. Our Findings: Significant Levels of Achievement and Major Changes

III. Defining Organizational Change

The crucial dependent, evaluative variable in our study is the level of achievement and degree of change a department makes in implementing the philosophy of community policing. Of course, a police department can change in many ways, along many different dimensions. It can get larger or smaller. Its morale can go up or down. It can become more or less focused on serious crime and dangerous offenders. It can become more or less aggressive in its patrol operations. Its administrative systems and technological infrastructure can become more or less sophisticated and well adapted to its operations. It can become more or less corrupt and brutal. Arguably, any or all of these dimensions of change could be of interest to someone for some purposes.

A. Measuring the "Shift Towards Community Policing"

For our purposes, however, we focus our attention on a particular kind of change: the extent to which police departments that received COPS grants shifted their overall strategy and operations towards "community policing." To answer that question, one must have an operational definition of what it means to "move towards community policing:" what concrete, observable characteristics of police departments constitute a more or less significant change in the direction of community policing. Of course, much controversy attends this question. But much of the controversy is at an abstract, philosophical level. It tends to focus on the important but somewhat theological question of how far a department really has to go to cross some magical line that distinguishes departments that have embraced community policing "as a philosophy," and those that are merely opportunistically giving "lip-service" to the concept.[20]

Determining how far an organization has gone in shifting towards community policing, and how strong its commitment is to community policing are, of course, important questions. Indeed, being able to measure precisely this quantity is central to our ability to evaluate the COPS program and to draw lessons about how best to manage changes in police departments. In our experience, however, much of the controversy over measuring the extent of change disappears once one begins looking at concrete cases. With enough cases, it becomes fairly easy to operationalize concepts of community policing; and further, to see how far different departments have moved along the dimensions of performance that help to define the strategy, operations, and administrative systems that support community policing.

1. Community Policing as "Problem-Solving" and "Community Partnerships"

Following John Eck and Daniel Stern, we define "community policing" as an effort to enhance two functions that were always present in police departments, but which are given new emphasis and importance by the philosophy of community policing.[21] One of those functions is

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[20] Jack Greene and Stephen Mastrofski, eds. *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality* (New York: Praeger, 1988).

[21] Eck and Stern, "Revisiting Community Policing."

increased reliance on "problem-solving" as an operational method within the police department. The other is an increased effort at establishing "working partnerships" with other government agencies, and most importantly, with various kinds of community groups.

We assume that it is possible to characterize the extent of a police department's commitment of resources and energy to these particular functions at the present moment, and to compare that with what was true in the past. That characterization would focus on such things as: 1) how much of the police department's overall activity seemed to be committed to these functions; and 2) how widely the responsibilities for engaging in these activities was spread throughout the organization. The observed change is the magnitude of the particular kind of organizational change that interests us.

2. Commitment to Change and the Future Trajectory of the Department

Movements of police departments' operations along these two large dimensions that define the strategy of community policing captures one important way of measuring the change in a police department. In addition, however, we are interested in the questions of how long the changes will be sustained; whether any momentum generated by the change in the time period in which we made the observations will be sustained or flag.

This is sometimes formulated as the question of whether a particular change has become "institutionalized" or not. Insofar as the concept of "institutionalization" focuses our attention on: 1) whether the changes are likely to be sustained over time; 2) whether the changes have either incorporated or been understood by a broad portion of the organization; and 3) whether the changes have become embedded in the administrative systems and culture of an organization; the question of whether changes have become institutionalized is a good one.

The difficulty with the concept of "institutionalization," however, is that it suggests that an important organizational change is one that freezes an organization forever in a particular shape. That, of course, is never true. All changes can be undone at some time in the future. More importantly, it is not particularly desirable for some particular set of organizational characteristics to become "institutionalized." Flexibility and responsiveness are virtues in organizations, making it possible for them not only to change in response to changing political and task environments and retain their relevance and utility to the communities they serve, but also to allow them to deal with more heterogeneous tasks and problems they encounter with novel, adaptive responses.

Of course, one may wish to institutionalize a continuing capacity for adaptation, learning, and change. Indeed, one of the important ideas behind community and problem solving policing is precisely that it does "institutionalize" a continuing capacity to be flexible and responsive in police departments, and does so by opening the department up to a variety of external challenges, and authorizing creative responses at many different levels of the organization. But that is a much different kind of institutionalization than we usually mean when we are discussing whether a particular change has become institutionalized in an organization.

Thus, an important part of our evaluation of the impact of the COPS grants must address not only the question of how far an organization has moved in the period of observation, but also

what, if anything, has happened to the likely future trajectory of the organization. At any given moment an organization has a certain envelope of future possibilities that include continuing as it now is, or continuing on the path of change to which it seems committed, or backsliding in various ways. To the extent that the COPS grants helped to build a kind of organizational momentum, or to construct a climate of external or internal expectations, or to construct an organizational or informational infrastructure that seems to favor some paths to the future over others, one can say that the effect of the COPS grant is greater than that which can be observed in the given period. It extends its influence into the future of the organization. That, too, is what we mean by the degree of organizational change.

3. Measuring the Quantity and Quality of Problem-Solving Activity and Capabilities in a Police Department

If the shift toward community policing is defined partly by a police department's increased reliance on problem-solving as an operational method, then, in judging the amount of movement toward a strategy of community policing, one must look inside the department to ascertain how the quantity and quality of its problem solving activity has changed over time. A difficulty, here, is that police departments have always engaged in activities that could easily be called "problem-solving," but have not been accounted for as such. For example, individual police officers have often handled problems on their beats in creative ways. At higher, more formal levels, police departments have long initiated directed patrol operations targeted on particular places or people. And, police departments have also long been in the business of managing special operations to deal with celebrity visits, major disasters, or complex investigations. Such activities are similar to problem-solving efforts in that they are "proactive" and/or rely on methods other than arrest and prosecution to deal with a crime or disorder problem. Given that much of this activity has occurred in the past and not been accounted for, how can one measure a change in the quantity and quality of problem-solving?

While it is important to acknowledge that the baseline of problem-solving is far from zero in police departments, it still turns out to be pretty easy to determine whether the quantity and quality of problem solving in a department has increased. Specifically, we looked for the following things in a police department:

1) We looked for evidence of the extent to which the Department's concept of problem solving had shifted from the relatively superficial ideas of "directed patrol" and "special operations" (designed primarily to deal with a crime problem by concentrating patrol operations on particular places and times) to the more complex idea of problem-solving (which includes problems involving disorder and fear as well as those involving crime, and which requires the police to search for interventions in addition to threatening or actually arresting offenders). The more the proactive initiatives undertaken by the department undertook to understand the causes of a problem as well as simply when and where the problem occurred, and engaged in an "uninhibited search" for solutions, the more credit they were given for having increased the quality of problem-solving efforts.

2) We also considered the extent to which administrative systems in the organization were created to "recognize" problem-solving efforts, and thus transformed the

activity from something that *happened informally at the individual officer level* to something that happened *formally at multiple levels* in the organization. One version of this change was the creation of particular structurally defined units committed to problem-solving. But another more significant advance was the *creation of administrative systems capable of authorizing and recognizing problem-solving initiatives at whatever scale and wherever they occurred in the organization.*

3) We also looked at *how broadly the authorization to initiate and engage in problem solving efforts was distributed* across the organization. We assumed that the more widely the activity was authorized, the more of it occurred, and the more that problem-solving was likely to be embedded in the culture of the organization.

4) We also considered the capability of the organization in defining and acting on *problems of varying sizes.* Some problems are relatively small in terms of their importance to a community, the time and effort it would take to solve, the claims they made on specialized resources within the department, and the amount of help required from other government agencies and the community. Other problems are much larger. For simplicity, one can imagine beat level problems versus city wide problems. A department that was capable of defining and acting on problems across this range was considered more adept at problem-solving than one that could only operate at the beat level or only at the city wide level.

5) We were also interested in the question of whether the departments were set up to *assess the impact of particular problem-solving efforts and to learn from them.* Those that were capable were considered further along in their commitment to problem-solving than those that did not devote much attention to assessing impact or learning from their own operations.

6) Finally, we were interested in the *extent to which the organization was capable of enlisting other government agencies and the community both in defining and solving community problems.* Those departments that were skilled in enlisting other organizations to help them solve problems they had defined, and (more importantly) open to and willing to work on problems nominated by community groups and other government agencies, were considered "more advanced" than others.

In a crude sense, these characteristics became the scale along which we measured progress towards "increased quantity and quality of problem-solving."

4. Measuring the Capacity to Establish "Community Partnerships"

With respect to gauging the organization's increased reliance and capacity to build "working partnerships" with communities on one hand and other governmental organizations on the other, several problems arise.

First, as in the case of problem-solving, all police departments have long sustained activities that could be understood as efforts to build effective partnerships with communities.

Indeed, one could understand the 911 system as one that was explicitly designed to link police departments directly to individual citizens, and to ensure a fast, tailored response to their concerns. Moreover, following the riots of the late sixties, most police departments had established some kind of community relations unit that was supposed to keep tabs on and act to increase the quality of the relationships between the Police Department and organized community groups.[22] Finally, enthusiasm for certain kinds of crime prevention activities in the seventies and eighties had resulted in many Police Departments developing "Neighborhood Watch" programs that encouraged citizens to become the "eyes and ears" of the police.[23] So, there was a baseline level of activity that could be understood as efforts to construct "working partnerships with communities.

What is new in the idea of community policing is that the value assigned to the community relations function in the old strategy was far too little. In essence, the philosophy of community policing claims that it is important to have strong relationships with community groups as well as with individuals.[24] Moreover, that such relations are important not only to achieve the operational goals of policing (namely, to reduce crime by enlisting the aid of citizens in deterring crime and helping to find and incapacitate offenders), but also to achieve the goal of building support and legitimacy for police operations with the broader public. Legitimacy is viewed both as a valuable end in itself, and as an important means to achieving a more widely supported and more effective department. Thus, what interests us is how far beyond, and in what particular ways, a police department went beyond these standard commitments to community relations.

Second, in gauging the character of "working partnerships" with citizens and citizen groups, we were interested in the precise character of the partnership: specifically; 1) whether it was one in which the police were using citizens for their purposes or one in which the police remained open to purposes that citizens nominated; and 2) whether it was one in which the police thought that they dominated the citizens, or one in which the police thought they were in the relationship at least partly to serve and to be accountable to the citizens. Of course, the police can never be wholly subservient in their relationships with community groups.[25] There are things that community groups can and will ask the police to do that they are duty bound to reject as illegal or unfair to others in the community. But given this fact, one can see the police as being more or less interested in and responsive to the concerns of citizen groups.

Third, we understand that it is often as important to construct working partnerships with other parts of the criminal justice system, and with other agencies of city government as it is to construct working partnerships with citizens. Moreover, we understand that both require hard work across organizational boundaries. Still, we are inclined to view the links to citizens and community groups as somewhat more important than the links that are established across governmental organizations. The reason is not just that the links to community groups are judged

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[22] Reference on community relations units following the riots

[23] James Garofalo and Maureen McLeod. "Improving the Effectiveness and Utilization of Neighborhood Watch Programs." Unpublished Report to NIJ SUNY Albany Hindelang Research Center, 1986.

[24] Malcolm Sparrow, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing.* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

[25] *Ibid.*

to be more effective in achieving the operational goals of the police. It is also that links to community groups build support and legitimacy for the police more widely than is true of linkages to other governmental agencies, and we think that building support and legitimacy for the police is important operationally over the long run. We also think it is more difficult for the police to cross the gulf between "civilians" and the police than it is to cross the divide among "civil servants."

In gauging the capacity of the police to develop working partnerships, then, we tended to look at the following characteristics of a police department:

1) We looked at the extent to which the police department had *taken advantage of and extended previous efforts to mobilize citizens to help the police achieve their objectives*. This included the extent to which the police had developed a network of neighborhood watch groups. In addition, we were interested in the newer efforts to recruit and maintain a corps of volunteers to help them staff their operations.

2) We looked at the *extent to which the police department had articulated and operationalized a philosophy of service and responsiveness to individual citizens and citizen groups with whom they interacted as clients*. Related to this was the question of whether *they relied on surveys of citizens as an important measure of performance*.

3) We looked at the extent to which the police department *had structured itself to ensure easy access and continuing connections to citizens to its core patrol operations*. This included the questions of: a) whether the department had *defined precincts, sectors and beats to correspond to natural neighborhood boundaries*; b) whether the department *relied on modes of patrol (such as foot, bicycle, or mounted) that encouraged face to face contact with citizens*; c) whether *manpower allocation schemes and dispatching rules fostered a continuing relationship of an officer with a particular geographic area*; d) whether officers were *explicitly authorized and encouraged to attend community functions of various kinds*; e) whether the department had established *decentralized physical locations* (e.g. store fronts or mobile vans) that offered convenient access to citizens; and f) whether the department established *specific liaison officers* from among operational patrol to be responsible for work with particular groups of citizens (whether neighborhoods or people with particular interests such as women, or minorities, or the downtown business community).

4) We looked at the extent to which the police had acted to *form more effective partnerships with other governmental agencies*, including other elements of the criminal justice system, and other elements of municipal governance.

5) We looked at the extent to which the police department had *acted to embrace accountability*, and make their organization and its operations more visible to individual citizens and organized groups. This includes the development of: a) *citizen academies* that allow citizens to learn how the police department operates; b) the development of *advisory groups and citizens forums* at different levels in the department to discuss policies and operational priorities; and c) the development of much *more open and proactive policies and practices toward the media*. Of

particular importance here is the extent to which the police department becomes and remains open to citizens' nominations of important problems to be solved and operational priorities.

6) We paid special attention to efforts made to *establish close working partnerships between the police and representatives of minority groups*. Part of this concerns the extent to which the police engaged in active efforts to *recruit a diverse police force,* but goes beyond that to ask the question of whether the police could actually establish effective working partnerships with poor, minority communities. This seemed particularly important because it is in these quarters that police legitimacy is often the shakiest. It is also in these quarters that the work of building effective partnerships is often the most difficult, since it involves crossing ethnic and class barriers, and setting aside a past history of antagonism.

As in the case of problem-solving, these different features of a police department's capacity to establish working partnerships with citizens define a ladder of achievement. The more activity and capability we see in these different realms, the further along a police department has gone towards the implementation of a strategy of community policing.

5. Gauging the "Institutionalization" of the Changes

It is one thing to observe a set of changes from the past to the present; it is quite another to estimate how deeply rooted the observed changes are, and to make a prediction about the future trajectory of an organization. Yet, in many respects, that is the most important question to ask about the impact of the COPS program on an organization. We have long known it is possible to make a temporary change in an organization's performance simply by paying for some new program and capability. An important additional effect to strive for is to "institutionalize" the new program by ensuring its survival over time, and perhaps by widening the impact of the program to influence the operations and cultural commitments of the rest of the organization. Whether the COPS programs, and the ways that managers used them, could produce these larger effects is one of the most important questions in the Kennedy School part of the evaluation effort.

In considering whether a change has become "institutionalized" (in the sense that the changes induced may last over time and widen to include other parts of the organization), several observations seem important.

1) We looked at the extent to which the *commitment to change remain rooted in the leadership of the department, and in the expectations of those in a department's political environment who oversee the department's operations*. We reason that if the commitment to community policing is anchored in the expectations of citizens and their representatives, and those who lead the police departments; or if it is anchored in a funding source that continues to supply funds for the reforms; then the likelihood of the changes continuing over time increases.

2) We looked to determine to what extent the changes *were organizational wide rather than specific to a particular structural unit*. It seemed likely that the changes

wrought would be more likely to survive and be influential if many in the organization were caught up in the change process than if the change was isolated within a particular structural unit.

3) We looked at the extent to which the changes *were rooted in the physical and operational infrastructure of the department*: e.g. the extent to which the changes were embodied in new physical plant, in new information technologies, and in new operational procedures. The tighter the connection between the changes and these underlying infrastructures, the more durable and influential the changes were likely to be.

4) We looked at the extent to which the changes were embodied *in revised administrative systems* that guide the organizations operations. Particularly important here are the *personnel systems* that police rely on to recruit, select, train, evaluate, compensate, promote and discipline their officers. But also important are the systems the department uses to *allocate resources, monitor operations, and measure the overall effectiveness of the Department.*

5) We looked at the extent to which the changes came to redefine *the cultural understandings and commitments of the department* – the extent to which employees at all levels of the organization "bought in" to the idea of community policing, and understood and believed in its principles. Of particular interest here was a kind of *"generational" effect* that was produced by a change in the proportion of people in a department who had grown up under the new system rather than the old system of policing.

Again, these characteristics form a scale of achievement. If many of the things we were looking for were present, we considered the changes to have been effectively "institutionalized." If none of them were present, we viewed whatever changes we had seen as quite vulnerable.

B. Our Findings: Significant Levels of Achievement and Major Changes

Using these definitions and criteria, Table 1 presents our preliminary assessments of the levels of community policing, and the magnitude of the changes we observe in our ten cases.

Table 1
Levels of Community Policing (circa 1997)
Changes in Community Policing (1990-1997)
Preliminary Assessments

City	Quantity & Quality of Problem-Solving	Capacity to Develop Working Partnerships	Degree of Institutionalization
Albany	Low Level/Low Changes Relatively little evidence of problem-solving.	Med Level/Med Changes Greatly improved partnerships in many neighborhoods and some city agencies around "quality-of-life" issues; poor relations in minority neighborhoods.	Low Cultural commitment to "quality of life enforcement" among many officers and in city government, but administrative systems are weak and most change is restricted to special units.
Colorado Springs	High Level/Big Changes Successfully implemented a sophisticated problem-solving model which most offices implement.	Med-High Level/Big Changes Strong strides: not as sustained as problem-solving.	High • strong consistent leadership • community organizational principles embedded in organizational systems • generational change
Fremont	High Level/Med-Big Changes C.O.P.P.S. brought basic problem-solving ability further along. Based on SARA, involve outside collaboration and community input, and strong commitment to evaluation.	Med Level/Medium Changes Had excellent general reputation, but little interaction with groups. Now, some progress with community, huge strides with agencies.	Medium Continually innovative organization; specific focus on COP; may stay constant, may change.
Knoxville	High Level/Big Changes Old KPD did directed patrols. By 1996, the DP system had expanded. Most officers doing one per week. Use of "problem-solving kits" for larger and more complex problems.	High Level/Big Changes From "neighborhood watch" to extensive community partnerships. District Roundtables, participation in Crime Control Plan. Some difficulties with minority community.	High Administrative systems geared to community policing.

Table 1, continued

City	Quantity & Quality of Problem-Solving	Capacity to Develop Working Partnerships	Degree of Institutionalization
Lowell	<u>High Level/Big Changes</u> Through 1992, little proactive efforts. By 1997, at least 43% of offices fully committed to problem-solving at many levels.	<u>High Level/Big Changes</u> Nonemergency contact with community has grown dramatically.	<u>High</u> Locked in to change.
Portland	<u>High Level/Med-Big Changes</u> Portland long had ability to solve problems; community policing brought this ability to the "cutting edge."	<u>High Level/Med-Big Changes</u> Portland had moderately strong ties with many recognized groups, but no efforts to reach unorganized. By mid-nineties, Portland had top-notch community partnerships at both the neighborhood and citywide levels.	<u>High</u> Locked in to change.
Riverside	<u>Med Level/Med Changes</u> Very strong problem-solving capacity in 10-officer POP team, little in patrol force.	<u>Med-Low Level/Med-Low Changes</u> Remarkable new partnerships in one Latino neighborhood; much cultural resistance by officers elsewhere.	<u>Med-low</u> Strong administrative systems but cultural resistance is high and political support conflicted.
St. Paul	<u>High Level/Med-Small Changes</u> St. Paul moved into problem-solving two decades ago. Problem-solving permeates all aspects of operation.	<u>High Level/Med Changes</u> Contact with citizens is not just occasional – it is ongoing and part of service delivery. Has been that way since late 1970s.	<u>High</u> Long history of commitment.
Savannah	<u>Med Level/Large Changes</u> POP strategies implemented in 1990s. Offices at all levels involved. Shift from many small projects to fewer larger, high-quality projects.	<u>Med Level/Med Changes</u> New perception as a "good partner." Grass-roots connections. Strong partnerships with criminal justice agencies. Some difficulty in minority community.	<u>Med</u> New culture may be evolving, but hasn't taken hold.
Spokane	<u>High Level/Big Changes</u> Strong strides towards incorporating problem-solving in daily operations; many notable successes.	<u>High Level/Big Changes</u> From distant to close working relations, especially through extensive efforts with volunteers.	<u>Medium-High</u> Strong commitment which should survive Mangan.

The following conclusions can be drawn from this table.

First, eight of the ten departments have *gone a long ways toward the successful implementation of a philosophy of community, problem-solving policing.*

Second, in six of the eight departments that had gone a long distance in implementing community policing, we thought there was a *high or medium-high degree of institutionalization.* In two others, we thought the changes were less well established. We judged the changes in Fremont to be less institutionalized because it was starting late in developing some key administrative systems, and always open to further change. We thought changes in Savannah were more fragile because it, too, is starting late, only now developing some key administrative systems, and because the new culture has not yet widely taken hold.

Of course, these favorable results should not be surprising. The cases were selected to find the organizations that had gone furthest in implementing the strategy of community policing. So, these results tell us nothing about how common this level of success is in the nation at large. But it was heartening to find that some police departments had, in fact, advanced the frontiers of community policing, and showed how the philosophy could be practically implemented and institutionalized. These organizations are demonstrating the feasibility of implementing a comprehensive, department-wide strategy of community policing.

Moreover, some of these departments achieved a remarkably high level of success in advancing toward community policing in a relatively short period of time, starting from a relatively disadvantaged position. Many of the highest achieving departments in 1997 occupy this position because they started early in the direction of community policing, and that experience provided a platform they could use to advance farther. (This characterizes Colorado Springs, Portland, St. Paul, and Spokane.) A few departments, however, (notably Lowell) started only recently towards community policing, and nonetheless made rapid progress, and seems to have institutionalized some of the important changes. So, not only do we see significant levels of accomplishment in our cases, but also some dramatic and rapid changes.

It is also significant, we think, that for the departments that moved later from lower bases of performance, the COPS grants played a crucially important role in initiating and catalyzing change. This was particularly true in Lowell. Again, this tells us nothing about how often this effect occurred nationally. But there is data showing the existence of an effect that interests us.

This is all the good news. It is worth noting, however, that there is some less encouraging news in these results as well. Specifically, while all the Departments seemed to move pretty far in the direction of increasing the *quantity and quality of problem-solving efforts,* they did less well in developing their *capacity for establishing and maintaining community partnerships.* By our assessment, five departments had achieved high levels of performance in establishing community partnerships. In addition, five had made big, or medium to big changes in this dimension of performance. There are some standouts in this domain: Portland's strong links to a network of community associations, and St. Paul's well established connections to

minority communities, establish benchmarks for the rest of the field. But many departments did not get as far towards effective community partnerships as they did toward problem solving.

Particularly troubling is the fact that success in establishing working partnerships with minority communities was spotty at best. The only clear success stories here were the work that the St. Paul police department did with the Hmong. In addition, Lowell and Portland have made solid gains in working with their minority communities. Spokane made a major effort to strengthen its relationships with its minority communities, but it is not clear whether that has produced an important change in the attitudes of the community. Apparently, establishing effective partnerships with community groups remain more challenging to police departments than the development of a proactive capacity for problem-solving, and it remains particularly challenging to establish effective working relationships with poor, minority groups – just as it has always been.

For those who advocate community policing, and those who hoped that the COPS program might act as a powerful instrument for advancing this philosophy in the police profession, the fact we can observe some departments that have reached a significant level of achievement in implementing community policing is good news. It seems that it is at least possible to implement this strategy. For those who want to ascertain the particular contribution that the COPS program made to these Departments' efforts, however, the mere fact that they have reached a fairly high plateau does not necessarily mean that the COPS program was successful. The Departments might have gotten there on their own without the federal aid. To see the particular effects of the COPS program per se, one must first partial out the effects of the context in which the organization was operating; and second see exactly how the COPS grant was used by management in a broader strategy of change. That is what we do next.

IV. Accounting for High Levels of Achievement and Rapid Change: The Role of the Context and Environment

One explanation for the high levels of achievement of the Departments we have reviewed is that the particular context in which they were operating made it necessary or inevitable that they would achieve high levels of success. In this view, neither the COPS grant itself, nor the particular managerial efforts undertaken to produce a change in the strategy of policing could claim to have contributed much to their success.

Recall that we include in our conception of the context three different factors: 1) the *political* environment of expectations and demands that citizens and their representatives imposed on the department; 2) the *task* environment that required police departments to respond in particular ways; and 3) the past *history* of the organization (both as it occurred and as it has been interpreted by the current leaders and members of the organization). Arguably, if these factors were set right for the implementation of community policing – if citizens and mayors were demanding this strategy, if disorder, drugs and fear had become prevalent in the community, if the organization was on a well-traveled path towards community policing – then much of the achievement we observe could reasonably be attributed to these factors rather than to the COPS program or the managerial efforts made by the leaders whose actions we studied.

Recall, also, that our sampling method deliberately tried to introduce variation in how favorable the context of the organization was to the successful implementation of community policing. Among the eight high change cities, we picked three cities in which we thought both the external and internal environment were favorable to the implementation of community policing (Lowell, Colorado Springs, and St. Paul); four in which we thought the external political and community environment was neither urgently demanding nor consistently supportive (Fremont, Knoxville, Portland, and Savannah); and four in which we thought that internal support and capabilities were not favorable to the implementation of community policing at the outset (Knoxville, Portland, Savannah, and Spokane). In two cases, we thought neither the external nor the internal environment was particularly favorable (Knoxville and Savannah).

Of course, these judgments were nothing more than initial impressions formed by the surveys we used to pick the sites. Once in the sites, we found that some of these assessments were wrong. Portland seemed to have more external and internal support for community policing than we thought, and thus probably belongs in the first group. Savannah had a city manager who consistently pushed for community policing. Knoxville in retrospect, turned out to have a history of police innovation that had been interrupted by a period of stagnation. Lowell's organizational history was less favorable to change than we expected. Still, that left us with no organizations that had tough sledding both externally and internally.

Table 2 presents our preliminary assessments of whether the context of each department was favorable, neutral, or unfavorable to the implementation of community problem-solving policing. When we examine the external political environment, we distinguish between situations where political leaders demand change, are supportive of change but not insistent, where they are indifferent, and where they are hostile to change. We also consider whether they are supporting general improvement in police performance, or specifically demand or support community policing. When we examine the external task environment, we treat as favorable conditions that could be expected to spark changes in the Department; specifically, whether the Department is facing an escalating crime problem of a particular type, or some serious community relations

problems. When we examine the organizational history, we look for a prior history of innovativeness, and particular kinds of innovations that tend to be supportive of community policing (e.g., team policing).

Table 2

Initial Context of Organization (Circa 1990)

City	External Political Environment	External Task Environment	Organizational History
Albany	**Mostly Supportive Throughout** Pressure for community policing in principle but some dispute over particular reforms.	**Neutral-Favorable** Moderate, persistent crime problems but no sense of crisis.	**Unfavorable** Some experience with community outreach in 1970s, but little experience with other innovations.
Colorado Springs	**Moderately Supportive Throughout** City Manager passion for "improved" policing; supportive of "community" policing, but not insistent.	**Neutral** No particular crime problems/no particular community problems.	**Favorable** Innovative history of organization.
Fremont	**Indifferent→Becoming Supportive Later** Initially indifferent to community policing; becomes strongly supportive later.	**Neutral** No particular crime or community relations problems.	**Favorable** Innovative history.
Knoxville	**Indifferent→Supportive** Mayors indifferent, then supportive of "organizational focus."	**Neutral** No particular crime or community relations problem.	**Unfavorable** Stagnant organization.

Table 2 (continued)

City	External Political Environment	External Task Environment	Organizational History
Lowell	**Supportive** City manager – very supportive of neighborhood-oriented change.	**Favorable** Escalating crime problem; open-air drug markets.	**Unfavorable** Competent but not innovative history; closed.
Portland	**Supportive** From 1984, moderate political pressure for change.	**Favorable** Rise of gangs and drugs; consistent problems with minority community.	**Favorable** Long history of innovation.
Riverside	**Decaying Support** Strong pressure for reform at outset evaporates as internal turmoil spills over to city politics.	**Neutral-Favorable** Moderate crime problem gains increasing attention, but no sense of crisis	**Unfavorable** Skilled force, but weak connections to professional community, some internal turmoil, and poor administrative systems
St. Paul	**Supportive Throughout** Expect community and problem-solving policing.	**Favorable** Demand for change arose within community, with tension present between police and African-American and Hispanic communities.	**Favorable** Long history with team policing.
Savannah	**Supportive** Demands for change from mayor and city manager.	**Favorable** Crises in both crime rates and community relations.	**Unfavorable** Limited experience with problem-solving and team policing.
Spokane	**Indifferent→Supportive** Manager wants good police department; supportive of changes initiated.	**Neutral-Favorable** No urgent crime problem but some community relations problems with African-American community.	**Unfavorable** Traditional department, slightly demoralized at outset.

We can use the data from all 10 cases to do a kind of bi-variate analysis the checks out the effects of these various contextual variables on the level of change that the police departments were able to achieve.

Table 3 looks at the impact of an organization's *political context* on the magnitude of the change it was able to make in implementing community policing. If the political context had a decisive impact on the rate of change, the cities would have lain along the diagonal from the upper left to the bottom right. To a degree, one can see this effect. This indicates a positive correlation between a favorable political environment and a fast rate of change towards community policing -- an unsurprising result. Pushing these data, one could also make these additional observations. First, it was hard to achieve a high rate of change without favorable political support. No department that made rapid change did so with a negative political environment. Second, a high level of political support could not necessarily guarantee a high rate of change. The example of Albany shows that a favorable political environment was not able by itself to ensure a significant change. Taken together, these observations suggest that a favorable political context is helpful to but does not necessarily guarantee a significant change.

This analysis assumes that the political context is independent of other causal variables in our analysis. In fact, we have a great deal of evidence (presented below) that police managers can be influential in affecting the political context. Examples on the negative side would include the example of Riverside, where departmental leadership created a backlash in the political arena. Examples on the positive side include Spokane and Colorado Springs in which the chiefs worked hard and successfully to create political support for different parts of their reforms. The fact that the political context can be influenced by organizational leaders *strengthens* the idea that leadership and management matter in determining the degree of change since some portion of the impact of politics can, in some cases, be attributed to effective political leadership of the department.

Table 4 looks at the influence of the *task environment* on the rate of change and degree of institutionalization in the departments we studied. Again, if the task environment were extremely influential, one would expect the cases to lie along the diagonal from the top left to bottom right. That is less true for the task environment than for the political environment. Apparently, the task environment is less important in shaping the rate of change and degree of institutionalization. One can see from this table that it is possible to achieve high rates of change without a favorable task environment (e.g. Colorado Springs, and Knoxville). Moreover, having favorable task environments doesn't necessarily produce a high rate of change (St. Paul and Savannah).

Table 5 looks at the impact of *organizational history* on the rate of organizational change. This table shows that an unfavorable organizational history is a heavy burden to overcome. Both cases with the lowest level of change had unfavorable organizational histories. Nevertheless, it was possible to overcome an unfavorable history: both Knoxville and Lowell achieved very high rates of change despite little momentum from the past. On the other hand, if one had a favorable organizational history, it seems to be very hard to go backward, and relatively easy to reach high levels of success.

Table 3
Influence of Political Environment
on Magnitude of Organizational Change

Rates of Change/Degree of Institutionalization

Political Environment	Low	Medium	High
Negative Throughout			
Starts Positive/Goes Negative	Riverside		
Starts Negative/Becomes Positive		Fremont Spokane	Knoxville
Positive Throughout	Albany	St. Paul Savannah	Colorado Springs Lowell Portland

Table 4

Influence of "Task Environment"
on Magnitude of Organizational Change

Rates of Change/Degree of Institutionalization

Task Environment	Low	Medium	High
Negative		Fremont	Colorado Springs Knoxville
Negative to Favorable	Albany Riverside	Spokane	
Favorable		St. Paul Savannah	Lowell Portland

Table 5
Impact of Organizational History
on Magnitude of Organizational Change

Organizational History	Rates of Change/Degree of Institutionalization		
	Low	**Medium**	**High**
Unfavorable History	Albany Riverside	Savannah Spokane	Knoxville Lowell
Favorable History		Fremont St. Paul	Colorado Springs Portland

These tables show that the context is not all the whole story in trying to explain levels of organizational change. This suggests that there is some role for leadership to play in determining how far a department can go in implementing community policing. We will explore how leadership was able to overcome some of the problems in the contexts below. Before doing so, however, it is useful to offer some tentative observations about the relative importance of different aspects of the context from a more nuanced and detailed examination of the cases.

First, it seems clear that a favorable or neutral political environment helps. None of the cases we observed found themselves in an environment that was completely hostile to community policing. Several, however, found themselves in situations where political interest seemed either ambivalent or indifferent. This created an opportunity for a reform-minded chief to forge ahead if he wanted to do so, and that is what they did. (Fremont, Spokane)

Second, community policing also gets a boost when there is a strong local tradition of neighborhoods, joined with a tradition of neighborhood governance. (Portland, St. Paul). Portland's strong communities date back to 1974 Model Cities efforts that established Office of Neighborhood Associations. It is weaker when it is hard to find these coherent communities, or when city government as a whole is not organized in these ways (Savannah, Fremont). Knoxville had a "torrent of community organizing" at about same time as they were introducing community policing, and that seems to have aided their efforts to implement community problem-solving policing.

Third, the supply of financial resources that translated into manpower in the force seemed to be very important. Several departments had important initiatives stopped by budget cuts that hit in the early and mid eighties. But these cuts seemed to pave the way for dramatic changes when cuts were restored in subsequent years, and then supplemented with federal support. The most favorable budget trajectory was one in which cuts were followed by increases at the time that the new initiatives were being launched. (Note: resources available to department were importantly influenced by managerial action and leadership. In two cities, chiefs did

political work of passing bond issues. In virtually all, they built strong political bases that would ensure a flow of tax resources. In many cities, they supplemented these funding streams with grants.)

Fourth, in several cases, some of the strongest pressures and most important cultural events that triggered change came from significant problems in handling minority groups. These could have been chronic problems that flared up predictably with police operations. (Spokane, Savannah) But in other cases, the problem came from the arrival of new groups that needed to be integrated into the community. (St. Paul)

Fifth, it seems like there are some kinds of problems that community policing is well adapted to handle. This includes problems with housing projects, or with drugs and disorder. When these problems are present, or when they develop as important problems in a community, community policing gets a boost. (Lowell, Portland, Savannah)

Sixth, community policing is aided by a track record of applying for and receiving grants, and having a history of innovativeness. Many of the departments we observed participated in the waves of innovation that swept over policing: those focused on enhancing patrol and investigative effectiveness (e.g. ICAP, rescheduling of patrol force); those focused on more proactive prevention (Youth Programs, CPTED); and those focused on building community relations (Neighborhood Watch, Team Policing). Experience with the innovations that focused narrowly on improving the capacity of the police to apprehend offenders through patrol and investigation could act either as a trap that anchored police in traditional methods, or as a platform for further advances. The parts that were "progressive" were proactivity, the use of information, and the interest in prevention. The part that was "regressive" with respect to prospects for community problem-solving was the exclusive focus on arrests as the goal of policing. Particularly important is having had some experience with Team Policing.(Fremont, St. Paul) Moreover, Colorado Springs imported as chiefs police officials from Los Angeles who had had experience with team policing; and Portland drew on the experience of the County Sheriff's Department in team policing. It is as though a general experience with innovating, and more particular experience with particular kinds of innovation prepare the department for making rapid progress in implementing community policing.

Seventh, though it doesn't show up in the chart, the cases suggest that successful implementation and institutionalization of community policing is aided by a "generational" effect. If people can remember team policing, or if a department turns over relatively quickly as a manager is trying to implement community policing, that seems to have an important effect on the level one can achieve, and the extent to which the changes come to be internalized. (Portland, Knoxville, St. Paul)

Eighth, for many of the departments we observed, it was crucial that the chief and some key members of his staff be connected to regional or national networks of police executives who were talking about new philosophies of policing. (All Cases) Sometimes departments got the benefit of national experience by importing chiefs who had been exposed to the ideas in other departments. (Colorado Springs, Fremont, Spokane) Other times, the exposure came from deliberate efforts by local chiefs to learn about and expose their staffs to the new professional currents. (All Cases)

Ninth, it seems that the pace of change (if not the level of achievement) can be linked to the particular time in which a department initiated its reform efforts. Those departments that began their changes long ago tended to move more slowly to significant levels of achievement. (St. Paul, Colorado Springs, Knoxville, Portland, Spokane) Those who started later could often make very rapid progress simply by relying on the experience of those who had come before. (Lowell, Fremont, Savannah) In some cases, the "late adopters" may have leaped ahead, not only in terms of the rate of change, but also the absolute level of accomplishment. (Lowell)

In sum, the context of these departments can be viewed as demanding, enabling, or permissive of change. Regardless, whether anything happens depends to some degree on what those who lead the organization decide to do, and the persistence and skill they show in implementing change. That is what we will take up next.

V. Accounting for High Levels of Achievement and Rapid Change: The Role of Leadership

A??The Impetus and Locus of Leadership
B??Managerial Interventions
    1. Political Management
    2. Defining Mission, Strategic Planning
    3. Re-Designing Organizational Structure
        a. Special Problem-Solving Units
        b. Specific Crime Initiatives
        c. Special Liaison Units
        d. Decentralizing and Re-Organizing the Patrol Function
    4. Re-Engineering the Technical Core
    5. Building a Supportive Physical Infrastructure
    6. Building the Information Infrastructure
    7. Human Resources
    8. Changing the Organizational Culture

V. Accounting for High Levels of Achievement and Rapid Change: The Role of Leadership

The final "variable" we consider important in accounting for observed levels of achievement and rates of change is "leadership:" the actions and choices taken by those with formal or informal authority over an organization. We think that the particular situations the organizations in our study confronted contained more or less potential for significant levels of achievement and fast-paced change. How much of that potential was exploited, however, depends importantly on what those individuals entrusted with leading the organization did with that opportunity.

In some ways leadership is the most important factor for us to examine. This is true for two reasons. First, it is this variable that is particularly well measured through the use of case studies, since we can talk to the managers and find out what they were thinking, and we can observe some of their more important actions and initiatives over a period of time. Second, if we can learn what the most skilled managers did to exploit the opportunity represented by a particular context and a COPS grant, we might be able to improve the overall performance of the COPS program by teaching managers to make better uses of the opportunities. In short, management can be "engineered" in a way that "contexts" cannot. Although the COPS office could theoretically target grants in just those places where an organization's context is most congenial to its success, its legislative mandate (particularly the view of COPS as a revenue-sharing program) partially limits its discretion to do so. But to the extent that change is affected by the choices and actions of *leaders*, it can presumably be increased by helping leaders make different choices and take different actions with the grants they receive.

In assessing the impact of leadership, the first job is to identify the locus of leadership: who, or what team, took the initiative to make significant changes in the Department, or to seek out a COPS grant. The second, more elaborate job, is to determine to the extent that our existing data permit, which managerial interventions seem to be necessary or particularly powerful in producing high levels or rapid paces of change. We have already observed that the cases analyzed in this interim report share a high degree of change, and even more a high degree of achievement. Thus the analytic task is to identify which interventions are present across all eight cases, and thus which ones are associated with change and achievement. It is possible, of course, that none of those shared interventions are in fact *necessary* for dramatic change—just because "successful" agencies share them does not mean that less successful ones do not share them as well. To check this possibility, we consider two departments that did not achieve quite as much as the eight described here. Those interventions shared by the high change cases and missing from the low change cases will be considered as potentially important interventions.

With a tentative and imperfect description of what sorts of interventions seem to be associated with change—or at least not unnecessary for it—the evaluation question then becomes which ones the COPS program advances, and under what conditions it does so. Here the analysis relies heavily on two key judgments. First, we try to think about the *potential* contribution of COPS by asking 1) which needed interventions the COPS grants contribute something towards, and 2) whether or not any of the major COPS initiatives are directed at tangential or downright unimportant interventions (in that they are not necessary for change, as revealed by the fact that many high-change departments never pursue them). Second, we try to

understand the *actual* contribution COPS seems to have made in the 8 cases described here: How was management able to harness the grants to advance particular interventions in some cases? Why it was not willing or able to do so in others?

A.   The Impetus and Locus of Leadership

Leadership begins with some individual or team taking the responsibility for initiating a change process. Usually, this is also occasioned by some event or shared understanding about why change might be necessary: a factor that is called the "driver" of change in the private sector. Thus, the first thing to consider in gauging the impact of leadership is to look across the cases to find the impetus, rationale, and locus of the leadership whose acts are to be considered.

Note that what is here considered the impetus and rationale for change would be considered above as external conditions that are considered favorable to change. Some important possibilities include: 1) a fiscal crisis that forces a change in the way that a department can operate; 2) a political crisis involving the loss of significant support for the police department and its leaders in the city at large, in particular parts of the community, or among the officers themselves; or 3) some emergent problems that the police department finds difficult to handle. In some cases, the impetus for change could come simply from a professional aspiration to perform better than one now is.

A review of our ten cases reveals evidence for all of these different forces for change. Table 6 examines the impact of different "drivers of change" for the rate of change that occurred in the departments we analyzed. Table 6 shows that in none of the departments was a fiscal crisis the driver of change. At the time that the pace of change begins to pick up, none of the Departments were suffering from a fiscal crisis. Virtually all of the cases show that the departments had faced fiscal crises earlier in the eighties, but in the period in which rapid change occurs, the departments had usually received a flow of fresh resources. Concerns about the quality of community relationships were an important driver of change in 5 of the 10 departments, but in none of these departments did this concern drive them to rapid rates of change. Concerns about crime control effectiveness were the important drivers in two of the 10 cases, and one of these departments (Lowell) achieved a very rapid rate of change from a standing start (i.e. with an unfavorable organizational history). So, this is one case in which concerns for crime control animated an important shift towards community policing. Surprisingly, however, one of the most important drivers of change was professional aspirations. This was important in four of the ten cases, and helped two of those organizations (Colorado Springs and Knoxville) achieve high rates of change and institutionalization.

Given a reason to change, one must look next at who takes it upon themselves to act in response to the need. The leadership could come from outside the department or inside. The responsibility for change could be picked up within a police department by an individual or by a team. The responsibility for driving the change could stay in the same hands over a long period of time, or it could be deliberately handed off from one person to another, or it could simply be picked up by another person if one person or one team tires.

Table 6
"Drivers of Change" and Effect
on Magnitude of Organizational Change

Rates of Change/Degree of Institutionalization

Driver of Change	Low	Medium	High
Fiscal Concerns			
Community Relations Concerns	Albany Riverside	St. Paul Savannah Spokane	
Crime Concerns		Savannah	Lowell
Drive for Professional Achievement		Fremont St. Paul	Colorado Springs Knoxville

Table 7

"Locus of Initiative" and Effect
on Magnitude of Organizational Change

Rates of Change/Degree of Institutionalization

Locus of Initiative	Low	Medium	High
External			
External ► Internal	Albany Riverside	Savannah Spokane	Colorado Springs Knoxville Lowell Portland
Internal ► External		Fremont St. Paul	

Table 7 examines the locus of initiative for change in the 10 departments we studied. In no department, did the initiative for change remain entirely outside the department, or stay entirely inside the department. There always seemed to be some partnership between leaders outside the department and those inside. This is a natural result of the shared responsibility for running police departments. A kind of team had to develop between those outside and those within the department. By far the most common pattern was for the initiative for change to start outside the department, and then find some expression inside the department. This pattern produced both relatively high and relatively low rates of change, however. The pattern that begins with strong internal advocates and reaches out to external support occurred less frequently, and produced only medium rates and institutionalization of change.

With respect to the question of whether the initiative is lodged within an individual or a team, we have already observed that a kind of team must eventually emerge between the Mayor or City Manager on one hand, and the Chief on the other. But a review of the cases also makes it clear how important it is for a chief to have a team working inside the Department. Indeed, a very common pattern across the cases is for the Chief to find one or two staff people who become the key drivers of the change within their Departments. Sometimes these are staff people drawn from Planning or Administration. But far more commonly, they are people who have had line commands as well as staff positions. Moreover, they have often been the people who were involved in some of the early experiments with the operations that became the precursors for the particular version of community policing that the Department adopts. Sometimes, the staff person becomes the chief when the chief retires, and maintains the continuity of the changes. Finally, even where the chief is an outsider, the key staff person is usually a long-term veteran of the department.

Table 8 examines who within departments assumed the responsibility for leading change. Here, there was no department in which the chiefs worked by themselves, and only one in which they worked primarily with a civilian staff. The most common pattern was for the chief to work with line managers drawn from their sworn staff. This produced both high and low rates of change. In three of the ten departments, chiefs had succeeded in transferring the change initiative to a successor. This was associated with medium and high rates of change.

Once a team exists, in order for it to have an effect on the way a Police Department actually operates, it has to take action. The team members must undertake concrete reforms of the Police Department's administrative systems in order to advance community policing along the three dimensions we have identified. Several such interventions are common across these eight cases of success.

What is important about them from the viewpoint of COPS and its impact is that each category of intervention is associated with characteristic management challenges. Some of the challenges center on getting resources, in which case COPS obviously becomes relevant to the extent that its funding categories match the local wish list (and to the extent that city officials are willing to make the matches and commitments COPS requires). Other challenges center on getting cooperation or buy-in; perhaps surprisingly, COPS can also be important in these cases. Finally, some of the challenges are primarily intensive not of money or teamwork but of imagination. Each category of interventions tends to offer a distinctive mix of challenges that, together with the grant requirements and managerial skill, determine whether or not COPS helps a leader advance change.

Table 8
Locus of Leadership in Departments and Effects
on Magnitude of Organizational Change

Rates of Change/Degree of Institutionalization

Leadership	Low	Medium	High
Chief Alone			
Chief and Staff		Savannah	
Chief and Line Managers	Albany Riverside	Fremont	Knoxville Lowell
Chief and Successor		St. Paul	Colorado Springs Portland

B.   Managerial Interventions

1. Political Management

Among the most important managerial challenges facing those who would manage change in a Police Department are the actions they can take to influence the political environment in which they find themselves. We noted above that the external political context had a powerful effect on the level of achievement and rate of change. We noted also that changes were importantly influenced by the flow of resources into the Department, and the extent to which the Mayor or City Manager either demanded or tolerated the change.

Of course, one could take the view that, from the perspective of a chief, or a leadership team that included the chief, these features of the political environment would have to be viewed as fixed and unmovable by them. But that is not actually true. When the leadership team includes the Mayor or City Manager, the political environment can obviously be influenced by the chief. But even when the Mayor or City Manager are not central to the leadership team, the political environment can be reached and influenced by police leaders.

The most dramatic examples of the role of external political management in supporting the change efforts comes from the cases of Colorado Springs and Spokane. In both of these Departments, the Chiefs with their leadership teams essentially built the political support necessary to pass Bond Issues that increased the flow of resources to their Departments. In all other cases, the Chiefs worked hard to maintain both a mandate for change from their Mayor or .

City Manager, and an increasing flow of resources. In many cases, these efforts were aided by the adoption of much more open policies toward the media.

The fact that the COPS program existed was for many of these departments an important political opportunity. Because the COPS program offered both money and prestige, they could use the COPS program to gain additional autonomy and resources. In fact, the organizations we studied had made significant investments in their capacity to obtain grants from external sources – including the federal government. Many of the Departments had long histories of participating in Federal Grant programs. All received at least one COPS grant. And several of the organizations had more than one. In some cases, the flow of grant money became a significant part (more than 10%) of their total operating budget.

The managers in our cases also seemed to be unusually interested in and adept at politics. Several took higher office at some stage in the change process. Several others ran for office while continuing to run their Departments.

Several assiduously cultivated community groups of various kinds. That was part of their operational strategy for building a community problem-solving department. But it also built support for them and their change efforts. Several focused on building connections with the business community.(St. Paul) Others benefited from the existence of a dense network of community groups to which they became responsive. (Portland). Still others showed a great deal of imagination in finding community support by organizing it on different bases when geographically-oriented citizen groups concerned about crime did not appear. (Fremont)

The net result of all of these political management efforts was to change the image of the police department, and to build a wide network of support that began with the Mayor and City Manager, but then also embraced the Federal Government, the media, and various community groups. This ensured continuing support for the process of change.

2. Defining Mission, Strategic Planning

Another common managerial intervention was to go through a more or less elaborate, and more or less participatory effort to define the mission and values of the organization, and to develop a strategic plan for improving the overall performance of the organization.

Interestingly, however, this was not always the first effort these managers undertook: In many cases, somewhat unplanned initiatives marked the first efforts towards community policing (as in Portland's Overlook Neighborhood effort, Lowell's flagship precinct in Centralville, and the Help-P Unit and Team Policing Pilot Project in St. Paul). These initiatives were guided, of course, by the personal vision the leadership team brought to its job. But these nascent efforts seem to be as much about discovering ends as pursuing them: They help an agency discover what possibilities exist, and thereby what exactly it is that they want to pursue. Only after the organization acquires some experience does anyone define the overall goals of the organization explicitly or set the trajectory down on paper. Many of these early efforts were funded by grants, as further described below (though for reasons of timing these agencies took these first steps before COPS itself became available).

Still, at some stage, and usually fairly early on in their reforms, all of these departments self-consciously sat down to plan the remainder of their change efforts. The most effective efforts had three characteristics: 1) They carried authority to guide and coordinate future reforms, 2) They were broadly participatory, and 3) They paid attention to a need to build planning capacity.

First, not all departments created plans that were equally elaborate or equally powerful, and underdeveloped plans proved problematic. Most notably, Albany's plan was fairly minimalistic, and the department did not follow through on many elements of it.[26] But that failure proved damaging to the overall reform effort. For example, the initial plan did lay out a coordinated program for bringing community policing to the patrol force through decentralized assignments, training that would help officers understand what to *do* with their newfound discretion, and evaluations that would let top management know whether the reform was working and help them make corrections. But plans to beef up the training unit never materialized, and neither did intentions to develop evaluation tools (such as a planned community survey). The result was that many officers did not behave much differently in their new "decentralized" assignments than in their older ones, and management had no systematic way to see if the effort was working. Planners had foreseen the interdependence of decentralization, training, and evaluation, and they programmed changes in each area in such a way that they would (hopefully) complement one another. But failure to follow through on the plan in some areas undermined developments in others. At this extreme end of flexibility, planning lost its ability to perform the key function of integrating diverse but interdependent reforms. That is apparently part of the reason why change efforts in Albany made less progress than they did in other departments, where coordinated plans helped police to develop an integrated program of reform where different elements reinforced each other in the pursuit of an overarching mission (Portland's plan is an especially strong example).

A second type of problem with planning involves participation. Most of these agencies made extensive efforts to generate participation from all ranks, using the planning sessions to improve buy-in to reform. But occasionally planning had the opposite effect by excluding a key group. Riverside is a case in point where the department excluded Sergeants from initial planning sessions, and many RPD members report that this was one reason (though not the only one) that group never came on board. One RPD member reports:

> The Lieutenants and all of the Captains went up and spent a few days together working on a strategic plan for the department, listening to expectations, [but] we did not have Sergeants involved. So [when] we came back, the expectation was to meet with your Sergeants and share it. Well, we had spent days together, so obviously there is some kind of a bond that occurs that they have not been a part of. . . . [Also, we] redefined the role of a Sergeant, but they did not have any input on what their role was—we defined what it was. We did have input into redefining what the

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[26] One department manager points out that the political context in Albany made it impossible to do any better: "Given the way the city worked, you could never run a strategic plan—a three year plan, a five year plan. It would be futile because you couldn't stick to it. . . . This is such a political environment that the minute some stakeholder group began to yip about something, we'd be modifying that strategic plan, and then somebody else would begin their yipping and you'd have to modify it again to where it became the point that you didn't have a plan."

role of the Lieutenant was going to be, and redefining what a Captain would be. But we did not have Sergeants participate.

In the end, Sergeants rebelled against their new duties and contributed to serious dissent over community policing, which never took root widely in Riverside.

Finally, if a sophisticated (but not stultifying) plan is important, and planning must be broadly inclusive, then it becomes important for agencies to develop the capacity to engage in this complicated activity. In many of these agencies, that task proved challenging. For example, in Knoxville, one department member reports that the first strategic planning session was difficult: "None of us had ever really done anything like that before, and we all were asked to come up with goals and objectives. Well quite frankly, most of them didn't have a clue what a goal and an objective was." These competency issues became important in several departments, and an important managerial challenge involved meeting them. Knoxville's Chief responded with a series of leadership development initiatives that, among other things, sought to demystify the process of planning. Other departments lacked the in-house capacity needed to develop such a curriculum, so they had to turn to outside consultants. For example, Lowell police had absolutely no previous experience with planning, and barely any with meeting as a group, and the department faced serious challenges developing its initial plan. Lowell's Chief addressed this problem with the help of an outside consultant.

It is precisely in getting such outside expertise—and many of these departments found themselves in the same situation as Lowell or Knoxville—, that resources and not just imagination become important. Thacher reports the thoughts of Lowell's consultant on the matter:

> Hart, who now runs a private consulting business to support organizational change in the private sector, reports that funding is often a stumbling block for police departments—which is why the LPD is the only police department she has had a chance to work with. A few departments have contacted her, but none have been able to come up with funding to support consultant's fees; Hart believes the problem is that there are too few grants specifically designed to support the process aspects of organizational change, and that city governments are loath to spend money on such "frills." The funding the LPD was able to get was entirely a result of their own inventiveness: "We were just very creative," she explains. "We just wrote it in but the grants weren't specifically set aside for organizational change. I think the proposals were strong enough that they allowed it to stay in the proposal. And it was still a relatively small amount [relative to the rest of] the proposal."

Of these eight agencies, only Knoxville drew on COPS funding (specifically, a DEMO grant rolled over from BJA) to fund such activity, hiring a consultant to help guide a mid-term community planning effort. So, while this was an important managerial intervention, and one where funding did play some role, it was not one that was widely supported by COPS grants.

3. Re-Designing Organizational Structure

In addition to engaging in mission-defining, strategic planning processes, all the organizations at some stage more or less radically re-structured their organizations. Because the substantive work of solving problems and managing community partnerships represents relatively new activity in each department, local managers needed to carve out some

organizational space for it to be developed. Four prongs of such activity can be discerned in the cases: 1) establishing structures dedicated to problem-solving; 2) establishing structures designed to deal with specific crime problems, and establishing special liaison personnel or units linked to particular interest groups; 3) re-structuring patrol operations to ensure some links to geographically based communities; and 4) re-structuring other departmental units to improve their community focus and relationship with patrol. There are some commonalties across the sites in how they accomplished these jobs, but there also seems to be some flexibility in how to approach them.

    a. Special Problem-Solving Units

Many of the cases describe efforts to institutionalize community problem solving by creating special units with substantial responsibility for central pieces of it. Perhaps the clearest example is Lowell's "precincts," which grew up completely outside of the 911 system so that its officers could devote all of their time to developing community partnerships and solving community problems. Similar but smaller-scale examples include Portland's Neighborhood Response Teams (NRTs), Riverside's POP units, Albany's community outreach units, St. Paul's ACOP and FORCE units, Colorado Springs's NPUs, and Spokane's NROs (Savannah's "czars", crime prevention officers, and Crime Suppression Units are variations on this theme, as they were and Fremont's Street Crimes Unit also focuses on chronic problem places and manages interagency relations). While these units could not carry problem-solving completely (Albany and Riverside both created them but failed to diffuse their skills to the rest of the patrol force), they often helped to launch problem-solving efforts in the Departments, especially by providing the officers involved with much needed experience, and by providing those watching with important evidence about the practicality and efficacy of the efforts.

The major management challenge these units created involved the tension that usually arises between the new POP officers and the traditional patrol force. Coles gives a clear example in St. Paul, where the patrol force apparently became jealous of one special unit's flexibility, and displeased about its impacts on their workload:

> The latitude given to the HELP-P team to innovate created very real tensions with the rest of the Department. One of the first changes then-Lieutenant McDonald made involved shift schedules: HELP-P officers were placed on a ten-hour shift to accommodate their work with citizens. While HELP-P officers "loved it," this created something of a rift with the rest of SPPD, which did not change its shift structure until much later. HELP-P officers also spent much of their time meeting with local citizens and attending community events, which sometimes required heavy reliance on backup from the rest of the Patrol Division to cover calls that could not be answered by HELP-P officers. Yet when non-HELP-P officers came into the area on a call, citizens in the project did not like it—they wanted HELP-P officers only, and not "strangers." (McDonald recalls that citizens were never timid in pointing out what was going right or wrong.) McDonald tried to reciprocate by having HELP-P officers respond outside the housing projects around the periphery of their areas when patrol officers couldn't handle all the calls coming in. But he never solved the problem of citizen responses.

Indeed, Coles reports that special units have become one of the sore points in St. Paul's otherwise successful reforms:

A big gripe of these officers is the proliferation of special units under Chief Finney—bike patrol, storefronts, FORCE—and to staff them, "patrol is always the first place they take from." Some sergeants also notice this: they argue that patrol is getting depleted, more and more. Some of the special units—FORCE, and Downtown Patrol—do work that patrol officers and sergeants can see is actually contributing to a reduction in the workload of patrol officers. But other units don't contribute at all in their eyes. Another concern is that newer officers are being moved into some of these special units after as little as three or four years with SPPD, without having had the extensive experience on patrol that the older officers think is valuable.

A related concern in many departments was that these special units would monopolize problem-solving and absolve other officers of the responsibility, thereby shrinking both the overall quantity and quality of problem-solving, and also weakening the likely future of problem-solving efforts in the organization.

Out of this welter of concerns, the most explosive have revolved around the complaint that special units deplete the patrol force and thereby increase each officer's workload. That complaint became serious in places like Riverside and Spokane, where efforts to expand community policing units at the expense of 911 created a serious backlash that has left a legacy of resistance to this day. Sheingold writes:

> Some of these officers felt they were too busy responding to calls for service to problem solve. Or they were frustrated by what they saw as a thinning out of patrol, as new programs . . . were added. The number of uniformed personnel assigned to respond to 911 calls decreased from 157 in 1990 to 142 in 1992. This decrease frustrated some patrol officers. "We were getting thinned out in terms of bodies available on the street vs. bodies to work this volunteer activity, or design that particular program. There was a real feeling of, 'Jesus, where are the cops anymore?" one department member said.

The alternative to robbing patrol to pay POP was simply to hire more officers for the new units. *This* form of organizational restructuring can be quite money-intensive, and not surprisingly, the hiring-focused COPS grants played a very visible role here: Savannah's CSUs, for example, were beefed-up with 10 COPS Ahead officers, Colorado Springs used Universal Hiring money to expand its NPU, and Spokane expanded its NRO unit with Phase I money. As Sheingold reports about Spokane:

> State grants allowed the department to hire the first two NROs and create the LEAD Academy and COPY Kids program. In 1994 the department made a big personnel gain when Spokane Congressman, then House Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA), helped the department acquire a Federal Justice Department Phase I grant to hire 26 new police officers. This grant helped increase the ratio of officers to citizens from 1.2 per thousand to 1.5 per thousand. Many in the department credit this grant with allowing the department to fully implement community policing. As a result of this grant, for example, the NRO program was expanded from three to seven officers, the street crimes unit was created, and the DARE program was expanded. "That gave us the ability to carry out some of these strategies that were just pilot projects and still maintain control capacities," [SPD Chief Terry] Mangan said. "That helped us to grow where we've gone from 222 commissioned officers in 1987 to 297 officers in 1997." Deputy City Manager Peter Fortin acknowledged that without the federal grant, the department would not have experienced the same growth in personnel. "Spokane is a real conservative city when it comes to budget.... We wouldn't have gotten into a lot of programs, or been able to expand them, without the federal dollars. They are the absolute catalyst for change... We couldn't have done it without them," Fortin said. While some department members were frustrated that many of the new officers were placed in special programs, other members felt that the new officers helped alleviate some of the initial internal

tension about community policing. "I think since we've replaced some of the numbers... with federal assistance... we're not as thin as we were," one department member said. For [community member] Cheryl Steele, the federal grant was critical. "We wouldn't have the NROs, we wouldn't have the DARE program, we wouldn't be able to have specialized police officers help the neighborhood groups problem solve," Steele said.

Similarly, Lowell's chief explicitly tied the opening of new precincts to the availability of grant money, and today 43% of the department's patrol force is organized within this new structure outside of the 911 system. At the outset of this effort, city government explicitly told the department that any new hiring would have to come from grant money.

Thus there is a tight nexus between COPS hiring and the creation of new problem-solving units in many of these agencies. In most of these cases COPS money expands rather than starts these units, but that is probably an artifact of our evaluation's timing: As mentioned above, in order to locate departments where change had had *some* time to settle in, we eliminated from our sample departments that started their COP efforts before 1995, leaving very little room for COPS to "start" these units. But in half of the departments studied, earlier grant sources got these units off the ground. For whatever reason, grant money seems central to this important class of COP interventions.

Those new units, in turn, seem to be instrumental to community policing reform: they are one of the few common characteristics of our eight high-change departments. They are hardly sufficient, for the departments that experienced less change (like Albany and Riverside) also sported such units but failed to diffuse their skills to the rest of the patrol force: In those departments (particularly Riverside), the special units *themselves* became quite skilled at tasks like problem-solving and community outreach, but management did not succeed in spreading those abilities to the rest of the patrol force. At the same time, it is important to note that despite some conventional wisdom in the field, these units *can* serve as a springboard for future development throughout an agency: The backlash they create does not inevitably undermine the progress of reform. In particular, that tension can be kept within manageable bounds when the personnel for new units are not stolen from patrol, and using discretionary money like the COPS grants has helped many of these agencies to accomplish that. Moreover, these units can help to develop capacity and experience in community policing that can eventually help advance reform throughout the department. Thus if special units are not sufficient for change, they may be necessary.[27] The ideals associated with community policing perhaps fall into Philip Selznick's category of "precarious values," which, Selznick argues, demand administrative autonomy at the outset in order for them to take root.[28]

b. Specific Crime Initiatives and Neighborhood Liaisons

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[27] Knoxville would seem to be the exception here, in that it has nothing resembling a problem-solving unit. But in fact large-scale problem-solving is still fairly uncommon in the city (a dozen or so projects are active at any given time in the city), and its administrative systems for facilitating smaller "directed patrol" efforts are extraordinarily advanced.

[28] Philip Selznick. *Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation.* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 126 *ff.*

These multipurpose problem-solving units were often joined by close relatives with more limited mandates, focusing on particular types of crime or a particular community. These structures helped advance problem-solving and partnership goals by focusing organizational attention on these areas. Both present the same managerial challenges as the development of new problem-solving units, and the COPS hiring grants often helped managers to meet them.

Where specific crime initiatives are concerned, domestic violence units or czars are perhaps the most common example, as they carve out a new organizational space to locate responsibility for investigating that category of crimes and providing prevention and victim-assistance services (for example, St. Paul's Field Referral Unit and Savannah's Domestic Violence Unit). Occasionally, as in Colorado Springs, they went further, pursuing full-blown problem-solving efforts directed at domestic violence. All of them are particularly important from the point of view of the COPS program, which set aside funding specifically for domestic violence prevention. In each department that focused on this area, the basic idea—and often some nascent organizational structure—had been around long before COPS. But several agencies used COPS to expand these special units, and often in the same interorganizational direction in which Colorado Springs moved (as, for example, in St. Paul and Lowell). In some cases, like Albany, these units are made up essentially of civilians, and while they do fulfill their aims of bringing better information to victims, they have not apparently catalyzed the sorts of wider changes that have transpired in Colorado Springs. That added leverage seems to come from hitching the new domestic violence unit to an influential part of the existing force, rather than creating a new isolated unit—particularly one made up only of civilians, who may not have much influence in their department.

In a similar vein, many of these departments created special units with responsibility not for particular types of crime, but for specific subsets of the community, such as youth or public housing residents (as in St. Paul's widely-acclaimed ACOP unit in a mostly-Asian public housing development). School Resource Officer units are one example, and St. Paul, Fremont, Lowell, Colorado Springs, Savannah, and Spokane all introduced them as part of their community policing efforts (though Spokane initially faced some resistance from its school district to the idea, and Riverside actually began to extricate its SROs from the school district at the outset of community policing). In Fremont, for example, the officers were assigned full-time to individual schools, and the results have apparently been positive; Thacher writes: "The SRO program has, perhaps more than anything else in the FPD, brought its officers into close contact with a particular community—something that has proven to be a challenge in Fremont . . . . As [City Councilwoman JoNelle] Zager explains, 'The community does want to know who their patrol cop is. It's just in a different setting and it's for kids.'"

These community- and crime-specific special units account for much of the remaining hiring money that these departments received from COPS: Fremont, for example, explicitly targeted its Universal Hiring Money for the SROs, and almost every agency found COPS Domestic Violence money attractive for starting or expanding domestic violence units.

Of course, not every agency fully exploited hiring money to beef-up problem-solving units, whether we define that category narrowly or broadly. First of all, some agencies (like Knoxville, Portland, Albany, and Riverside) have accepted hiring money but not targeted it to special units, using the new hires for other purposes related to community policing (as described

below). Others tried to avoid hiring money altogether, typically because of concerns about explicit or implicit matching requirements, but sometimes for more idiosyncratic reasons.[29]

But such opposition is not always intractable, and Fremont managers, at least, believe that targeting hiring grants for special units is the most convincing strategy one can use to overcome potential opposition. In that city, police management recognized that COPS funding would not look very attractive to city council, so it sought to make as clear a case as possible for the importance of the money and to leave no ambiguity about its important effects by spending it directly on a new special unit. As Thacher explains:

> COPS grants did not play a large role in Fremont's transition to C.O.P.P.S. for a simple reason: The funding simply was not attractive to the city. An expensive city to live in, Fremont pays a starting salary of close to $50,000 per year plus benefits for sworn officers; but the Title I hiring grants pay a total of only $75,000 over three years to fund an officer. . . . .Nevertheless, Fremont did seek a few small hiring grants, as well as one domestic violence grant, to aid its transition to community policing. In doing so, it followed a specific philosophy of grant-getting. As [Captain Mike] Lanam puts it: "We tied it to programs. For instance our first COPS grant was for the school resource officers. So we said if we're going to do this, this is what we want to use it for. This is the area we're going to step out into, school resource officers. It wasn't a case of just saying 'We're going to put another officer on the street.' You put officers on the street, but the exact purpose of that officer was identified. . . That we could tie back and say, report back to council, 'Hopefully you've spent your money wisely. This is what is going on.' And then they evaluate the program.

Fremont was also able to reduce the matching burden in this particular case by sharing the costs with the school district. In any case, the evaluation that came back on the SROs was very positive, and the city is now actually planning to expand the unit with its own funding.

c. Decentralizing and Re-Organizing the Patrol Function

Beyond creating new special units, every department studied insists that it has reorganized its structure to focus attention on places. Much of the most significant work here happened at relatively high levels of aggregation: Some of Portland's districts and Colorado Springs's divisions have populations as large as the entire city of Lowell, Knoxville's three districts each cover some thirty square miles, and Fremont actually *increased* the size of its zones by cutting their number in half. True "neighborhood scale" seemed less important to these departments than clearly assigning *some* structure of responsibility for places rather than times

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[29] Colorado Springs, for example, sought to target hiring money to its NPU unit but was initially stymied in city council, as Sheingold explains: "While the department's ability to acquire outside funding has generally been supported by City Hall, in one case it caused some controversy. In 1995 the department was awarded a Universal Hiring Grant by the federal government to hire 12 new officers. These officers would have allowed the department to expand its NPU units. Initially, however, the City Council would not approve the hires, with some members arguing that the program amounted to a federal take-over of local law-enforcement. 'It was a political issue with [the last Mayor and a City Council Member]. They were both pretty conservative Republicans and they did not want to support Clinton's Crime Bill,' [CPD Chief James] Munger said. 'There were some strings attached to the money because the officers had to be committed to community policing and those two talked about wanting the officers to do other things. But · that wasn't really the issue. It was political.'"

(though some Albany officers insist that part of the problem with their reforms has been decentralization into zones that were too large, so that a true sense of ownership never developed). Moreover, in almost every case, this task of forging accountability focused on management rather than the patrol force. In Lowell, for example, the patrol force *already* had geographic assignments: Restructuring by sectors meant assigning sergeants and captains to the new, geography-based organizational units (in the past, both ranks had supervised officers all over the city). Indeed, only in the largest departments, like Portland and St. Paul, did top management have geographic responsibility before community policing got underway, and in places like Lowell and Fremont, not even sergeants had been assigned by place. Today, all ten departments assign both first-line supervisors and top management to particular places in their cities.

Beneath the large-scale efforts to organize around geography were a number of truly neighborhood-scale efforts with the same aim. In particular, Fremont, Portland, and St. Paul made maps of their respective neighborhoods into elements of organizational structure in order to assign responsibility for community partnerships. Coles describes the process in St. Paul, and she reports that St. Paul's NSA's increased officers' sense of ownership of and responsibility for areas:

> Neighborhood Service Area (NSA) organization was begun as a prototype in East District in 1994 under Commander Dick Gardell, and expanded throughout the City the next year. The NSA incorporates a well-defined neighborhood into a police service area. A complement of police officers and a supervising sergeant (who coordinates community-oriented policing activities) are assigned primary responsibility for each NSA. Each NSA sergeant has authority over all three shifts, and assigns officers to specific districts in the form of beats (which refer to foot patrol) or areas. Those NSAs that contain a storefront will have an officer assigned responsibility for its operation: the officer reports to the NSA sergeant. The goal in NSAs is for residents, businesses and police officers to get to know each other better, and to be able to work together on issues that affect the quality of life and public safety.

> How have the NSAs affected policing? One officer describes a growing sense of identification with that turf, that geographical area, covered by the NSA: "Within the last four years, especially, it's becoming a more formalized situation in that we not only have a supervising sergeant, but you have someone who actually is focused on a neighborhood service area no matter what the shift is—days, midnight, or afternoons—we've formalized more on the team area as complaints for information come in and then that is dispersed down to the officers on the street...if a complaint comes in from a sergeant, that neighborhood service area sergeant will actually get a hold of us and say, 'Hey, my colleague is working this area, I've been hearing this, can you tell me about it?' Then I can give him names, addresses, phone numbers, information.... I can say 'This is the complaint....' If something's really happening, it doesn't take long to get feedback." Officers report that the system (begun two or three years ago) of tracking information and police reports generated within an NSA in the District station (by computer) has been immensely useful for NSA officers. This information pool gives them an overview of what is happening in the NSA beyond their own individual beat. Patrol officers within one NSA also provide back-up for each other: "We're all each other's information chain, and if one is tied up, I can expect that I'm going to be sent there, too."

The job of assigning responsibility for particular "communities" seemed particularly important places like Fremont, where a low crime rate meant that community organizations rarely grew up specifically around public safety issues. Without such "natural partners" delivered to its doorstep, the FPD faced an urgent need to find a way to cultivate relationships with the diverse

community groups Fremont *did* offer. Its response was to create a "reporting area" program that assigns every officer in the FPD to one of 94 small, four- to five-block areas of the city, making them experts on their respective neighborhoods.[30] Portland's NLO program echoes this logic exactly, and it must be understood in conjunction with the Bureau's redrawing of its beat maps to match neighborhood boundaries: Although residents may not have known the difference, the alignment made it possible for management to hold particular officers responsible for liaison with particular neighborhoods.

Both the large-scale decentralization efforts and the neighborhood-scale reorganizations created several management challenges. Fragmentation was one, arising (for example) in Knoxville after the city established its three precincts; Thacher writes:

> the newly-decentralized patrol force undermined coordination across districts. At best, decentralization meant that each district did not have any opportunity to learn from the experiences of the others. At worst, it led to redundancy, as neighboring districts and other KPD units targeted the same problems on the same nights, entirely unaware of each others' plans. In any case, [Officer Terry] Moyers recalls that [Deputy Chief Robert] Coker asked him to start reviewing problem-solving projects, saying: "I want you to start collecting all the data on problem solving kits and DPs. This is what I want you to look at, and anything else you think I need to know."

Moyers's position arose as a separate administrative remedy to solve the fragmentation problem: Charged with reviewing each proposal for a directed patrol or problem-solving, he helped accomplish quality control, coordination, and learning across the three autonomous districts. This sort of role is unique among the departments studied, and it is perhaps worthy of imitation if (as Knoxville police insist) it does help solve a key problems decentralization creates.

Another class of problems stemmed from the fact that the new geographic structures do not replace but supplement the existing temporal structures—the platoons, shifts, or detachments that still organize work in every agency. Indeed, Albany actually increased its attention to organization by time at some expense to decentralization. No one in Albany argued that this centralization interfered with community policing in any important way. But in other cities, continuing authority from shift bosses did create some tension. In Lowell, for example, sector

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[30] According to [Captain Mike] Lanam, RA officers are told "You have this large response area for emergency calls for service. But you are responsible to maintain or keep track of the smaller five or six block neighborhood. So some time during your shift and during your week you are going to go down and keep track of that neighborhood and resolve the issues down there." In practice, that means directing the RA officers to identify and meet with relevant neighborhood groups and businesses, to learn about the area's concerns, and to coordinate a departmental response. Lanam hopes that [the program] will help the FPD keep track of community concerns. On the one hand, when the FPD or anyone else in city government proactively decides to undertake a neighborhood initiative, the RA officer should be able to identify the relevant stakeholders. As Lanam puts it, "it identifies your different focus groups. . . We can reach out to Centerville, [because] their structure's in place." On the other hand, the RA's also serve as more reactive antennae that alert the FPD to emerging crises. Lanam explains: ". . . . we do miss pockets of the community. We need to take care of those neighborhoods and look at them at least a couple of times a week. It doesn't take much to get a neighborhood up in arms because some neighborhood kid is speeding up and down the street . . . So once in a while that stuff will pop up in front of the council when we'll say 'Oops, we missed something, let's get on it.' That's what the strategy of the RA is about, so that there is less of a chance that is going to happen."

Lieutenants initially found that shift captains were undermining their problem-solving plans by pulling officers from those assignments to beef up patrol shifts. Superintendent Ed Davis's solution, "discovered" when one captain's illness forced his lieutenant to take over his shift for a long period of time, was to reverse the captains' and lieutenants' roles, firmly putting the authority of the higher rank behind the new sector structure.

The nature of these challenges was such that grant money played no visible role in most of these reorganizations, mainly because they were just that: Paper reorganizations of existing officers according to a new logic of responsibility. Such reorganizations require some planning; they demand attention to such challenges as fragmentation and the potential for tension with the temporal commands. Moreover, they must certainly be reinforced by the sorts of training interventions discussed below. But in and of themselves they are not particularly fundable interventions. The only example in which COPS *did* play a role in them in Fremont, where the department applied for a discretionary "Advancing Community Policing Grant" to fund civilian support for officers exercising their new RA responsibilities. It is conceivable that COPS might push them through technical assistance or grant conditions, but in none of our cases did that happen.

d. Re-Organizing Investigations

Most of these efforts to reallocate (or create) functional and geographic responsibilities through organizational restructuring centered on the patrol force, but all of these agencies also made some attempt to redefine the organizational relationship *between* patrol and other supporting units whose assistance would be needed. For example, investigations turn out to be an important resource for problem-solving, and most departments felt and acted on a need to integrate patrol work more closely with investigations. One important way turned out to be reorganizing the detective Bureau in a way that matched it more closely with patrol, which in practice meant decentralizing detectives to the precinct level and having them work more closely with patrol officers. In Portland, for example, this reorganization immediately made sense to many investigators, and they carried it forward with creativity:

> [Sergeant Irv] McGeachy argues . . . : "People involved in property crimes, . . . I would guess that 75% and above are involved in narcotics." In North Precinct, at least, many or even most burglars seemed to take their spoils to drug houses and exchange them for drugs. The result was that drug houses usually contained large amounts of stolen property that detectives could tie to past burglaries in order to bring charges against the offenders. Shutting down drug houses meant clearing up burglaries; and more important, it meant eliminating the immediate reason to commit burglaries in the neighborhood. As McGeachy sees it, both burglaries and drug activity had a common source in the places where criminals congregated: "If you take a neighborhood, there's only a few houses, one or two houses maybe, that would be the focus of the attention . . . And that's where everybody goes; whether it's to get dope to take their stolen property, to socialize, to whatever." North's NRT already maintained a list of drug houses that it had identified from community input and officer knowledge, and McGeachy used that list to assign addresses to his detectives in two ways. First, if a house was primarily a drug problem but there was reason to believe that it also had stolen property, then he would put the NRT in charge of it but allow them to use the detectives to support their work (for example, detectives had the background to write search warrants, conduct interviews, and work informants). On the other hand, some drug houses were located in burglary hotspots (which McGeachy and another officer identified by plotting all the incoming burglary reports), and these were assigned primarily to a detective; in these cases it . was the NRT officers who played the supporting role.

Similarly, decentralization of some investigative functions in St. Paul, together with growing emphasis on collaboration in the department, apparently helped link patrol officers up with district officers. Coles quotes on SPPD officer to this effect:

> "Traditionally, investigations were separate from patrol, but now...we interact all the time." "...rather than coming out a 4pm and knowing by the time roll call is over, I'm not going to get down to headquarters...I can leave a note on someone's desk, and know it is going to be followed up on." "I can stop by the Lieutenant's desk and say, 'I'm not sure who has this report, but here is some unofficial information, here's the rumors...or I can't substantiate this information." "The other thing that happens is that citizens often become really excellent sources of information and once they get to know investigators, just as with any police officer, they are just as comfortable calling someone and saying 'I know you're not handling this case, but you did a real good job with mine, and I just thought I'd let you know this so you can pool your information....'" "The response from investigations and community officers has been so positive in the community that we're getting feedback from officers all the way up."

As common as these decentralization efforts were efforts to altogether reassign certain investigative functions out of detective units and into patrol: Agencies like Lowell and Knoxville ended up giving patrol officers at least part of the responsibility for property-crimes investigations. (Fremont, one of the few agencies that lacked such initiatives, *already* trained its officers as "generalists" who undertook most of their own investigations.) But as with geographic reorganizations, grant money played no significant role in any of these efforts.

e. Summary

In sum, organizational restructuring played a central part in most of these community policing efforts. First, every department except Knoxville created special units for problem-solving and fighting disorder, and most created other special units focused on specific communities (such as schools) or specific crime problems (such as domestic violence). Many of these units contributed to community policing by developing experience with new skills and ideas, institutionalizing the "precarious values" of community policing by giving them a protected space in which to grow. Grant funding was central to many of these units, for the alternative was robbing the patrol force at large to staff them—and doing that exacerbated an already difficult reform, since it inspired jealousy and complaints that workload had been displaced. Nevertheless, if creating new special units with grant funding was all but necessary for the most dramatic reform efforts, it was not sufficient for them: Departments like Albany and Riverside had some success with special units but could not leverage their gains to catalyze change in the department as a whole. We will return to this problem below.

Second, reorganizations of existing units—especially patrol and investigations—also played a role in most of these efforts. Particularly visible were efforts to decentralize patrol operations and create quasi-permanent assignments for both officers and their supervisors. But interestingly, many of these departments *already* had something like "beat integrity" for their patrol officers: The real changes affected Sergeants and middle managers, who had formerly supervised officers throughout their cities but now took on geographical assignments. In any case, the content of these efforts (for example, the size of "beats" or "districts") does not go very far to distinguishing the most successful cases from the others, so geographical decentralization does not seem to be the magic bullet for community policing that some have seen it as. Moreover, grant funding played little role in them: They required more in the way of

imagination than funding, and the great bulk of COPS funding simply could not be used for the sorts of "soft" expenses (like consultants) that *could* be useful to them.

4. Re-Engineering the Technical Core

In most of the cases, organizational restructuring succeeded in creating significant organizational space for the new activities of problem-solving and community partnerships. But the new dedicated units, however necessary, seem insufficient: They leave most of the patrol force untouched, and therefore most of the agency's man-hours with commitments to traditional activities. As Knoxville's Phil Keith put it: "You can have real successful special unit programs, but your overall mission is not reached'." Indeed, that seems to have been largely the case in Albany and Riverside: With a few exceptions, these departments' reforms did not extend in significant ways beyond the special units where they started. For this reason, almost all of the most successful agencies make significant changes to the basic operational systems that structure patrol work—particularly those that 1) affect the burden of 911 calls officers must handle, 2) provide structure for problem-solving, and 3) influence the ways in which officers use their discretion.

a. Freeing up time for problem-solving and community outreach

Officers in every department studied sounded the refrain that they did not have enough time for community policing. The complaint seems to have no relationship to the size of the patrol force: It was if anything louder in Albany, where the city has over 3 officers per 1,000 residents, than in Fremont, where the ratio is close to 1 per 1,000. But even where the complaint has little substantive merit, it can have great symbolic force, and management ignores it at its peril. By contrast, by taking steps to reduce each officer's workload, management can fend off one prominent excuse for avoiding new duties like problem-solving and community outreach. It turns out that there are several ways to accomplish this task, and some of them draw heavily on grant funding.

One of the most well-worn methods for freeing up patrol officers from 911 work is call diversion, and most of these agencies use some variation of the technique. The most common form is perhaps phone reporting, and agencies like Fremont, Savannah, and Knoxville initiated phone reporting programs as part of their reforms. These efforts can make a fairly significant impact: Knoxville's Teleserve unit, for example, has handled around 40% of the department's report calls for service since its inception in 1990, freeing up substantial patrol officer time. Other agencies undertook variations on these themes: Fremont and Colorado Springs both devised ways of dealing with common "loud music" calls without involving a patrol officer (this was only one of many inventive call diversion tactics Colorado Springs created); many agencies such as St. Paul redefined priority 1 and 2 calls; and Portland reduced the burden of low-priority calls by making them "self-assigned" (dispatch puts these calls in a queue, but officers themselves choose when to take them, so they have added flexibility to budget their time). All of these interventions, however, join the growing list started by geographic decentralization: Interventions that require more imagination than resources, and thus in which grant funding played a small role.

Another way to free up time involved changes to scheduling and deployment that concentrated slack time for problem-solving and community partnerships. Knoxville's effort is among the more systematic, as the department progressively improved its patrol deployment algorithms to the point where they staff shifts and districts not just with respect to call load, but also with respect to the volume of directed patrol activity and other forms of problem-solving. Similarly, Portland has included targets for the amount of self-directed time officers should have in its deployment calculations, and over the course of its transition to community policing, that fraction grew substantially. Savannah went through essentially the same process, and Fremont created a unique shift system that accomplished two goals: It created viable problem-solving teams, and it created a period of significant overlap across different shifts that built in slack time for problem-solving work. Grant funding played little role in these efforts, but there was one exception in Colorado Springs, which purchased a brand-new COPS MORE-funded computer system to deal with its runaway workload, and the resulting analysis led it to restructure its shifts entirely:

> As the city has grown both in population and size, the department realized in 1995 that its resources were being increasingly stretched. However, the likelihood of a large increase in personnel seemed unlikely. More effective deployment of the existing personnel was seen as the answer to this problem. The department applied for and received a $260,000 COPS MORE grant from the federal government to purchase a new computer manpower allocation program to more accurately track and forecast deployment needs.

> After examining several different programs, the department settled on the Police Resource Optimization System (PROS). During 1996, after the new system analyzed patrol demand, it became clear that establishing multiple start times for each shift would be the best way to meet demand needs. . . . . PROS also took into account that officers needed larger blocks of time to effectively conduct problem oriented policing projects. As a result, officer shifts were changed to four, ten-hour shifts per week. Officers were supportive of this switch because it gave them an extra day off per week and department managers were pleased that the new deployment formula projected that officers would have 30% of their time to conduct problem-solving projects. The combination of the officers new hours, and the multiple shift starts, was also projected to reduce the time between when a priority one call was received by the dispatchers and when an officer was free to take the call. (Since PROS's implementation, this time has been reduced from 3.5 minutes to 2.5 minutes.)

> Officers were enthusiastic about the switch from several perspectives. "For morale and scheduling this has made things so much better. It's four extra days off per month." Officer Larry Morgan said. Officers also appreciate that they have more back-up during peak periods . . . . Officer Sheldon Schnese finds that having overlapping shifts has meant that he has more time to work on problem-solving projects. "When the shifts are changing, if you have a problem you can come into the substation and work on it, and you are not hurting other officers who are on the street by being off the street," Schnese said.

Here, new MORE-funded technologies helped the department increase its ability to rationalize workload, thereby freeing up time for problem-solving.

The most direct way to tackle the "time" issue, of course, is simply by putting more cars on the street.[31] Most of these agencies made some effort to hire more bodies, and while it is hard to disentangle the symbolic significance of these interventions (discussed below) from their real significance for workload, most agencies report a real sense that hiring helped free up time from calls. Portland's "Operation Jumpstart"—a mayor-approved effort to bring 100 new officers into the Police Bureau—is a clear example of this strategy, as the agency explicitly tied the need for hiring to community policing. Knoxville, Spokane, Lowell, and Albany all undertook similar efforts, and in most cases officers are aware of the increase and feel it has helped divert call load to free them up for other duties.

This again is an area where COPS would seem to come to the fore, in that it directly funds hiring. Surprisingly, only two of the agencies studied significantly used COPS hiring for the explicit purpose of freeing up time for community policing activities. The other departments either minimized hiring grants altogether, targeted grant-funded hires in special units (as described above), or used grant funding principally to meet traditional needs rather than explicitly to free up extra time in the patrol force for community policing.

In a way, St. Paul did use general hiring to address workload concerns. Chief Finney apparently felt that special units like FORCE and ACOP (some started by reallocating personnel rather than hiring new bodies) threatened to hollow out the patrol force. But in his mind, COPS hiring enabled the SPPD to avoid that outcome. Coles writes:

> Chief Finney states unequivocally that he could not have done what he wanted to without these grants. First, the additional monies available to supplement hiring has been crucial: "They have been absolutely indispensable: I could not have developed the Department or been flexible in terms of designing my vision for service in the City without the money that's been there." Finney notes that when Norm Coleman became mayor, Coleman's stated goals were to increase services while cutting costs and reducing personnel. Bill Finney contends that without grants, he would have been unable to conform to the constraints imposed by these goals without sacrificing community-oriented policing programs in the City: "I could not have done it or been responsible at all. The first casualty would have been FORCE. It would have been gone, which would have created a greater crime problem inside the City of St. Paul. I would not have had the additional police officers. Police officers are expensive.... I'd probably still be standing at 512 or 519—I still feel St. Paul should be somewhere around 650 or 700 police officers.... FORCE is absolutely crucial in terms of doing patrol servicing in depth. Street officers that answer calls, 911, don't have the time to go out and work on problems. FORCE, even though it's a small unit, works on problems and has such a large impact on neighborhoods."

Thus Finney argues that COPS hiring was important because it helped maintain the status quo in the patrol force: It did not necessarily reduce workload and create new community policing capacity there, but made special units possible by backfilling officers that had been diverted there.

Albany used COPS money even more explicitly to reduce workload and free up patrol officer time for community policing. But it is not clear that workload reduction was really necessary there: Albany *already* had the highest officer-to-citizen ratio of any department

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[31] Lowell accomplished this job partly without hiring by all but eliminating the two-person car. But every other agency studied had already realized this gain well before the move to community policing, so more cars meant more officers.

studied, and officers do not describe a palpable reduction in their workload since hiring commenced. Regardless, the expansion likely had little influence on problem-solving and community outreach, since there is little evidence that those tasks have taken root yet in Albany's patrol force (as opposed to its small community outreach unit).

Nevertheless, Albany's patrol force hiring may have contributed to community policing reforms in two ways. First, the patrol officer's union insisted strongly that community policing could not work without more officers, and so the hiring staved off continued complaints and improved the legitimacy of departmental reforms (like the modestly successful community outreach unit, the new attention to disorder problems, and improved community relations in some neighborhoods). Second, many Albany patrol officers *have* increased their attention to "quality-of-life" policing, focusing on previously-neglected categories of disorder like public drinking, traffic and parking problems, and noise violations. To the extent that this attention demands more time from officers, some workload reduction may have been necessary, and COPS-funded hiring facilitated that effort.

On the other hand, grant-funded hiring may have unintentionally relieved pressure to look to *other* types of workload reduction, like call diversion, deployment, or scheduling strategies. Albany Chief Kevin Tuffey particularly opposed the first option: "That will never, ever, happen as long as I'm here," Tuffey says of call-diversion programs like phone reporting. "The purpose of community policing is to give people what they want. And if my house is burglarized and my bike is stolen, I don't want to see a telephone report. I want the police over there . . . People pay taxes to get service. And as far as I'm concerned, they will get the best service that I can help them get." His ability to cling to this position in the face of complaints about workload may have hinged on the availability of COPS money for growth.

Moreover, COPS requirements eventually led Albany to hire more police than it intended—28 grant-funded officers in all. After its first PHS grant for 14 officers, Albany apparently wanted to use COPS money to fund existing officers. But supplantation concerns led the COPS office to demur. In one case, the city simply withdrew its application; but later, it met COPS demands by agreeing to add new officers that city leaders had not planned. Thacher writes:

> The APD applied for its first formal COPS grant from the COPS AHEAD program, through which, as local officials understood it, the city would qualify for eight officers. Jennings apparently hoped to use the money to pay for cadets he had recently hired to round out his campaign promise, telling a group of downtown businessmen that he had no plans to hire past 345.[32] By December, that plan seemed to city officials to be on course, as the city received a letter from the Department of Justice explaining that Albany had been "authorized to hire eight officers."[33] But a few weeks later, Justice unequivocally told local officials that they could only

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[32] Jay Jochnowitz. "Crime Bill Means $8.5M for Albany, Jennings Says," *Albany Times-Union*, September 15, 1994, p. B-4. In theory, the 14 PHS officers plus a net total of 11 officers hired separately on city money would bring the APD from its Whalen-era authorized strength of 320 sworn officers up to a total of 345, which is what Jennings budgeted after taking office. Attrition in both the existing force and the recruit classes, of course, meant that the total would never reach that figure, and by 1995 sworn strength was hovering around 330 officers (just as under Whalen, the actual total had hovered around 300 rather than the authorized figure of 320).

[33] Jay Jochnowitz. "U.S. Says Albany Police Grant in Jeopardy," *Albany Times-Union*, December 29, 1994, p. B-3, citing a December 19 letter from Assistant Attorney General John Schmidt.

spend their authorization if they used the money for *new* recruits, in effect telling the APD that it needed to expand its ranks even further. Already facing unexpected budget troubles, the city withdrew its application and forfeited the money.[34] The APD hired no new officers for the next two years, and Jennings eventually revised the department's authorized strength back down to 320.

The APD's next hiring move came in December of 1996, when the city applied for a 14-officer COPS Universal Hiring grant and revisited the supplantation debate all over again. This time, according to newspaper reports, the city planned to use the grant money to effectively extend its expiring PHS grant, funding a class of recruits that was slated to enter the academy in January in order to make up for two years worth of attrition.[35] The Justice Department, however, refused to accept this proposal, and the controversy spilled over into Albany's Common Council, where one city Alderman exclaimed that losing the grant could put community policing in jeopardy.[36] Eventually Jennings and Tuffey conceded to the Justice Department's position, agreeing to hire fourteen more officers on top of the January class to bring total department strength to 334.

Having applied for federal money to fund existing officers, Tuffey and Jennings found themselves unable to withdraw the proposal after COPS reminded them of supplantation rules: By that time, other local officials had become convinced that more officers were necessary for the department to keep community policing going. Today, Tuffey concurs with them. "I need more people to do it," he explains. "If you want all these programs—and we didn't have the overtime grant at the time [referring to a COPS MORE overtime grant, which had been awarded but apparently not spent]—you either pay overtime to do it or you suffer with losing patrol. We can't afford to lose the patrol officers."

Nevertheless, other departments that made heavy investments in COPS hiring did not explicitly use the funding in this way to reduce workloads across-the-board. For example, the bulk of Lowell's hiring went directly into the new precincts described above, funding new special units rather than general workload reduction.[37] Knoxville seems to have had more general aims for patrol force hiring that had to do with population growth and annexation rather than making more time for community policing: The agency's grantsperson explained that "The chief knew where he wanted to be . . . and that was a logical progression of looking at increases in the city [population], the annexation issues, and the calls for service"—here the main motivation seems to have been keeping up with the traditional workload pressures rather than community problem-solving as such.

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[34] Two years later, Grebert would comment to a newspaper reporter that the city had been particularly concerned about picking up the cost of these officers when the grant expired. See Carol DeMare. "Strings Attached to Albany's Police Grant," *Albany Times-Union*, June 17, 1997, p. B-1.

[35] Jennings and budget director Chris Hearley are paraphrased to that effect in Jay Jochnowitz. "Albany May Reject $1M Grant for 14 Cops," *Albany Times-Unions*, December 19, 1996, p. B-1, in which Jenning also explains "my initial thoughts were, it wasn't for new cops."

[36] Kate Gurnett. "Alderman Presses for Cop Grant," *Albany Times-Union*, December 23, 1996, p. B-1.

[37] The rest was mainly justified as a way to manage the 911 burden and related "officer safety" concerns— a way to better meet traditional responsibilities rather than to free up time for new ones (though of course since all officers have some community policing duties, every grant-funded position advanced that aim somewhat).

The argument is not that Knoxville sidestepped the grant's requirement to put officers on the street "interacting directly with members of the community."[38] Given that *all* KPD officers have that duty, the grant clearly realized those aims in Knoxville. But it is entirely possible and legitimate for a department to put more officers on the community beat *without* catalyzing any further organizational change (here, creating slack time that can be used for things like problem-solving in *every* officer's workload). And in agencies like Knoxville, Albany, and Portland that put hiring grant money into the patrol force at large, there is less close a nexus between hiring and organizational change than in those agencies like Lowell or Fremont that used most or all of the money to start up new special units devoted to community problem-solving.

The distinction is perhaps precious, though, since general-purpose hiring grants did seem to serve important community policing aims in both Knoxville and Portland, whether or not that was there explicit purpose. In Knoxville, for example, Thacher writes:

> The new hires helped expand the department's numbers dramatically. "We would have still had some increases if it had to be entirely locally funded," [Knoxville Mayor Victor] Ashe maintains. "But probably not at the same level." Normal attrition meant that sworn strength never quite reached 416. But it came close, and in any case the growth was marked and noticeable (for example, from 1993 to 1997, the number of officers per 1,000 residents rose almost 25%, from 1.82 to 2.25). Officers on the street are aware of the increase and the fact that much of it was funded by grants—as well as the fact that the department must pick up the costs after a few years—, and although many still claim to feel pressed for time when topics like problem-solving come up, most seem to admit that growth has helped release their workload pressures.

> The new officers have had other impacts as well: For example, the Knoxville Community Development Corporation (KCDC), which manages the city's public housing, had long contracted with the KPD to have officers patrol its developments at overtimes rates. But as its funding from HUD began to fall in recent years, KCDC asked the KPD if it could create a more formal arrangement for its developments—namely, to assign a team of regular-duty officers to patrol public housing, thereby saving the agency from overtime rates. At first police resisted the idea. "Their numbers were down in the department," explains Fred DeBruhl, KCDC's executive director. "They didn't have the manpower." But the KPD's recent growth spurt changed that situation: "As time went on [and] their numbers increased," DeBruhl explains, "[KPD Chief Phil Keith] got to a point where we felt like we could do that." In any case, although the COPS hiring grants were not specifically targeted for the new KCDC team, it seems likely that they played an important role in making it possible.

In Portland, hiring money was not even considered for the first three years of the COPS program: The agency had apparently already stretched itself to fit the shape that community policing demanded through earlier efforts like Operation Jumpstart. But even there, a recent statewide property-tax rollback precipitated a budget crisis that some felt would put community policing in danger. Thacher writes that in the fall of 1997, the PPB drew on its first significant hiring money to avert disaster:

> This type of use of COPS money—as a way to repair the damage of budget crises—found its most dramatic expression very recently, when the Bureau received its first hiring grant from the Universal Hiring Program (UHP). The grant had its roots in 1996, when Oregon voters approved a property-tax reduction measure (called "Measure 47") that sent most cities into budgetary crisis.

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[38] U.S. Congress, 103d Session (1994). *Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.* P.L. 103-322, Sept. 13, sec. 1002.

Portland faced overall budget cuts of nearly 10%, and though Measure 47 explicitly directed cities to give priority to public safety, the PPB's cuts (of 4.75%) touched almost every part of the organization. In August of 1997, Chief Moose took the Bureau's troubles to Washington, personally applying to the COPS office for a hiring grant that would pay for 60 officers, and asking for a full waiver from the usual 25% matching requirement. To support his case, Moose pointed towards the extraordinary circumstances that Measure 47 represented, and he outlined an uncommonly explicit plan for retention: The city committed itself to putting away approximately $1 million per year from its general fund so that it could draw on the money when the grants expired (Mayor Katz, a fiscal conservative who takes pride in Portland's AAA bond rating, would settle for no less). In the event, COPS approved Portland's proposal, and Moose came back from Washington as something of a local hero. The grant made front page news in the *Oregonian*, and many inside and outside the PPB credited the chief with averting the most severe crisis the Bureau had faced in recent years. . . . The UHP grant arguably gave the Bureau a shot of resources and self-esteem at a moment of severe budgetary stress—stress that some began to doubt community policing could survive.

Thus, even if general-purpose hiring grants were not *motivated* by a goal of organizational change in these agencies, they were not entirely irrelevant to advancing or simply maintaining it.

Nevertheless, the nexus between general (as opposed to targeted) hiring and organizational change is not tight: It seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient to producing organizational change. First, it is not necessary because even if workload *is* an issue in community policing, other reforms are available to address it, such as call diversion and changes to deployment or scheduling; COPS money may simply relieve pressure to focus on those sorts of reforms in favor of hiring. Second, it is not sufficient because there are many ways to use the free time workload reduction creates. In Albany, many officers in the patrol force reportedly have not changed what they do at all (one supporter of the community policing effort suggests that close to half of officers fall into this category), though many have increased their attention to quality of life offenses.

None of this is to say that general purpose hiring plays *no* role in advancing community policing:[39] Examples like St. Paul, Portland, and Knoxville suggest that it may be important. But in departments that targeted COPS hiring in special units, like Savannah, Fremont, and Lowell, there seems to be a closer nexus between hiring and organizational change, as described above.

b. Institutionalizing Problem-Solving

Those changes to patrol's technical core described so far are negative enterprises: They seek to facilitate activities like community problem-solving by reducing other more traditional demands on officer time. But a complementary type of technical core reform is more positive in the sense that it affirmatively carves out space in the officially-recognized workload for the new activities, and gives those activities structure. Problem-solving was especially important in this regard.

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[39] On the idea that conditions that are neither necessary nor sufficient can still be important, see Charles Ragin. *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*, forthcoming.

Almost every agency here accomplished this job by giving official sanction to practices like taking officers out-of-service to attend community meetings, and by creating new administrative systems that recognize time spent on problem-solving work. In some cases, the department not only "recognizes" problem-solving and community relations work, but actually mandates it—above and beyond whatever encouragement personnel evaluations and promotions criteria give. In Savannah, for example, Coles reports:

> Park, Walk and Talk (signal 74) is expected to be a component of patrol, in which officers are to spend 30 minutes, twice on each shift, getting out of their cars and talking to residents and business owners on their beats. (It is subject to some abuse by officers who need some 'time out' for other reasons.) Officers are also expected to attend regular neighborhood meetings to discuss crime problems and solutions. Time utilization sheets are compiled from dispatch records showing the use of officer time by the minute for each month.

At the same time, there was some skepticism that such mandated logs would fulfill their aims:

> Recognizing the limits of this system, at least one captain has experimented with beat officers recording their own use of time—but he found these to be sufficiently inaccurate as well that they were of little use toward his hopes of gaining a more accurate picture on actual use of patrol officer time.

Indeed, one of the problems with simply "recognizing" such work to encourage it is that this strategy can encourage superficial problem-solving. That clearly happened in Knoxville for a time, and Coles reports that it happened in Savannah as well:

> At first there were many more projects: "people thought everything was a problem for a POP—they didn't understand what types of problems were really appropriate." Many of these early projects were never completed, and the numbers being started have dropped off. Those involved in POP projects believe this to be a positive development, since the quality of projects seems to be improving, and those who actually do the formal projects are more serious about them and less apt to be doing a POP project because of pressure from the Department..

Knoxville created the most elaborate solution to this problem, institutionalizing quality control over problem-solving in the position described above. Other agencies tried to control problem-solving quality by not simply labeling and legitimizing the work, but of actively structuring it by prescribing the methods officers needed to use: All of the departments except Lowell and Albany created new "official" problem-solving processes in this way. Sheingold reports that this was one of the essential elements of Colorado Springs's model POP efforts:

> In order to further systematize and reinforce the problem-solving strategy, [Deputy Chief Pat] McElderry and his staff also designed a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for community and problem-oriented policing. This SOP defined the philosophy and goals of problem-solving, and provided specific procedures and tactics for patrol officers to follow when conducting this work. The SOP repeatedly reinforced the idea that problem-oriented policing involved partnerships with community members and other agencies. "Members must… adopt an attitude that police services are not something which they deliver to the community from the outside, but rather are something which arise from within the community in response to specific needs," the SOP declared. "Officers must be open to two way communication with members of the public… such an information exchange is essential if Department members are to develop problem-solving strategies in partnership with the community." With this idea in mind, officers were encouraged to implement several different tactics to develop this type of community relationship. These included:

- Follow-up investigations which involved contacting members of the public to identify information about specific incidents and to identify general problems and conditions in the neighborhood.

- Park, Walk, and Talk: Officers were further encouraged to utilize this previously described tactic.

- Neighborhood Surveys: The department designed a survey instrument which could be distributed to residents which would capture their concerns about specific neighborhood based problems.

- Contacting other agencies: Officers were encouraged to see themselves as "service brokers" for the public. In this role they were directed to contact other service agencies whose assistance might help solve a problem.

In these SOPs, in Knoxville's "Problem-Solving Kits", and in the more traditional SARA process (used in places like Savannah), one glimpses the beginnings of a protocol for problem-solving work to match the procedures that already govern call response.

On the other hand, the nature of problem-solving work is such that too much formalization threatens to stifle it. In Knoxville Thacher reports that

> The administration was more than pleased with the kit itself and the way officers began using it, feeling that it eliminated SARA's core weaknesses—particularly its failure to operationalize key terms like "analysis." Nevertheless, some department members have reacted somewhat negatively to the kits, and while these reactions hardly mark the new tool as a failure, they do suggest that the pitfalls of problem-solving are less an error to be corrected than a dilemma to be managed. As one officer puts it: "The problem solving kit when you have got a problem is excellent. But I think most patrolmen are scared to death of it. You know, there is kind of a lot to it, and a lot of them will do most anything they can to stay away from a problem solving kit. . . . It's just got a lot of categories—the nature of the problem and things like that; solutions." Other officers echo these sentiments: One, for example, maintains that the kits "intimidate a lot of officers," and the result seems to be that department members lean towards the simpler directed patrol strategy wherever possible. "It's human nature," one officer explains. "If you have a blank DP form and they can fill out one piece of paper and work on something they want to work on, and then you hand them a problem solving kit, it's obvious which one they're going to gravitate towards."

> This reaction seems to suggest a fundamental tension in problem-solving: On the one hand, simple frameworks encourage problem-solving by making it easy to do, but the efforts that result will likely be superficial; on the other hand, complex frameworks force officers to take problem-solving seriously, but at the same they may discourage them from taking the initiative in the first place. Indeed, the KPD's two levels of problem-solving—the directed patrols and the problem-solving kits—may be seen as one answer to this dilemma, as they give officers a ready outlet for simple problems while preserving a carefully-controlled structure for more complex efforts.

Thus, through a process of trial, error, and creativity, departments like Knoxville develop a set of problem-solving protocols that are both sensible in themselves and that complement each others' weaknesses, with the result that the whole system advances problem-solving capacity. In this particular class of interventions, COPS did not play a direct role in any agency studied.

Whatever their dilemmas and limitations, these systems to institutionalize problem-solving seem integral to the efforts of the most successful COP programs. They are part of a

more general effort to reshape the technical core in these departments by carving out organizational space that is free of call response routines, and to replace it with something different. The only agencies studied that arguably did not make many interventions in this area for its patrol force were Lowell and Albany. In Lowell, as of Spring 1997, the police department had not undertaken major changes to its technical core such as call diversion or even formal POP tracking. The LPD compensated for this lack through its massive new "precinct" system, which protected a significant chunk of the sworn force from anything *but* community problem solving.[40] Albany, on the other hand, did not compensate for this lack at all, and the result is that sophisticated problem-solving is still very rare in the city.

    c.   Shaping officer discretion

Despite these efforts to develop the administrative systems that authorize and mandate problem solving, in most departments, the new "problem-solving" category does not seem to have dominant or even equal stature with 911. Consider the experience of Knoxville, which undertook a massive effort to give more structure to officer workloads through its directed patrol system—surely an easier reform to implement on a broad scale than more sophisticated versions of problem-solving. Even there, the city's 178 patrol officers logged only 26,320 hours of directed patrol activity in 1996, or about 8% of their total working hours; during the same period, they responded to 237,561 calls for service. Directed patrol work has become important and common for officers, and its importance may outweigh the number of working hours officers devote to them. But it has hardly displaced more traditional police work, which still occupies most officers most of the time.

For that reason, reforms directed at how officers use their discretion in more prosaic situations are at least as significant as currently-fashionable ideas like problem-solving. This idea can be described as a third type of reform to a police agency's technical core: One that shines a spotlight on the discretion that officers use in all their work, legitimizes that discretion, and tries to provide some guidance about how to use it (just as problem-solving reforms recognized and legitimized *that* activity and sought to give it structure).

Recognizing and paying attention to discretion is clearly closely-linked to community policing reforms, and all of the agencies studied reported making some effort in this direction. For example, in St. Paul, Coles explains that FORCE officers enjoy special autonomy in their work, and that they consider this an appealing aspect of their jobs. More generally, one of the major changes SPPD members associate with community policing has been the growing discretion accorded to officers. Coles writes:

> Sergeants report one big change in the organization that is apparent on the streets: officers didn't used to be trusted with telling the "company line;" the Department didn't want them telling citizens what the police were going to do. "Now they kind of trust police officers a little bit more to go in and say, 'Well this is the plan.'" Supervising sergeants also report that they see officers

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[40] Indeed, the strategies of re-engineering the technical core and re-designing organizational structure seem to be potentially interchangeable: Knoxville, the outlier on organizational structure (in that it did not create any new problem-solving unit), compensated by making elaborate changes to its technical core (notably by incorporating directed patrol activity into patrol deployment algorithms, and also by seriously pushing DPs themselves). Lowell, the outlier on technical core, compensated by creating a huge new organizational unit whose duties lay outside the current workload systems.

initiating more action—"...you don't have to be a sergeant or lieutenant to see what needs to be done. Now they're there [officers] and they're talking to people. People are telling them what the problem is, and 'okay, what are you going to do for me?' Now they have the opportunity to come up with their own ideas, rather than me just saying 'go do this.'"

All of the high-change departments echo this theme. Knoxville's Phil Keith makes an especially close and concrete connection between the ideals of community policing and the use of officer discretion, explaining that in his reforms he has tried to encourage thoughtful responses to even the most routine policing situations. Thacher writes:

> [KPD] officers are not to be held accountable for slavish attention to procedure, but for achieving the department's public safety mission. As an example, [Keith] describes a hypothetical traffic stop and how he hopes an officer might handle it: "[Consider] a seventy year old person who inadvertently runs a traffic signal, and no harm comes out of it. That's the issue about discretion: Do you gain more by trying to [understand] the reason he ran it? . . . . Say is there something symptomatic . . . . He can't see very well. He can't distinguish colors—[so] he ran through that light. 'Well, are you going to write me a ticket,' [the man asks]. 'Well, let's not talk about that right now,' [the officer should respond]. 'Let's see if there is some issue that we [need to look into].'" Creative patrol work like this is partly encouraged through administrative systems that make room for officers to spend the necessary time—notably call diversion systems that reduce the 911 burden. But according to Keith, it also demands supervisors who encourage their employees to exercise discretion intelligently: Neither abusing it by ignoring the larger purposes at issue nor avoiding it by sticking to formal procedure.

Colorado Springs made this recognition and valorization of discretion especially concrete by giving all officers "empowerment" cards, which explicitly directed them to exercise discretion and gave some minimal guidelines within which to exercise it. Sheingold writes:

> [Chief Kramer] tasked the staff to work with officers and civilians to create a department-wide definition of empowerment. The eventual definition was placed on laminated cards which were distributed to every member of the organization. Each Empowerment Card read:
>
> > CSPD EMPLOYEE EMPOWERMENT
> > Is it ethical?
> > Is it legal?
> > Is it the right thing for the community?
> > Is it the right thing for the CSPD?
> > Is it within our policies and values?
> > Is it something you can take responsibility for and be proud of?
> > If the answer to these questions is YES – then don't ask permission – JUST DO IT!

> The empowerment cards were handed out to personnel during an in-service training session which Kramer addressed. "I stood in front of the group and held that card up and told them, 'this is what we mean by empowerment and we're really serious about giving you the latitude to make decisions. If you make a mistake nobody's going to cut your head off," Kramer said. Kramer recognized that there was some risk in openly increasing officer discretion, but he felt it was the only way to achieve the results he sought.

On the other hand, most departments did not apparently go very far in trying to *shape* this newly-valued discretion: They limited themselves to general calls, like those in Knoxville and Colorado Springs, for officers to use their freedom to help achieve the organization's mission.[41]

d. Conclusion

Reform clearly cannot be limited to front-line operations, for change at that level demands change in the administrative structures that support it (like information systems, human resources systems, and planning systems, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter); indeed, we will explain how failures at *those* levels undermined the relatively strong reforms Riverside made to its technical core. But these three reforms to the technical core of department operations played a central role in most of the change efforts described in these cases. Where they did not, as in Albany and Lowell, the agency either made some compensatory reform (as with Lowell's massive precinct system), or else important aims of community policing simply were not realized (as with Albany's failure to develop any significant problem-solving capacity). The other agencies advanced their community policing efforts by finding new ways to free up patrol officer time for problem-solving, to recognize and give structure to that work, and to recognize and encourage officer discretion. Grant funding was not important for most of these efforts, but it did play some role in helping to free up officer time from call response—time that could instead be used for community problem-solving.

5. Building a Supportive Physical Infrastructure

One of the more mundane but still important managerial tasks that these agencies faced involved physical infrastructure. Though police agencies (unlike, say, housing authorities) spend the great majority of their funds on manpower rather than buildings and equipment, those more tangible changes turn out to be an essential even if not driving force in COP reforms.

a. The Physical Component of Organizational Decentralization

First of all, organizational decentralization often entails physical decentralization. Some agencies, like Knoxville and Fremont, demonstrate that it is not necessary to build physical facilities for new "precincts."[42] But in other cities, police insist that organizational decentralization demands physical decentralization, which creates the necessary sense of identification with a place. Consider the thoughts of Albany Mayor Jerry Jennings:

> Psychologically, it's good for people to see that, . . . a permanent, twenty-four hour a day, three shift, fully-staffed station. . . . And you know, they go to work there—they park there, the men and women in the department. They're a constant presence. They get to know everyone that lives in each building, and what person owns what store, and who belongs and who doesn't belong there. That's the key to it. Identification. They build up trust with the residents in those

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[41] For a more elaborate proposal for shaping police discretion, see George L. Kelling, "Police Discretion: Revisiting Police Guidelines," unpublished draft, 1996.

[42] For example, although St. Paul and Knoxville both ended up with three precincts *organizationally*, the latter only opened one new physical facility while St. Paul has structures for all three precincts. Part of the difference stems from the fact that St. Paul is a larger department by half, but Knoxville is actually a much larger city physically, at 98 square miles *versus* St. Paul's 55.

neighborhoods because they get to see them. And believe me, it's a very effective way, and it's well worth the bricks and mortar that we have to put together to place them in the facility.

Using this rationale, Albany decided to open up a new substation in the city's predominantly-black Arbor Hill neighborhood, where many residents reportedly distrusted police.

In some departments, these physical decentralization efforts are relatively minor, involving the opening of satellite offices and substations. This was especially true of smaller departments (such as Lowell), where new "precinct stations" are often little more than storefronts: Officers still report to work at their old downtown headquarters, using the precincts as places to write reports and attend meeting with the rest of their teams. On the other hand, larger departments like Portland and actually built expensive new full-service police facilities as part of their efforts to decentralize.

Whatever its scope, the agencies that chose physical decentralization faced three sorts of problems. First, in some cities, decentralization efforts met with complaints that they were irrelevant to the most pressing issues the city faced. Albany exemplifies this difficulty, as Thacher writes:

> Alderwoman Sarah Curry-Cobb, whose ward encompassed some of the neighborhoods that the new station would serve, argued that a building alone was not enough to deal with tensions in Albany's minority communities, and she proposed further reforms designed to fill the gap. (One proposal asked the APD to offer Arbor Hill officers added training on topics like cultural sensitivity, and another asked Jennings to institute a neighborhood advisory board for the area.) Other aldermen worried that the new station would rob their own wards of police staffing, and one simply felt that the proposal was rash. "It's not well thought out," Alderwoman Shawn Morris told a reporter. "There isn't a plan for this building other than to put one person on the desk. . . . Do we need a 3,500-square-foot, $400,000 building to do that?"[43] All told, five Albany aldermen expressed opposition to the plan, and their votes alone would have been enough to derail it: In order to expedite the project, the city intended to sell the site to a quasi-public agency called the Albany Local Development Corporation, which was exempt from regulations like bidding requirements. But to do so it needed 12 votes on the 15-member Council.[44]

Nevertheless, the APD's plan prevailed due to support from the city's powerful Mayor, who refused to back down on the proposal or modify it (he dismissed Curry-Cobb's proposals as an attempt to "bog this thing down with additional legislation"), and who ultimately convinced the five dissident council members to support the proposal.

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[43] Jay Jochnowitz. "Dissent on Substation Dissolves in Unanimity," *Albany Times-Union*, October 22, 1996, p. B-1. Morris apparently made this statement after reluctantly voting *for* the plan. See also Jay Jochnowitz. "Aldermen Hold Key to Arbor Hill Station," *Albany Times-Union*, October 19, 1996, p. B-1; Jay Jochnowitz, "Arbor Hill Station Hits Roadblock," *Albany Times-Union*, October 8, 1996, p. B-5.

[44] Similar concerns echoed inside the APD, where one top manager argued as follows: "If money was going to spent, I would have preferred to see one new headquarters building built that everybody would have worked out of, and then the decentralization would have taken place in the form of the outreach offices—there's about thirty of them around the city. To use those more proactively as meeting places with community and that sort of stuff—that was the decentralization that I was looking for, in the hopes that we could get one new headquarters building out of the whole thing. Well, that wasn't going to happen. The Mayor said he was building that building in Arbor Hill."

Second, unlike purely administrative decentralization, physical decentralization can create runaway demand. In St. Paul, one commander explained: "One of the downsides of the storefronts is that everybody wants one, and we do not have the resources to do as many as we would like to." In Lowell, the city manager explained: "[When] you get more money, and you can do one more. Who's going to get it? . . . It does become a political problem. And then when you decide who's going to get it, where does it go? Everyone wants it as close to them as they possibly can." By contrast, no one was caught clamoring for one of Fremont's virtual "zones," which are very useful to management for accountability but potentially invisible to residents. In any case, a clever response to runaway demand for new stations is the creation of "mobile precincts"—something most of the departments did—that can park in a temporary trouble-spot and satiate the neighbors' need for physical presence (as well as satisfying more traditional policing needs like crisis management).

Finally, the most immediate challenge of physical decentralization involved cost. Consider the example of Savannah, which did make substantial efforts to decentralize physically but was hardly the most extreme case, since it leased existing facilities instead of building its own new stations. Coles reports that the challenges of even this modest strategy were great:

> Many of the immediate challenges were logistic: four precincts were to be created, grouping together various service areas so that crime problems would be more manageable. This meant establishing four stations: furnishing each, moving equipment and personnel to the sites, and preparing for patrol activities to be deployed from the stations. "Now to go from a centralized operation to decentralization, knowing you have to get facilities . . . the money to lease some of the facilities was a monumental task . . . . we had to buy more cars . . . because you had to separate, to get the support staff into those locations. The furniture, the FAX machine, which was key. Some kind of communication system—we had to have four of everything now, instead of one."

Indeed, many of these new expansions are monumentally expensive, it seems that city councils are so little used to spending money for anything but personnel in their police departments that general funds simply are not forthcoming. For example, when Colorado Springs embarked on its massive effort to build three new substations to advance organizational decentralization, its new Chief went after a special bond issue to fund it. Even the more modest efforts created a funding difficulty. Most of the substations these eight agencies built are donated by businesses, housing authorities, or other government agencies that have moved elsewhere—even Knoxville's one full-service satellite office came from space donated by a shopping center. Most of the rest are leased (rather than bought or built) for a nominal fee. Finally, the expensive mobile precincts that Lowell and Fremont built were substantially funded by volunteer contributions.

Given the expense of these efforts and the unavailability of general fund money for them, one might expect grant money to play a large role. And indeed, places like Fremont and Lowell did use grant money to help pay for some of their new facilities. But Title I COPS money could not be used for these expenses. In any case, some agencies—like Fremont and Knoxville—are finding that they can minimize new physical structures while still creating organizational accountability and ownership.

b. Intangible Benefits of Physical Infrastructure

Organizational decentralization is perhaps the major thrust behind this category of interventions, but physical structures and particularly equipment can also play another role in

pushing community policing. New buildings, cruisers, bulletproof vests, and even weapons may not seem like community policing interventions, but in several departments they helped to boost officer morale and build credibility for their chief, who could in turn use that political capital to generate buy-in to his reforms. In places like Fremont, whose city council funded a brand-new modern headquarters for the police, the new "perks" were an entirely serendipitous boost to organizational morale and change. But in Lowell, at least, the Chief consciously used equipment purchases and physical changes to send the messages that change was in the air:

> [LPD Superintendent Ed] Davis began with a number of high-visibility gestures intended to show that change was in the air. "I did a bunch of things that were critical to making clear that there was a new game plan," he explains. "I changed the colors of the cruisers. . . . . I cleaned the place up. The place was really nasty looking. I started walking to the main desk and throwing books out. And they were very upset at me when I did that. There were books that had been there for years that nobody ever looked at, they were just there. I felt it was important for me, every time I was someplace where there was a bunch of offices, to do something outrageous to make it clear that we were going to change things. So I took the 1986 City Directory that had been sitting around for six years and I threw it away. And somebody says to me, "That's the 1986 City Directory." I said, "I know, and it's gone. And so are the 1942 and '43 phone books." And I threw those away. I mean, the place was just littered with all this old stuff that nobody would throw away. . . . I also recognized that the front desk was a horror show and I changed the front desk. And that really kind of upset the apple cart. . . . There had been a Plexiglas window. Years ago the glass window had been broken out during a fight. So somebody had reinstalled Plexiglas in the thing, it was pretty bad looking. It was all marked up and scraped and dirty, people had spit on it and nobody cleaned it off, it was a terrible looking front entrance. . . . I took that window out, and I moved the front desk where it is now. . . " Davis feels that these demonstrations had the intended effect: "They knew something, either something bad or something good was happening that day," he explains.

Moreover, Davis and his management team purchased bulletproof vests, revamped facilities like the crime lab, and arranged for a brand-new training and meeting facility, with the result that officer morale shot up.

> Davis could build support with the department-at-large, especially the patrol force . . . by dealing with bread-and-butter issues. Davis himself does not describe a conscious strategy for this, but many officers explain their high regard for him and his mission for the department in terms of the lengths he will go to in order to look out for their interests. . . . Many officers (including both the president and vice president of the patrol officers' union) credit Davis with helping to improve pay, safety, and equipment dramatically over the past few years.

Spokane is an even clearer case of this strategy, as outsider chief Terry Mangan built credibility with his troops by spearheading a bond issue that sought to upgrade SPD facilities. Sheingold writes:

> As part of his new partnership with the community, Mangan worked hard to gain their support for his proposed $4.3 million dollar law enforcement bond issue. If the bond issue passed, Mangan wanted to upgrade officer's radios and convert their revolvers into semi-automatic pistols. A rehabilitation of the public safety building would follow, with new locker rooms, day rooms, and sleeping facilities. Finally, Mangan hoped to upgrade the department's technological capabilities by installing a CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch) and RMS (Records Management Systems).

> Mangan was initially met with skepticism about his plan for the bond. Never before had a bond · issue passed for law enforcement. In order to build a strong set of allies, Mangan made a strategic

decision to broaden the bond's scope. Rather than place a city-wide bond issue on the ballot, Mangan proposed that it would be a county-wide law enforcement bond. This garnered the support of all the local law-enforcement agencies, and a committee was formed to encourage the passage of the bond. The committee hired Dick Cottam, the local television producer, to make a video which visually demonstrated the need for the upgrades. With video-tape in hand, Mangan spoke before countless community organizations. "[I told them] it's up to you. You're the taxpayers and it's like a pizza. We're a good police department, if you want us to make you pizza we will make you the best pizza we can make with the ingredients that we've got. If you give us the best ingredients for a medium pizza it will be the best medium pizza we can make for you, but it won't be a large pizza," Mangan said.

With unified support from all levels of local law enforcement, endorsements from the newspaper and Chamber of Commerce, and Mangan's personal lobbying of local community groups, the bond issue passed in September, 1988 with more than 70% of the vote. As the first outside chief in Spokane's history, Mangan's ability to quickly obtain these resources sent a strong positive signal to the department and helped win organizational trust. While many personnel had little interaction with Mangan directly, they appreciated, as one officer explained, that "the chief got us some really good stuff."

On the other hand, Riverside's Chief made some minor efforts in this direction—notably buying new guns to officers' specifications after one turned up with a crack—, but the effort did not stop his steep decline in popularity. The problem may have been that the Riverside effort was not as substantial or visible as those in Spokane and Lowell; or it may simply have been that too many other sources of resistance arose in Riverside, so that new guns simply could not compensate. Moreover, one of the central "perks" RPD management tried to offer officers was mobile data terminals, but officers simply did not become excited about this new tool. Whatever the explanation, it seems clear that while new physical infrastructure has some potential to improve morale and build support, it is not a silver bullet. In any case, Title I money does not fund such efforts, so in none of the cases was that grant money important for this intervention.

6. Building the Information Infrastructure

One other "tangible" intervention cuts across all but one of the sites, namely, a push for better information systems. Almost every department studied found that community policing demanded innovations in information technology, and often in many different ways—there are myriad different examples of how MIS reforms fed into COP. But perhaps the most common idea here was that the ability to identify, analyze, and evaluate problems demanded new systems for managing and accessing data. In fact, the Albany Police Department was the only agency studied that did not embark on any significant effort in this area,[45] and there is reason to believe that this decision hurt the department's reforms: Officers have little access to information systems, and in practice they rarely use data analysis to support their problem-solving efforts. Moreover, management has little information other than gross citywide crime statistics to use for evaluating the progress of reform.

In the agencies that did revamp their information systems, the precise interventions depended on the state in which management found the agency's existing information systems. Consider three broad categories: Technological improvements, hiring computer-savvy civilians,

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[45] It is interesting to note that Albany applied its MORE money to overtime projects instead of technology.

and communications technologies like pagers and cellphones. Each was money-intensive, and MORE grants played some role in supporting each of them.

a. Technological Improvements

Several departments found that their information systems had basic problems that made it almost impossible to undertake important analyses, and they embarked on massive efforts to revamp their RMSs. Lowell, whose previous chief distrusted recorded information to the extent that he refused to submit UCR reports for years, clearly falls into this category, and under its new chief the department accelerated a city-initiated computerization drive that helped create the databases analysts would draw on. In Knoxville, too, there was a palpable sense from officers that existing information systems were not meeting their needs, and the agency is revamping its RMS to facilitate analysis. Finally, Spokane also found that existing information was inadequate, particularly because the manual system of entering calls and incidents into the computer meant that the databases were usually out-of-date. Sheingold gives one example of the interventions that the department used to remedy such problems:

> The CAD system which came on-line in 1994 (RMS followed in 1996), allowed operators to enter dispatch information immediately onto a computer. "Before, if we had to recall an incident we would have to go back into the storage room and pull out the call cards and flip through them by hand to see if we could find the address and what happened on a particular call. Now we can query the computer if we have the basic address, the time and that sort of thing," Dispatch Supervisor Ted Robison said.

Even an agency like Savannah, which had developed significant crime analysis capability by the mid-1980s, the "official" transition to COP found a need to revamp the CAD/RMS system to expand analytic capacity. The effort made little progress for a number of years after it was officially adopted as a strategic planning goal, but the SPD recently drew on COPS MORE funds to begin it. That, however, was not necessarily the norm among these agencies: Unlike the case of new physical facilities, several of them received general fund money for these expensive technological improvements—often as part of a citywide computerization effort.

As agencies like these rapidly brought their central information systems up to date, they were simultaneously decentralizing their facilities, and management saw an opportunity to join the two reforms and make the new analytic capabilities available at the "precinct" level. Coles poses the problem and describes the response clearly for St. Paul:

> The challenge for SPPD in decentralizing so many of its operations has been how to ensure access to information and facilitate the flow of information across districts and between the districts and centralized units, to all personnel. In 1993, terminals were placed in and computer links were upgraded with the four team houses so that each Team had a link with the CAD system (which had been put in place in 1988); a new system was also added so each team could track incidents and look up warrants and criminal histories of suspects. The tele-serve system was moved out to the team offices, making it possible for property crime victims to file a police report and obtain necessary documents for filing insurance claims there. At the same time, a system was designed for department-wide access to intelligence information.

Lowell sought simply to get basic computer capabilities in place in the precincts, and to lay the foundations for full connections in the future:

The strategic planning meetings had identified reform of Management Information Systems as a crucial task for the LPD, and while much of this transformation began earlier, COPS MORE grants sped the process along. In particular, grant money helped the department decentralize its information systems as it decentralized its operations. The LPD used some of the money to outfit its precincts with up-to-date computer hardware and software (many of its systems were still the old Wang systems installed as part of the citywide computerization program), and to install telephone lines that allow some precincts to connect to the department's developing e-mail system. Officers can use these systems to write reports and correspondence at the precinct stations (some cruiser officers regularly stop by the precincts to use them for these purposes), and some also use them to develop databases. MIS has also begun to install a local area network (LAN) connected to a central server, both of which are funded by COPS MORE. Lieutenant Arthur Ryan, head of MIS, expects that in the "not too distant future" the precincts will be able to use the LAN to get the same information they would be able to get at headquarters.

Spokane took this additional step, and its experience reveals that technological decentralization demands the design of user-friendly software that officers—not just trained crime analysts—can use:

While [the new system described above] was a big improvement, only crime analysts were able to access this program. However, [Administrative Services Director Dave] Ingle wanted a system that anyone in the department could use. "We have this vision of a patrol officer or a supervisor being able to sit down in an interactive session with the computer at 3 o'clock in the morning," Ingle said. "And learn what he or she needs to know in terms of identifying a problem or doing some kind of analysis that... can be done by anybody with a minimal amount of training and at their fingertips, rather than through a specialized unit." Ingle tasked Lead Analyst Alison Banholzer with this job and in 1996 Banholzer designed such a system: Data Retrieval Analysis Containing Uniform Level Activity (DRACULA). The system earned its acronym, according to Banholzer, "because everybody was calling our mess 'the monster'... so we called it DRACULA." Banholzer's windows based program, was simple enough to use that simply pointing and clicking a computer mouse allowed the user to generate all of the sophisticated crime reports that ACCESS could produce. "We've put DRACULA in a form where you don't have to be a computer guru to use it," Banholzer said.

Not only were crime analysts able to access DRACULA, but it was placed on several different computer terminals throughout the department – NRO offices, the patrol sergeants, block watch, Spokane COPs, Detective units and Crime Prevention. (Under [SPD Chief Terry] Mangan, the department purchased more than 150 personal computers.) While NROs began using the DRACULA system immediately to help identify problem locations in their neighborhoods, patrol officers did not have direct access to terminals. However, Banholzer printed out weekly reports which listed top calls or top addresses and posted them in the roll call area. During the first year she did not get much response from the officers. However, in the second year, as some of the original NROs shifted back into patrol and discussed the benefits of the new system, Banholzer found herself getting messages from patrol officers on her voice mail asking for reports. "They'll call and leave a message on my voice mail, 'hey can you run me this address... I'm getting complaints that this is a party house.' Then I'll run it and put in their box the next morning," Banholzer said.

Almost every agency considered this strategy—creating user-friendly interfaces so that patrol could analyze information *itself*—to be the final frontier of POP-related analysis.[46] Even

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[46]Knoxville approached a similar problem not by simplifying the interface but by improving the skills of officers, drawing on MORE money to buy computers for a training laboratory.

Portland, which has enjoyed significant crime analysis capabilities for years, still felt there was work to do in this area during the latter years of its COP transition, and management seized on COPS MORE money as the opportunity to do it. Thacher writes:

> The technology component of the MORE '96 grant fed into a longstanding PPB priority. Planning and Support staffmember Steve Beedle, who had a hand in the grant application and who works on crime analysis in the Bureau, explains that the PPB has "for a long time been [exploring] how we do crime statistics and share crime information," and that "the sharing of information, . . . is all part of the strategic plan as well as the original transition plan." Over time, the Planning and Support Division has developed a particular philosophy about the best way to work with information: "Our basic premise here is [that] we can provide information, . . . [but] the best people to do the analysis and interpretation are the people who work in that area—whether they're Community Crime Prevention personnel or they're district officers. . . You can make very wrong assumptions from a central office, and not knowing it reduces your credibility. Why guess? [Instead,] we'll work closely with them. What time periods do they need? What type of information did they want? Here it is. If that's not exactly, after looking at it, what works best, we'll come back and do something else but let them do the problem-solving, making the interpretations. It's just worked out really well over the years. You don't have a central office that isn't that familiar with the actual area." Thus, the PPB's philosophy of crime analysis has been to work as closely as possible with front-line workers; Beedle and others eschew regular crime analysis "bulletins," preferring to respond to specific requests.

> Given this philosophy, the next logical step was to make the primary databases directly accessible to front-line workers, and the PPB started to undertake a technology project that would improve precinct computer technologies and connect the precincts to the central computer. As Beedle explains the project: "The idea was to have all officers be able to walk up to a precinct computer and with very minimal training, they'll walk up and click: 'Okay, I need arrests, I need calls for services; I need reported crimes for this area, this time period; I need them displayed; I need a report.' So they can do a lot of that work." The PPB began to develop the necessary systems in the last couple of years, but it quickly found that the effort—particularly connecting the remote sites to a central server—was more expensive than anyone had predicted.

> Consequently, the PPB turned to COPS MORE to move the initiative along. The MORE '96 grant specifically funded several important elements of the overall plan, including buying hardware and custom-developed software to install into the precincts, and helping to pay for the remote servers and associated equipment that would link the precinct computers to the central server.[47] The first test sites have only recently become operational, so it is too early to tell how well the system will serve its intended purposes. But although Beedle explains that there were some difficulties implementing the system due to the rapid pace at which technology changes, he does not report any major disappointments. In any case, the MapInfo-based interface was designed (with input from a user's committee) to be easy-to-use; as Beedle puts it, "You can walk up to it, right here, and you can read, 'Select your area; select the type of crime; select the time period; produce map.'"

The Portland example captures an important aspect of these information efforts: Work in this area never seems to be done, and agencies at every level of sophistication had active wish-lists at the time MORE money became available.[48]

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[47] The grant also included a small amount of equipment to be used for training officers to use the new systems, and funding for the development of an unrelated patrol deployment program.

[48] These MORE-funded interventions feed into the Scanning, Analysis, and Assessment steps of the most common POP algorithm, but Portland found a creative way to use "information" technology in the

With respect to community policing, many of these efforts were important primarily because of the capacity they built for sophisticated crime analysis, which would in turn support formal problem-solving efforts (though many also advanced community policing by facilitating changes in other organizational systems—as in the example of Colorado Springs's new patrol deployment system). But these agencies felt that the POP philosophy extended beyond large-scale "problems" and into patrol work itself: Even in the mundane work of taking calls and patrolling their beats (as opposed to tackling a designated "problem"), officers were exhorted to "think smarter", in part by using information to better advantage. It could be difficult to respond to this charge in agencies like Colorado Springs, Spokane, Riverside, Albany, and Knoxville, which lacked Mobile Data Terminals in patrol cruisers. Colorado Springs and Knoxville both used MORE money to put laptop computers in patrol officers' cars (Spokane and Riverside put MDTs in officers cars but used their MORE allotments for other technological improvements). In Colorado Springs, for example, Sheingold writes:

> Under another COPS MORE grant the department was able to significantly upgrade the technology in patrol cars, by purchasing portable computers and cell-phones. The laptops computers, placed in the patrol cars, are linked to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation as well as the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). A windows based system, the lap-top computers are easy to learn, and requires that officers point and click a mouse to check if suspects have outstanding state or federal warrants; perform checks of driver's licenses and motor vehicle registration information; run serial numbers of potentially stolen property; or check road conditions. While this information was previously available if officers radioed dispatchers, the very act of radioing for the information took up valuable radio space, which sometimes discouraged officers from making the checks in the first place. "It's very nice not having to go through dispatch, because this is a lot quicker. It frees up air time for other officers if they have something big going down," Officer Ressler explained. "You are not tying up one of the radio channels trying to run somebody, while another officer has a foot pursuit or something like that."

Knoxville had begun to go down the same path earlier, but—as in many efforts to invest in technology—the undertaking turned out to be more complicated than anyone could imagine or afford. Stalled, the agency turned to MORE funding to push its efforts along, as Thacher writes:

> The [MORE-funded] laptop initiative aims to extend an earlier effort funded by state grant money, in which the department bought 175 laptops for officers to use in their cars. But that endeavor faced several limitations: First of all, at the time the only ruggedized models available were the expensive military models, so the department had to settle for off-the-shelf 486 computers, which had shorter battery lives and more fragile construction than the department would have preferred. More important, the systems ran aground of implementation problems. For example, the computers were intended to essentially serve as substitutes for the MDTs that Knoxville officers have never had: Officers would be able to tap into central computers for information like vehicle registrations and warrants, and they would also be able to write up and send reports directly to the records department. But for various reasons, the department has not yet been able to secure a radio channel for these data transfers, and although officers could write their reports on their computers, they had to download them manually at the end of each shift. Unfortunately, some bugs in the original software design, together with the usual difficulties of teaching employees a new system, led to various degrees of "lost reports."

Response stage, namely, by purchasing security camera equipment that could be moved around the city to monitor the problem place *du jour* (graffiti targets and drug houses have been particularly common targets).

In any case, the 486 computers were taken back from the officers, and they will be replaced by the new MORE-funded ruggedized models. Those computers will be phased-in, starting with a smaller "test group" of day-shift officers—an arrangement designed to allow information systems personnel to work closely with the officers to troubleshoot any problems that arise. The 486 computers will then be given to other department personnel who have better access to power than officers in the field do, such as investigators or administrators. The result, the department hopes, will be a fully-computerized department. "Our intent," [KPD Planning and Budget director Judie] Martin explains, "is that when every officer comes through the academy, when he gets his weapon, his vest, and his radio, he also gets a lap top. He's got more things to carry than he knows what to do with."

The fact that MORE is *extending* an earlier effort in Knoxville does not lessen its significance, and in fact it will likely increase its impact: Having learned from past mistakes, the KPD's implementation plan for the MORE laptops is more sophisticated than the treatment the earlier models got, building in as it does a pilot phase for debugging.

Most of these efforts to revamp information system fed directly into community policing. But not all of them did so to the same degree. For example, while the interventions just described aimed precisely to improve capacity for problem-solving, Riverside's efforts sought simply to save officer time by computerizing most report-writing and dissemination, and purchasing an optical imaging system that could scan the paper reports that remained. This project turned out to be enormously complex: The department found itself scrambling for additional money to complete it, and it faced a need to upgrade its existing information infrastructure, which simply could not handle the project as envisioned (the department had very few computers to begin with, and those it did have were not networked in a way that would enable the automatic routing program to work). Moreover, the logistics of the dissemination element proved challenging: One RPD member explains that despite widespread efforts among California police departments, no agency has been able to accomplish the degree of interconnectivity that the RPD has planned for its various computer systems.

> For example, ... we all talk about imaging and we all know it's out there. I mean, they've had it on aircraft carriers for thirty years. And the imaging is pretty basic: It's storage and retrieval. But for us in law enforcement, we need a work flow plan that [tells the computer] how to take that data that's there and route it to everyone that needs to have it routed to. And that's an application. For instance in banks: Banks have that, and that and they know how to route so everyone gets it. The money was invested to develop an application, and now all banks pretty much use that application with some minor customization whether you're a Wells Fargo or a Bank of America. In law enforcement there is no such application with imaging.

In this official's mind, federal funding would be ideally suited to develop the necessary application. "The federal government threw out a bunch of money to all these jurisdictions to do automation projects," he explains. "And everyone is operating independently when in fact a standard could have been established on a state-by-state basis" (varying state penal codes determine where reports must be routed).

But what is perhaps equally significant about the Riverside experience is the extent to which its automation project is tangential to community policing reform. That is not to say that the reforms were not important to the agency for other reasons, nor that they do not fulfill the crime bill requirement to free up time for community policing (which they will do if automation does end up saving time). But they did not seem to have any influence, either positive or

negative, on the swelling resistance that began to threaten the city's community policing efforts. Technological reform can feed into community policing; but it can just as easily be tangential to it. The difference lies in strategic use of this intervention to address the central problems of reform.

b. Civilian Crime Analysts

As basic RMS problems were resolved, or in cases where they did not exist, the strategic question became who knew how to *use* existing information to facilitate POP. The answer was often no one, and many agencies turned to civilian expertise. To return to the example of Spokane, that agency built on its CAD/RMS efforts by hiring new civilian crime analysts, who in turn made software enhancements that furthered both problem-solving and more traditional call response and deployment aims:

> While the new systems created a powerful database, on their own CAD and RMS were unable to generate sophisticated analysis. This was remedied when the department received a 1994 Federal Demonstration Grant, which allowed the SPD to hire analysts who linked the CAD/RMS systems with a Microsoft ANALYSIS program, which greatly expanded the department's analysis capacities. Previously only tactical analysis of burglaries, rapes and robberies occurred. The new system expanded the department's capacity to perform crime analysis and created the capacity to conduct administrative analysis of such indicators as response time and deployment levels. The raw data in the CAD system was turned into reports that analyzed calls for service by: priority, time period, shift, type of call, source of complaint, average response time and disposition. In addition, crime activity could be reviewed at an address-by-address level; the most frequent types of calls for service could be examined by police block, shift, city-wide; and the number of officer initiated calls could be reviewed by day, hour, month, priority, or type.

Similarly, Knoxville used COPS MORE money to hire three civilian crime analysts, one for each of its new precincts, who could provide analytic support for patrol officers—a pressing need in a department where a baseline survey found that only 15% of department members thought information systems were meeting their needs. Finally, Lowell used MORE money to hire its first-ever civilian crime analyst, who went on to become instrumental to the agency's evolving problem-solving focus. Thacher writes:

> On the management side, COPS MORE also enabled MIS to hire a civilian crime analyst named Steve Di Noto, a recent graduate from U Mass Lowell's Criminal Justice program. DeNoto is charged with preparing maps, crime statistics, and other pertinent information about crime trends and patterns in the city. This information plays a central role in the department's COMPSTAT meetings, where Di Noto presents and hands out packets of information about crime trends. [LPD Superintendent Ed] Davis sees this information as perhaps the most important way in which he can monitor trends in the city, proactively deal with community problems, and hold his managers accountable. Speaking of COMPSTAT, he explains that "the bottom line is we're using Steve Di Noto's talents to direct the activities of the police department."

It is impossible to tell whether or not these agencies would have added such civilian expertise if grant money for civilianization was not available: Savannah, at least, was able to add similar positions without drawing on COPS money for the effort. Still, the fact that so many went in this direction suggests that the money fed into a felt need associated with community policing reform.

c. Decentralizing Information Systems

One final category of information technology interventions focuses not on problem-solving but on community partnerships. In order to bring officers "closer to the community," a number of these agencies purchased cellular phones or pagers for some proportion of their officers. Sheingold explains the logic and the process in Colorado Springs:

> The department also used MORE funds to purchase cellular phones for each of the patrol cars. "We send out police officers into the field. They are fairly expensive people to employ. Yet we send them out into their office, which is the patrol car, without a telephone," explained Capt. Robert Kean, commander of the Information Services Unit. "Rather than making a phone call, officers had to drive to see somebody, because they [weren't equipped with] a phone. It was stupid. You wouldn't ask any other professional to physically go see a person in order to get some little piece of information, but that's what we had cops do." According to [Officer John] Ressler, having the phones in the cars has changed how officers conduct this follow-up work. "A lot of times, before the cell phones were put in, if we had to do some follow-up over the phone, we had to go to the sub-station to use a phone. You may receive a call on a harassment or an assault complaint and the suspect might not be there. You go, you get the information [from the complainant] but you want to talk to the [suspect] before you go ahead and take the signed complaint. Instead of having to go all the way back to the police station or a fire station or someplace that has a phone and call this person, you can go out to your car, get on the cell phone, call this person, get his side of the story, and make the determination then whether a crime has been committed. You've done all this while you are out on the street... you finish the call a lot faster and you are now free to handle another call that comes up." Not only were the phones placed in the cars, but the phone number was painted on the back of each car so that citizens could phone officers directly. According to Ressler, this can ensure a faster officer response. "I've had people call up and tell me, 'I was driving along and I saw a traffic accident.' If something goes down right away and they just saw the cop go by, they can look at the back of the car and see the phone number. They call us directly and they don't have to go through communications and it does not have to get dispatched," Ressler said.

However attractive, such devices have not been uniformly embraced, despite the fact that MORE funds them. Portland bought cell phones for its officers but took them back after a public controversy over unpaid personal phone bills, which began in the Police Bureau but spiralled out-of-control to encompass other agencies as well; and Spokane has only used them for special units like NROs. Agencies like Savannah apparently never went after the phones, and Fremont studied the idea of buying cellphones but rejected the idea as too expensive.

In any case, this catalogue of interventions into information systems is for the most part a long list of expensive equipment purchases. Moreover, in the case of building *human* capacity for analysis, the preferred response turns out to be civilianization and therefore hiring. In both cases the central managerial problem is money, and although the general fund seems to be more munificent for gadgets than for buildings, grant money still plays an important role in many of these cities. The efforts it funds do not always feed substantially into community policing reform, as Riverside's automation efforts suggest. But the majority of these cases used MORE money directly to advance important elements of community policing—especially the development of analytic capacity necessary for both problem-solving and monitoring reform.

7. Human Resources

These interventions into physical structures, information systems, and even organizational structures and core technologies leave relatively untouched the most important resource a police agency has: Its personnel. As Knoxville's Phil Keith put it, personnel systems were a central aspect of his reforms "because that's where the majority of our resources are vested." Thacher writes that Keith tackled the problem holistically:

> From the moment he first took over as police commissioner, Phil Keith tried to shape the personnel he had inherited through training and reassignments. But he had apparently always seen these actions as short-term measures: For him, the KPD's "competency" problem in areas like leadership skills and technology stemmed from the historical system that department members had advanced in—thus getting to the root of that problem meant reshaping the systems that had generated it. Consequently, in addition to a short-term challenge of leadership, Keith believed that he faced a long-term challenge of organizational design. With respect to hiring systems, for example, he describes the changes made during his administration in the language of an artisan: "When I first became Chief, I obviously didn't hire any of those people. But today out of the nearly four hundred people we have employed, I've hired three hundred and thirty or three hundred and forty of them. So I can't run from whatever is out there. I have to take architectural responsibility for it." These architectural efforts to shape the department's personnel took many forms, most of them aimed to increase competency, create a focused workforce, and encourage the more specific skills that ideals like community policing demanded.

Every agency studied made similar (though not always equally elaborate) changes to its human resource systems in order to advance community policing, and although there was much variety in the particular strategies used, a few common themes emerge.

The substance of the reforms are fairly similar: Every agency sought to make changes in hiring and recruitment, training systems, and personnel evaluations and promotions, finding all of them essential to community policing.[49] Consider each of them in turn, including both their substance and the challenges that they created.

a.   Hiring and Recruitment

Hiring and recruitment reforms sought to change the qualifications required for new recruits in at least three ways. First, many agencies sought to strengthen their education requirements on the assumption that community policing, and especially problem-solving, demands greater intellectual sophistication (for example, St. Paul began to require a two-year associate's degree, and Portland began requiring a four-year college degree). Second, many agencies simply changed the profile of the recruits they were trying to hire, notably by emphasizing skills like communications, as happened in Portland during a complete overview of its hiring processes. Finally, many agencies embarked on an effort to increase minority representation in the force, and St. Paul in particular reported remarkable gains in this area. (On the other hand, no major efforts of this type are reported in either Colorado Springs or Albany.)[50]

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[49] Civilianization efforts also belong in this category: For example, places like Lowell and Portland sought to improve one of their first lines of contact with the community by civilianizing dispatch, which had traditionally been an undesirable job for sworn officers, and therefore did not attract the most qualified candidates. COPS MORE helped both efforts along.

[50] Riverside embarked on perhaps the most radical hiring reform of all: Opening up middle-management positions to outsiders. Thacher explains: "From the start, Fortier actually tried to bring in lateral hires at

Many agencies report that uncommonly-high turnover in their forces during the 1990s made these reforms both especially pressing and especially feasible. COPS played some role in this dynamic by bringing on a large number of new officers in some cities. But the older LEAA grant program also played a role: Many agencies had hired large numbers of "LEAP babies" in the early 1970s, and these officers began to retire just as community policing picked up steam.

Nevertheless, recruitment and hiring reforms created some implementation challenges. For one, many of them required sign-off from the civil service commission, and management faced a need to build support in that quarter. Consider Portland's experience:

> One way the PPB sought to improve its ability identify *quality* recruits who had community policing skills was to revamp its written examination. In order to do so, it needed approval from the state Civil Service commission and from the city's Bureau of Personnel Services (BPS). Then-captain Bruce Prunk, who oversaw the process, recognized this from the outset, and he planned his strategy accordingly: "Whatever you do, you do in partnership and not in competition with your partners in government and in the community," he explains. "I think it's important that you not make it competitive, that it has to be a win/lose for somebody. We made this a win/win."
>
> Prunk began by talking with people at BPS about his intentions and getting their feedback and advice. Working particularly with a staffperson named John Worcester, who in turn dealt with Civil Service, Prunk raised the idea of bringing in an outside consultant not only to write the new test, but also to validate it empirically. According to Prunk, BPS was intrigued, particularly by the unusual idea to validate the exam scientifically. "They were excited about this new process," Prunk maintains. "We opened up the organization and made our people available for the research." Worcester suggested a consultant named Ted Darany who had done similar work before, and Prunk followed up on the suggestion, starting a collaboration that would last several years. There were a number of stumbling blocks along the way, to be sure: Prunk explains that the Bureau and BPS worked through logistical disagreements about things like who would take responsibility for various tasks, who would pay for different pieces, and how much the effort would cost. But as he maintains: "None of those should be deal breakers or show stoppers. I mean, that's what folks like myself get paid to deal with." In the end, Darany produced a completely new written examination that predicted success (both in training and as an officer) better than the existing one,[51] and the PPB adopted it with BPS's and Civil Service's blessing.

Colorado Springs repeated essentially the same process (*sans* formal validation of the new testing process).

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the management level, opening up all management jobs to outside applicants. Fortier remembers this strategy as a radical one that 'threw down the gauntlet' to RPD managers: When he announced the new policy to the assembled command staff, he told the group, 'if you want these jobs, you're going to have to change,' laying particular stress on their need to embrace accountability. Fortier quickly made good on the promise by making two lateral hires—a Lieutenant from the San Bernadino Sheriff's Office, and Blakely himself, who was hired from the SDPD as a Captain and immediately promoted to Deputy Chief." But Thacher goes on to report that "the backlash against this effort was severe—at best department members resented the loss of a rare promotion opportunity, and at worst they took the move as a statement that in Fortier's eyes, 'in-house people weren't good enough'—, and many RPD managers believe that the Chief backed off on it. But Fortier insists that he did not, and that he was willing to consider outside applicants for all fourteen of the management positions he eventually filled during his four years in Riverside."

[51]The validation essentially correlated exam scores with a number of "success" variables, including training academy standings and ratings of the recruits' performance (by both peers and supervisors) as police officers when they reached the street.

Minority hiring, while supported by a large segment of the public, also faced some obstacles that needed to be overcome. First of all, this goal potentially conflicted with the intention to increase educational requirements: In most cities, the pool of college graduates was less diverse than the pool of high school graduates. Second, some strategies for increasing minority representation raised cries of "special treatment" that threatened to derail them. Portland's experience exemplifies both problems, and it also suggests how management can overcome them. Thacher writes:

> Many in Portland expected that stronger hiring qualifications would also conflict with the goal of hiring a diverse workforce. For example, early on in the transition, the Bureau began requiring that all new hires had to have a four-year college degree, and some believed that this requirement would *de facto* discriminate against precisely those groups that were underrepresented in the PPB. But according to Prunk, that has not been the case. A review of the PPB's efforts to diversify its workforce helps illuminate the reasons why.
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> The Bureau tried several different strategies to attract minority and female recruits. Early on, it simply tried to revise the way it used the written test to "screen" applicants: The PPB had traditionally rejected all applicants who scored below 80 on the exam, but under the new rules it would lower the threshold to 70 (which had always been the "official" passing score according to civil service rules) for women and minorities. Though Mayor Clark and others approved the change, the patrol officer's union balked, sending a letter of protest to then-chief Walker and threatening to sue.
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> Later efforts backed off from the "screening" approach and paid more attention to recruitment. At first these efforts were local and traditional: Advertisements in community newspapers, Potter's appearance on a gay cable-access show to encourage applicants, and creation of a recruitment brochure. Prunk also worked on recruitment with various "communities of interest"—particularly with the formally-constituted racial and ethnic advisory councils, like the Hispanic Roundtable and the Asian Law Enforcement Council. Prunk gave many of these groups application packets (previously the packets were only available at the downtown Civil Service office), and generally used them as windows to Portland's different communities and as partners in outreach.
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> But the Bureau eventually concluded that to meet its goals for minority hiring, it would have to look outside Portland entirely. As Prunk remembers it, "What we found was is that while if we advertised in the local papers, that got us some results, but really we needed to target those colleges that have a higher minority and female representation [in their] criminal justice programs." That meant making recruitment trips all over the nation—particularly to Black colleges in the South and to Southwestern colleges with large Latino populations—in which Prunk and the rest of his team actually administered Portland's civil service tests on site. The city also paid for community representatives to go on these trips so that they could help administer the oral exam, a commitment that Prunk saw as crucial.

The effort was a substantial one: At one point, over half of all new hires to the PPB were from out-of-state. By using it, the PPB was able to solve some of the problems that people expected "hiring for diversity" would create. First, by taking a proactive, outreach-based approach, it avoided the union complaints of reverse discrimination that earlier "screening" efforts had created. And second, by focusing on minority *colleges*, it answered the early concern that it could not increase minority hiring while simultaneously raising the educational bar.

b. Promotions

Once hired, officers felt the influence of human resource systems in large part through evaluations and promotions. To truly encourage officers to behave differently, community policing needed to change these incentives directly. The exceptions prove the rule most dramatically. In Albany, for example, no formal changes to promotion and evaluation criteria were made, and this may be one reason why even the strongest supporters of community policing admit that it has not taken hold of most officers. Sheingold draws an even clearer link in Spokane, where the agency's failure to transform evaluation systems and to push training efforts far enough were a significant source of frustration in the agency early on: "Some officers who supported the shift were frustrated that their performance evaluations had not changed to reflect the new priorities," he writes. "While the department asked them to solve problems and reach out to the community, the yearly performance evaluation still reflected a time when arrests made and tickets written were the primary measurement tools of officer effectiveness."

In trying to reform these systems, police management usually found that outside forces had significant influence over "internal" human service systems, and managing those outside forces was among the central challenges they faced. Hiring and promotions are a particularly clear example, as civil service agencies created obstacles to reform in several agencies. In Spokane, Sheingold reports:

> Civil service rules also posed a challenge. While the department wanted supervisors to function as, "cheer leaders, resource getters, mentors, and coaches" the promotion test was a pencil and paper exam which didn't evaluate these skills. Some individuals were being promoted who didn't always have the talents that [Chief Terry] Mangan wanted in his supervisors.

These aspects of context demanded significant managerial ingenuity. In some ways, Mangan's strategy was to bypass the inflexible promotions system altogether by working around the rank structure. Sheingold reports:

> Because civil service regulations controlled promotion throughout all levels of the department except for the Assistant Chief and Chief positions, he had little authority to replace supervisors who were not up to these new roles. As a result, Mangan identified individuals in the department who were innovators and gave them authority to design new programs, regardless of their rank. Officer Robert Walker, for example, was given the responsibility of designing and managing a new Volunteer Unit (which will be discussed later in the case.)

At the same time, he reports that the strategy was an imperfect solution in that it "created some tension within the organization." Thacher writes that Ed Davis fought the system more directly in Lowell:

> Civil service laws still weigh heavily on the department . . . but the LPD has clearly begun to strain against this agency's fetters. For example, civil service testing normally governs promotions, but two years ago the department bypassed the high scorer to fill two captain positions—something that had apparently never been done before in Lowell. [LPD Superintendent Ed] Davis explains that he made this decision for two reasons: First, because the skipped Lieutenant was not fully invested in community policing, and that investment was indispensable in this crucial period of change, and second, because the other two candidates had proven themselves through their excellent work habits—"they had worked their tails off," Davis explains. Then-city manager Richard Johnson was a staunch ally in this process, taking the chief's advice on the matter of whom to promote after the chief had explained his reasoning to him (promotion decisions are in the immediate instance the city manager's), and testifying on the· department's behalf when the skipped lieutenant demanded a civil service hearing on the decision.

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The department has sought to reduce civil service constraints in other ways as well. It increasingly tries to bypass promotion-by-testing in favor of the civil service commission's "assessment center" approach, which recaptures some discretion by relying less on fixed examinations and more on the department's own interviews with and judgments of candidates; the new city manager, Brian Martin, has supported the LPD on this issue. And it has tried to change civil service regulations themselves. Davis has been working with a number of other chiefs in his region to try to convince the civil service commission to make a college degree a requirement for police hiring. The commission has so far balked at the request, but the effort nevertheless suggests that the department no longer takes civil service testing as immutable.

Of course, some agencies simply did not face these problems in promotions and hiring, as their state civil service laws leave management more discretion. Thacher notes that Portland's ability to make commitment to COP the central criteria for promotions was contingent on Oregon's flexible civil service system:

> All of this was reinforced by changing personnel policies that governed more tangible rewards—particularly promotions. In this realm, Chief Potter, and Chief Moose after him, were able to dip into some unused flexibility in Oregon's civil service system. All candidates for promotion in the PPB take a civil service test, and the Bureau had traditionally chosen the top scorer for the job. But though no Chief in recent memory had ever done it, the rules actually allowed him or her to promote any of the top *five* scorers (a provision known as the "Rule of Five"). Moose explains that he and Potter seized on this flexibility to help get buy-in to community policing: "Tom [Potter] went to great pains, and I've gone to great pains, [to make it clear] that if you're not doing community policing, if you're not committed to the philosophy, if you haven't demonstrated it in your day to day work, then your name could come up number one on a promotion list, and it doesn't matter. If number five has been living the goals and the philosophy of the organization, then we're promoting number five." There was great resistance to this idea in the early years, and many doubted that the administration would actually follow it through. But PPB management stuck to its policy, beginning with Moose himself, who did not top the civil service test but who Potter promoted anyhow, on the grounds that Moose had shown extraordinary commitment to and innovation in community policing. Moose explains that "you take a lot of hits" for going against tradition that way, but that it was crucial during the transition because it helped to convince officers that the Bureau was serious about community policing.

But the most severe difficulty in this area came in Riverside, where resistance came not from civil service agencies but from the officers themselves. Thacher explains:

> In any case, many around the department recall a general sense that promotions sped up during this period, particularly from the officer level to Sergeant. One RPD veteran recalls: "Fortier came here and then he made fifty-two promotions in like three years, which is incredible because we were averaging like one promotion every three or four months before." Another elaborates: "It was Fortier's goal to change the culture of this agency, and one of the ways that he was going to do that was by literally removing all the top layers of management, all of the people. There is only one person here . . . who was a lieutenant when Fortier came. There were only two [people here] who were captains when Fortier came. All the rest of those positions have been changed. There are only three or four sergeants left out of . . . maybe 35 or 40 who were sergeants when Fortier came. You talk about some sweeping, dramatic changes: Ninety percent of our sergeants have less than two years as a sergeant. So, the idea was to change the culture of this agency by changing, literally completely changing the management of the organization." More important, as the sheer pace of promotions sped up, the criteria used to decide who got them changed dramatically. Fortier embarked on a complete overhaul of the promotions process, assigning a laterally-hired lieutenant to review "best practices" in the field, help develop new written tests, and assemble three panels that would have input into each promotion decision. Finally, officer

evaluations began to incorporate problem-solving as a central component, and these evaluations in turn fed into promotion decisions.

Fortier insists that these efforts to build up a committed and able management team paid off. "The difference of what I left in place from when I started is like night and day. I mean, there really are some awfully good management people there." In particular, of the RPD's five patrol lieutenants who ran the city's watches in 1993, only one is among today's five area commanders, and Fortier expresses immense confidence in this group: "There really are some awfully good management people there, some real stars. Back when I left [Fortier retired from the RPD in 1997], I encouraged [City Manager] John [Holmes] that since he was required to stay inside to select my replacement, I said, "You really need to look at that Lieutenant level, because there are several people there who could walk in and be the chief of police tomorrow and would have no problem whatsoever. They're all well-educated, they do have backbones, they know what's the right thing to do, and they're willing to buck the culture." In this sense, the Chief felt that he accomplished his job of building a core of support in the management ranks who could in turn carry the message of reform to the rest of the department.

Nevertheless, the efforts also alienated many RPD members and thereby backfired with respect to the goal of building support for reform. Most simply, while Fortier could fill management positions using new criteria, he could not ensure that the new managers would have the necessary influence over their rank-and-file. Indeed, as the criteria for promotion changed, the entire process apparently lost some legitimacy in the eyes of the troops,[52] so that many officers became cynical about how their new superiors had made their ranks. Particularly controversial was the fact that Fortier bypassed the traditional route from patrol officer to Sergeant: In the past, almost no one in Riverside had made that jump without passing through the detective rank. But under Fortier, a number of energetic officers were promoted directly to Sergeant without ever working as investigators. Many RPD veterans considered this route irresponsible: One explains, "We have supervisors who have been here just a short period of time that have no idea where that criminal report goes or what happens to it when they're done with it." Another elaborates: "We've got a lot of officers that went straight to Sergeant, and there are the exceptions—there are certain guys that can make that step and adjust to it. But we do have quite a few that have never been a detective, or an officer on a special assignment to the detective bureau, who know the paper flow or know what the DA's function is, or [the function of] these other allied agencies that we call upon to assist on certain type of things. And they just blindly at times will sign off police reports where a validation for that investigation wasn't started properly. It's always detectives who have to come back and try to clean things up." Some officers specifically resented the promotion of outsiders, who they felt did not understand the "Riverside way of doing things." More generally, many of the recent promotions got labelled as "Ken dolls" (after Fortier's first name), the implication being that they had pandered to what the Chief wanted and now simply operated as his tools. So although Fortier was successful in changing the face of management and even supervision, the new face did not necessarily have the authority to bring the rest of the department along.

The opposite problem was perhaps even more severe: Despite their moniker, many of the department's new promotions were not particularly loyal to the new administration and the reforms it valued, to the point that some of them actively stonewalled against them. "[Fortier] thought that all these folks that he was going to promote were going to buy into and go off down this road," one RPD veteran explains. "[But] they didn't. And it was almost like he would

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[52] In fact, the Riverside Police Officers Association filed a lawsuit against the city trying to block the new policy, though it dropped the suit after Fortier agreed to promote four officers already in line for promotions.

promote people—particularly guys who wanted to be Sergeant really bad—he'd promote them and then they'd kind of turn on him."

Thus reforms to promotion and evaluation criteria are crucial to community policing, but they demand special care. These systems cannot be manipulated arbitrarily, lest they may lose their legitimacy and breed the sort of cynicism and ill-will that plagued Riverside's effort.

c. Training

Finally, training systems played an equally central role in community policing. Specific new skills like problem-solving obviously demanded specialized training. But community policing also demanded a more general shift in competence, one that emphasized skills like communications, as well as substantive knowledge of subjects like community demographics and history (for example, the St. Paul academy added instruction on cultural studies, focusing on several different ethnic groups living in Saint Paul, including Asian, African American, and Hispanic). In-service offerings were even more likely to tilt in the direction of subjects related to community policing—most notably in the "one-shot" training sessions that invariably accompanied new reform efforts, but also sometimes in routine in-service offerings (as happened in St. Paul and Knoxville). To be sure, different departments put more or less effort into each category of human service systems: For example, while Fremont only changed the FTO portion of its recruit officers' training, Lowell started a brand-new academy for officers that was dedicated to community policing, and Knoxville changed its recruit curriculum dramatically over the course of 10 years of reform (the total number of weeks grew from 18 to 25, two-and-one-half times the state mandate, and the academy has more than doubled the amount of time it spends on teaching officers to interact with the community). But almost every agency tried to do *something* in the area of training.

Indeed, those that did not report that the decision interfered with other reforms. For example, this problem plagued Spokane at the outset of its community policing effort. Sheingold writes:

> Another challenge, some personnel reported, was that community policing in the training curriculum was presented in a more theoretical light rather than as a hard set of tools. "It has been more theory than anything else. But nothing for that line officer to say, oh, this is what they want me to do," one department member said. As a result, many officers and supervisors left the academy with a broad understanding that they should work more closely with the communities they policed, and that employees should be empowered to come up with innovative solutions to problems, but few guidelines about how to make it happen. For some personnel this was all the training they needed. Other personnel were frustrated, however, by a lack of clear direction about how best to implement community and problem solving policing. One current member of the department described a resulting tension from this style of training. "We've said [to supervisors] you're no longer the order giver, you are the coach, the facilitator, the resource getter, the supporter, the cheer leader. Its well and good to say these things, but if you don't know how to do these things and there's nobody there to show you how to do these things then you're kind of left to your own devices. Now what we have… is a situation where… again we're broad brushing… we have sergeants, and lieutenants and captains who say 'OK I get it!' They do empower their troops and they do act like the coach, the facilitator, the resource getter, but Sergeant B over next door ain't buying into any of this and he isn't going to do any of this stuff."

Spokane addressed this problem by drawing on federal DEMO funds to improve in-service offerings on the nuts and bolts of POP. But in Albany, those who have raised concerns about the level of training they received in community policing insist that the department simply has not sufficiently addressed the problem. APD management point out that the department did undertake one in-service training effort several months in to the new community policing effort, and that it has supplemented this training by incorporating some community policing subjects into regular in-service offerings. But as of Spring 1998, the department had not carried through on its original intentions to expand the training unit by adding two new positions, and it had not substantially changed its recruit academy. It is this inattention to training efforts to which some APD members attribute the uneven success of community policing. Riverside, too, did not change its training systems as dramatically as some other agencies, and many department members attribute some part of the RPD's difficulty's with community policing to inadequate training—including not just the *amount*, but also the *type*, for the initial in-service session alienated many department members.

Thus training systems were clearly important to community policing. But changing them was by no means simple, since the departments did not have unilateral control over their content. Recruit training posed a special problem for these mostly mid-sized agencies, many of which had to use state academies for all or part of their needs. Even Portland, the largest police agency in Oregon, was required to use a state academy for recruits' basic training, and this inflexibility was of some concern in the department. In response, PPB management sought to work directly with the state system to ensure that its offering met local needs.

Lowell faced a more serious problem: The state gave its recruits *all* their training, and community policing had hardly made a dent in its curriculum. Intriguingly, Superintendent Ed Davis seized on massive COPS hiring as an opportunity to gain some control over the system, and his reforms ultimately helped transform the very context that had limited him:

> But the hiring programs had a final, more unexpected impact as well. The process of hiring so many officers at once (one UHP grant alone funded 20 officers) created enormous problems for the department. . . . . [Among other problems,] the state's training system simply could not handle the huge number of officers that not only Lowell, but many other Massachusetts police departments were hiring, largely as a result of the enormous COPS program. Even in the early years of smaller grants, the LPD had to scatter its hires across the state in several different training academies, since no single academy had enough room. (This was hardly the most efficient means of training the officers, many of whom had to drive three hours a day to get to and from their academies.)

> But the situation had a silver lining, as it ultimately forced the LPD to do something it had wanted to do anyway: Open its own training facility. In addition to its inconvenience for local recruits (the nearest academies were well over an hour's drive each way), the existing system simply did not reflect the LPD's emerging philosophy. State academies were run in a very military style and spent only four to six hours on community policing.

> The Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Council, who ran the state system, agreed that it could not meet the skyrocketing demand for training, and it approved Davis's plan to have the LPD start its own. Davis chose Sergeant Thomas Fleming to design the new academy, as Fleming had taught in the state system for ten years and was a firm supporter of community policing. He also enlisted the support of U Mass Lowell, which provided space for classes and athletics even when the final enrollment turned out to be well over twice the department's initial estimates (Lowell took recruits from many nearby cities, and it ended up running two sessions in parallel, educating a total of 96 new officers) . . . Most important, the academy was the first one in

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Massachusetts grounded entirely in the philosophy of community policing. By cutting from specialized areas like accident investigation and fingerprinting (which Fleming argues patrol officers do not undertake alone anyhow), it expanded the amount of time dedicated solely to community policing to 44 hours. And perhaps equally important, it eliminated the old system's quasi-military atmosphere (doing away with things like marching, saluting, and the more extreme forms of uniform inspection), replacing it with what Fleming describes as "more of a college campus atmosphere." Some recruits, upon reading newspaper articles reporting on the "new kind of academy," and discussing their experience with colleagues in their home departments, began to raise concerns that the new academy was too "soft." In response, Fleming reshaped some aspects of the academy mid-course, notably by increasing the already-rigorous physical training program. Fleming describes this change as "confidence-building," and in any case it appeared to demonstrate that the academy was far from "soft."

The academy was apparently a huge success, as Fleming reports hearing nothing but positive feedback from the recruits, the many Chiefs who sent them there, and the Training Council. Indeed, the Council has recently begun work with PERF on a $300,000 contract to revise its own curriculum, and it has been greatly influenced and encouraged by Lowell's experience. This may end up being one of the most significant impacts of COPS in Lowell: A rapid acceleration of changes in the way policing is taught not only in the LPD and the cities who have directly used its academy, but potentially throughout Massachusetts.

Thus in this case, massive COPS hiring throughout the state created a window of opportunity to expand the state's training system (just as it created a similar window to make important changes to hiring and recruitment).[53] Lowell's Chief was proactive and inventive enough to make something of it.

Lowell's example is perhaps idiosyncratic, but the underlying problem—the inertia of state and national systems in the face of local change—turns out to be generic. Knoxville, for example, found that leadership development simply was not available in the quality and quantity it wanted. Thacher writes:

Training was a central element of administrative reform in the KPD, especially in the area of leadership development, where the department developed entirely new programs for its sergeants and lieutenants. [Chief Phil] Keith maintains that the need for this training was severe: "Leadership development—we didn't have any," he explains. "Very few law enforcement agencies back in the fifties, sixties, and seventies—even in the eighties—had leadership development programs, except for perhaps maybe the senior staff in large, large organizations. You [had] your traditional training institutions like Southern Institute, Northwestern, and whoever else was out there. And you might train one person in a year. [But] we needed a greater competency basis, so we couldn't do just one a year. We had to look at how we could do the

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[53] A small number of case studies is not the best way to determine whether or not this opportunity is emerging across the country, but several of these agencies have undergone massive hiring pushes in recent years—partly as a result of COPS-related hiring, and partly because of increased retirements in recent years (some agencies report that their large numbers of "LEAP babies" are starting to retire). In St. Paul, for example, Coles reports that the 1996 academy class was the largest in almost two decades (*i.e.*, since LEAA). The idea is worth pursuing through other methods of research: Massive hiring pushed by COPS and other sources may be creating strains in the police profession's training systems. At the least, these strains would require expansion of capacity; at best, they offer an opportunity for institutional change along the model of Lowell. Moreover, to the extent that COPS truly produces a sudden jump in the number of officers in America, the demand for in-service training will expand as well. Whether or not they were designed to do so, the COPS regional training institutes may help to meet any such need.

masses, so to speak." The solution was to develop separate in-house courses for sergeants and lieutenants, designed by a small team that included Keith, Deputy Chief Robert Coker (who oversees the patrol force), and Deputy Chief Jerry Day (who oversees investigations). The team started out by learning what they could about the few existing programs that were offered around the country, blending those ideas with their own in order to develop a tailor-made curriculum for their evolving department. The first-line supervisors training, for example, was able to pay considerable attention to the ways in which sergeants could facilitate problem-solving— something that was becoming more important to the KPD but which was not covered effectively in the state training program the department had traditionally sent its sergeants to. As Coker explains: "[We wanted] to make sure that they could sit down with an officer and literally walk through problem solving, walk through directed patrols, walk them through a crime analysis function for their beat. If they had particular problems in their area and the officer was sitting there blind, dumb and happy, saying, 'Gosh, everything seems to be going okay.' Yes, the biggest *crime* problem is being addressed. [But] how about the symptoms that are starting to rear their head . . . the rowdy children or whatever that are symptomatic [that] you're going to have vandalism, break-ins, [or] larcenies coming up." In any case, such specific topics were blended with a more general supervisory curriculum that covered a broad spectrum of material— everything from basic tools like patrol deployment to more general principles like the importance of values and integrity in leadership. The result was an intensive four-week course that all new sergeants went through upon promotion, and a five-week course for new lieutenants.

The department went on to create all manner of in-service offerings for various levels of the organization, many of them designed to advance community policing principles. Many of these efforts were funded by grant money, and the department recently received a COPS regional training institute grant to carry them further and to make them available to other agencies. Thacher explains:

> The most recent training grant the department received came from the federal COPS office to fund a regional training facility for community policing, one of 33 around the country. The KPD had recently "gone regional" with its recruit academy, receiving the state accreditation necessary to train new officers and deputies from nearby jurisdictions. But the regional training institute offered a further opportunity to create a community policing curriculum for police employees and community members throughout the eight-state area around Tennessee. In any case, when the department received an RFP for the grant program, it seized on the opportunity, seeing it as an occasion to share its growing expertise in community policing and to increase its visibility with neighboring agencies.

> As required by the grant, the KPD proposed a joint program with the University of Tennessee and the Metropolitan Drug Commission—an agency that the KPD had long used to help build ties to the community, and which it hoped would help bring community members into the design of the program and into the training itself. The details of the training programs were left somewhat open, as the three agencies will soon conduct a needs assessment to set the curriculum's framework, but the basic focus will be the KPD's self-defined specialty of "infrastructure development" for community policing (including topics like crime analysis, managing calls for service, working effectively with neighborhoods, and leadership roles). In any case, the three agencies have recently hired a director for the effort whose mandate includes both getting the effort off the ground and finding funding to make it sustainable (the one-year grant is renewable for up to three years, but beyond that period it must fund itself).

> The regional training facility clearly will not take over all of the KPD's new in-house training programs. But it is interesting as an indicator of how far the department's training efforts have come: When Phil Keith took office as police commissioner, he viewed existing statewide training as inadequate to the KPD's changing needs, and the department was forced to develop its *own* in-

house training capabilities. With the regional training institute, the KPD hopes to bring those maturing capabilities to the region as a whole—reshaping the regional context whose shortcomings had pushed training reform to begin with.

St. Paul, which has long invested heavily in training, also took advantage of the Regional Training Institute money to advance in-service offerings for its own staff as well as other agencies'.[54]

So faced with problems in existing training systems, agencies like Lowell, Knoxville, and St. Paul put together their own new curricula, developing a permanent in-house capacity for continued training. Almost every other agency took some steps in the same direction, though some of them opted for the somewhat different task of having consultants provide most training directly. Fremont, for example, spent considerable money on training sessions with community policing luminaries like Herman Goldstein, Rana Sampson, and Chris Braiden (who also turned up to run training in St. Paul and Colorado Springs), and it went on to hire a local consultant to help department members operationalize the concepts—thereby solving the problem that Spokane had faced.

d. Conclusion

In sum, these three aspects of the human resource system play central roles in supporting community policing reform: The agencies that neglected some of them, like Riverside, Albany, and (for a time) Spokane, found their efforts held back significantly. A number of agencies were able to leverage COPS funding to advance this important category of reforms—especially in the case of DEMO and Regional Training Institute grants, which enabled departments to fund new training efforts directly. But the much larger pool of COPS money for hiring also played a role, albeit through a more indirect route: It created a spike in national police hiring, and in that way it opened a window of opportunity for important changes to personnel systems. This pattern played out most dramatically in Lowell, where the massive influx of new COPS hires throughout the state created a critical opportunity, allowing the LPD to open up a new recruit academy that it was able to redesign almost from scratch. Moreover, many of these agencies report that massive COPS hiring, together with extensive retirements of officers brought on by federal grants in the early 1970s, gave them uncommon leeway to self-consciously shape their forces.

8. Changing the Organizational Culture

Along with and underlying all these systemic interventions, most of the change agents in these cases paid attention to what is commonly called organizational culture: A department's perceptions about itself and the world in which it is operating, about what are important and meaningful tasks, and about what constitutes excellent performance; when these things were neglected, trouble ensued. There were many distinct approaches to this generic problem of winning the hearts and minds of officers for community policing.

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[54] The one other significant way in which COPS itself funded hiring was through its discretionary DEMO grants: Knoxville, for example, used some of its DEMO money to redesign training systems. The largest · COPS programs, of course, fund hiring and technology rather than training.

Most of the strategies did not and probably could not have much to do with grant funding. Portland's management team, for example, tried consciously to create organizational heroes who could stand as exemplars of what the new mode of working entailed. Thacher describes how the agency used its existing commendation systems and the media (including internal newsletters) to accomplish this task:

> Asked how the Community Policing Support unit he worked in tried to build internal commitment to the plan's ideas, Assistant Chief Williams echoes the sentiments of many in the Bureau: "You have to pay tremendous attention for those things that are in that direction [*i.e.*, community policing]. And then reinforce them by complimenting, nurturing, those kinds of things. And then celebrate those things, publicize them with commendations. Anything in any way you can." Managers throughout the Bureau, particularly precinct commanders, used this strategy on a daily basis, providing informal encouragement to officers and advertising their successes to others who were less committed to the new style of policing. But Williams explains that the Bureau also seized on the existing commendation system, which brought the Bureau and the community together every six months to recognize individual officers. In the past this system had mostly been used to recognize the acts of valor and heroism that most police departments emphasize (and which Portland still does recognize). But under [PPB Chief Tom] Potter, these events were increasingly used to recognize and advertise good community policing work. Many in the Bureau report making a particular effort to identify "officers that [were] well-respected by other officers," as one explained the logic. "We wanted to get people with some credibility."
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> For example, early on in the community policing program, the PPB commended one officer on a number of occasions, and he quickly became a local celebrity; ONA's [Office of Neighborhood Associations] Sharon McCormack explains how the associated publicity for community policing helped spread it through the department: "There'd just been some TV coverage on this guy who was an officer from another precinct. And it was like the citizens were saying, 'Well this officer is so wonderful and he can do everything.' And this veteran cop was saying, 'Well maybe if I could just get that guy over here then I could get some help from my neighborhood.' And we said 'Well, we think he's kind of a hot dog too, but here's some of the stuff he did.' Well, this officer comes back about two weeks later and he goes, 'I'm getting real sick of how to deal with the drug house on my block. Tell me this stuff again; how did these guys do this? And who did they work with?' So we hooked him up with the Bureau of Buildings person and a couple of other folks, and it got resolved like within a week. And he came back in, and he says, 'This stuff isn't so bad.' (laughter) And then he started telling other officers." In effect, the award ceremonies and less formal commendations sought to drill in one basic message: Community policing gets results, and officers whose work you respect are doing it. Repeated exposure, top managers felt, would diffuse that message throughout the ranks and gradually wear down resistance.

In St. Paul, many organizational "heroes" were long-time department members who had been involved in team policing reforms of the 1970s. Larry McDonald, for example, had been involved in these efforts at the patrol officer level, and as he gradually moved up in the department to management his success motivated others to take community policing seriously, spreading this ethos throughout the agency. This iterative model of community policing reform, where early experience with team policing helped pave the way for later efforts, also played some role in Knoxville, Albany, Fremont, and Colorado Springs.

Another common and essentially unfundable strategy for shaping the organizational culture was simply to make a constant effort to explain why what was happening was right, important, and inevitable. Fremont's Chief candidly admits that he initially neglected to pay sufficient attention to this business, and the result was considerable resistance, as Thacher writes:

The problem [was] that what the department had been doing—whether or not it had anything in common with C.O.P.P.S.—seemed to be working: Fremont had one of the lowest crime rates in the nation for a city its size. As Steckler remembers it: "The biggest mistake I made, is that we were a very successful organization at suppressing crime. . . . People . . . said, 'Gee, why are we changing? What are we doing wrong if we have to change?" [FPD Chief Craig] Steckler had an answer to that question—as described above, he thought that even though crime was not *currently* a problem, it was likely to become one in the future, given the trends Fremont was facing. But he admits that he did not make that answer clear up front: "I failed to articulate that the first time out of the blocks," Steckler explains.

But the department was a quick study, and its management quickly and insistently got to work justifying their department's new direction. By contrast, Riverside's top management reportedly had a tendency to presume that the justifications for its reforms were self-evident, and its failure to attend more directly to the way officers perceived them led to severe resistance that ultimately undermined much of the community policing effort.

Many more of these strategies might be listed, including the selective use of organizational history, exposing officers to the views of the citizenry, and the use of participation to generate ownership. The reader might wonder, however, if any of them have much to do with federal grants. Most, perhaps, do not. But by definition, cultural change involves establishing new values and norms of performance, and the federal government helped legitimize those norms and values when it included language in the 1994 crime bill and earlier legislation that put its weight behind community policing.[55] In various ways, many of the managers in these cases took advantage of that fact to leverage their own efforts at cultural change.

Lowell is the most intriguing case in this regard. At first, grant requirements helped then-Captain Ed Davis to bring community policing to an agency whose chief positively opposed it (his chief had assigned him to find grant money because the city's own economy was ailing):

> What Davis quickly found . . . was that the grants were not simply for more officers—they were specifically for more officers doing community policing. Thinking in particular of the Byrne grant, Davis recalls: "It was very specific. It talked about a new philosophy. It talked about problem solving. It talked about empowering officers and teams of officers." This suited Davis personally just fine; by this time he had attended the SMIP seminar and been "converted" to the cause of community policing. But chief Sheehan thought differently, so Davis brought the grant requirements to the Superintendent's attention. Davis recalls Sheehan's response: "I remember one conversation he had with me at his desk. . . . he says to me, 'I'm going to tell you something. You can write all these grants you want. There will never be community policing in this police department as long as I'm the Chief.'" But Sheehan clearly faced a dilemma: He had made a commitment to the elected officials that he would go after every funding option available, but all of those options seemed to require a style of policing that he rejected.
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> When the LPD received the state's Byrne grant, the conflict of philosophies arose in a meeting between Davis, Sheehan, and city manager Richard Johnson, as the three discussed what the city would do with the $75,000 it had received. Sheehan formally accepted the need to follow the grant requirements and use the money for community policing, but it was clearly not what he wanted to be doing. Johnson remembers, "I'm not saying that Chief Sheehan fought [community policing], but he didn't accept it readily." And Davis recalls: "As I was leaving the meeting, he

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[55] Aaron Wildavsky argues that all policymaking is about "creating culture." *Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis.* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books), p. 41.

agreed to do that [follow the grant's requirements]. But he started to talk a little bit about filling portable fifteen and portable thirteen and portable twelve," which were the cruiser routes in Lowell. "He was stuck in the old kind of idea of, 'Well, if we have more men, then we have to put them in the old routes.'" Concerned, Davis raised the issue with Johnson on his way out: "So, as I was leaving the meeting, the Chief kind of got away and I said to the Manager—it was really the only time that I had a private conversation with the Manager—and I said to him, 'The grant says we have to do things a certain way. And if we just fill the old routes, we're not going to get done what we want to get done. Make sure you kind of talk to the Chief about that.' I was concerned that the Chief was just going to override what was going on and he said, 'No, don't worry about that, we're not going to make any—we're going to do it exactly by the numbers.' So I felt a little empowered at that point in time, even though I was very open with Jack about this, too. I said to him, 'The Manager wants to do it this way, I've talked to him about this.'"

In this case, federal policy gave community policing an air of inevitability even to a hardened opponent, and it contributed to the legitimacy of Davis's effort. In any case, Davis went on to set up a new community policing precinct with the grant money that would serve as the beachhead for a departmental transformation. His chief would shortly retire, in part because he was out-of-sync with both federal and local policy (city government had recently embarked on a drive to work more closely with neighborhoods), and Davis would take over the LPD.

Tight nexuses like this one between grant requirements and the work of cultural change seem to be the exception rather than the rule. But in a more general way, several community policing chiefs built general support among their troops through their success at bringing in federal funds. The basic principle was expressed above through the example of Mangan's bond issue: A Chief who brings in resources earns loyalty—including (to some degree) loyalty to a new or existing change effort. (Something of this dynamic seems to have been operating in Lowell, Portland, and Spokane.) Of course, *any* chief who gets grant money could build this kind of support, and he might use it as cultural capital for changes that are entirely unrelated to community policing (though it would seem harder to use it for changes *away from* community policing, given the crime bill's close and fairly explicit identification with the effort). But the examples suggest that it is at least possible to apply it in that direction.

One final technique for shaping organizational culture was intimately tied to grants in most of these agencies, namely, the use of demonstrations and experiments to shape the organization's view of reality. This idea too may seem counterintuitive: Demonstrations and experiments are usually viewed in terms of their contribution to things like skill-building, knowledge, and new routines, and they do seem to advance those aims as well. But in almost every one of these cases, some early demonstration or experiment (and often several of them) stood out as an unequivocal benchmark of change: Something the organization points to as an inflection point, and more important, something that justifies the new interventions.

To continue with the example of the first precinct that Ed Davis began in Lowell, the effort quickly became heralded as a success, and that perception translated into newfound legitimacy for community policing in general.

The fledgling precinct became a model for how the LPD would operate its future precincts, but its legacy was broader than the tools it field-tested. The ways in which it cemented ties between the police department and several other city agencies were clearly important, as [then-Sergeant Robert] DeMoura [who started up the Centralville precinct] testified. The experiment had a similar effect on others, primarily by demonstrating what might be accomplished.

Perhaps most important, Centralville's quick and dramatic success seemed to give community policing legitimacy within the department—even among many skeptics. As Davis explains, "Centralville was such an incredible success that nobody could argue with it," echoing the sentiments of many in the department when asked about the early reception of community policing in the LPD. The Centralville officers did not take a "soft" approach to fighting crime— they attacked it with at least as much vigor, and more success, than the many more traditional officers who had preceded them.

Thacher goes on to suggest how the same logic operated *outside* the department: Citizens and even drug dealers became absolutely convinced that precincts were effective, and thus a new totem was established in the local cosmology.

But restricting ourselves to cultural change within the departments, Lowell's pattern turns out to be quite common. In discussions of how resistance was overcome in these agencies, some variant of the phrase "you can't argue with success" is inevitably heard, and it is typically conjoined with the name of a particular project that is considered to prove the point. In St. Paul, these early projects stretched back to the 1970s efforts at team policing, as suggested above. In Spokane, the key project was a more recent effort called the West First neighborhood. Sheingold writes: "While some patrol members still refer to community policing as 'soft,' this example clearly illustrated that patrol can conduct strong enforcement actions, while also working with the community." Portland started out with a project in its Overlook Neighborhood, and it went on to find grant funding for several demonstration projects intended to generate new ideas. Thacher writes that formal evaluations of these programs were largely positive but hard to interpret, as in this example:

> For example, the Bureau undertook an extensive evaluation of its Central Eastside demonstration project, intending to identify good models of community problem-solving that could be replicated throughout the city. But one Bureau member explains that the results, though positive, were not completely convincing: "I think the evaluation did show [that] overall that they had made improvements. . . . What is probably a little difficult to say is which specific efforts were the most [important] . . . . Because the thing is, rarely are we doing the only effort in any area. So if we say [it was] purely our efforts that cause this decrease, increase, or whatever we are looking for, that's not accurate. It could have been a community organizing effort that had a part of that. It could have been the parole and probation part that had a part in that."

Nevertheless, the project became one of the many in the local lore that managers and officers alike point to in explaining that community policing works.

Projects explicitly labelled "experimental" paved the way for cultural change in two further ways: First, promises of evaluation prospectively reassured officers that planned interventions would be considered carefully,[56] and second, by labelling a project an "experiment" or "demonstration," it became less important to resist it since it could presumably be terminated. Fremont's managers used this strategy repeatedly and to great effect, adopting almost every new initiative as a pilot program that could be discontinued after a year or so, often based on the result of a formal evaluation (the strategy applied not just to operational initiatives like Spokane's West First or Showcase Savannah, but also to administrative changes like its 4/11 plan). None of Fremont's efforts were funded by grants. But every other city that ran

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[56] On such uses of the trappings of rationality, see Martha S. Feldman and James G. March. "Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol," in *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 26 (1981), pp. 171-186.

experimental projects drew on grant funding to do so. COPS did not play a direct role in any of these agencies—much cultural work needs to be done at the outset of change, which for these agencies meant before COPS became available—, but there is no reason why it could not.

That these strategies are available to managers does not mean that cultural change can ever be completely engineered. Interventions designed for other purposes often backfire and spark resistance, creating myths that community policing is nothing but trouble. Fremont's experience with its innovative domestic violence effort can stand in for the many other examples from the cases. Thacher writes:

> Despite its studied attitude towards change, Fremont did face significant tension in the early days of C.O.P.P.S. . . . One major problem was that the term C.O.P.P.S. quickly became associated with "soft" policing. . . . . One early problem-solving project—and one of the most significant ones still running today—unintentionally contributed to C.O.P.P.S.'s reputation as "social work." The project focused on domestic violence, trying to address that problem by requiring officers to follow up three times at every address that generated a domestic violence call; in the follow-up, the officers were expected to try to check with victims and offenders to offer services and to ask how things had been going. Begun as a pilot project in one of the city's three zones, the effort produced a dramatic reduction in repeat domestic violence calls and none of the expected complaints from citizens that their privacy was being invaded. Even so, many officers felt that the project took too much of their time and that it bordered on social work, and they began referring to it as the "Adopt-a-Family" program. One FPD member recalls: "The Adopt-a-Family thing . . . took on a real social worker connotation . . . And that just put a label on the C.O.P.P.S. philosophy [as] this social welfare program."

Against the taboo language of "adopt-a-family," management—true to its form—raised the totems of compromise and evaluation:

> The administration's strategy for dealing with this resistance was twofold. First, it tried to modify the program to mitigate some of the main concerns officers were raising. Most notably, [Captain Mike] Lanam proposed excluding the least serious domestic dispute calls from the list of calls that required follow-up. [Sergeant Mike] Eads [who came up with the domestic violence program] recalls of the idea, "I wasn't quite sure how that would work, but it was a lot better than having 100 angry officers not wanting to try the program at all. And it turns out that it was probably a better idea," primarily because it did not overload the patrol force. The second way the administration dealt with officer resistance was simply by staying the course, emphasizing that the program was a pilot, and explaining the possible benefits (namely, that by reducing repeat domestic violence calls, the program would ultimately *reduce* officers' workload, even if it increased it in the short run). As Lanam explains . . . "When Mike Eads starts getting flack from officers, or even some of his fellow sergeants that you are just making more work for us, we are the ones that say, 'We will see. Maybe he is making more work for you now, but it will pay off ten fold in the future.'"

When evaluations showed marked declines in repeat calls from targeted addresses, that information became ammunition in the cultural skirmish over what good police work was.

VI. Conclusions

Given these ten stories, what can be concluded about the impact of the COPS grants on the field of policing, and more particularly on how the grants can be used by police managers in changing police departments?

First, COPS grants did make important contributions to the goal of producing organizational change. We don't know from our cases how common the important changes were across all departments that received COPS grants, but we have some clear examples of significant change. In some cases, COPS grants allowed departments that were pretty far down the path toward the implementation of community policing to get even further along, and show us and the rest of the field what advanced forms of community policing look like. In other case, COPS grants allowed some departments with limited experience in community policing to make rapid progress – in some cases to leapfrog the field.

Second, while a favorable environment and organizational history seem to improve the odds that community policing will succeed, they do not explain success completely: Effective management—including strategic use of COPS money—can overcome serious obstacles to community policing. Consequently, although it is true that the impact of the COPS grants on organizational change varies as a function of *where* the grants are used (*i.e.*, whether or not they land in favorable environments), it also depends on *how* management uses them.

Third, successful community policing efforts focused on several key interventions that go beyond the usual program of decentralization and training. These interventions include building political support for change, creating a coherent leadership team, planning the course of reform, redesigning organizational structure and the organization's technical core, building a supportive physical infrastructure, building a supportive information infrastructure, altering human resource systems, and instilling new cultural ideals. Difficulties with community policing can usually be traced to the failure to attend to one of these managerial tasks, or inability to handle the distinctive challenges each one raises. This fact is important for the COPS programs, because their impact on organizational change lies in their ability to help managers solve these distinctive challenges.

Fourth, for some of these key interventions, the distinctive challenges centered on getting resources for hiring and technology, and COPS played an important role in them— especially creating special units as part of organizational restructuring, improving the information infrastructure, and, to a lesser extent, freeing up time for community policing (part of redesigning the technical core) through general-purpose hiring. Used strategically, COPS funding helped many agencies make these important reforms. Thus although there have been concerns expressed that grants focused only on hiring more officers would not be helpful in shifting the style of policing, it seems clear from these cases that such grants *can* be useful in helping departments make the shift to community policing.

Fifth, other key interventions raised challenges that COPS could not entirely solve. Elements of reform like planning, cultural change, and administrative decentralization required more imagination than funding; and expensive interventions like physical decentralization, training, and new equipment did not qualify for most Title I money. Smaller COPS grants like DEMO and the regional training institute grants did usefully advance some of these reforms, but most departments accomplished them with other resources.

Sixth, COPS still played an indirect role in some of those reforms—especially by creating a spike in national police hiring that opened a window of opportunity for making important changes to personnel systems. For example, COPS hiring put enough pressure on the state training system in Massachusetts that one department was able to gain the support needed to open a new, nontraditional recruit academy. Many other departments rethought recruitment and hiring practices as they found themselves hiring many new officers (in part because of COPS, but in part because of abnormally high turnover, as LEAP hires from the early 1970s began to retire in recent years).

Finally, in all of these impacts, COPS interacted with local forces to produce important changes. As a rule, COPS grants did not necessarily require or specifically support the key managerial interventions. But they did enable them. And enabling change turns out to be particularly valuable when the field as a whole is already inclined in a particular direction.

Figure 1
Analytic Framework

Dependent Variable

Change in Organizational Strategy and Operations
(from Time T = 0 to T = N)

* Changes in Use of "Problem-Solving"
* Changes in Use of "Community Partnerships"
* Degree of Institutionalization

Explanatory Variables

* Context of Organization
    * Political Environment
    * Task Environment
    * Organizational History

COPS Grant

* Leadership & Management of Organization
    * Political Management
    * Defining Mission/Strategic Planning
    * Re-Designing Organizational Structure
    * Re-Engineering Technical Core
    * Building Supportive Technical Infrastructure
    * Building the Information Infrastructure
    * Human Resources
    * Changing the Organizational Structure