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Drug Trafficking

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1988

The widespread use of drugs such as heroin, cocaine, and marijuana is commonly viewed as an important social problem. In the public mind, drugs are linked to three social problems.

Drugs and crime. Very large proportions of those arrested for street crimes such as robbery, burglary, and larceny are drug users. The addict's need for money to finance his habit and the mechanisms of addiction establish a link between drugs and crime. Insofar as drug use itself is illegal, society has linked drugs to crime directly. Any possession or use is, by definition, criminal conduct.

Drugs and social dependence. To many people, drug dependence in itself is a serious social problem. Persons who willfully drug themselves, particularly when they do this repeatedly, become social dependents. They have violated their obligation to remain sober and responsible by surrendering their judgment and their faculties to drugs.

A predictable set of consequences is commonly believed to flow from the compulsive use of drugs. These include early death, elevated morbidity, frequent unemployment, deep poverty, incapacity to meet responsibilities to spouses and children, and social isolation. Insofar as society accepts responsibility for meeting the health and economic needs of its citizens, drug users' inability to care for themselves and their dependents becomes a social problem.

Drugs as traps for children. A particularly troubling aspect of drug use is the notion that many children who would otherwise remain on a path toward responsible citizenship are deflected by drug use. Casual experimentation leads to more frequent use which, in turn, leads to reduced performance in school, tragic accidents, and reduced life chances.

Although this last image may be more a product of parental fears than of reality, some important facts lie behind it. Early drug use *is* correlated with more serious later drug use, with difficulties in schools, and with crime. One of the worst aspects of drug use may be its attraction to youths in urban ghettos, for it robs many of their chance for upward mobility. With that, some of the promise and justice of a democratic society is lost.

Perspectives on Drug Trafficking

It seems wrong—even evil—for drug traffickers to supply drugs to users, and it seems unjust that drug traffickers grow rich and powerful on their ill-gotten gains. These simple intuitions establish two quite different perspectives for looking at drug trafficking.

Drug trafficking as drug supply. From the perspective of drug control policy, the worst thing about drug traffickers is that they supply drugs. Too many drugs reach illicit users in the United States. The objective of drug trafficking policies should be to minimize the supply capacity of the distribution systems so that the smallest possible volume of drugs reaches users.

Drug trafficking as organized crime. Some criminal organizations engaged in drug trafficking grow rich and powerful. This situation, in turn, undermines citizens' confidence in their government. When drug trafficking is viewed as an organized crime problem, the objective of control efforts is to arrest and punish rich traffickers and to prevent new groups from arising.

To a degree, these perspectives and objectives are congruent. A principal means for minimizing the flow of drugs to the United States is to immobilize major trafficking organizations. In some circumstances, however, these objectives diverge. Aggressive law enforcement efforts directed at marginal trafficking organizations might well reduce the overall supply of drugs to illicit markets. But these efforts, by eliminating marginal traffickers, may increase the wealth and power of the drug trafficking organizations that remain by allowing them to gain effective control over the market.

Alternative Approaches

Choices between approaches for dealing with drug trafficking will depend on which aspects of the trafficking problem are deemed most important and on the costs and efficacy of particular policies.

Legalization. The most radical approach to dealing with drug trafficking is to legalize the drugs. Legalization can mean many different things. At one extreme, it can mean complete elimination of any legal restrictions on the production, distribution, possession, or use of any drug. At the other extreme, it can mean allowing some limited uses of some particular drugs, producing the drugs only under government auspices, distributing them through tightly regulated distribution systems, and punishing with severe criminal penalties any production or use outside the authorized system.

The goal of legalizing drugs is to bring them under effective legal control. If it were legal to produce and distribute drugs, legitimate businessmen would enter the business. There would be less need for violence and corruption since the industry would have access to the courts. And, instead of absorbing tax dollars as targets of expensive enforcement efforts, the drug sellers might begin to pay taxes. So, legalization might well solve the organized crime aspects of the drug trafficking problem.

On average, drug use under legalization might not be as destructive to users and to society as under the current prohibition, because drugs would be less expensive, purer, and more conveniently available. However, relaxing opposition to drug use, and by making drugs more freely available, legalization might fuel a significant increase in the level of drug use. It is not unreasonable to assume that the number of people who become chronic, intensive users would increase substantially. It is this risk, as well as a widespread perception that drug use is simply wrong, that militates against outright legalization.

An alternative is to choose a system more restrictive than outright legalization but one that still leaves room for legitimate uses of some drugs. Arguably, such a policy would produce some of the potential benefits of legalization without accelerating growth in the level of drug use. The difficulty is that wherever the boundary between the legitimate and illicit use of drugs is drawn, an illicit market will develop just outside the boundary. Indeed, the more restrictive the boundary, the larger and more controlled by "organized crime" the resulting black market.

The existing drug laws in the United States establish a regulatory rather than a prohibitionist regime. While most uses of heroin and marijuana are illegal, some research uses of these drugs are authorized under the current laws, and there is discussion of the possible use of these drugs for medical purposes such as the treatment of terminal cancer patients. Cocaine is legal for use as a local anesthetic by dentists. And barbiturates, amphetamines, and tranquilizers are legalized for a variety of medical purposes and distributed through licensed pharmacists and physicians.

That there are some legal uses of these drugs has not eliminated illicit trafficking. For marijuana, heroin, and cocaine, the restrictions are so sharp relative to the current demand for the drugs that virtually the entire distribution system remains illicit and depends on drug trafficking. For amphetamines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers, the restrictions are fewer, so a larger portion of the demand is met from legitimate illicit distribution. Distribution of these drugs takes the form of diversion from legitimate channels rather than wholly illicit production and distribution.

Source country crop control. A second approach to dealing with drug trafficking is to try to eliminate the raw materials that are used to produce the drugs. For heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, this means controlling opium, coca leaf, and marijuana crops in countries such as Turkey, Afghanistan, Thailand, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Jamaica. For marijuana, illicit domestic production is also important.

Efforts to control these foreign crops generally take one of two forms. Governments either try to induce farmers to stop producing the crops for illicit markets or attempt to destroy those crops that can be located. Sometimes the inducement takes the form of subsidies for growing other crops. Other times foreign crops are

bought and burned before they reach illicit channels. Eradication may also be accomplished by airborne chemical spraying (which has the advantage of being controlled by a relatively small number of people, and the disadvantage of doing a great deal of collateral damage to legitimate crops), or by ground-level destruction of crops through cutting and digging (which has the disadvantage of relying on large numbers of people and of being quite visible well in advance of the operations).

In general, these efforts suffer from two major difficulties. First, there seems to be no shortage of locations where the crops may be grown. If Turkey stops growing opium poppies, Mexico, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia can eventually take up the slack. If Colombia stops growing coca, Peru can replace it. If Mexico eliminated marijuana production, the hills of California would be even more densely filled with marijuana plants than they now are.

The second problem is that foreign governments cannot always be relied on to pursue crop control policies vigorously. Sometimes the difficulty is that the crops lie in parts of the country that are not under effective governmental control. Other times the problem is inefficiency or corruption in the agencies that are managing the programs. In the worst cases, the crops are sufficiently important to the domestic economy (or the personal well-being of high government officials) that the government prefers not to act at all.

When foreign governments are reluctant to cooperate, the United States Government must balance its interest in advancing its drug policy objectives against other foreign policy objectives. One particularly perplexing problem is posed by governments that are important to the United States as regional bulwarks against communist expansion and are also acquiescent in drug trafficking. The United States Government may feel required to overlook drug trafficking in order to maintain that government's anti-communist activities.

These observations do not imply that crop control policies can never be effective. In the early 1970's, more effective control of opium poppies in Turkey produced a 2-to 3-year reduction in the supply of heroin to the U.S. East Coast and an observable reduction in the rate at which new people were becoming addicted.

These observations do suggest, however, that crop control programs cannot be counted on as long-term solutions; they will take place sporadically and unpredictably. This suggests that an effective way to manage our crop control efforts is to position ourselves in foreign countries to notice and exploit opportunities when they arise but not to rely on this approach as our major initiative for controlling drug trafficking.

Interdiction. Interdiction efforts aimed at stopping illicit drugs at the border are appealing. First, the imagery is compelling. If we cannot rely on foreign countries to help us with our drug problem, we will do it ourselves by establishing defenses at the border.

Second, Government agencies have special powers to search at the border, which should make it easier to find illicit drugs. Forces of the U.S. Customs Agency and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service inspect people and goods passing through official "ports of entry," and they patrol between "ports of entry," to ensure that no one can cross the border without facing inspection. The Coast Guard, the military, and civilian aviation authorities all have capabilities that allow the Government to detect who is crossing the border and to prevent illegal crossings.

There are, however, two problems with interdiction. One is the sheer size of the inspection task. More than 12,000 miles of international boundary must be patrolled. Over 420 billion tons of goods, and more than 270 million people, cross these boundaries each year, yet the quantities of drugs are small—a few hundred tons of marijuana and less than 20 tons of heroin or cocaine. Moreover, the heroin and cocaine arrive in lots of less than a hundred pounds.

That the volume of heroin and cocaine imported is much less than the volume of marijuana points to the second problem with interdiction. It is a strategy that is more successful with marijuana than with heroin or cocaine. Marijuana's bulkiness makes it more vulnerable to interdiction efforts.

This situation is unfortunate because, in the eyes of many, marijuana presents fewer problems than heroin and cocaine. Moreover, marijuana can be grown easily in the United States. If foreign supplies are kept out, the supply system can adjust by growing more marijuana domestically.

That seems to be what has happened. Current estimates indicate that interdiction efforts are successful in seizing about a third of the marijuana destined for the United States. Yet, except for a few local areas, the impact on the price and availability of the drug has been minimal. Worse, the current U.S.-grown marijuana is more potent than the imported marijuana.

High-level enforcement. A fourth attack on illicit trafficking is directed at the organizations responsible

for producing, importing, and distributing drugs. The basic aim is to immobilize or destroy the trafficking networks.

In the past, enforcement agencies have tended to view this problem as "getting to Mr. Big"—the individual kingpin who, it was assumed, controlled an organization's capacity to distribute drugs. If that person could be arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned, the network would fall apart.

More recently, the law enforcement community has become less certain that this strategy can succeed. Even when "Mr. Big" is in prison, he can continue to manage the distribution of drugs. Moreover, the organizations seem less dependent on single individuals than enforcement officials once assumed. Finally, the whole drug distribution system is less centralized than was once assumed. Relatively small and impermanent organizations—freelance entrepreneurs—supply a large proportion of illicit drugs.

To deal with this decentralization, enforcement aims have shifted from stopping individual dealers to destroying whole networks. Federal investigators have been granted special powers to seize drug dealers' assets, including boats, cars, planes, houses, bank accounts, and cash.

The main problem with attacking illicit trafficking organizations is that it is enormously expensive. Convincing evidence can be produced only through sustained efforts to recruit informants, establish electronic surveillance, and insinuate undercover agents. It is difficult for prosecutions to succeed because of the complexity of conspiracy laws and the particularly intrusive investigative methods that must be used to gather evidence.

Street-level enforcement.   A fifth line of attack is to go after street-level dealing through the use of physical surveillance or "buy and bust" operations. In the recent past, this approach has been deemphasized. It seemed to have no impact on the overall supply because dealers who were arrested were jailed only intermittently and when they were, they were easily replaced. At best, drug dealing was driven off the street temporarily, or to a different street. Many hours were spent to produce small, transient results, and these operations seemed to invite abuses of authority and corruption. As a result, many police were removed from street-level enforcement.

Recently, police have renewed street-level enforcement efforts, but they have altered their objectives. To the extent that street-level enforcement increases the "hassle" associated with using drugs, it can make a contribution to the objective of reducing drug use. If drugs, already expensive, can be made inconvenient to purchase, some nonaddicted users may be persuaded to abandon drugs. More experienced users can benefit if treatment programs are available.

Street-level enforcement can contribute to other objectives. It can encourage criminally active drug users to reduce their consumption, or draw them into treatment programs. It can contribute to the objective of immobilizing major traffickers by identifying defendants who can provide information about major trafficking networks. Ultimately, it can contribute to the quality of life in neighborhoods by returning the streets to community control.

These rationales give street-level enforcement some plausibility. What gives it real force is that it seems to work. A small task force committed to street-level drug enforcement in Lynn, Massachusetts, cut robberies by 18 percent and burglaries by 37 percent while it was in operation. Operation Pressure Point, carried out on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, reduced robberies by 40 percent and burglaries by 27 percent.

There have also been some important failures. An operation in Lawrence, Massachusetts, modeled after the Lynn program, failed to produce any important effect on levels of crime or drug use in that community. The reasons seem to be that the effort was too small relative to the size of the opposing trafficking networks and that the effort was focused on cocaine rather than heroin. An operation in Philadelphia failed to produce anything other than angry citizens and a stern rebuke by the courts because it was carried out without any consultation with the community, and without any regard for evidentiary standards.

Subsequent discussions of these results among academics and practitioners have produced several guidelines for successful street-level enforcement. First, the scale of the enforcement effort should be in some sense proportionate to the effective size of the trafficking network. Second, police should carry out the operation after obtaining widespread community support, and with scrupulous attention to the niceties of search and seizure. Otherwise, the operation will lack the legitimacy necessary to sustain continued support. Third, it is important to complement the street-level enforcement effort with other investments, not only in the criminal justice system, but also in the treatment system. Otherwise the opportunities created by street-level enforcement will not be fully realized.

Discussion Questions

1. Why should drug use be prohibited? Is it to reduce crime or to achieve a social welfare objective? Are the drug laws an appropriate use of the criminal sanction?

2. What should society's objective be in confronting drug trafficking? Should the primary objective be to minimize the supply of drugs, or to attack powerful criminal organizations, or something else?

3. What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the four major drug trafficking policies: crop control, interdiction, high-level enforcement, street-level enforcement?

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National Institute of Justice / Perspectives on Policing

Policing and the Fear of Crime

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When crimes occur—when a ghetto teenager is shot to death in a gang war, when an elderly woman is mugged for her social security check, when a nurse is raped in a hospital parking lot, when one driver is punched by another in a dispute over a parking place, when a black family's new home is vandalized—society's attention is naturally focused on the victims and their material losses. Their wounds, bruises, lost property, and inconvenience can be seen, touched, and counted. These are the concrete signs of criminal victimization.

Behind the immediate, concrete losses of crime victims, however, is a different, more abstract crime problem—that of fear. For victims, fear is often the largest and more enduring legacy of their victimization. The raped nurse will feel vulnerable long after her cuts and bruises heal. The harassed black family suffers far more from the fear of neighborhood hostility than the inconvenience of repairing their property.

For the rest of us—the not-recently, or not-yet victimized—fear becomes a contagious agent spreading the injuriousness of criminal victimization. The gang member's death makes parents despair of their children's future. The mugging of the elderly woman teaches elderly residents to fear the streets and the teenagers who roam them. The fight over the parking place confirms the general fear of strangers. The harassment of the black family makes other minorities reluctant to claim their rights. In these ways, fear extends the damage of criminal victimization.

Of course, fear is not totally unproductive. It prompts caution among citizens and thereby reduces criminal opportunities. Too, it motivates citizens to shoulder some of the burdens of crime control by buying locks and dogs, thereby adding to general deterrence. And fear kindles enthusiasm for publicly supported crime control measures. Thus, reasonable fears, channeled in

constructive directions, prepare society to deal with crime. It is only when fear is unreasonable, or generates counterproductive responses, that it becomes a social problem.

This paper explores fear as a problem to be addressed by the police. It examines current levels and recent trends in the fear of crime; analyzes how fear is linked to criminal victimization; considers the extent to which fear is a distinct problem that invites separate control strategies; and assesses the positive and negative social consequences of fear. It then turns to what is known about the efficacy of police strategies for managing fear, i.e., for reducing fear when it is irrational and destructive, and for channeling fear along constructive paths when it is reasonable and helpful in controlling crime.

The Fear of Crime

Society does not yet systematically collect data on fear. Consequently, our map of fear—its levels, trends, and social location—is sketchy. Nonetheless, its main features are easily identified.

First, fear is widespread. The broadest impact was registered by "The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime" released in 1980. Two-fifths of Americans surveyed reported that they were "highly fearful" they would become victims of violent crime.[1] Similar results were reported by the Harris poll of 1975, which found that 55 percent of all adults said they felt "uneasy" walking their own streets.[2] The Gallup poll of 1977 found that about 45 percent of the population (61 percent of the women and 28 percent of the men) were afraid to walk alone at night.[3] An eight-city victimization survey published in 1977 found that 45 percent of all respondents

limited their activities because of fear of crime.[4] A statewide study in Michigan reported that 66 percent of respondents avoided certain places because of fear of crime.[5] Interviews with a random sample of Texans in 1978 found that more than half said that they feared becoming a serious crime victim within a year.[6]

Second, fear of crime increased from the late 1960's to the mid-1970's, then began decreasing during the mid-1970's. According to the 1968 Gallup poll, 44 percent of the women and 16 percent of the men said that they were afraid to walk alone at night. In 1977, when a similar question was asked, 61 percent of the women and 28 percent of the men reported they were afraid to walk alone at night—an increase of 17 percent for women and 12 percent for men.[7] In 1975, a Harris poll found that 55 percent of all adults felt "uneasy" walking their own streets. In 1985, this number had fallen to 32 percent—a significant decline.[8]

Third, fear is not evenly distributed across the population. Predictably, those who feel themselves most vulnerable are also the most fearful. Looking at the distribution of fear across age and sex categories, the greatest levels of fear are reported by elderly women. The next most frightened group seems to be all other women. The least afraid are young men.

Looking at race, class, and residence variables, blacks are more afraid of crime than whites, the poor more afraid than the middle class or wealthy, and inner-city dwellers more afraid than suburbanites.[9]

Indeed, while the current national trend may show a decline in fear, anecdotal evidence suggests that this trend has not yet reached America's ghettos. There, fear has become a condition of life. Claude Brown describes Harlem's problem in 1985:

> ... In any Harlem building, ... every door has at least three locks on it. Nobody opens a door without first finding out who's there. In the early evening, ... you see people ... lingering outside nice apartment houses, peeking in the lobbies. They seem to be casing the joint. They are actually trying to figure out who is in the lobby of *their* building. "Is this someone waiting to mug me? Should I risk going in, or should I wait for someone else to come?"
>
> If you live in Harlem, USA, you don't park your automobile two blocks from your apartment house because that gives potential muggers an opportunity to get a fix on you. You'd better find a parking space within a block of

your house, because if you have to walk two blocks, you're not going to make it. . . .

> In Harlem, elderly people walking their dogs in the morning cross the street when they see some young people coming. . . . And what those elderly men and women have in the paper bags they're carrying is not just a pooper scooper—it's a gun. And if those youngsters cross the street, somebody's going to get hurt.[10]

These findings suggest that one of the most important privileges one acquires as one gains wealth and status in American society is the opportunity to leave the fear of crime behind. The unjust irony is that "criminals walk city streets, while fear virtually imprisons groups like women and the elderly in their homes."[11] The important long-run consequence of this uneven distribution of fear for the economic development of our cities [is this]: if the inner-city populations are afraid of crime, then commerce and investment essentially disappear, and with them, the chance for upward social mobility.[12] If Hobbes is correct in asserting that the most fundamental purpose of civil government is to establish order and protect citizens from the fear of criminal attack that made life "nasty, brutish and short" in the "state of nature," then the current level and distribution of fear indicate an important governmental failure.[13]

The Causes of Fear

In the past, fear was viewed as primarily caused by criminal victimization. Hence, the principal strategy for controlling crime was reducing criminal victimization. More recently, we have learned that while fear of crime is associated with criminal victimization, the relationship is less close than originally assumed.[14]

The association between victimization and fear is seen most closely in the aggregate patterns across time and space. Those who live in areas with high crime rates are more afraid and take more preventive action than people living in areas where the risk of victimization is lower.[15] The trends in levels of fear seem to mirror (perhaps with a lag) trends in levels of crime.

Yet, the groups that are most fearful are not necessarily those with the highest victimization rates; indeed, the order is exactly reversed. Elderly women, who are most afraid, are the least frequently victimized. Young men, who are least afraid, are most often victimized.[16]

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Even more surprisingly, past victimization has only a small impact on levels of fear; people who have heard about others' victimizations are almost as fearful as those who have actually been victimized.[17] And when citizens are asked about the things that frighten them, there is little talk about "real crimes" such as robbery, rape, and murder. More often there is talk about other signs of physical decay and social disorganization such as "junk and trash in vacant lots, boarded-up buildings, stripped and abandoned cars, bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, street prostitution, panhandling, public drinking, verbal harassment of women, open gambling and drug use, and other incivilities."[18]

In accounting for levels of fear in communities, Wesley Skogan divides the contributing causes into five broad categories: (1) actual criminal victimization; (2) second-hand information about criminal victimization distributed through social networks; (3) physical deterioration and social disorder; (4) the characteristics of the built environment (i.e., the physical composition of the housing stock); and (5) group conflict.[19] He finds the strongest effects on fear arising from physical deterioration, social disorder, and group conflict.[20] The impact of the built environment is hard to detect once one has subtracted the effects of other variables influencing levels of fear. A review article by Charles Murray also found little evidence of a separate effect of the built environment on fear. The only exception to this general conclusion is evidence indicating that improved street lighting can sometimes produce significant fear reductions.[21]

The important implication of these research results is that fear might be attacked by strategies other than those that directly reduce criminal victimization. Fear might be reduced even without changes in levels of victimization by using the communications within social networks to provide accurate information about risks of criminal victimization and advice about constructive responses to the risk of crime; by eliminating the external signs of physical decay and social disorder; and by more effectively regulating group conflict between young and old, whites and minority groups, rich and poor. The more intriguing possibility, however, is that if fear could be rationalized and constructively channeled, not only would fear and its adverse consequences be ameliorated, but also real levels of victimization reduced. In this sense, the conventional understanding of this problem would be reversed: instead of controlling victimization to control fear, we would manage fear to

reduce victimization. To understand this possibility, we must explore the consequences of fear—not only as ends in themselves, but also as means for helping society deal with crime.

The Economic and Societal Consequences of Fear: Costs and Benefits

Fear is a more or less rational response to crime. It produces social consequences through two different mechanisms. First, people are uncomfortable emotionally. Instead of luxuriating in the peace and safety of their homes, they feel vulnerable and isolated. Instead of enjoying the camaraderie of trips to school, grocery stores, and work, they feel anxious and afraid. Since these are less happy conditions than feeling secure, fear produces an immediate loss in personal well-being.

Second, fear motivates people to invest time and money in defensive measures to reduce their vulnerability. They stay indoors more than they would wish, avoid certain places, buy extra locks, and ask for special protection to make bank deposits. Since this time, effort, and money could presumably be spent on other things that make people happier, such expenditures must also be counted as personal costs which, in turn, become social costs as they are aggregated.

These are far from trivial issues. The fact that two-fifths of the population is afraid and that the Nation continues to nominate crime as one of its greatest concerns means that society is living less securely and happily than is desirable. And if 45 percent of the population restricts its daily behavior to minimize vulnerability, and the Nation spends more than $20 billion on private security protection, then private expenditures on reducing fear constitute a significant component of the national economy.[22] All this is in addition to the $40 billion that society spends publicly on crime control efforts.[23] In short, fear of crime claims a noticeable share of the Nation's welfare and resources.

Fear has a further effect. Individual responses to fear aggregate in a way that erodes the overall quality of community life and, paradoxically, the overall capacity of society to deal with crime.[24] This occurs when the defensive reactions of individuals essentially compromise community life, or when they exacerbate the disparities between rich and poor by relying too much on private rather than public security.

Skogan has described in detail the mechanisms that erode community life:

> Fear ... can work in conjunction with other factors to stimulate more rapid neighborhood decline. Together, the spread of fear and other local problems provide a form of positive feedback that can further increase levels of crime. These feedback processes include (1) physical and psychological withdrawal from community life; (2) a weakening of the informal social control processes that inhibit crime and disorder; (3) a decline in the organizational life and mobilization capacity of the neighborhood; (4) deteriorating business conditions; (5) the importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance; and (6) further dramatic changes in the composition of the population. At the end lies a stage characterized by demographic collapse.[25]

Even if fear does not destroy neighborhood life, it can damage it by prompting responses which protect some citizens at the expense of others, thereby leading to greater social disparities between rich and poor, resourceful and dependent, well-organized and anomic communities. For example, when individuals retreat behind closed doors and shuttered windows, they make their own homes safer. But they make the streets more dangerous, for there are fewer people watching and intervening on the streets. Or, when individuals invest in burglar alarms or private security guards rather than spending more on public police forces, they may make themselves safer, but leave others worse off because crime is deflected onto others.

Similarly, neighborhood patrols can make residents feel safe. But they may threaten and injure other law-abiding citizens who want to use the public thoroughfares. Private security guards sometimes bring guns and violence to situations that would otherwise be more peaceably settled. Private efforts may transform our cities from communities now linked to one another through transportation, commerce, and recreation, to collections of isolated armed camps, shocking not only for their apparent indifference to one another, but also ultimately for their failure to control crime and reduce fear. In fact, such constant reminders of potential threats may actually increase fear.

Whether fear produces these results or not depends a great deal on how citizens respond to their fears. If they adopt defensive, individualistic solutions, then the risks of neighborhood collapse and injustice are in-

creased. If they adopt constructive, community-based responses, then the community will be strengthened not only in terms of its ability to defend itself, but also as an image of civilized society. Societies built on communal crime control efforts have more order, justice, and freedom than those based on individualistic responses. Indeed, it is for these reasons that social control and the administration of justice became public rather than private functions.

Police Strategies for Reducing Fear

If it is true that fear is a problem in its own right, then it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of police strategies not only in terms of their capacity to control crime, but also in terms of their capacity to reduce fear. And if fear is affected by more factors than just criminal victimization, then there might be some special police strategies other than controlling victimization that could be effective in controlling the fear of crime.

Over the last 30 years, the dominant police strategy has emphasized three operational components: motorized patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigation of crimes.[26] The principal aim has been to solve crimes and capture criminals rather than reduce fear. The assumption has been that if victimization could be reduced, fear would decrease as well. Insofar as fear was considered a separate problem, police strategists assumed that motorized patrol and rapid response would provide a reassuring police omnipresence.[27]

To the extent that the police thought about managing citizens' individual responses to crime, they visualized a relationship in which citizens detected crime and mobilized the police to deal with it—not one in which the citizens played an important crime control role. The police advised shopkeepers and citizens about self-defense. They created 911 telephone systems to insure that citizens could reach them easily. And they encouraged citizens to mark their property to aid the police in recovering stolen property. But their primary objective was to make themselves society's principal response to crime. Everything else was seen as auxiliary.

As near monopolists in supplying enhanced security and crime control, police managers and union leaders were ambivalent about the issue of fear. On the one hand, as those responsible for security, they felt some obligation to enhance security and reduce fear.

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That was by far the predominant view. On the other hand, if citizens were afraid of crime and the police were the solution, the police department would benefit in the fight for scarce municipal funds. This fact has tempted some police executives and some unions to emphasize the risks of crime.[28]

The strategy that emphasized motorized patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation of crimes was not designed to reduce fear other than by a reduction in crime. Indeed, insofar as the principal objective of this strategy was to reduce crime, and insofar as citizens were viewed as operational auxiliaries of the police, the police could increase citizens' vigilance by warning of the risks of crime. Nevertheless, to the extent that reduced fear was considered an important objective, it was assumed that the presence and availability of police through motorized patrols and response to calls would achieve that objective.

The anticipated effects of this strategy on levels of fear have not materialized. There have been some occasions, of course, when effective police action against a serial murderer or rapist has reassured a terrorized community. Under ordinary circumstances, however, success of the police in calming fears has been hard to show. The Kansas City experiment showed that citizens were unaware of the level of patrol that occurred in their area. Consequently, they were neither reassured by increased patrolling nor frightened by reduced levels of patrol.[29] Subsequent work on response times revealed that fast responses did not necessarily reassure victims. Before victims even called the police, they often sought assistance and comfort from friends or relatives. Once they called, their satisfaction was related more to their expectations of when the police would arrive than to actual response time. Response time alone was not a significant factor in citizen satisfaction.[30] Thus, the dominant strategy of policing has not performed particularly well in reducing or channeling citizens' fears.

In contrast to the Kansas City study of *motorized* patrol, two field experiments have now shown that citizens are aware of increases or decreases in levels of *foot* patrol, and that increased foot patrol reduces citizens' fears. After reviewing surveys of citizens' assessments of crime problems in neighborhoods that had enhanced, constant, or reduced levels of foot patrol, the authors of *The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment* concluded:

> ... persons living in areas where foot patrol was created perceived a notable decrease in the severity of crime-related problems.[31]

And:

> Consistently, residents in beats where foot patrol was added see the severity of crime problems diminishing in their neighborhoods at levels greater than the other two [kinds of] areas.[32]

Similarly, a foot patrol experiment in Flint, Michigan, found the following:

> Almost 70 percent of the citizens interviewed during the final year of the study felt safer because of the Foot Patrol Program. Moreover, many qualified their response by saying that they felt especially safe when the foot patrol officer was well known and highly visible.[33]

Whether foot patrol can work in less dense cities, and whether it is worth the cost, remain arguable questions. But the experimental evidence clearly supports the hypothesis that fear is reduced among citizens exposed to foot patrol.

Even more significantly, complex experiments in Newark and Houston with a varied mix of fear reduction programs showed that at least some programs could successfully reduce citizens' fears. In Houston, the principal program elements included:

1. a police community newsletter designed to give accurate crime information to citizens;
2. a community organizing response team designed to build a community organization in an area where none had existed;
3. a citizen contact program that kept the same officer patrolling in a particular area of the city and directed him to make individual contacts with citizens in the area;
4. a program directing officers to re-contact victims of crime in the days following their victimization to reassure them of the police presence; and
5. establishing a police community contact center staffed by two patrol officers, a civilian coordinator, and three police aids, within which a school program aimed at reducing truancy and a park program designed to reduce vandalism and increase use of a local park were discussed, designed, and operated.[34]

In Newark, some program elements were similar, but some were unique. Newark's programs included the following:

1. a police community newsletter;
2. a coordinated community policing program that in-

cluded a directed police citizen contact program, a neighborhood community police center, neighborhood cleanup activities, and intensified law enforcement and order maintenance;

3. a program to reduce the signs of crime that included: a) a directed patrol task force committed to foot patrol, radar checks on busy roads, bus checks to enforce city ordinances on buses, and enforcement of disorderly conduct laws; and b) a neighborhood cleanup effort that used police auspices to pressure city service agencies to clean up neighborhoods, and to establish a community work program for juveniles that made their labor available for cleanup details.[35]

Evaluations of these different program elements revealed that programs "designed to increase the quantity and improve the quality of contacts between citizens and police" were generally successful in reducing citizens' fears.[36] This meant that the Houston Citizen Contact Patrol, the Houston Community Organizing Response Team, the Houston Police Community Station, and the Newark Coordinated Community Policing Program were all successful in reducing fear.

Other approaches which encouraged close contact, such as newsletters, the victim re-contact program, and the signs-of-crime program, did not produce clear evidence of fear reduction in these experiments. The reasons that these programs did not work, however, may have been specific to the particular situations rather than inherent in the programs themselves. The victim re-contact program ran into severe operating problems in transmitting information about victimization from the reporting officers to the beat patrol officers responsible for the re-contacts. As a result, the contacts came far too long after the victimization. Newsletters might be valuable if they were published and distributed in the context of ongoing conversations with the community about crime problems. And efforts to eliminate the signs of crime through order maintenance and neighborhood cleanup might succeed if the programs were aimed at problems identified by the community. So, the initial failures of these particular program elements need not condemn them forever.

The one clear implication of both the foot patrol and fear reduction experiments is that closer contact between citizens and police officers reduces fear. As James Q. Wilson concludes in his foreword to the summary report of the fear reduction experiment:

In Houston, … opening a neighborhood police station, contacting the citizens about their problems, and stimulating the formation of neighborhood organizations where none had existed can help reduce the fear of crime and even reduce the actual level of victimization.[37]

In Newark, many of the same steps—including opening a storefront police office and directing the police to make contacts with the citizens in their homes—also had beneficial effects.

The success of these police tactics in reducing fear, along with the observation that fear is a separate and important problem, suggests a new area in which police can make a substantial contribution to the quality of life in the Nation's cities. However, it seems likely that programs like those tried in Flint, Newark, and Houston will not be tried elsewhere unless mayors and police administrators begin to take fear seriously as a separate problem. Such programs are expensive and take patrol resources and managerial attention away from the traditional functions of patrol and retrospective investigation of crimes. Unless their effects are valued, they will disappear as expensive luxuries.

On the other hand, mayors and police executives could view fear as a problem in its own right and as something that inhibits rather than aids effective crime control by forcing people off the streets and narrowing their sense of control and responsibility. If that were the case, not only would these special tactics become important, but the overall strategy of the department might change. That idea has led to wider and more sustained attacks on fear in Baltimore County and Newport News.

In Baltimore County, a substantial portion of the police department was committed to the Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit—a program designed to improve the quantity and quality of contacts between citizens and the police and to work on problems of concern to citizens.[38] A major objective was to reduce fear. The effort succeeded. Measured levels of fear dropped an average of 10 percent for the various projects during a 6 month period.[39] In Newport News, the entire department shifted to a style of policing that emphasized problem-solving over traditional reactive methods.[40] This approach, like COPE, took citizens' fears and concerns seriously, as well as serious crime and calls for service.

These examples illustrate the security-enhancing potential of problem-solving and community approaches to policing. By incorporating fear reduction as an im-

portant objective of policing, by changing the activities of the police to include more frequent, more sustained contacts with citizens, and by consultation and joint planning, police departments seem to be able not only to reduce fear, but to transform it into something that helps to build strong social institutions. That is the promise of these approaches.

Conclusion

Fear of crime is an important problem in its own right. Although levels of fear are related to levels of criminal victimization, fear is influenced by other factors, such as a general sense of vulnerability, signs of physical and social decay, and inter-group conflict. Consequently, there is both a reason for fear and an opportunity to work directly on that fear, rather than indirectly through attempts to reduce criminal victimization.

The current police strategy, which relies on motorized patrol, rapid responses to calls for service, and retrospective investigations of crime, seems to produce little reassurance to frightened citizens, except in unusual circumstances when the police arrest a violent offender in the middle of a crime spree. Moreover, a focus on controlling crime rather than increasing security (analogous to the medical profession's focus on curing disease rather than promoting health) leads the police to miss opportunities to take steps that would reduce fear independently of reducing crime. Consequently, the current strategy of policing does not result in reduced fear. Nor does it leave much room for fear reduction programs in the police department.

This is unfortunate, because some fear reduction programs have succeeded in reducing citizens' fears. Two field experiments showed that foot patrol can reduce fear and promote security. Programs which enhance the quantity and quality of police contacts with citizens through neighborhood police stations and through required regular contacts between citizens and police have been successful in reducing fear in Houston and Newark.

The success of these particular programs points to the potential of a more general change in the strategy of policing that (1) would make fear reduction an important objective and (2) would concentrate on improving the quantity and quality of contacts between citizens and police at all levels of the department. The success of these approaches has been demonstrated in Baltimore County and Newport News.

Based on this discussion, it is apparent that a shift in strategy would probably be successful in reducing fear, and that that would be an important accomplishment. What is more speculative (but quite plausible) is that community policing would also be successful in channeling the remaining fear along constructive rather than destructive paths. Criminal victimization would be reduced, and the overall quality of community life enhanced beyond the mere reduction in fear.

Discussion Questions

1. What causes the fear of crime in a neighborhood? Which crime patterns provoke the most fear?

2. What are the economic and social costs of fear? Can neighborhood patrols and self-defense forces counteract fear?

3. What can law enforcement agencies do to counteract fear? Can such strategies as foot patrol really make a difference?

4. Consider the benefits of a "high-tech," motorized, computer-equipped patrol force. What advantages could a police community organizing effort have over modern technology?

Notes

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