RECOGNIZING VALUE IN POLICING

The Challenge of Measuring Police Performance

Mark H. Moore
with
David Thacher
Andrea Dodge
Tobias Moore

POLICE EXECUTIVE
RESEARCH FORUM

INTRODUCTION

The Challenge of Measuring Police Performance

WITHIN WEEKS OF BEING APPOINTED Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), William Bratton shocked the jaded New York citizenry (and his own department!) by publicly declaring that the New York Police Department would reduce crime by 10 percent within the next year (Meyers 1992).

To some, it might not seem surprising that a police commissioner would make such a promise. That, after all, is presumably the point of having a police department. But for many years as crime rates rose, police chiefs (supported by criminologists) claimed that many important causes of crime were simply beyond police control (Bayley 1996). Consequently, it was unreasonable to hold them accountable for reducing crime. In such a world, it was refreshing for a highly visible police chief to make a public pledge to accomplish this important goal.

What added drama to the situation was that in making such a pledge, Bratton put himself and his department on the line. He was staking his personal reputation, the credibility of the Giuliani mayoral administration, and the professional standing of the NYPD on achieving the promised results. Naysayers and skeptics throughout the city (to say nothing of determined political opponents) would be watching closely to see whether Bratton would succeed. The city's crime statistics would ultimately tell the tale.

Having crawled out on this particular limb, Commissioner Bratton desperately needed company (Krauss 1994). He needed an administrative tool to spread the accountability he had personally embraced on behalf of the NYPD throughout the department. He found that device in COMPSTAT—a particular system of management control, supported by particular kinds of perfor-

mance measurements (Chetkovich 2000). COMPSTAT required each of the NYPD's 72 precinct commanders to appear at a meeting hosted by the department's top managers, and attended by their peers. At that meeting, each precinct commander's crime statistics were displayed on a large screen visible to all. The "brass" of the NYPD reviewed the statistics with them. Reductions in crime were noted and applauded, increases attracted close grilling, and commanders' inability to respond to the grilling was greeted by a chilly silence. Given that Bratton had replaced more than 30 percent of the precinct commanders shortly after his appointment, the precinct commanders reasonably believed their futures depended on showing that they had reduced crime, or had well-conceived plans for doing so (Bratton 1998).

Over the next few years, against all expectations, levels of reported crime dropped significantly in New York.

THE POTENTIAL POWER OF POLICE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

This simple story seems to reveal the enormous power of performance measures joined to a tough system of accountability to improve police performance. Apparently, all the police need do to improve their performance is 1) commit themselves to a sharp focus on reducing crime, 2) make themselves visibly and politically accountable for achieving that result, and 3) animate performance throughout the department by measuring the contribution that each organizational subunit makes to the organization's overall performance. In short, all police managers need do is determinedly apply the basic principles of Management 101: focus, measurement, and accountability.

No doubt, there is a great deal of truth in this simple idea. Indeed, I count myself among the most ardent supporters of the importance of encouraging public sector leaders to 1) focus the attention of their organization on a clear mission, 2) develop measurable goals consistent with their mission, 3) embrace political accountability for achieving measured goals and objectives, and 4) build internal measurement systems that help everyone in the organization feel accountable for making their individual contributions to the achievement of the overall goals. I am also delighted that the police would take responsibility for controlling crime, and by their apparent success in doing so.

Yet, the simple story of Bratton's success in New York raises some important questions that must be answered if we are to understand how measures of police performance can be used more generally, more reliably, and more accurately to enhance police departments' value to their communities.

EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT MEASURING POLICE PERFORMANCE

Some of the important questions are *empirical*. For example, what motivated Bratton to publicly embrace accountability for controlling crime? If he had not chosen to do so, could Mayor Giuliani, or the city council, or the citizens of New York have forced him to do so? If it was up to Bratton to choose, why did he decide on this apparently risky path? What could be done to create conditions under which other police executives might make this same choice (assuming for a moment that this choice was a desirable one)? These are empirical questions about the conditions that might cause managers to deploy performance measurement systems to manage their departments more effectively.

Other empirical questions focus on what causes a particular performance measurement system to take hold and powerfully influence police operations. Why do some measurement systems seem to exert a powerful influence over the hearts and minds of police officers, and shape the overall performance of the organization, while others fall flat and seem to have no impact on performance other than to burden the organization with paperwork? Does the behavioral power of a measurement system—its ability to guide and motivate behavior—have something to do with aligning the measured goals with the organization's existing culture? Or does it have more to do with the extent to which the *internal* systems of accountability are plugged into and aligned with *external* systems of accountability? Or perhaps its behavioral power depends principally on the particular way it is used inside the organization—how frequently the measures are reviewed, who reviews them, how public the review is, and what consequences flow from the review for the professional futures of those whose performance is being reviewed?

Answering empirical questions such as these is important for informing the technical design of performance management systems.

PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT POLICE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

Beyond these empirical questions that lead to technical advice, however, are deeper, more fundamental *normative philosophical* questions about the *values* that we want police departments both to express and achieve for us. For example, what, in the end, are the valuable (and valued) results of policing that would justify the investments that we make in police departments? It is clear, of course, that we expect them to reduce crime. We also count on them to produce the kind of justice that we associate with holding offenders accountable for their crimes. But do we also expect them to *prevent* crimes before they occur? If so, do we want them to use techniques beyond both arresting and

threatening to arrest offenders? How should we feel about the potential loss of liberty that might come from the police trying to anticipate crimes?

Another issue: We know that citizens' fears are less reliably linked to the objective risks of criminal victimization than we once imagined. We also know that there are things that the police can do to reduce fear that are not necessarily successful in reducing real crime. Thus, an important question becomes whether the police should think themselves accountable for reducing fear as well as for controlling crime?

A third issue: Where do our concerns for fairness and the proper use of force and authority fit into our idea about high-performing police departments? If a police department could achieve its crime control objectives using less force and authority, would we view that as an improvement in its performance? Is our interest in reducing the use of force and authority similar to or different than our desire to achieve law enforcement objectives at the lowest possible use of public dollars?

A fourth issue: How important is it for the police to act fairly? Does "fairly" mean that each case gets only what it "deserves" and that "like cases are treated alike"? What is the relationship between our interests in having the police behave fairly on one hand and our interest in controlling corruption on the other? Does "fairly" also mean that the police allocate their effort across a city according to a neighborhood's need for protection rather than its political influence or its share of the city's tax base?

Answering these sorts of value questions is key to answering the important *philosophical/strategic* questions about the purposes for which police departments should be managed.

Note that to develop a satisfactory performance measurement system for police departments it is necessary to answer *both* the empirical/technical questions and the philosophical/strategic questions. If one knows how to construct a measurement system that is behaviorally powerful, but cannot say what values the organization should express and achieve, one risks driving the organization in the wrong direction. If one knows the purposes for which a police department ought to be managed, but has no way of effectively driving the organization to achieve those purposes, one risks ineffectiveness and unreliability in achieving the desired results.

THE TASK AHEAD

These preliminary observations point to the difficulty of constructing a measurement system that can help the police both recognize and realize the value they can

create for the communities that invest in them. To construct such a system, one must deal with some important *philosophical* questions about what the important *purposes* of the police should be, and *who gets to decide* this important matter. One must also deal with practical *political* problems that have to do not only with negotiating terms of accountability between police chiefs and political overseers, but also among competing political overseers with different ideas about what the police should do. In addition, there are *technical* problems that must be solved to develop valid operational measures reliably linked to such abstract ideas as security, justice, and quality service. Finally, there are always the important questions of *cost and administrative feasibility* of developing and sustaining any system of performance measures inside a police department.

I do not offer these difficulties as reasons to resist the task, however. In fact, the purpose of this monograph is exactly the opposite. My aim is to work through the difficult problems, and finally develop a system for measuring police performance that could function as a more complete and truer guide to the value that police departments can deliver to their communities than those now in use.

The only reason to point to the complexities is to warn the reader that this is far from a simple problem. Indeed, those who want to treat the problem as simple and straightforward should probably stop here. The reality is that developing a suitable "bottom line" for policing is very difficult—philosophically, politically, technically, and administratively.

Yet, for all the difficulty, it is also important to keep in mind how urgent the task is, and how much value could be created if we could muster the will and skill required to make progress. Once developed and routinely used, a system that could reliably recognize and help to realize value in public policing would be useful to at least three important groups, each with their own important purposes.

- First, it would be useful to *citizens* who want to accurately reckon the value of the police departments they support.
- Second, it would be valuable to *police managers* who feel responsible for guiding their organizations toward achieving the maximum value they can return to the citizens who invest in them.
- Third, it would be valuable to *police officers* who want to know what is expected of them, and what they can do to increase their contributions to their communities.

Ideally, a police performance measurement system could usefully align the understandings of these three groups, and transform what is now a contentious relationship among these groups into one focused on achieving valued results rather than finger-pointing and criticism.

In developing the ideas about police performance measurement for this monograph, I make three fundamental assumptions. First, I take it for granted that technical measurement systems must be linked to behaviorally powerful systems of accountability. For measurement systems to be important either externally or internally, somebody who is powerful and important must be monitoring the performance recorded by the measurement system. A measurement system that is not used by some "principal" to hold some "agent" accountable is a waste of time and effort.[1] It simply will not produce the behavioral results that are the fundamental reason to construct the measurement system in the first place. On the other hand, joining a measurement system to a behaviorally powerful system of accountability is what transforms a technical measurement system into an important tool for managing the organization's performance.

Second, I assume that there are at least three distinct vantage points that one could adopt in developing a system of police performance measurement tied to accountability.[2] One is the vantage point of citizens or their representatives who want to know how the police are performing on particular dimensions of performance that are important to them. This is the subject of *external* accountability. The second is the vantage point of police executives and leaders who want to use systems of measurement to signal to their organizations what they think is valuable to produce, and distribute a sense of urgency about producing those valued results across the organization. That is the subject of *internal* accountability.

Obviously, there is a relationship between the two. The more closely aligned the external accountability system is with the internal accountability system, the more powerful the effect of the measurement system. But there may be some reasons for the two different systems to differ from one another to avoid

---

[1] For a discussion of principals and agents, see Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985. For a discussion in the context of the public sector, see Moore and Gates 1986.

[2] The two reasons that are commonly given for improving the measurement of public sector performance are meeting demands for external accountability, and demanding internal accountability from subordinate personnel. See Walters 1998.

either inappropriate political interference or a dispiriting kind of external micro-management.[3]

The third vantage point is that of the police managers and officers who are subjected to a particular system of accountability. Their important questions focus on whether the system asks them to do something that they think is both important and doable, whether it provides opportunities for them to learn and get better at their jobs, how much paperwork burden it imposes on them, and whether they believe the system is applied fairly. It may well be that a measurement system's ultimate effectiveness depends as much on the extent to which the troops accept its importance and legitimacy, as on the determination with which citizens and police executives seek to impose it.

Third, I assume that the development and use of a measurement system in the context of external and internal systems of accountability is a *strategic* rather than *technical* issue.[4] That is, I think that there are important philosophical and political choices to be made about the goals for which police departments might best be managed, and the particular dimensions of police performance that should be emphasized in a particular community. For example, some communities might want crime control above all else. Others might want to focus attention on the quality of the service the police provide. Still others might emphasize fairness and restraint in police operations.

I believe that such decisions about police purposes and the relative priority to be given to different aspects of police performance are properly guided by local community values and aspirations. I do not assume that there is only one answer to the question of what the police could best do for their local communities. I *do* assume, however, that there are some fairly generalizable ideas about the important *dimensions* of police performance that are common to all areas. That is what I am after. What will differ from one political community to

---

[3] The question of how transparent the internal performance measurement systems should be to external review is the topic of a keen debate in the private sector. See Kaplan and Norton 1996: 209–210.

[4] As David Bayley (1996:51) suggests, "Performance evaluation is more than an academic exercise, a matter of methodologies and numbers. How performance is measured affects not only what the public knows about the police, but also the character of police operations and the management climate. Because performance evaluations establish priorities, incentives, and requirements, they are much too important to be left to technicians. Performance measurement should be viewed as an integral, ongoing part of the management of policing." See also Behn 1997.

another is not the relevance of these different aspects of performance. Each community will view the different dimensions of performance as potentially important. What will differ across communities is how much emphasis they will place on the different aspects of performance, and how much effort they will put into actually measuring them.

By claiming that the issue of how best to measure the performance of policing is a strategic rather than a technical issue, I also mean that there are nearly always *dynamic* concerns about how one moves from one system of measurement to another. The path of development from the present system of performance measurement to some new, improved system will be influenced not only by issues of cost and technical feasibility, but also by issues of external politics and internal culture. In sum, I do not think there is a general answer to the question of how best to measure police performance. I think a great deal depends on what goals a local polity and its police chief think are valuable to achieve through their police departments, and what risks they are prepared to run in trying to shift or refocus their attention on previously neglected values or opportunities. My aim, then, is not to impose a general system, but to allow local communities to have an informed discussion about the possibilities.

I begin the discussion by looking at the compelling image of business' "bottom line" as an important challenge to measuring performance in government in general, and policing in particular. I do so at least in part because the commercial ideas of establishing a bottom line, identifying and satisfying customers, and insisting on external accountability have become very important in motivating and directing efforts to measure the performance of police departments. Because these private sector concepts are culturally and politically powerful, it is important to take some time to understand which parts of these ideas translate easily into the field of policing, and which do not. I turn, then, to the important question of what citizens and their representatives should and do expect of police departments, and how these aspirations might be tied to specific measures of performance in an effort to construct a suitable system of *external* accountability. I then ask how police managers might use measurement systems to improve performance within the department through improved *internal* systems of accountability. In the last section, I take up the question of how citizens, chiefs, and police officers might together, step by step, improve and add to existing measurement systems to improve the performance of the departments they oversee or staff.[5]

---

[5] These ideas are developed in more detail in Moore forthcoming.

PART I
Defining Value in Public Policing

CHAPTER 1

The Famed "Bottom Line": Recognizing Value and Measuring Performance in Business

IN SEARCHING FOR WAYS to exact higher performance from public organizations, it is impossible not to take inspiration from private sector practices (see, for example, Osborn and Gabler 1992). Citizens, like stockholders of private enterprises, want some simple summary of an organization's performance to know whether it merits continued investment. Police managers, like corporate CEOs, want to measure the performance of their organization's varied units to motivate performance, guide resource allocation, and help their organization learn what works. In short, both citizens and managers want some measure of performance that is as simple, powerful, and objective as the private sector's famed "bottom line."

To construct a measure that works as well for public policing, however, it is important to start with a clear understanding of what gives the bottom line its significant power in the private sector. It is also important to understand the limitations of these measures, and the reasons why many business investors and managers are moving beyond sole reliance on financial measures of performance (Kaplan and Norton 1996). This is important background before one takes on the special difficulties that arise when one tries to develop a bottom line for police agencies. Measurement in the private sector is by no means easy. Moreover, the easy answers are not necessarily the right ones. If that is true in the *private* sector, then easy answers are even more likely to be wrong in the public sector. After all, the values at stake in the public sector are more complex and difficult to measure than those in the private sector.

WHY THE BOTTOM LINE IS POWERFUL AND USEFUL IN BUSINESS

Technically speaking, business' bottom-line is a *financial* measure that compares 1) the *revenues* earned by a firm through the sale of goods and services to willing customers, with 2) the *costs* incurred in producing the goods and services. If more revenues were earned than costs incurred, then a company earns a *profit*. Profits, in turn, signal the firm's success. That success is practically important for the firm's investors, managers, suppliers, and employees. They can take satisfaction in a job well done, look forward to sharing in the financial rewards of having done that job well, and anticipate a healthy future for the organization.

The firm's profitability has a larger social significance as well. If a firm has earned a profit, society as a whole can be reasonably sure that the *firm has created value for the society as a whole,* not just for the shareholders and employees. That conclusion follows from two simple facts and one important normative assumption.

> *Fact #1:* Customers showed how much they valued the products and services by voluntarily plunking their own money down for the products and services.

> *Fact #2:* When consumers' valuations of the product and service were counted up and compared with the costs of producing it, there was more value to consumers than costs of production.

> *Normative Assumption:* To the extent that we, as a society, think there is public value in meeting the demands of individual consumers, then we, as a society, can conclude that a profitable firm creates *public* as well as *private* value.

Of course, one can quarrel with the normative assumption that there is public value in satisfying individual desires. It is hard to agree that value is simply what consumers are willing to buy when they buy such trivial things as lemon-scented furniture polish and hula hoops. Indeed, one can become quite indignant about the social value of spending scarce resources and managerial attention on such products. With all the problems there are in the world, why are we spending any energy at all on producing these gimmicks?

Yet, when called to account for the value of their work by a skeptical public sector audience, those who make these products have a powerful

answer—they simply point to the fact that people buy them. That fact shows that these products are at least *valued* by someone if not *intrinsically valuable*. If society thinks that *individual valuations* of products deserve respect (which virtually all liberal societies do), then lemon-scented furniture polish and hula hoops are *socially* as well as *individually* valuable. The cash paid into the till by a willing customer is all the evidence that a liberal society needs of social value creation.

Indeed, it is hard to overestimate the usefulness of *revenues earned through the sale of products and services to willing customers* as a piece of information about an organization's performance. This number, viewed as a performance measure, has at least five key attributes that make it nearly ideal for purposes of rendering accounts externally and guiding activity internally:

- First (and most important) revenues earned by the sale of products and services to willing customers provide a direct measure of value to the customer. We know *that* they value the product and service because they bought it. We even know *how much* they valued it because they paid a particular price for it!
- Second, because revenues are recorded in the currency of dollars, it is possible to compare the value that consumers place on different products and services. If people are willing to pay 25 cents for apples and 50 cents for oranges, we can, in fact, compare the value of apples and oranges with high reliability.
- Third, because the *costs* of producing products and services are also recorded in the currency of dollars, one can directly compare the costs of production with the value of the product. Indeed, that is precisely what the "bottom line" does. When more revenues are earned than costs incurred, one can presume that value has been created, as well as the future of the enterprise ensured.
- Fourth, all the information contained in the revenue is gathered at low administrative cost right at the boundary of the organization. We know the value of a product at precisely the moment the customer hands over the cash. Unlike the efforts we typically undertake when we evaluate social programs, we do not have to wait for socially valued effects to

occur at some remote time in the future. We do not have to go out into the field to find out what happens over the long run to the addict we once treated. The cash register right there at the counter provides better, faster, and cheaper information about organizational performance than any program evaluation, however intelligently designed and executed.

- Fifth, because revenues are not just *measures* that are valuable in running the organization, but also *real money* that employees could divert to other personal purposes, businesses cannot be casual about accounting for the revenue they earned. They need accuracy to discourage theft as well as gauge the overall value of their operations. Indeed, the financial accounting systems now used to provide investors and managers with important data about how to evaluate and strategically position their organizations were originally constructed for the much more limited purpose of controlling theft. It took us several centuries to learn the managerial uses of the system. But, because we now have several centuries of experience with systems designed to ensure that revenues are reliably accounted for, we can count on very accurate measurement of revenues when such systems are used for these newer purposes. Again, this contrasts rather sharply with the confidence we can have in measurements of quantities and quality of government output, which are far more recently constructed, and less reliably tied to efforts to guard against theft.

To sense the power of earned revenue for measuring an organization's value and performance, simply consider the plight of private sector managers if we denied them this information. Suppose we told investors of an automobile manufacturing company, or managers of a fast food franchise, that they could have all the *cost* information they wanted, but no *revenue* information. What would happen to their ability to evaluate their investments, or manage their operations? What would they do to compensate for the loss of that information?

It doesn't take much reflection to see that both investors and managers of such commercial enterprises are seriously weakened when revenue information is lacking. They know their costs, but they don't have a clue about the

value of their products and services. Nor do they know much about their ability to generate a revenue stream that can sustain the enterprise. Therefore, the investors can't know whether the enterprises they own are creating either private or social value, and the managers can't figure out how to improve their performance. The auto manufacturer doesn't know whether the cars he is producing are valuable, and whether he should stay in this business. The fast food manager doesn't know whether the hamburgers and fries are worth enough to the customers who are lined up to wolf them down to cover the costs of managing the teenagers behind the counter.

To compensate for the loss of revenue information, these managers might well end up doing many of the same things that public sector managers do. They might survey their customers to find out whether they liked the cars they bought or the hamburgers they ate. Alternatively, they might consult with mechanical engineers or nutritionists to tell them whether their cars and hamburgers were "good" in some technical sense, whether the cars were safe and fuel efficient, and whether the burgers were germ-free and nutritious. Each of these efforts to gauge value would be more expensive, slower, and more equivocal as an indicator of value than simply tallying up the revenues earned each day by the sale of these products. That is why the revenue number is so important both as a valid indicator of value creation, and as a guide to improved performance.

The first problem, then, in constructing a bottom line for policing is finding some way to define and recognize the *value* of police activity. As we will see, this is by no means obvious. It is not clear who should do the valuing of police activities. Nor is it clear what the proper customers of police either do or should value. Nor, finally, is it clear how the dimensions of performance that are valued can be measured.

LIMITATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL BOTTOM LINE:
THE NEED FOR A "BALANCED SCORECARD"

Before tackling these problems, however, it is worth discussing the *limitations* as well as the strengths of the financial bottom line, because many business leaders are recognizing that, valuable as financial measures of performance are, they are no longer enough to allow them to manage their enterprises successfully (Kaplan and Norton 1996). Of course, businesses are not proposing to do away with their financial measures; they remain central both to capital markets and to business operations (Kaplan and Norton 1996). Yet many leading businesses recognize that they must supplement these financial measures with additional measures. They do this for two principal reasons.

Focusing on the Future: Investments in Learning and Key Relationships

First, companies have developed nonfinancial measures to focus their attention on the things they must do today to ensure their financial viability for the future.[6] After all, a truly successful business does not produce a profit only once. Rather, it *sustains profitability over time.* Yet, to sustain profitability over time, the organization must *invest* today in activities that will not produce a financial return until tomorrow—and then only uncertainly. Because the investments get recognized today as *costs* but have no *revenues* to set against them, investments typically have a negative impact on an organization's financial bottom line.

Yet, investments in new production processes and new products are precisely the things that increase the organization's future profitability and value. To ensure sustained attention to these value-creating activities, organizations need to develop measurement systems that focus their attention on efforts to improve and learn for the future, as well as perform in the present. These measurements foster the discipline a company needs to avoid pursuing profitability today at the expense of profitability tomorrow. Two different kinds of investments are important: investments in *learning,* and investments in the quality of key working *relationships.*

Investments in Learning. There are different kinds of investments in learning and improving. For example, some private companies develop measurement systems that focus their attention on "continuous process improvements" (Cohen and Brand 1993; Varley and Zimmerman 1992). These are often companies that focus their productive energies on a single product—say, aluminum, or bottle caps. Because these organizations are producing a single, relatively homogeneous product, the only way they can make money is to establish and maintain some kind of cost or quality advantage over their competitors. This requires them, in turn, to commit themselves to continuous process improvement designed either to drive down the costs or increase the quality of their results. To ensure continuous process improvement, their measurement systems must allow them to look behind their current financial mea-

---

[6] Kaplan and Norton (1996:7–8) suggest that "financial measures tell the story of past events...[They] are inadequate for guiding and evaluating the journey that information age companies must make to create future value through investment. The Balanced Scorecard complements financial measures of past performance with measures of the drivers of future performance."

sures to see the details of the manufacturing processes that are now producing their financial results—how long it takes them to execute a particular step in their production process, how often they have to change their tools to retain quality, how small an inventory of parts they can get away with, and hundreds of other details of their manufacturing activities. In short, they must supplement their measures of *financial outcomes* with detailed measurements of *operating processes* (Kaplan and Norton 1996:27). These measurements of *operating processes* as opposed to *financial outcomes* are important because they initially point toward places where improvement can be made. Then, once an effort has been made to improve operations, the systems can record whether the improvements have been achieved.

To the extent that these process measures help to improve operations, the results will eventually show up in the financial measures as reduced costs associated with particular processes. But it is important to understand that these systems measure a cost per unit of an intermediate output—not a financial bottom line in which the total costs are compared with revenues earned by the final sale of a product or service. The analogue in policing would be not to focus on crime reduction per se, but instead on some aspects of the way police do their work—the amount of time it takes them to contact a key witness, the reliability with which they store narcotics evidence, and so on.

Typically, the kinds of investments linked to continuous process improvements are relatively small, and focus on process improvements rather than the development of new products or businesses. Larger investments in new products are counted as research and development, or R&D, expenditures. For many high-tech firms operating in intensely competitive markets such as Texas Instruments or Johnson and Johnson, high R&D spending is essential to stay ahead of the competition (Vancil 1972). The problem is that, in the short run, R&D spending reduces the organization's measured profitability. Over the long run, however, it is the only thing that sustains profitability. Consequently, high-performing technology companies have found ways to measure their R&D efforts and accomplishments independently of past profitability, and have developed the internal organizational discipline required to continue to invest in R&D even when the financial returns are both uncertain and in the future (Kaplan and Norton 1996:92). An analogy from the world of policing might be the efforts to learn whether new procedures, such as mandatory arrests in cases of domestic violence, are more effective than older procedures, or whether undercover sting operations are effective in arresting muggers and reducing robbery.

The largest and riskiest investments of all, however, are those that an organization makes when it repositions itself in its environment by making a fundamental strategic change—for example, when Bethlehem Steel decides to diversify into the plastics industry, or General Electric decides to sell off its traditional business in small electric appliances to pursue opportunities in factory automation and consumer credit (Aguilar, Hamermesh, and Brainard 1985). Such large changes are always very expensive and risky. But they are sometimes necessitated by dramatic changes in the market that either threaten an organization's core business, or create significant new opportunities for a company to exploit. These changes, too, cut into today's operating profitability. Indeed, the changes are often so expensive to execute that they cannot be financed from internal funds. Instead, the firm must reach out for more equity financing, or take on increased debt.

In raising the required outside funds, the business typically must tell a story about why the important strategic change can be expected to increase profitability in the future (Kaplan and Norton 1996:165). It must also set out a business plan that describes the assumptions it is making about market conditions, and establishes milestones to be achieved in managing the strategic change. This provides external investors with a chance to review the organization's performance on a basis other than its current financial performance. It can check the company's reasoning about market conditions, and it can check the company's performance in "retooling" itself to take advantage of the new opportunity. If events occur that make the initial assumptions less plausible, or if the company's progress in making the required changes slows down, the investors can re-evaluate. In effect, the rationale and plan for change substitute for the financial bottom line in capturing the firm's value.[7] The analogy in policing might be an organization's decision to shift from a strategy of reactive policing, to a strategy of community problem solving.

Investments in Relationships with Customers, Suppliers, and Employees. Still other consumer product and service organizations have found that the key to future profitability is not only in the investments that allow them to improve their production processes, bring new products to market,

---

[7] The existence of a business plan explains why biotech firms with no revenues and no marketable products—that is with no financial evidence of value creation—can nonetheless have a capital valuation in the stock market. Investors are valuing a story of future profitability. The stock price moves up and down in response to the credibility of the story.

and strategically reposition their firms, but also in the strength of their *relationships* with customers, employees, and suppliers (Kaplan and Norton 1996:7–8). The idea is that loyal customers, motivated employees, and satisfied suppliers all help to reduce costs and uncertainties in the future. As a result, it is valuable to spend money today to strengthen these relationships.

Yet maintaining these working relationships over the long run can cut into short-run profit performance. If managers respond only grudgingly to consumer complaints about poor-quality products and services, or if they press their employees for reduced wages and increased effort, or if they squeeze their suppliers for reduced costs and faster responses, then they can add to the company's financial bottom line. The price, however, is that relationships are frayed, and with that, some potential for future profitability.

Faced with this choice, many private sector companies have decided that the long-run relationship is more important than reduced costs today.[8] As a result, they have developed measurement systems that look closely at customer satisfaction, employee morale, and the quality of the working relationships they have with suppliers. They have also developed customer relations policies, human resource management systems, and contracting systems that are designed to attract and sustain the loyalty and commitment of these key stakeholders. The analogy in policing might be to recognize that community support is essential to effective police performance, and to develop measures that could keep the police apprised of whether their stock of legitimacy and good will in the community is increasing or diminishing.

Recognizing Nonfinancial Values of the Firm

Second, many private sector businesses have realized that they have many purposes they value and goals they want to achieve that are not fully captured by their financial performance (Kaplan and Norton 1996:7). For example, many companies want to be known as socially responsible companies—the kind that protect the environment, promote human rights, avoid racial discrimination, or contribute as good corporate citizens to other social goals. Their commitment to these goals is both reflected in and achieved by the development of measurement systems that record their performance in achieving these goals as well as their financial targets (Elkington 1998; Hopkins 1999).

---

[8] Companies do, however, make an important distinction between profitable and unprofitable customers. See Kaplan and Norton 1996:71–72.

Of course, there may be long-run financial reasons for companies to align themselves with these social objectives. For example, they may think that by doing so, they will curry favor with consumers. Or they may think that pursuing some of these goals will allow them to gain credibility with government regulators (Kaplan and Norton 1996:34–35). Or they may think that aligning themselves with these values will enable them to compete more effectively for high-quality employees who also value these objectives. These effects, in turn, will add to their financial bottom line as well as produce an uncompensated but nonetheless real social value.

But the point remains that they focus attention on achieving purposes beyond short-run financial performance by developing and using measures that capture their performance in achieving these purposes.

Toward a Balanced Scorecard for Measuring Corporate Performance

Because investments in organizational learning; strengthened relations with customers, employees, and suppliers; and the achievement of nonfinancial but socially valuable goals are all recognized by financial systems as costs in the short run that lead to profitability in the long run, it is important for companies to measure their performance in these dimensions as well as on short-run profitability. Otherwise, they focus too much attention on short-run profitability, and miss opportunities for improving their long-run performance. To promote sustained performance over the long run, they go beyond financial measures in search of a "balanced scorecard" (Kaplan and Norton 1996).Note, however, that none of the claims made above about the contribution that various activities could make to the company's bottom line are proven general propositions. The long-run financial returns to a company engaging in these activities are all largely unknown, both in general, and for any particular company.

What makes investors willing to invest in companies that are performing well on these indicators, and managers determined to measure and improve performance on these particular dimensions of performance, is belief in a *theory* that links these activities to future profitability. While plausible, this theory is by no means proven (Kaplan and Norton 1996:17,165). Yet, when thinking about how to perform best in the future, managers in the private sector have no choice but to rely on a theory. To some degree, both investors and managers can rely on a proven fact—namely, their past performance. But to perform well in the future, they have to be prepared to bet on some theory of future value creation. They cannot know whether their theory of value creation is right until the future happens to them. By that time, of course, they will have to be thinking about the next period, for which the same uncertainty obtains.

The implication is that, in planning for future value creation, private sector managers find themselves in circumstances that are quite similar to public sector managers. Both have to make decisions and operate on the basis of a *theory* of value creation that is embedded in their strategic plan. Neither can depend wholly on proven facts from the past. They have to make bets on theories of future value creation. Of course, they can develop measurements that allow them to track their performance against their theory. But they cannot be sure that their theory is correct until the future happens to them.

In this respect, a modern biotech company committed to developing future drugs is a lot like the defense department—they both have to invest a great deal in developing a product that they are not sure will work. Their only guide in making the investment is a theory that links today's activities to value creation in the future. The only way that investors can evaluate their performance is by testing the plausibility of their theory.

The fact that business is less enamored of the financial bottom line, and is relying more on nonfinancial measures both to recognize their value to the society and find ways to improve their performance, should be good news for public sector organizations. The reason is simply that, in the absence of good financial measures, public sector organizations and managers have long been forced to rely almost exclusively on these other kinds of measures (Kaplan and Norton 1996:179–180). Thus, the challenge facing both private and public managers is not simply to adopt financial measures of performance and use them ruthlessly to evaluate and guide operations. It is, instead, to learn how to use measures that reflect a theory of future value creation to guide organizations toward improved performance. That is the task we essay below for policing.

CHAPTER 2

A "Bottom Line" for Policing:
What Are the Profits? Who Are the Customers?

GIVEN THE ENORMOUS POWER of a financial bottom line in managing business enterprises, it is tempting to want the same kind of thing for public policing. Moreover, it is tempting to try to construct this "bottom line" for policing by relying on the same basic concepts that the public sector relies on—e.g., that value lies in the satisfaction of individual "customers," and in the "profits" earned by the organization for its shareholders and owners.

REDUCED CRIME AS THE "PROFIT" GENERATED BY POLICING

Bratton wholeheartedly embraced this business-like approach when he declared, "crime reduction is the 'profit' that a police department produces for a community's citizens and taxpayers." In making this claim, he was implicitly endorsing two powerful ideas.

The first is that police organizations and their "investors" should use concepts from business to recognize and pursue public value. More precisely, they should be clear about who the customers of the police are, and what those valued customers want from the police. Once clear on these matters, they should stick to achieving those valued objectives as their core mission, and rely on measurement and accountability to achieve them.

The second is that the most important value the police can achieve is to reduce crime. There may be other things that citizens want the police to do, and other valuable effects that they produce. In the end, however, the most important job of the police is to reduce crime. Period. That is the idea that aligns the expectations of citizens, their elected representatives, police leaders, and police officers.

It is the simplicity, clarity, and conventionality of this position that gives the idea that reducing crime is the single most important result of policing its significant political and organizational power.

Now, given the extensive discussion of the role of financial measures in the private sector, it should be obvious that I don't want to argue with the idea that private sector accounting models provide a compelling image of how, ideally, the police should account for their activities. Indeed, my task is precisely to construct an accounting framework that can do for police departments what today's financial and nonfinancial measurement systems do for business enterprises—namely, reliably recognize and help managers realize the value their organizations are able to produce. Nor do I want to argue with the idea that one of the important goals and valuable results of public policing is to reduce crime. That goal remains central to all visions of what a police department should do and be, and central to all performance measurement systems.

What I *do* want to resist, however, is the facile use of (misunderstood) private sector concepts to measure police performance. I also want to resist the casual assumption (but not necessarily the considered judgment) that reducing crime captures the full value of what public police departments do or should provide to the communities that support them.

In short, I am concerned that, despite its appeal, the idea that crime reductions are the only thing to be used in measuring police performance is fundamentally flawed. Indeed, I am deeply concerned that this commonly embraced idea leads police departments *away from* rather than *toward* the production of public value. Briefly, I think the idea that crime reduction is the "profit" earned by the police is wrong in a *technical* sense because it confuses the *gross* value produced by a police department with its *net* value. It is wrong in a *philosophical* sense because it fails to accommodate the important consequences of the fact that police departments use public authority as well as public money to accomplish their goals. It is wrong both *philosophically* and *practically* because it fails to identify accurately the important customer whose desires should be satisfied by a public police department. And it is potentially wrong *strategically* because it does not necessarily identify the full set of valuable purposes that a properly run police department could reasonably aspire to achieve. Let's take up these arguments in turn.

REVENUES VS. PROFITS: THE GROSS VS. THE NET VALUE OF POLICING

The problem with equating "crime reduction" with "profit" begins with a technical error. "Reducing crime" is not, in a strict accounting sense, equiva-

lent to a company's profit. Strictly speaking, "crime reduction" is closer to the idea of the *gross revenues* a private company earns by producing and selling particular products and services, not its *profit*.

In the private sector, the *gross value* of an organization's output is measured by the amount that customers paid for the firm's products and services. This amount registers in a private company's accounting system as the *revenues* earned by selling products and services. *Profit*, however, is calculated by *subtracting* from the company's *revenues* the *costs* it incurred in producing its products and services. *Revenues* are a measure of the *gross* value that customers attached to the firm's output. *Profits*, on the other hand, are a measure of the *net* value produced by the firm. *Net* value is what both the firm and the society are after. After all, as companies such as Sears and Roebuck and Harley-Davidson have painfully learned, they can earn huge revenues and still run the risk of bankruptcy if those huge revenues fail to cover even larger material and operating costs.

By analogy, then, the value that citizens attach to police success in reducing crime is the equivalent of the *revenue* earned by a police department. That is (at least part of) the value they attach to the products and services of the police. To calculate the *profit* earned by the police, however, one would have to subtract the *costs* incurred in producing that valuable result. That is the measure of the *net* value of the police. And the *net* value of the police to the society is what ought to interest us—not just its gross value. As citizens, we should be interested not only in how much the police reduced crime, but also in *how much it cost to produce that result.* Managers ought to be interested in trying to widen the difference between the valuable results the police produce (reduced crime), and the costs incurred in producing those results.

But what costs should be recognized in calculating the net value created by a public police force? The most obvious are the direct financial costs—the dollars paid out in salaries and benefits to working officers, the costs of training the officers to do their jobs well, the purchase of gasoline and automobiles that allow the officers to patrol and respond to calls for service, and so on. By subtracting these costs from the benefits associated with reducing crime, we could approximate something like the private sector's financial bottom line. (We could get even closer to a public sector equivalent of a bottom line if we could find a way to "monetize" the benefits of reducing crime or other valuable results produced by the police. Then, we could subtract the monetary costs from the monetized benefits and calculate in financial terms whether the enterprise was "profitable" or not. The problem, of course, is that it is not easy to monetize the benefits of reducing crime.)

AUTHORITY AS A RESOURCE

It is important to recognize, however, that tax dollars are not the only asset that police departments use in reducing crime. The other valuable asset that is deployed in police operations is *state authority*. As the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force (1987) observed,

> The police are entrusted with important public resources. The most obvious is money: $230 million a year flows through the Philadelphia Police Department. Far more important, the public grants the police another resource—the use of force and authority. These are deployed when a citizen is arrested or handcuffed, when an officer fires his weapon at a citizen, and when an officer claims exclusive use of the streets with his siren.

Just as the *money* that public police use comes from money that would otherwise be used for private consumption, so the extensive *authority* that the police use in their work comes from the stock of private liberty that we, as citizens, enjoy as a matter of right. We are as reluctant to part with our private *liberty*, as we are to part with our *money*.

Of course, we may be persuaded to part with our liberty in the interest of being safe from the attacks of criminals, just as we might be persuaded to part with some of our money to accomplish the same goal. But the point is that we part with these assets only grudgingly. All other things being equal, we would like the police to use the authority we grant them sparingly. That is why we train police officers extensively in methods that allow them to accomplish important law enforcement objectives with the minimum use of force. And that is why we pay damages to individuals who can show that they have been the victims of inappropriate uses of police force and authority (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). In an important accounting sense, we have to recognize the grant of authority to the police as an asset, and count its use in police operations as a cost to be weighed against the benefits of lowering crime.

The fact that the police use public authority in their efforts to reduce crime means, at a minimum, that we ought to account for the use of that asset in calculating the net benefits produced. If we reduced crime, but did so by relying on more intrusive investigative techniques, or patrol techniques that were both more assertive and viewed as biased, then the increased use of authority would have to be viewed as a loss to be put against the gain.

But the fact that public police departments use public authority has two even more important effects on how we think about police department performance. First, it changes the substantive criteria we use to evaluate police performance. Second, the use of authority by the police has a profound effect on our understanding of who the important "customers" of the police really are.

JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS AS IMPORTANT GOALS OF POLICING

Consider, first, how the police use of authority might change the evaluative criteria we use to reckon the value of police operations. When we talk about money, we are primarily interested in a means/ends calculus: the cost of a means compared with the value of an end. The key words here are *efficiency* and *effectiveness*.

When we talk about the use of authority, however, the criteria shift to concerns about *justice* and *fairness*. When public authority is used, citizens are interested not only in *how much* authority was used and to what important effect, but also in how *justly* and *fairly* it was deployed. After all, we support police departments not only to achieve the practical result of reducing crime, but also to achieve the principled result of "doing justice." Justice is produced when we succeed in calling offenders to account for their crimes. It is also achieved when we respect the rights of those suspected of crimes. And, a certain kind of justice and fairness is achieved when we equitably distribute the burdens and benefits of public policing across the general population.

Producing justice, fairness, and equity may seem like abstract values—more important to academicians and idealists than to practical people like citizens, mayors, and police chiefs. Yet, I suspect that more chiefs have lost their jobs due to failures to solve particularly horrendous crimes, or scandals surrounding the excessive use of force, or allegations of police corruption than to public indignation about failures to be cost-effective in controlling crime. If true, this would imply that the public has at least some intermittent interest in the capacity of the police to produce *justice* and *fairness* as well as *crime control effectiveness*.

Moreover, there are many individual citizens who suffer daily from a reasonable, experience-based belief that they will be subjected to higher levels of police scrutiny and receive lower levels of police service than their fellow citizens (Flanagan and Vaughn 1996). Their sense of unfairness must count as a loss in accounting for the value of public policing. Such disappointments must be considered a loss in themselves, for an important goal of the police ought to be to satisfy all the citizens of their community. They can also be considered a

loss because the disappointments can undermine these citizens' willingness to help the police achieve the practical goal of controlling crime, and in doing so, increase the costs or reduce the effectiveness of the police in this important task.

Our interest in ensuring that the public authority invested in police departments is used *justly* and *fairly* as well as *cost-effectively* flows naturally from the view that, in a free society, state authority is a collectively owned asset. It follows, then, that it should not be used at all unless it is for the good of all. Moreover, when authority is used, it is supposed to be used only for particular, specified purposes, and is to be applied equally across differently situated individuals. That is what we mean by justice and fairness (Packer 1968).

This claim that the police use of authority exposes them to accountability for fairness as well as for efficiency and cost-effectiveness gains even more bite when we remember that much of the *money* we use to operate police departments is also raised through the use of *authority*. Typically, individuals do not choose to purchase the level of public policing they would like as individuals. Instead, they pay taxes, some of which go to support a public police department. By definition, taxes use state authority to collect money for public purposes. It is logical to conclude that public expenditures of *money* raised through the power of taxation must meet standards of fairness and equity just as public uses of authority must. For example, to the extent that public law enforcement creates benefits for citizens in the form of heightened security or a stronger sense of justice, those benefits ought, in principle, to be as fairly distributed as the costs and obligations (*Serrano vs. Priest* 1976. 18 Cal. 3d 728).

THE IMPORTANT CUSTOMERS OF POLICE: CITIZENS AND TAXPAYERS VS. CLIENTS

The fact that police use state authority both directly (to call offenders to account) and indirectly (to raise money to pay salaries and buy gasoline) also has a profound impact on who might best be considered the "customers" of the police.[9] Discerning the important customers of police is important if one is going to use private sector concepts to help manage police departments, because private sector concepts treat customers as the key arbiters of value. It is the customers who get to decide what is valuable. It is the success of organizations in meeting customer demands that not only allows them to carry on, but also justifies their continued existence.

---

[9] The following lines of discussion are developed in Moore 1995.

Citizen Callers and the Quality of "Customer Service"

In trying to identify the "customers" of public policing, it is natural to look to those individuals who most resemble customers in the private sector—namely, those individuals who both *transact with* and *benefit from* a police department's operations. With this concept as a guide, one could naturally conclude that the customers of policing are those who call the police for assistance: the mugging victims who want their assailants arrested and punished, the victims of car theft who want the offenders caught and their property recovered, the anxious mothers who want their children's path to elementary school cleared of gangs and drug dealers.

These individuals closely resemble customers in the private sector in three important respects: 1) they are "downstream" in the production process, 2) they want particular bits and pieces of service from the police and may be indifferent to everything about the organization other than what it is doing for them as individuals, and 3) they *benefit* as individuals if they can get the services they want from the police. We can also easily imagine what attributes of performance such customers would value in a police department's operation: fast, open-ended, polite responses to their requests for assistance—whatever those might be.[10]

It is almost certainly true that those who call the police are, in some important sense, customers of the police. Presumably, an important goal of policing should be to provide some relatively high degree of satisfaction to such individuals. And, if this is an important goal of policing, we ought to find a way to measure it.

Yet, it is possible that satisfying these individual customers of the police is less important than it would be in the private sector. One reason is simply that such customers differ from private sector customers in one crucial respect—they do not *pay* for the service. Or, more precisely, they do not pay for the service when they decide to use the service for their own immediate purposes. The costs of police service are paid wholesale by taxpayers, not at retail by customers. An important implication of this fact is that the individuals who call the police can avail themselves of a service that is paid for by others. Indeed, they can claim hundreds of dollars in public resources for nothing more than the price of a phone call.

---

[10] These concrete features of police service and operations are what Kaplan and Norton call the "value propositions" from a customer perspective—the specific attributes that will build customer loyalty and commmitment. See Kaplan and Norton 1996:30.

Arguably, for purposes of properly valuing an organization's output, one of the most important characteristics of customers is precisely that they *do* pay for the organization's products and services. After all, it is their decision to spend their own money on a particular product or service that creates the presumption that what the organization is producing is valuable. If one can have a service without paying for it, it is not clear how much one values it.

Citizens and Taxpayers as the Paying Customers of Police

If *paying* for an organization's products and services is important, then to find the important customers of the police, one must look *away* from the individuals who *call* the police for services. One must look, instead, to the citizens and taxpayers who *pay* for the police department; that is, the individuals who provide the money and the authority the police need to stay in operation. After all, their decisions to give up some of their money and some of their freedom provide the wherewithal that the police need to do their job and stay in business. And the fact that citizens and taxpayers pay for police operations makes *them*, rather than the individual clients who call the police for services, the important customers of the police.

They are an odd kind of customer, however. While individual taxpayers do on occasion call the police for service, on the whole they do not interact with the police department "downstream" in the production process by capturing bits of the organization's overall production for their own use. Instead, they interact with the police department "upstream" where the organization seeks authorization and resources to carry on. In this respect, they are more like "owners" or "shareholders" than "customers."

More important, at that "upstream" end, they do not act as individuals by claiming little bits of the organization's output of products and services for themselves. Instead, they participate in a collective, political, policymaking process, which forges their individual interests and views into some kind of collective decision about what they would like their publicly owned and operated police department to produce.

Citizens and Taxpayers as a Political Community.

A careful reader might have noticed that much of the discussion above used the word "we" when discussing the valuation of police departments. That word "we" was particularly prominent when the subject under discussion was the value attached to such qualities as justice and fairness in police operations. But it was also there when the subject under discussion was crime reduction as an

aggregate value to be pursued—not as the aim of an individual victim who called the police, hoping to reclaim his or her property and sense of security.

An important question, of course, is just who is this "we" that is referred to in these discussions? As Tonto is alleged to have asked the Lone Ranger in a somewhat different (but hardly irrelevant) context, "What do you mean 'we,' white man?" It is a very important question. If it is a "we" that values policing, then figuring out who that "we" is, and what it is that "we" want is crucially important.

In principle, "we" could refer to two quite different ideas. In one definition, "we" could refer simply to the summation of each individual included within the concept of "we." Each individual could have an idea of what he or she wanted or expected from policing, and have some valuation of what they got from a public police department. The value that the "we" attached to a public police force would simply be the summation of those individual valuations of their experiences with the department.

In a second definition, however, "we" could refer to the result of a (quite imperfect) political process that produced some collective agreement about what "we" as a collective wanted from our collectively owned public police department. In this formulation, each of us would have to give up some of our individual ideas of what we wanted from the police department, and have our own views subordinated to what the collective thought was the right thing to expect and want from a police department. In effect, the value of the police department would lie not in the satisfaction of those who called the police for service, nor in the satisfaction of the desires of individual citizens and taxpayers, but instead in the extent to which the police force lived up to a collective understanding of what the publicly authorized, financed, and directed police force ought to produce and how it ought to produce it.

The Mission of the Police as a Community Choice

This might seem like an odd idea, but it is actually what we mean when we say that a police department ought to pursue its agreed upon "mission." The mission of the police department, whether established by tradition, statute, professional aspiration, or informal agreement, is important precisely because it embodies a shared, collective conception of what police departments should try to achieve, and how they ought to behave in trying to achieve their goals. A department's mission is a collectively defined aggregate purpose, not an individually valued transaction.

Of course, "we" could decide that one of the things "we" wanted was a police department that would deliver to each of us, when victimized by crime,

a high-quality and responsive service. But the important point is that "quality service" to individuals would become an important dimension of police performance *only if the collective agreed that it was important.* This differs from the usual conditions in the private sector, where managers can assume that one of their objectives is to provide quality service to paying customers.

If it is true that the value of a police department is established by a collective deciding what kind of police department they would like to have, and that this view takes precedence over what individuals might want from police departments, then one can easily imagine circumstances in which the society's goals might conflict with an individual's goal. Indeed, the tension between the goals of producing consumer satisfaction on one hand, and crime reduction on the other, is revealed in a culturally significant bit of police procedure and language.[11]

Officers on patrol are often dispatched to respond to an individual citizen's call for service. When they arrive at the scene, they typically radio the dispatcher, and announce that they are *"going out of service."* They say this at precisely the moment when they step from the car to meet the citizen who called! Then, when the officers leave the citizen and get back into their cars, they radio the dispatcher to say they are "back in service."

Obviously, the issue here is who are the officers "in service" to—the individual citizen, or the dispatcher? Given today's focus on customer service, one is inclined to think that police officers should be "in service" when they are meeting and talking to the individual citizens who called. That seems more important than serving the dispatcher, who wants nothing more from the patrol officer than that he or she be ready for another call.

Yet, a little reflection reveals that the dispatcher is embodying another kind of socially valued capability—namely, the police capacity to respond quickly when a dire emergency arises. In an important sense, the dispatcher's interest in having cars available for dispatching embodies the broader public's interest in efficiency and effectiveness in responding to serious crime. The individual caller's interest in having the police officer respond thoughtfully and courteously to his or her individual need embodies the idea that good police service means being responsive to individual citizens. To the extent that we want police capacity to respond reliably to crime emergencies, we may have to give up a little in terms of individual service. To accomplish the high-priority goal of

---

[11] I am indebted to my colleague, George Kelling, for noting and emphasizing the importance of this phenomenon.

being available for emergencies, police officers must cut their encounters with citizens short so that they can be back in service to the dispatcher.

Precisely because the satisfaction of the individual who calls the police for services is not the sole *raison d'être* of a public police department, it might be better to think of such people as "clients" of the police rather than "customers." As clients, these individuals make claims on the department to advance their own interests. Satisfying such clients is important. But it is not self-evidently the end-all and be-all of public policing, as it would be if these individuals were customers in the private sector.

Citizens and the Goal of Ensuring Fairness

The idea that the police are supposed to serve not only those specific individuals who call, but also those larger and more abstract purposes valued by a collective, becomes even more apparent when we realize that, in the ordinary practice of policing, police managers often have to tell both individual citizens and groups of citizens that they cannot have what they want from "their" police department. Sometimes, police managers have to explain that even though they would like to provide additional foot patrol to a fearful neighborhood, they cannot because there are other neighborhoods that have greater need of these resources—their real victimization rate is higher than the community that is petitioning for more officers. Police managers also sometimes have to explain that they cannot simply remove undesirable people from a street or park. Because the streets and parks are public, those considered undesirable by the local population may have a right to be there, and it is the police responsibility to protect those minority rights as well as to bring the criminal law to bear on offenders.

These observations are familiar enough. But once reflected on, they raise the question of who the police are serving when they allocate police resources according to need rather than either political influence or ability to pay, and when they use state power to protect minority rights as well as advance majority interests.

One answer is that they are serving no one. These are simply abstract, intrinsic values that the police as a professional, constitutional force are committed to serve even when no one cares about them.

A different answer, however, is that these are values that citizens *should* have, even if they don't necessarily feel them right at the moment. If this were true, then the police might have an important political and educational function to perform in helping citizens remember why these values are important

and desirable, and should be supported even when citizens would prefer something else.

A third answer is that citizens *do* have these values, but their commitment to them is fickle and unreliable. Most of the time, they are focused on other important values served by policing, such as reducing crime and fear, or delivering quality services to them as individuals. But at moments when the police do things that seem brutal or corrupt, they suddenly rediscover these other virtues and demand that the police embody these as well. In the aftermath of such "moral panics," professional reputations are shattered and careers are often lost (Thompson 1998).

Another question is whether these values should be considered as constraints on the real goals of policing, or as valued ends in themselves. This difference may matter a great deal, operationally, culturally, and psychologically. If these values are viewed as *constraints* on police efforts to achieve their *real* goal (reducing crime), then it is natural for police managers and officers to chafe against these restrictions. The constraints become "handcuffs" that prevent the police from achieving their true goal; an obstacle to be overcome, not a cause to be celebrated. If, on the other hand, these values are considered important *goals* of policing—to ensure that everyone in the society gets the protection that they need from criminal offenders, and that an architecture of liberty is constructed that allows all citizens who do not offend to enjoy the freedom that is the right of each individual—then these values stop being constraints to be struggled against, and become ends to be pursued.

Citizens vs. Clients

At this stage of the analysis, it is useful to return to the distinction made above between "citizens" on one hand, and "clients" on the other. Importantly, this is *not* a distinction among particular individuals; many individuals are *both* citizens and clients of a police department. It is, instead, a difference in point of view and perspective—perhaps of "social office." A "client" is someone rooted in his or her particular position in society. Clients are those who know whether they are rich or poor, black or white, living in a dangerous or safe area. Because clients have a particular known position in society, they have particular interests to be advanced. The rich person might want a police force that allocates services according to ability to pay, while a poor person might want a police force that allocates services according to need for protection.

A "citizen" on the other hand differs from a "client." Following the philosopher John Rawls, I want to define a "citizen" as someone who is consider-

ing a question about the just and proper use of state resources *without considering the particular position he or she occupies in society* (Rawls 1971). Thus, for example, citizens, both black and white, might consider whether it is a just and fair police practice to stop black drivers more often than white drivers because they fit a profile of criminal offending. Or, a citizen might consider whether aggressive panhandling should be a criminal offense subject to jail time, without considering his own position as a homeless man, or a businessman walking to work.

Nota Bene: In offering these examples, I am not insisting on a particular conclusion. It is possible that citizens might well decide to accept the unfairness of police tactics that disadvantage an already disadvantaged group because they agree that the crime reduction benefits are large enough, and sufficiently fairly distributed, that the injustice is worth it. Moreover, citizens might conclude after deliberation that aggressive panhandling laws are in the interests of social order, and the potential injustice a slight one. The point is that it is a bit harder to conclude these things if one can imagine being a black motorist or a homeless person, than if one knows that one will likely never be in either of these positions. This feature of a *citizen's* perspective makes this perspective particularly important when, as in the field of policing, important matters of justice are at stake, as well as matters of efficacy.

I should also note that I do not underestimate the practical difficulty of transporting individuals to the particular psychic state of "citizen." I find this particularly difficult given the low quality of political leadership now common in the society. For the most part, politicians now pander to *client* views rather than challenge clients to think and act like *citizens*.[12] But conceptually, I find it useful and important to think that the values that we call "process values" or "symbolic values" (as distinct from "substantive values") do not simply hang out there in the air as ideals to be achieved. I think they are actually deeply rooted in our (citizens') ideas about a just and fair society that we would like to have realized in the real world. I am encouraged in this view by the suspicion noted previously that more police chiefs are fired for failures to produce justice and fairness than for failures either to control crime or deliver high-quality services to clients.

Note, finally, that among the divides that individuals are expected to cross when moving from the position of a client to the position of a citizen, by far

---

[12] On the temptations that leaders face to pander rather than challenge, see Heifetz 1994.

the most difficult may be those that separate black from white, and rich from poor. It is hard both ways. It is hard for rich whites to see American policing exactly the way that poor blacks see it. And it is hard for poor blacks to see American policing the way rich whites see it. The reason is that, as particularly situated individuals, they have different objective experiences with policing. When they hear the others talk about their experiences and perceptions, they may think the others are simply lying, and doing so in bad faith. Thus, an important goal for policing might be to narrow the differences in both the actual experiences and the perceptions of the different groups in society (Problem Solving Group on Law Enforcement Stops and Searches 1998).

A Summary: Who Decides on the Values the Police Should Both Express and Seek to Produce

The important point of this discussion for the police performance measurement is the conclusion that that the valuing of police services is not done simply by those who are *clients* of the enterprise, but also by the wider *citizenry* and the institutions of democratic representative government.[13] What the wider citizenry buys is not just service to them as individuals, but instead the realization of some conception of the proper mission of a public police department.

That mission may include many different dimensions of performance. It can include substantive values such as reducing crime and providing high-quality services to individual clients. But the mission could also include the reliable achievement of "process values," such as calling individual offenders to account for their crimes, or treating suspects fairly.

What the wider citizenry consumes as the products of the police department are the material conditions they wanted to produce through policing. But they cannot consume this directly, because as particular individuals, they experience only a part of what the police produce. What they consume instead are reports that tell them whether the police department in which they have invested is achieving the purposes set for it, and operating in ways that reflect the values citizens want expressed in police operations.

In this, citizens are more like owners and investors in public police departments than like customers. As owners and investors, they may be interested in how well the department is doing in satisfying individual clients because they think that is an important end in itself, as well as a way of building relationships

---

[13] This is what I call the authorizing environment, both below and in Moore 1995.

that can strengthen police operations in the future. But, in the end, as owners, they are primarily interested in the department's overall, aggregate performance in executing its mission, not just the quality of the individual experiences of callers. Reassuring these *owners* who continue to provide the money and authority that the police need to operate may be far more important than satisfying the department's individual clients.[14]

Offenders, Rights, and Compliance

So far, I have diverted attention from another possible "customer" of police services—namely, those who are arrested, cited, or stopped and questioned by the police. Arguably, these individuals resemble private customers in the sense that police encounter them at the "downstream," delivery end of the organization. Yet, it is pretty obvious that they differ from customers in the private sector. They do pay for the "service" they receive from the police. But it is not the social point of the organization to make them as happy as possible![15]

These observations make the obvious point that police departments are not simply in the business of providing services; they are also in the business of imposing duties and obligations (Sparrow 1994). Indeed, one useful description of the business of policing is that they make retail deliveries of obligations: "You, stand still to have the orderly process of justice visited upon you!"

Once we understand that many police encounters are not "service encounters," but are instead "obligation encounters," it becomes important to consider what makes something a high-quality obligation encounter. We know what makes for a successful service encounter—a satisfied customer. But what constitutes a successful obligation encounter?

One unique feature of an obligation encounter is that the experience of obligation both can be and frequently is evaluated not only by the individual "obligatee" who experiences it, but also by citizens and their representatives. The reason is that an obligation encounter is, by definition, an exercise of state authority. When state authority is used, both the individual against whom it is used and the rest of us have in interest in seeing that the authority was used properly. Both citizens and obligatees want this obligation to be imposed justly.

---

[14] Those writing about performance measurement in the public sector nearly always mention the importance of such measurement to attract resources to the organization by offering a high degree of accountability. See Walters 1998:8; Behn 1992:16.

[15] This, too, is widely recognized in public sector performance measurement. See Walters 1998:25–27; Sparrow 1994; Moore,1995.

They also want it to be imposed economically. Indeed, we want these dimensions of performance so much that we have laws that give individual clients of the police department the right to sue the police department if they have reasons to believe that they have been treated unfairly (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). We also support special agencies to receive and investigate cases of police misconduct at public expense (see Walker 1995; Vera Institute of Justice 1988). And we spend enormous amounts of time and effort training the police not only on the circumstances that entitle (and require) them to use state authority, but also on techniques to bring that authority to bear in ways that minimize the risk of injury to them and to the offender.[16] These facts all testify to the reality that citizens require as a matter of principle that the police use the force of the state economically and fairly.

A second important feature of an obligation encounter is that the ultimate objective of the encounter is not to make the client happy; it is to get the client to *comply* with the particular obligation that is being imposed. We want the offender to come along quietly, not resist. Securing compliance may be importantly aided by using overwhelming force so that the object of the obligation encounter has no choice but to comply. But research tells us that securing compliance is also aided by the perceived fairness of the obligation that is being imposed (Lind and Tyler 1988). And it may also be aided when police respect the dignity of the person being obliged.

Of course, operational realities often make it difficult (to say nothing of dangerous) to reason with an offender and secure compliance through means other than overwhelming force. But there is something remarkable about the fact that police officers routinely protect a handcuffed offender who has been wrestled to the ground from banging his head on the roof of the police car when he is being placed in the car for transport to jail. It is equally remarkable, I think, given the intensity of police efforts to arrest offenders, that they nonetheless stop and read offenders their rights at the moment of arrest. In both circumstances, the police are displaying a remarkable degree of respect for individuals whom they suspect of committing crimes.

In these respects, then, the police seem to respect the dignity and attend to the satisfaction of those whom they *oblige* as well as those they *serve*. This is necessitated in part by their commitment to using force fairly and economically, and to protect the rights of suspects. But it is also supported by the

---

[16] See for example, California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), on the Internet at www.post.ca.gov.

instrumental aim of gaining compliance. Still, the point remains that, in obligation encounters, the satisfaction of those obliged by the police is not their ultimate goal. They are granted the use of state authority to achieve collectively defined goals, and to protect the dignity of and satisfy offenders only to the extent that the collective says they should.

Public Value: Mission Effectiveness vs. Client Satisfaction

On reflection, it is clear that the customers who matter in defining the value to be produced by the police are not the people whom the police encounter in either individual service or obligation encounters. They are, instead, the citizens and taxpayers who, through a complex, highly imperfect political process, both authorize and finance the continued operation of public police departments. It is they who provide the resources—both the money and the authority—that the police use in their productive activities. It is their decisions to support and guide the police that create a presumption that something of social or public value is being created. It is their collective preferences that ought, ideally, to be reflected in the mandate and mission of policing.

Given our contemporary distrust of collective, political processes, it may seem odd to conclude that this imperfect process provides the values that the police ought to pursue. Yet, as noted above, this conclusion is not much different from assuming that the important goal of the police is to achieve its socially defined "mission." After all, one way to understand the police department mission is to see it as a reflection of a collective process of deliberation about the proper and valuable purposes of the police. The collective view of the police department's mission may be powerfully shaped by tradition, law, and professional ideology. It may also be influenced by cumulative experience with the distinctive competencies of the police. It may also be influenced by emergent problems and contemporary views of problems and how they might best be handled. But however it emerges, the police mission defines the public value that the police should pursue.

While this point seems clear enough, one must work hard to see the difference between the idea of "mission effectiveness" on one hand, and the idea of "customer satisfaction" on the other. To repeat, a public sector organization's mission is established through a political process that forges *individual* views of citizens and taxpayers about the kind of public police organization they would like to support into a *collective* view defining the organization's goals and objectives. It is not found by adding up the value that individuals receive through particular service encounters with the organization.

Of course, the body politic could decide that it valued responsive, high-quality services to callers or crime victims as one important goal of its police department. It could even decide that it wanted those who were cited by or arrested by the police to be well treated. And it might decide to measure both these effects through some kind of customer survey (Hatry, Marcotte, Van Houten, and Weiss 1998).

But what makes this different from private sector enterprises is that customer satisfaction becomes an important goal *only if the community decides that is an important goal.* In the more likely case, the community will decide that, while high-quality service to individuals is *one* important goal of policing, there are many others as well. For example, it could decide that reducing aggregate levels of crime is at least as important as providing high-quality services to those who call the police. It could decide that it wants its police department to call offenders to account, both as an important means to the end of reducing crime, and as an important end in itself. It could decide that it is important to reduce fear and enhance security as well as reduce crimes. It could decide that it is very important to use state authority economically and fairly, and to minimize both brutality and corruption. It could decide that it wants to keep the financial costs of the police department as low as possible so that there is money for schools and hospitals as well as the police. It could decide that it wants its police department to engage citizens effectively in the "coproduction" of public safety to increase both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the police.

Each of these things represents something that a community *might* value in a police department's performance. They may not all be equally valuable. And they could be somewhat inconsistent with one another. But the point is that each of them represents a dimension or attribute of police performance to which a community might attach some value. If the community values these dimensions of performance as more or less important parts of the police mission, then they become important candidates for measurement.

CHAPTER 3

Defining the Mission of the Police

WHAT IS THE FULL SET of goals and objectives that a community might decide are important for a police department to achieve? What dimensions of performance might a community decide to monitor in making judgments about the value that their police department is producing? What particular attributes of performance would a police chief use to decide whether the organization's performance was going up or down? What, in the end, would a community settle on as the important mission, goals, and objectives of the police? These are the questions to which we now turn.

To many (particularly those who are impatient with academic quibbles), the most important mission (or collectively valued result) of policing is obvious—reduced crime. Period. This is the view that Bratton endorsed so emphatically when he claimed (incorrectly) that reduced crime was the "profit" that police departments earned for their owners—the citizens of the communities in which they operated.

REDUCING CRIME AND CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION

Without doubt, reducing crime and criminal victimization is the single most important contribution that police are expected to make to society's well-being. In business parlance, reducing crime is "job #1."

It has this importance because society judges it to be very important to minimize the immediate physical and economic losses of criminal victimization. We want fewer stabs and bruises, fewer trips to the hospital, and fewer stolen wallets and stereos. These are the clear, objective, socially desired effects of reducing criminal victimization.

Yet, in transforming the goal of reducing crime and criminal victimization into a measurable "bottom line" for policing, two important issues arise. First, it is unexpectedly difficult to measure levels of crime and victimization. What the police can (and do) conveniently measure is the level of crime *reported to them*. Arguably, this is the right measure to use in gauging the level of crime. After all, if a crime isn't important enough for a citizen to report it to the police, one can argue that it probably wasn't a serious matter. Moreover, because it is both practically and legally difficult for the police to act on crimes not reported to them, perhaps the only crimes that police should be expected to handle are those that *are* reported.

The difficulty, however, is that there are many serious crimes that go unreported but still take their toll on society's welfare (Moore 1983). For example, both domestic violence and child abuse and neglect may go unreported because the victims are afraid of the unknown consequences of filing the report. Similarly, victims of rape may fail to report due to embarrassment. And those who live in housing projects dominated by the economic power and threats of drug-dealing gangs may fail to report on the daily extortion that occurs in such places.

Whether citizens report crimes to the police also depends a great deal on whether they think the police *can* or *will* do anything about their reports (Black 1970). If they think the police are overwhelmed, incompetent, or biased against them, they may well decide it is not worth the trouble to report the offense, even when the offense is serious. If the valued goals of a police department included such things as being open and responsive to citizens' concerns, fair in responding to calls for service, and eager to provide a good enough service to citizens to guard against the temptation that citizens would take the law into their own hands, then the citizens' reluctance to report crimes would be viewed as a sign of poor rather than good police performance. A police department to which crimes are not reported is one that has become irrelevant to citizens rather than one that has succeeded in reducing crime. Yet, precisely because crimes are not being reported, it would look as though the police are successful in keeping crime low!

In measuring levels of crime, then, one must deal with the simple fact that between the level of *reported crime* and the *real underlying rate of crime* lies the "dark figure" of *unreported crime* (Bidderman and Reiss 1967). Determining the level of *unreported crime* is important not only to get a more accurate measure of the real rate of criminal victimization, but also to determine how much confidence citizens have in asking the police for help.

The only way to measure the underlying rate of victimization is to conduct a general survey of citizens asking about their victimization, and their reasons for failing to report crime to the police (see, for example, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000). But these "victimization surveys" are expensive, and vulnerable to several different kinds of error in themselves.[17] Still, if one wants to get close to the real level of victimization, and to learn about the extent to which the police have earned citizens' confidence in responding to criminal offenses, then there is little choice but to complement information on reported crime with information gained from general surveys of local populations.

Second, some believe that measuring police performance in terms of their impact on levels of crime is wrong because, in their view, the police have little ability to control crime. As David Bayley (1996:40) put it,

> Crime is not something the police can really control. Sad to say, crime is not determined by what the police do or by how many of them there are. Criminologists have shown again and again that the best predictors of crime...are economic and social factors, notably income, unemployment, education, prevalence of minorities, households headed by single women, household size, and home ownership... Police [themselves] often ruefully observe that law enforcement is little more than a Band-Aid on the cancer of crime.

If police cannot control crime, then 1) it would be a substantive error to attribute crime reductions to them, 2) it would be unfair and ineffective for citizens to hold them to account for this result, and 3) it would be politically imprudent for police managers to be evaluated in terms of their crime-reduction performance. Bayley (1996:41) argues that,

> From a political point of view...reliance on reported crime rates...would seem to be risky for the police. It makes them responsible for circumstances they cannot control. They do not deserve praise when crime rates fall, or blame when they rise.

---

[17] The most common errors are underreporting and overreporting. For a full discussion of the problems and errors in victimization surveys, see Garofalo 1990; Jackson 1990.

In this view, crime reduction may be a desirable and valuable thing. The police may be able to contribute to this goal. But, in the end, there is so much else that contributes to overall levels of crime that it would be wrong, substantively and managerially, to hold the police accountable for controlling crime.

Of course, Bayley and his colleagues may be wrong. After all, the fact that the best predictors of crime levels turn out to be social and economic variables, not the level of policing, does not necessarily mean that the police cannot produce valuable crime-reduction effects. This is particularly true if one is willing to accept some local and temporary reductions in crime as important results. Besides, there are encouraging signs that some police approaches can, in fact, reduce crime below previous or expected levels of crime given the social and economic conditions (Moore 1992).

Indeed, there is even some evidence that the police can reduce crime through *interventions that do not depend on threatened or actual arrests*. For example, they can prevent burglaries by encouraging citizens to harden their homes and businesses against the usual practices of burglars (Clarke 1992). They can prevent racial conflicts among teenagers by re-arranging bus routes, and conducting educational programs in schools (Kennedy 1990). They can reduce the lethality of youthful disputes by regulating the availability of guns to kids (Kennedy, Piehl and Braga 1996).

These important *preventive* activities fit directly into the core mission of reducing crime. But they focus police attention on different kinds of activities than patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigations, which constitute the standard police methods for controlling crime. They also work through means other than making or threatening arrests (Goldstein 1990).

These preventive methods for controlling crime are, in principle, very high-value police activities—particularly if we view authority as a resource whose use ought to be husbanded. The reason is simply that an arrest uses the authority of the police intensively. If we can achieve the same crime reduction result through means that use less state authority, and rely, instead, on the state using smaller bits of authority to alter the conditions that lead to crime, then presumably the net value of a police department would increase. For example, it seems pretty clear that we ought to prefer to have the police eliminate street-level drug dealing by using civil sanctions against landlords who have allowed their premises to become havens for drug dealers rather than through repeated mass arrests. It is not just that the first saves *money* over the second. It is also that there is less state *authority* being invoked in the first than in the second.

But even if we concluded that the police *could* reduce crime (either through the traditional methods of making and threatening arrests through the use of patrol, rapid response, or retrospective investigation, or through problem-solving methods in which police intervene in the circumstances that lead to crime), the problem of reckoning the value of policing *only* in terms of reduced crime is that the police make other equally (or conceivably more) valuable contributions to society beyond their contribution to reducing crime. Unless we focus attention on those results as well, we risk failing to recognize and produce some of the social value that the police are capable of producing for their communities.

HOLDING OFFENDERS TO ACCOUNT

Many who are skeptical of police capacity to control crime, for example, nonetheless applaud their efforts to "enforce the law" and "call offenders to account." In this view, identifying and making cases against criminal offenders is consistent with achieving the principled goal of doing justice. Achieving that goal, in turn, is valuable in itself even if it produces no or little impact on crime. Indeed, to some, doing justice is the *only* important goal of policing.

Focusing on the goal of calling offenders to account has the further (apparent) advantage of focusing police attention on something that the police can control. They may not be able to influence overall levels of crime, but they ought to be able to identify and apprehend those who offend.

To many, of course, achieving the *principled* goal of holding offenders to account is tantamount to achieving the *practical* goal of effectively controlling crime. In this view, the mechanisms of deterrence and incapacitation are assumed to be powerful enough to ensure that if the police catch those who commit crimes, crime will be reduced in the future. Indeed, for many, this connection is so close that the two different ideas cannot easily be separated.

Yet, there is a clear difference between the principled goal of ensuring justice and the instrumental goal of reducing crime. From some ethical perspectives, it is desirable to hold offenders to account even if that effort had no impact on future crimes.[18] In this view, meting out just punishment is something intrinsically good. A good and just society would seek that result and spend money to produce it even if the punishment had no practical effect on future criminal offending. As the philosopher Immanuel Kant argued, if a criminal offender has been justly sentenced to some form of punishment, it would

---

[18] This is called a deontological ethical theory. See Frankena 1973.

be important to carry out that punishment even if the offender and the warden were the only people left on earth (Kant 1964).

REDUCED FEAR AND ENHANCED SECURITY

The goals of reducing crime and victimization, and calling offenders to account are squarely at the center of the conventional view of the police mission. They are also dimensions of performance for which more or less adequate measurement systems have been constructed—reported crime rates on one hand, clearance rates on the other. There is a third goal of policing that is closely related to these others, but for which current measurement systems are less well developed—namely, reducing citizens' *fear* of crime and enhancing their sense of security.

As in the case of the relationship between reducing crime on one hand and calling offenders to account on the other, there are many who consider the relationship between reducing crime on one hand, and reducing fear and enhancing security on the other to be so tight that the distinction isn't worth making. The close connection between the two concepts is made through two strong bonds. First, one of the principal reasons society should be interested in reducing crime and criminal victimization is to relieve the fears that beset victims and those who fear they might become victims of crime. Second, the best and only proper way of accomplishing that goal is to bring down the level of criminal victimization.

Those who hold these views are right to think that reducing fear is one of the important reasons to be interested in controlling crime. After all, the direct economic and financial losses to victims represent only a small part of the overall social costs of crime. The other costs are linked to the fear that victimization induces (Warr 1990; Ferraro 1995). Those frightened by crime spend money and effort to defend themselves against crime. They stay closer to home, and shun public parks and transportation. At home, they surround themselves with locks, guns, dogs, and burglar alarms purchased from commercial private security concerns. Some hire private police to patrol their areas. Others ask their neighbors to watch their houses or join them in citizen patrols. All of this takes time and energy away from other activities. Such efforts may relieve citizens of some of their anxieties, but some residual fear will remain to make the quality of life edgier than they would desire. There is also the problem that some of the self-defense methods may end up increasing fears, increasing tensions, and actually contributing to crimes in the future.

But there are two reasons to detach the goal of reducing fear and increasing citizen security from the goal of reducing criminal victimization. One is

that the relationship between criminal victimization on one hand and fear on the other is much less direct than is commonly assumed. We know that fear is triggered by relatively minor instances of disorder, and responds more to changes in disorderly conditions than to underlying risks of criminal victimization (Skogan 1990). The reason is that fear is a subjective phenomenon. The real risks of victimization establish a backdrop of concern. How concerned one feels on a daily basis seems to depend on "signs of crime" that have subjective rather than objective significance. If the experience of fear is only imperfectly related to levels of criminal victimization, then reducing criminal victimization cannot necessarily be counted on to reduce fear. Moreover, there may be some things that the police could do to reduce fear that are not successful in reducing criminal victimization.

The second reason for taking fear seriously as a problem independently of reducing criminal victimization follows directly from this first observation. It has become clear that there are many things that the police can do to reduce fear that do not necessarily reduce crime. For example, by becoming more intimately known to citizens through foot patrol and stable beat assignments, and by dealing with instances of disorder as well as responding to serious crime, police can enhance a community's sense of security (Police Foundation 1981). This effect occurs even if these tactics fail to reduce the objective risks of criminal victimization.

If fear is somewhat independent of criminal victimization, and can be addressed separately by the police, then the broader society and police executives could view fear reduction as a distinct product line—related to but not the same as reducing crime and catching offenders. Whether the police should embrace this line of business is hotly argued.

The arguments *against* focusing explicit attention on fear reduction are essentially three. First, it is argued that fear reduction secured through "feel-good tactics" such as foot patrol that have no real impact on levels of crime is nothing but a shallow and dangerous public relations victory. In this view, the only proper way to produce fear reduction is the old fashioned way—to earn it by reducing the real risks of criminal victimization. Anything less than this deludes citizens into thinking the world is safer than it is, and risks their safety by encouraging them to lower their guard.

Second, because fear is essentially a subjective phenomenon, it cannot be objectively measured. Therefore, no matter how valuable it might be for a police department to focus on reducing fear, because levels of fear cannot be reliably measured, reducing fear cannot become a practical goal of policing.

Third, like crime, many things other than what the police do influence fear. Indeed, we know that the public's view of crime is significantly influenced by what they see on TV, and further, that what they see on TV is often quite disconnected from local crime conditions. Because the police cannot control the factors that cause citizens to become afraid, it would be wrong to hold them accountable for levels of fear.

On the other hand, the arguments *for* recognizing police contributions to reducing fear are also strong. Arguably, enhancing the subjective sense of security is ultimately what policing is all about. If we had a great police force that solved all crimes and captured offenders but left citizens afraid and anxious that they were vulnerable to crime, it is not at all clear that we would have accomplished what a police force is intended to achieve. It is right to be concerned that the police might find ways to cheat in their efforts to promote a sense of security, and use public relations techniques to produce an undeserved fear-reduction effect. But police can nevertheless be interested in promoting a sense of security that keeps the risks of criminal victimization in proper perspective—particularly when there are so many who have an interest in exaggerating the risks of victimization and in keeping citizens afraid.

Besides, we know now that reducing fear can make an important independent contribution to serious criminal victimization. When fear is reduced, informal social control is enabled. When informal social control is enabled and combined with police action, serious crime goes down (Skogan 1990). Similarly, when the police focus on minor criminal offenses to reduce fear, it seems that they have a direct effect on serious criminal victimization as well.

Finally, it seems clear that police efforts to reduce fear by being present in certain ways, and by reducing minor disorder offenses as well as serious criminal victimization tend to increase the economic and social capital in particular neighborhoods (Moore 1999). That is good in itself—it adds to citizens' wealth and overall quality of life. It is also instrumentally good, because a stronger civil society tends to strengthen the overall performance of government (Putnam 2000; Correia 2000).

Most people, faced with these arguments, will agree that the police should be concerned not only with reducing crime and victimization, but also with the larger issue of reducing fear and enhancing security. Indeed, some will conclude that reduced fear and enhanced security is what they were really after when they said that the goal was to reduce crime and criminal victimization, and to call offenders to account. They just thought that the most appropriate way of enhancing security was to reduce the real, underlying risk of criminal victimization, and arrest offenders.

Once one agrees that the police should be interested in reducing fear as well as reducing crime, however, the problem becomes how to measure it. This is very difficult. There has been some progress made in assessing levels of fear, however (Ferraro 1995). The principal instruments are surveys that ask citizens about their levels of fear, and their investment in self-defense efforts. These questions are usually asked in the same surveys that ask about unreported criminal victimization and the reasons that the citizens failed to report their criminal victimization to the police.

STRUCTURING THE BURDEN OF DEFENDING AGAINST CRIME

The discussion of fear and the burden of self-defense that fear imposes on individuals focuses attention on a frequently overlooked issue in discussions of the value of public policing—namely, how the quantity and quality of *public* policing affects the overall balance between public and private security arrangements in the society. This effect is potentially important in valuing the operations of a police department for the simple reason that society might have some preferences about how the burden of defending against criminal attack ought to be distributed between private and public efforts, and what forms of private efforts are more socially valuable than others.

With respect to the proper balancing of public and private defense against crime, it is easy to forget that for most of our history, we relied much more on private self-defense than on publicly financed policing. The public police as we know them are essentially less than 150 years old. It is also important to remember that we *still* rely on citizens as the first line of defense against crime. We need citizens both to be vigilant in their own defense, and to support the work of public police agencies in reducing crime and calling offenders to account. Indeed, current police tactics for controlling crime depend crucially on citizens calling them when crimes occur, and helping them identify those who committed the crimes. All this is to say that the goal of public policing should clearly *not* be to eliminate private self-defense efforts. We continue to need private as well as public security efforts.

On the other hand, there were important reasons that society decided to turn some of the responsibility for controlling crime over to a public agency. One reason was to relieve private citizens of the burden. Presumably, for most citizens, it is valuable to be able to call on a public police force to defend them rather than rely solely on their own capacities. To the extent that the burden of self-defense is lifted from private individuals, some social value may be created.

A second reason to shift toward reliance on public policing rather than self-defense was to enhance the overall fairness of the system. In a world dominated by private security, it is reasonable to imagine that the rich would have more security (and more justice) than the poor, because they would be able to pay for their protection, and the investigation and prosecution of crimes against them while the poor would not. In a public system of justice, private individuals who have fewer means to defend themselves are not left on their own to be victimized. They have a publicly supported protector, and the society as a whole enjoys a more fairly distributed level of security.

A third reason to prefer public rather than private security is that it is generally believed that a public police force can administer the laws more fairly and impartially than a system that relies primarily on private initiative to enforce the law. Offenders who attack the weak, the tolerant, or the generous do not suffer less than those who attack the powerful and vengeful. The fairer distribution of the benefits and burdens of public policing was thought to be in the interests of justice and fairness as well as efficacy.

Society might also be interested in the kinds of self-defense that citizens rely on. For example, society might decide that the forms of self-defense that protect individuals but leave their fellow citizens worse off (such as guns, locks, and dogs) are less preferred than forms of self-defense that make whole communities safer and build social relations in the process (such as community block watch groups). It may also be that forms of self-defense that increase the safety of some communities at the expense of others, and build a climate of distrust among citizens (such as gated communities guarded by private security guards) are less valuable than those that increase the safety of all, and enhance a sense of shared responsibility for producing both order and liberty (such as public police departments committed to creating a kind of ordered liberty that is available equally to all, and keeps the city as a whole open to all its citizens).

The implication, then, is that in assessing the value of a police department, one might be interested in knowing how much of the burden of crime control they had left in the hands of citizens, and how the citizens were responding to that burden. The answer to this question could be obtained through the use of surveys. Presumably, police departments that had succeeded in reducing levels of self-defense to modest levels, shifting the type of self-defense to those forms that helped strengthen communities, and ensuring "ordered liberty" should be considered more successful and valuable police departments than those that are being tossed aside by citizens in their desperate effort to protect themselves.

THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC SPACES AND TRAFFIC SAFETY

The discussion of reducing fear and structuring society's overall response to crime in ways that produce an "ordered liberty," focuses our attention on some additional police activities that could be considered extremely valuable, but do not fit neatly into the conventional image of the police as the organization whose principal goals are to reduce crime and call offenders to account. These are the roles of the police in what Herman Goldstein describes as "managing the movement of vehicles and people in public locations;" or, more concretely, in traffic enforcement and the maintenance of public order (Goldstein 1977).

Compared with the drama of crime and punishment, the largely civil and regulatory police role in traffic safety would be easy to overlook. Yet, there are at least three reasons to take traffic enforcement seriously as a value-creating activity of the police.

First, the safety of citizens is more threatened by careless driving than by murderers and rapists. To the extent that the police are properly concerned with protecting citizens from accidents as well as crimes, their contributions to traffic safety may be as important as their contributions to reducing homicide.

Second, in traffic and parking enforcement, the police come into direct contact with the largest number of citizens. In all likelihood, to the extent that citizens form their views of the police from direct experience rather than from TV, they do so on the basis of what they, and their families, friends, and neighbors, experience in traffic stops. If the police are courteous, respectful, and professional in these transactions, then citizens will have a favorable view of the police. If they are rude, openly contemptuous, and unprofessional, then the citizens will form another view. To the extent that the police should be interested in citizens' views, they might be interested in ensuring that these encounters are done well, or that they are used only when necessary, and then done as well as possible.

Third, whatever one's views about the social benefits of traffic enforcement, the police spend a great deal of time doing it. Because the costs of the effort are high (both as an absolute amount as well as a proportion of their budget), it is important that the police measure the results.

Fourth, it is possible that there is an important synergy between traffic enforcement on one hand, and success in reducing crime and catching offenders on the other. Traffic violations often motivate the police to stop citizens who turn out to be offenders, or allow them to stop citizens whom they suspect of being offenders for other reasons. Just as the focus on disorder offenses brings the police into broader, closer contact with citizens, with the

effect of reducing serious crime, so might a focus on traffic offenses. Indeed, writing in 1978, Barbara Boland and James Q. Wilson found that the only police activity that seemed to predict lower crime rates in cities was a high level of traffic enforcement (Wilson and Boland 1978).

Note that the principal reason the police are engaged in traffic enforcement and parking regulation is simply that streets and thoroughfares are public spaces. As public spaces, they are an asset that ought to be available to all. But there are also competing uses for the space. A road, after all, can be used as 1) a thoroughfare that helps citizens get quickly from one place to another; 2) a staging area for deliveries and pick-ups to commercial enterprises located on the street; 3) a place to park; 4) a pedestrian mall; or 5) a fairground, ball field, or fountain and wading pool when a fire hydrant is opened on a hot day. Unfortunately, it cannot be used simultaneously for these different purposes without serious danger. Thus, public policy decisions, encoded in street signs, are made about how the streets are to be used for the benefit of all. Police authority is needed to ensure that the rules are followed.

What is true for public streets is also true for other common spaces such as public parks and schoolyards. It is also true for commercial activities that can affect the population's health and safety, such as the distribution, sale, and use of alcohol and guns. And it is also true for political activities such as striking, demonstrating, and voting. These places, commodities, and activities are all parts of our collective life together. To ensure that there is a reasonable degree of harmony in these collective activities, the police are charged with producing both fair access to and orderly conditions within these spaces. Indeed, in these domains, the police role as the architects of liberty rather than as crime fighters is most apparent. And that may be one of the most important reasons for keeping these activities salient in the minds of the police. These activities remind citizens and the police that they exist to promote fairness and liberty, not simply to ensure security.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL AND SOCIAL SERVICES

A sixth important service provided by the police is some form of emergency social and medical services to vulnerable and desperate people. The police save intoxicated people from being mugged or freezing to death. They protect runaway children from the hazards and exploitation of street life. They help abused spouses through the terrible hours following a domestic assault.

Again, there is a tendency to disparage these police activities as "social work" rather than "crime fighting," and to complain that such work is more properly the

responsibility of other agencies. So it might be. But it is still true that the police end up doing a lot of this kind of work. The reason is primarily that they are one of the few government agencies open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. They not only patrol the streets looking for problems, but also make house calls. The result is that the police inevitably end up being the first responders to emergencies, regardless of their causes or their best future management.

We could, of course, treat this function of policing as unimportant, or as something that some other agency could do better or more inexpensively. But the alternative is to view this function as important and valuable. And the function might be valuable not only to the citizens who are aided, but also to society as a whole, which might want to ensure that some such emergency capability existed. After all, having such a service available is a kind of insurance policy that we have all learned to enjoy.

Note that there is one kind of emergency medical and social service that is quite intimately connected with the police role as crime fighter—the emergency medical and social service provided to victims of crime in the aftermath of a criminal attack. Such services (which could include first aid, some initial counseling, notification of family and employers, etc.) are valuable in at least two ways.

First, to the victim of the crime, they may ease the pain and reduce the shock of their victimization. To the extent that an important goal of policing is not only to prevent crime, but also to lessen its consequences for those who suffer, these services would count as value-producing activities.

Second, the connection created between the police and the victim by the provision of high-quality services can help to increase the chance that the case will be solved and successfully prosecuted. Prosecutors long ago discovered that criminal cases could be sustained and strengthened by assigning people from their office to care for victims and families, and keep them involved in the case (President's Task Force on Victims of Crime 1982; Geis 1983). Presumably, the police, too, could benefit from cultivating stronger relationships with victims, even though the police may sometimes have to treat victims with some suspicion.

DIFFERENT WAYS TO THINK ABOUT THE APPROPRIATE PURPOSES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE POLICE

So far, we have developed a list of wider purposes and broader effects of policing that go beyond controlling crime and enforcing the law. That wider set of purposes and effects includes: 1) preventing crime through means

other than arresting offenders; 2) reducing fear and enhancing security; 3) reducing the burden of self-defense for citizens, and encouraging forms of self-defense that strengthen broader social relationships; 4) increasing the safety and protecting the freedom of public spaces; and 5) providing emergency medical and social services. An important question is whether these effects of policing should be considered potentially valuable results that ought to be measured and managed for. In effect, are they important components of the mission of public policing, or dangerous distractions from a public police department's core mission? One can answer this question through two different methods.

Value as "Mission Accomplishment" or the "Exploitation of Distinctive Competence"

The first relies on history and tradition to decide whether these activities should or should not be part of the police mission. In the case of public policing, this method gives an unequivocal answer—*such activities have long been considered important parts of the mission and goals of public policing* (Monkkonen 1992). Indeed, the man who is widely recognized as the architect of modern policing, Sir Robert Peel, held a broadly expansive view of the police mission. In his view, the job of the public police was to do those things that any citizen would do to make the society safe and just if they had the time to do so (Walker 1992). More contemporary writers also agree that police functions are broader than simply reducing crime. Herman Goldstein (1977:35), for example, defined the following eight important police functions:

1. To prevent and control conduct widely recognized as threatening to life and property (serious crime).
2. To aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm, such as the victim of a criminal attack.
3. To protect constitutional guarantees, such as the right of free speech and assembly.
4. To facilitate the movement of people and vehicles.
5. To assist those who cannot care for themselves: the intoxicated, the addicted, the mentally ill, the physically disabled, the old, and the young.
6. To resolve conflict, whether it be between individuals, groups of individuals, or individuals and their government.

7. To identify problems that have the potential for becoming more serious problems for the individual citizens, for the police, or for government.

8. To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community.

So, society has always wanted the police to perform these other valuable functions, and has apparently seen value in creating an organization that could do so. Indeed, it is only relatively recently that the police have given as much emphasis as they have to their crime-fighting mission, to the goal of reducing crime, and to crime statistics as the proper measure of police performance.

The second method for considering whether these wider effects and diverse activities ought to be part of the police mission is to rely on "strategy planning models" that have been developed to help both public and private sector managers "position" their organizations in their particular environments. It is worth noting, however, that there is an important difference between the way that public sector managers are advised to think about this subject on one hand, and the way that private sector managers are advised on the other.[19]

In the public sector, strategic planning begins with the organization's mission already defined and established. It is assumed that this is written in some statute, or is sanctioned by some tradition. The goal of public managers, then, is to stay true to that mission, and to build and operate an organization that is efficient and effective in the pursuit of that mission. Indeed, strict adherence to the mission is considered the *sina qua non* of public sector performance. Once a mission is created, it becomes the goal of public sector managers to achieve that mission, and *only that mission*. If the organization happens to be producing valuable effects outside the boundary of its assigned mission—for example, a public library happens to be useful in providing after-school programs to latch-key children—that effect goes unvalued, unmeasured, and unmanaged (Moore 1995). If the organization happens to have a set of capabilities that would make it valuable in an alternative use—for example, a national defense radar system happens to be capable of identifying drug smugglers—that is viewed as a dangerous distraction, an unwelcome opportunity for "mission creep" to set in (Dickert 1992). In short, in the public sector, an obsessive focus on mission is considered key to success, and it is only success in achieving the established mission that counts.

---

[19] For further discussion, see Moore 1995. See also Kaplan and Norton 1996:37.

In contrast, in the private sector, a focus on a well-defined mission is somewhat less important. Instead of starting with fixed, well-defined purposes that are used to value the organization's performance, private sector organizational strategists begin with the idea that their task is to find valuable uses of an organization that exists, and has acquired a certain *distinctive competence* (Andrews 1980). The distinctive competence is based on the things that the organization is now doing—the particular products and services it now offers, the particular technologies it relies upon, the particular managerial systems it uses to manage its work. But the distinctive competence is also seen as something larger and more abstract than what the organization is now doing. It is seen in the organization's ability to use what it now knows how to do in exploiting new market opportunities. In effect, instead of starting with well-defined purposes and then building an organization that stays confined to those purposes, a private sector manager begins with an organization that has a certain distinctive competence, and then asks how many valuable things could be made by exploiting that distinctive competence (Kaplan and Norton 1996:37). In the public sector, the value of organizations lies only in their utility in achieving particular specified purposes. In the private sector, the value of organizations lies in their ability to adapt and respond to changing circumstances.

Private sector models also take quite seriously the idea that there might be important "synergies" among an organization's diverse "product lines." (These are also called "economies of scope" as distinguished from "economies of scale.") The "synergies" might lie in being able to take advantage of a production process created for one purpose that turns out to be valuable in an alternative purpose. For example, many organizations that have developed computing capabilities to serve a large customer network as part of their core mission— say, the telephone company, a large retail operation, or an airline—have found it relatively easy to convert that capability into the ability to offer credit cards linked to their core business as a new product line. Or the synergies might lie in exploiting a relationship that is developed with a particular customer. For example, once a designer has developed a reputation with a customer for providing stylish clothes, that firm might go on to produce perfume or other toiletries as part of an effort to support the customer's commitment to a particular lifestyle. Of course, a company can fail by becoming too diversified, and straying too far from its distinctive competence. But the point is that there might be many different products and services a company could provide that are within its distinctive competence, and that one product line might help another product line succeed.

To understand the significance of the distinction between these ideas, consider two different views of a police department. In the traditional public sector conception, we might start with the idea that the important mission of the police department is to reduce crime by arresting and threatening to arrest criminal offenders. In pursuit of that goal, we might then build organizations that consist of a very large, well-trained, mobile force, carrying the authority of the state, available to citizens for the price of a phone call 24 hours a day and seven days a week, and able to reach any location in the city in less than five minutes. We might then value that organization only in terms of its impact on crime.

The problem, however, is that once society had built such a capability, it would soon discover that the organization's distinctive competence was broader than simply controlling crime or calling offenders to account. It would have value in a wide variety of other uses. The police could end up enforcing traffic and parking laws, settling disputes, generally reassuring citizens, and providing both immediate emergency services and referrals to long-term treatment and other help.

Moreover, there might be some important synergies among these different activities. The relationships that the police build with citizens by performing some of these other roles turn out to have value in supporting their crime control function. Because the police depend on the help of citizens in controlling crime, it is important to build good will among the citizens. Because responding to these other demands helps to build good will, the efforts could be understood as contributing to the overall goal of crime control.

From a private sector perspective, the fact that the capability the police had built to control crime had value for other uses would hardly be viewed as a problem. It would, instead, be viewed as a significant opportunity. It would be good news, not bad, that the police are both valuable and valued in alternative uses. Moreover, the extent to which there are important synergies among the varied uses of the police would make the varied activities even more valuable.

If the police were to be guided by private sector principles, then, they would not hesitate to respond to the many demands made on them. Each would be considered an opportunity to create value, and an opportunity to build a valuable relationship for the future. So, wisdom from the private sector suggests that there are many reasons for the police to accept the public expectation that they perform these other functions, and to begin managing themselves to ensure that they perform these additional functions well. Indeed, observations such as these provide a large part of the justification for commu-

nity policing as an overall strategy of policing (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990).

One Product or Many? "Production Line" or "Job Shop"?

The fact that the police have many different mandated purposes and many different effects raises the important question of whether, for purposes of evaluation, we should think of public police departments as single organizations with one product line and one ultimate objective, or as enterprises that more closely resemble multiproduct conglomerates with many different product lines, each with its own business objectives. A related question is whether we should think of police departments as "production line" organizations or as "job shops."

Note that there are really three different questions here. One is whether the police as a whole have only one objective—one important dimension of value on which their overall performance will be judged? Or, (as I have been implicitly arguing) do they have multiple objectives—with each objective defining an important dimension of value? The second is whether we should think of the police department as a single, coherent organizational entity, or as a collection of smaller units each with its own single or multiple objectives. (I will make the case that we ought to think of the police department as composed of different product lines, different subunits, and a wide variety of special projects and initiatives.) The third is whether the smaller units of the police department that deserve to be evaluated separately are the routine operations of the formally structured subunits of the organization (e.g., the individual precincts, the crime lab, or the juvenile unit); or particular projects initiated by operational units to deal with larger, nonroutine problems such as an outbreak of gang violence in a particular part of the city, or the emergence of prostitution in the downtown business district. (I will argue that we should be spending more attention on evaluating the individual initiatives.)

It is this last idea—that there are special projects and initiatives taken up by operating pieces of police organizations, which might need to be separately identified and valued—that makes the question of whether we should think of police departments as "production lines" or "job shops" an important one.

A production line organization has one standard method of production that is designed in advance, often embodied in particular kinds of machinery, and used over and over again to produce the organization's products and services. Quintessential examples are automobile companies and fast food restaurants. Some customization of products is possible in such firms. One can order different colored automobiles, and hamburgers with or without cheese. But

there are clear limitations on the degree of customization one can get from production line organizations.

A job shop, on the other hand, does not have a standard method of production, but instead figures out how to produce each new product as it accepts the commission for producing that project. Quintessential examples are architectural firms, urban redevelopment agencies, or consulting partnerships. Of course, these enterprises don't really start anew with each product. They have some methods and approaches that they have used in the past that can be adapted to the new circumstances. But still, compared with production line companies, these organizations have to do more inventing for each product they produce.

This distinction matters for the following reason. If police departments are single organizations with one product produced through a uniform production process, then it is possible to capture the organization's overall performance with relatively simple summary statistics that measure either the results or the process. If, on the other hand, police departments are best viewed as multiproduct conglomerates with many products produced through many different production processes (some of them invented for only one time use!), then one will probably not be able to develop a single satisfactory performance measure for the organization. Instead, one will have to look at the results and the process of each of the individual initiatives that are undertaken.

Note that this problem does not arise in quite the same way in private organizations. All private organizations, whether production lines or job shops, can characterize their overall objectives in simple terms—their goal is to make money. Moreover, each product, whether produced through a production line or a job shop, can be evaluated in financial terms; there is no special need to evaluate the individual jobs. They can be simply summarized and added together to show the overall performance of the enterprise.

These issues arise in the public sector simply because we cannot get a good comparative measure of the value of reducing street-level drug trafficking in a neighborhood relative to improving the robbery clearance rate, or reducing the average response time. If these are all distinct products that the police *could* produce, then it is important to decide whether we are going to try to capture the impact of these diverse activities in a single overall measure of performance, or whether we will treat these as different product lines, each with its own measure of performance.

Initially, there seems to be strong public preference for viewing the police department as a single, coherent organization with a simple goal produced by

a straightforward production process. Indeed, much of what gives the professional model of policing its extraordinary power is the fact that it embodies such a vision of policing. The overarching goal is to reduce serious crime. The method is to threaten and actually produce arrests for crime through patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigation. To ensure consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness in the pursuit of this broad goal through these methods, the organization relies on standard methods written down in manuals that instruct officers in how they are to do their jobs in the many different circumstances they will encounter.

Yet, the current trend is to recognize and value the fact that, while the police have long represented themselves as a single, coherent organization with a common purpose and a consistent methodology, the reality has long been the opposite. They produce many different things, relying on high degrees of initiative and innovation from their front-line officers. Of course, these efforts may aggregate up to an effect on overall levels of crime and security in the same way that an architectural firm's diverse efforts will add up to an overall profit and loss for the company, and a more or less attractive skyline for a city. But the point is that there is lots of variety in what the police do that deserves separate evaluation just as each building deserves to be separately evaluated by the architectural firm, and each method of treatment for lung cancer needs to be evaluated separately by a hospital. Further, it is not at all clear what the overall metric should be to capture the combined effect of the police department's activity. Should it be reduced crime, or increased justice, or enhanced safety and security (and the economic value that brings), or simply increased citizen satisfaction with the quality of service they receive from the police?

Note that in a world in which many police departments are trying to shift from responding to incidents through routine procedures to identifying and dealing with the problems that underlie the particular incidents, these questions are particularly important. An increasing share of police department resources will be devoted to dealing with larger, nonroutine problems—the kind of work that resembles a job shop more than a production line organization. The effect of these efforts may or may not show up in the traditional measures a police department uses for measuring its activity and results. To be sure that we understand how much of the problem-solving efforts are going on, and what their effect is, it may be important to develop some special measures for capturing the value of these initiatives.[20]

---

[20] For an excellent example, see Eck and Spelman 1987.

A "BALANCED SCORECARD" FOR POLICING

So far, we have been operating on the principle that there is an important "bottom line" for public policing—some valuable results that are produced by the police that can justify their use of public money and authority. I have been arguing that the results are broader than reduced crime. The wider effects include producing justice by calling offenders to account, reducing fear/enhancing security, and creating safety and liberty in public spaces. Moreover, I have argued that the value of these results has to be set against the costs of money and authority that are used in producing them. And further, that because public money and authority are being used in policing, there is value in operating fairly and justly as well as economically. While complex, these ideas can all be fitted into the idea that the police have a substantive "bottom line." These are all dimensions of performance that could be and probably are valued by citizens (viewed as both owners and customers, overseers and clients, of the public police).

Each of these dimensions of performance could also be measured. We can measure levels of crime. We can measure how successful we are in calling offenders to account. We can measure how safe citizens perceive themselves to be in public spaces. We can measure how much money was spent on producing these results. To a degree, we can even measure how much authority and force was used to achieve the results. And we can measure whether the operations spread the benefits and burdens of public policing fairly across the population. While it might be difficult to develop a common metric that would allow us to add up the diverse effects in a single score of overall effectiveness that could be easily compared with the costs of producing those results, it is certainly possible to determine whether performance on each of these dimensions was moving in the right direction—that is, crime going down, more offenders called to account, sense of security going up, less money being spent, less force and authority being used, fairer distribution of burdens and privileges.

Suppose, however, that we wanted to take the advice of leading business firms and go beyond this effort to account for past performance on important valued objectives to create a "balanced scorecard" for policing? What additional dimensions of performance, if any, would we have to attend to in trying to manage police departments for the maximum value to the society?

Obviously, we have already taken the counsel that we should not necessarily restrict our attention to *financial* measures of performance. Indeed, there is only one financial measure in our bottom line—the costs of public policing. All the benefits or returns of policing are denominated in nonfinancial terms.

We have also taken the counsel that we should look to measures of "process" as well as "outcome." This is not just because process measures support both accountability and learning in the organization. It is also because, in public policing (as in many service organizations), the process is part of the product's value. Processes are not simply means to an end in policing; they are ends in themselves. When we succeed in calling an offender to account, that is not only an effective means to the valued end of reducing crime; it is also a valuable result in itself. It is part of what we mean by justice, and part of what we hope a public police department can help to produce. When we protect offenders' rights in an "obligation encounter," that is not only a means of inducing compliance, but also a valued result in its own right. By operating in this way, a police department becomes more just and fairer as well as more effective.

The counsel we have not yet taken from the idea of the "balanced scorecard," however, is that we should be focusing our attention on those things that will lead to continuing or even greater success in the future. This includes the idea that we ought to be continually evaluating our methods to learn better ways of doing our work, monitoring the organization's research and development efforts toward valuable new products and services, and keeping track of important strategic alignments that are occurring. It also includes the idea that we ought to be paying attention to the quality of relationships between the organization and its customers, suppliers, and employees.

In the context of policing, the first injunction suggests that public police departments should be spending lots of time monitoring and assessing the processes they are relying on to produce current results—for example, learning more about the best ways to close down street-level drug markets, deal with domestic assaults, and notice when serial rapists and killers are active, and improve their methods for tracking them down (Sherman 1998). It also means spending money on the research and development activities that can help a police department develop, field, and evaluate large new products such as the DARE program, special efforts to deal with youth violence, or special efforts to control disorder and fear. Indeed, in a world where we do not understand "what works" to control crime in general, and where we suspect that there are many different kinds of crime problems, each with its own efficient solutions, it seems that we ought to be spending a great deal of time and money developing and testing the methods we rely on to control crime and fear.

This first injunction also means that we might need some special measures that allow us to track the progress that police departments are making in shifting their basic strategy of policing. Over the last decade, criticisms of what had

become the conventional strategy of policing have accumulated. The conventional strategy of policing was largely reactive. It relied principally on patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation to control crime. This strategy had some significant strengths, including its ability to protect citizens' privacy by operating at the surface of social life and intervening only when called on to do so by the occurrence of a crime, its ability to operate fairly and consistently, and its ability to respond to individual calls for service (as long as they involved offenses). This strategy, however, also had some significant weaknesses. It did not seem to be effective in reducing crime, nor in stilling fears. Nor did it seem capable of responding to concerns of neighborhoods about instances of disorder as well as serious crime. Nor did it spend much time and effort sustaining relationships with local communities. It took it for granted that individuals and communities would trust them enough to call and assist them in their inquiries.

These weaknesses led to the development of a different strategy of policing, one that was both broader and more proactive. It took crime prevention and fear reduction as seriously as crime control. It saw value in responding to neighborhood concerns about disorder as well as serious crime. It relied on "problem solving" as an important new technology for dealing with crime and disorder problems. It saw the community as a valuable resource in dealing with crime, and judged strong community relations as instrumentally very important to the future success of the police. These ideas were all embodied in the commitment to "community" and "problem-solving" policing as a new strategy of policing.

The difficulty, of course, is that the police cannot change their strategy overnight. It takes a great deal of investment in an organization's operating systems, human resource management systems, measurement systems, and culture to create an organization that is capable of operating this new strategy. If the change in strategy is considered important and valuable, the "balanced scorecard" instructs us to develop measures that could track the organization's progress in preparing itself to operate through this new strategy of policing. We can record whether the old dispatching system has been modified to give higher priority to disorder offenses, and to lessen the importance of rapid response relative to preserving "beat integrity" by giving the calls to the patrol officer assigned to a particular location. We can see whether the organization has adapted its recruiting strategies, and the investment it has made in training both its current officers and its new recruits in the new philosophy and practices. We can see whether it has developed and deployed new measurement

systems to measure levels of fear and disorder, and levels of confidence that citizens have in the police. We can measure whether members of the organization understand and agree with the new philosophy of policing, and the extent to which they think it gives them additional opportunities to contribute to the welfare of the communities they police (Moore et al. forthcoming).

The second injunction from the "balanced scorecard" suggests that the police would do well to monitor the state of their relationships with the citizens on whose behalf they police. They should not assume that the only thing citizens want from a police force is reduced crime. They should, instead, reach out to discover what individual citizens and groups of citizens *want* from the police. They should also find out whether citizens like and trust them or not.

It is important for police departments to monitor the state of their relationship with citizens not only because citizens are the customers of the police, but also because citizens are, in an important sense, "suppliers" to the police department as well (Epstein, Wray, Marshall, and Grifel 2000). Even under the old strategy of policing that depended so heavily on patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigation, the police depended on citizens for their operational effectiveness. If citizens did not call the police, the police department's expensive rapid response capability would be relatively worthless. If citizens did not cooperate with investigations, detectives would find it much harder to call offenders to account. Under the new strategy of policing that emphasizes the value of crime prevention through informal social control, as well as police-generated deterrence and incapacitation, citizens play a much larger role in controlling crime. We depend on them to help the police reduce opportunities for offending through self-defense activities, and by cooperating with the police in efforts to solve problems that lead to offenses. In short, much effective crime control is "coproduced," with the citizens supplying much of the effort that allows the police to be effective. Because citizens are both suppliers to the police as well as customers of the police, there is extra reason to be concerned about the strength of the relationship between the police and citizens.

It may be equally important for the police to monitor their relationships with their employees. Policing, after all, is an incredibly demanding business. There is heartbreak as well as danger in the work. One must meet the public on the public's terms, at times when they are hardly on their best behavior. In these respects, stress is a common feature of the job.

What is shocking, however, is that police ordinarily think that the greatest stress they experience comes not from the pressures of the work itself, but

instead from their own managers! (See Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990). They find their managers arbitrary in their demands, and unhelpful in the doing of their jobs. They find the systems of promotion and assignment unfair and nonsensical. All this leads both to unionism (despite laws against this), and to efforts to bypass collective bargaining by directly legislating rights to police officers.

The disturbed state of working relationships with employees is very bad for police performance for the simple reason that policing depends crucially on the motivation and quality of the officers themselves.[21] As in most service organizations, labor costs account for the vast majority of the police department's expenses. The quality of the experience that customers have depends crucially on the performance of the individual employees. Despite heroic efforts to reduce the discretion of police officers by writing policies and procedures, and creating dense levels of supervision and control, the fact remains that most police officers do their work alone or in pairs, on the street, without close supervision (Bittner 1975). Thus, the performance that we get is what police officers decide to do. If they are well-trained, highly motivated, competent professionals, we will get good performance. If they are unschooled, angry, and undisciplined, we will get an expression of whatever is in their hearts—and that may or may not be good.

The newer strategies of policing recognize the crucial importance of front-line police officers (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990). Indeed, they encourage officers to exercise initiative and imagination in dealing with problems they can see in their communities. But, to make such strategies viable, a great deal must be done to improve the working relationships between police officers and their own managers. We would have to spend more on training, and shift supervisory practices from direct control, to coaching and after-the-fact evaluation. This would make policing more like the profession that it is, and less like the blue collar bureaucratic process that it tries to be. To the extent that such changes are valuable, the principle behind the idea of a balanced scorecard says we should measure these changes.

---

[21] This seems also to be true in many service businesses and innovative companies. See Kaplan and Norton 1996:127–132.

CHAPTER 4

Values Expressed in and Achieved by Policing: What Citizens *Should* Demand and Value in Police Performance

THE ARGUMENT SO FAR, then, is that while one can assert that the ultimate public value produced by policing is crime reduction secured through the threat of arrests, it is by no means obvious that this is true. There are many things that the police can produce that are plausibly valuable to society other than reducing crime, and many means other than making or threatening arrests. These other valued results include 1) preventing crimes through means other than arrests; 2) holding offenders to account in the interests of justice; 3) reducing fear and promoting security; 4) reducing the burden and encouraging public-spirited forms of self-defense against crime; 5) regulating traffic and the use of public spaces in the interests of safety, security, and equal access to public resources; and 6) providing various types of emergency medical and social services.

Which of these valuable products are given priority should, in the business model, be decided by the "customers" of policing. But it is not clear who the customers of policing are. For sure, the customers include the service recipients—those who call the police and request assistance. But the customers of policing also include "citizens" and their representatives. These customers at least should, and may actually do, value the police not simply in terms of how responsive the police are to the particular needs they have as individual clients, but also in terms of how effectively the police pursue larger social goals such as reduced crime and fear, and how reliably the police express the goals of fairness in their use of authority, as well as efficiency and effectiveness.

The relevant customers may also include those who are *obligated* as well as those who are *served*—the arrested offenders, the subjects of investigations, the

witnesses who are subpoenaed, and the negligent drivers who are cited. This last group are customers only in the sense that they transact with the organization as individuals. They do not pay for the "services" they receive. Nor is it the organization's goal to satisfy them, except to the extent that their rights are respected, or their satisfaction is instrumental to achieving the real goal of the encounter, which is to secure their compliance.

TOWARD A LARGER VIEW OF THE PUBLIC VALUE OF POLICING

This discussion of what products and services the police produce, and who values them suggests that our usual ways of talking about police performance are not fully satisfactory. To see the value only in terms of reducing crime and calling offenders to account misses some important contributions the police both can and do make to society. To think only in terms of customer service is to miss the important role of "imposing duties" (Sparrow 1994). To see the police department as an organization with a single "product line" is to miss the complexity of the police enterprise, and the value that comes from having synergistic product lines. To see the police as a stable entity misses the important changes that are affecting the field. There is a different way to view public value in police departments that may be more satisfactory.

Distinguishing Utilitarian from Principled Values

The first step is to make a distinction between "practical" or "utilitarian" values on one hand, and "principled" or "deontological" values on the other. Practical values include goals like reduced crime, enhanced security, and responsive and courteous service. They are good to have and enjoy because individuals value them. The more of them, the better.

Principled values, on the other hand, are things like justice and fair treatment. These are considered good in themselves, regardless of whether individuals or collectives really want them, and regardless of whether the production of these values produce any additional good. The more reliably we live up to these principles, the better our performance.

Of course, individuals and collectives often *do* want and value these principled values as well as the practical ones. Indeed, they particularly seem to want these things when they get together as a collective to establish a public agency spending tax dollars and relying on state authority to accomplish public purposes. It is also true that actions taken to secure these principled values may also produce valuable practical results. Crime may be reduced through the deterrence and incapacitation that results from pursuing the principled

goal of holding offenders to account. Compliance with rules may be more reliably and inexpensively secured if citizens believe that the system that enforces compliance is just and legitimate. But the point is that these principled values can be distinguished from the utilitarian values, and viewed as important in judging the value of public policing.

Ordering the Importance of Stakeholders and Customers to Be Satisfied

The second step is to distinguish among the people—or more accurately, the *social positions*—who do the valuing of police enterprises. As noted above, it is useful to distinguish between the social positions of a *citizen* on one hand (who, in principle if not in practice, forms his views of how a police force should operate without regard for whether he is rich or poor, black or white, an offender or a victim), and a *client* (who is particularly situated in the society and therefore has particular interests that are affected by specific transactions with the police department) on the other. Among clients of the police, it is also useful to distinguish between those clients who want and receive services from the police (those who call because they have been victimized by a crime, or because they need other kinds of emergency service), and those whom the police oblige to do things (those whom the police suspect or know to have violated some laws).

Arguably, it is important to satisfy the interests of all these different stakeholders of policing, but the reasons for being interested in satisfying them, and the relative importance of seeking to satisfy them, differ a great deal. Some of the preferences deserve more standing than others.

The clients who receive *services* from the police look most like customers in the private sector, and therefore (in this era that celebrates business models) the individuals whose satisfaction seems most important to pursue. Of course, there are obvious prudential reasons why a police force would seek to satisfy these clients. Because there are many who call, because most of them are law-abiding citizens, and because most of them pay taxes, there are political advantages from providing quality services to those who call, walk in, or attend neighborhood meetings to request particular services. Yet, as noted above, sometimes it is the duty of a police department to say "no" to such customers. They cannot have more than their "fair share" of police resources. They cannot have the police operate illegally to advance their particular interests in having orderly streets and places. In these situations, the principled views held by citizens trump the desires of the particular customers, and the relative importance of citizens is greater than that of clients.

The clients who receive *obligations* from the police—the criminal offenders, the suspects in an investigation, the negligent drivers—look least like customers, and one can imagine that the police are under no obligations to try to satisfy them. Yet, as noted above, the police have *instrumental* reasons for wanting to satisfy these clients. All other things being equal, they would like the offenders to come quietly, the suspects to cooperate in the investigation, and the negligent drivers to recognize the error of their ways. The police also have *principled* reasons for treating the "obligatees" well. Citizens, thinking that they might someday find themselves in these awkward positions, have given offenders, suspects, and reckless drivers rights, and the police are duty-bound to respect those rights. So, even though the point of policing is not necessarily to satisfy the interests of offenders, there are important reasons for operating with some attention to both their interests and rights.

The stakeholders who, at first glance, seem least important to satisfy are the citizens. After all, the whole notion of a "citizen" as defined above is too abstract to have much practical value. Yet, as we went through the analysis of what police departments owed to particular, concrete clients, it kept turning out that the particular ways in which police departments managed their encounters with service recipients and obligatees were largely dictated by rules that "citizens," with their interests in fairness and aggregate efficiency and effectiveness wanted. The police can't say "yes" to every particular citizen demand, because they have to protect the interests of all. They have to consider the well-being of offenders because they have practical and principled interests in doing so.

It turns out, then, that the most important stakeholders to satisfy in policing are the citizens. That conclusion becomes less surprising when we remember that citizens provide police with the authority and money they use in operations. The authority comes from the precious stock of liberty we all enjoy. The money comes from private consumption via taxation. Because citizens pay for policing with these precious assets, and because the police must act for all, it is primarily citizens' desires that deserve to be honored in police operations.

Distinguishing Aggregate Values from the Quality of Individual Transactions

The third step is to distinguish between values that are realized in the aggregate, and those that are realized in smaller, more individualized transactions. This distinction parallels to some degree the distinction between citizens on

one hand and clients on the other. Arguably, citizens value the *whole* of polic-
ing, including questions about its aggregate fairness, efficiency, and effective-
ness. Clients, on the other hand, value the *particular transactions* in which they
are involved, either as service recipients or obligatees. An important part of
their individual valuation is whether they think they have been fairly and
decently treated.

It is worth noting that there are many levels of aggregation that lie be-
tween the entire political community in whose name a police department
operates on one hand, and individual clients on the other. There are different
geographic neighborhoods or communities of place. There are also different
communities of interest such as business owners or people of color, who have
interests that are larger than individual interests, but smaller than citywide
interests. All other things being equal, when individuals collect in mediating
institutions such as neighborhood groups, churches, or other kinds of interest
groups, they have more political power, and more legitimacy in demanding
police services than they do as individuals. But their legitimacy and effective
influence increases even more when their grouping includes many diverse
interests, or when the substantive claims they wish to make can be rationalized
as in the interests of the whole as well as their immediate, somewhat idiosyn-
cratic interests.

This point really parallels the idea that the police can often be viewed as a
job shop rather than a production line organization, and that the jobs they
sometimes do satisfy a group in their community that is larger than an indi-
vidual, but smaller than the whole community. To the extent that the police
work at satisfying these kinds of interests, they strengthen the structure of
mediating institutions in the society.

AN ORDERED LIST OF VALUES TO BE PURSUED
THROUGH PUBLIC POLICING

Once we have made these distinctions, it becomes possible to produce an
ordered list of values that the police might try to realize through their opera-
tions. Table 1 (see next page) presents a first cut at such a list. This table is
important to the subject of police performance measurement because each of
the values in this table is an important candidate for measurement. We know
that organizations tend to produce what is measured. We also know that if
some important values go unmeasured, the police will produce less of that
value than is desirable. Some urgency thus attaches to developing a suitable
measure for a neglected and important value. Thus, Table 1 can be used as a

Table 1. What Citizens Should Value in Their Police Department

	Principled Values	Instrumental Values
Social Perspective	*Enforce the Law Faithfully and Impartially* Call offenders to account Reduce brutality and excessive use of force Allocate police resources fairly Reduce corruption Distribute burden of protection between private and public fairly	*Enhance Safety and Security* Reduce crime and victimization Reduce fear Reduce public disorder Increase efficiency and cost effectiveness Increase traffic safety Provide emergency medical/social services
Individual or Group Perspective	*Engender a Sense of Fair Treatment* Among particularly situated groups Among those obligated by police	*Provide High-Quality Customer Service* Quality of customer service: Individual evaluation Quality of customer service: Group evaluation

template for assigning priority to the construction of measures that could allow citizens to more reliably recognize the value of policing, and managers to more reliably guide operations. Some discussion of the values presented in Table 1 may help clarify the table's meaning and increase its practical utility.

The upper left–hand cell of Table 1 holds the aggregate, *principled* values that a police department is duty-bound to pursue. This includes the important idea that the police should enforce the law faithfully and impartially—and not just the laws that define felony crimes. The police should also enforce those laws that define misdemeanors, the civil statutes that seek to promote order in public places, and the laws that regulate the conduct of the police themselves. In this cell, then, is the value of calling offenders to account for their crimes.

Also in this cell is the recognition of patterns of corruption in the police force, or the unfair use of force and authority, and the important goal of reducing them. The reason is that, by definition, corruption involves the unfair application of the law. It consists either of failing to apply the law in cases in which it was warranted, or applying the law in cases in which its use was not warranted. Such acts are particularly egregious when they are done for reasons of personal gain.

This cell also includes the idea that the police should use force and authority not only fairly, but also economically. All other things being equal, as a matter of principle, we would like the police to achieve their principled and practical aims with the smallest use of public force and authority. This includes the important goal of eliminating incidents in which excessive force is used.

This cell also includes the idea that, as a *public* police force, the police should fairly distribute the protection and service they can provide across the entire political community they serve. Police services should be allocated according to socially defined need rather than political or economic power.

Perhaps most controversially, this cell also includes the idea that the police should keep the responsibilities for self-defense and the avoidance of criminal victimization properly distributed between private and public agencies. After all, the public police are not, cannot, and should not be the only social actor that takes responsibility for controlling crime. Citizens have to do their part in protecting themselves and their neighbors. The public police should 1) operate to support private self-defense efforts when they are constructive, 2) discipline and regulate them when they are not, and 3) (reluctantly) fill in gaps when the gaps appear. This is important as a matter of the proper relationship between the state and individual citizens in a liberal society. As a principled

value (that has important practical effects), it is important that the police take neither too much nor too little responsibility for defending citizens against attack. Much must be left to the citizens, who then must be aided and encouraged to support public-regarding forms of self-defense.

The upper right-hand cell of Table 1 holds the aggregate, *instrumental* values that serve as the primary practical justification for having a police force. The familiar goals of the police such as reducing crime and victimization appear here. It is also here that the wider goals and effects of policing occur, such as reducing traffic accidents, establishing order in public places so that they can be widely and comfortably used, providing emergency medical and social services, and helping other city government agencies to perform more effectively in improving the quality of urban life. Obviously, within this cell, the most important and urgent values are those associated with reducing crime, victimization, and fear. But the other effects, while less central to policing, are important results the police produce, and therefore important to recognize through measurement if we want them to continue.

The public's interest in efficiency and cost effectiveness also appears in this cell. They would like to know that their money, as well as their liberty, is being spent wisely and prudently.

The lower left-hand cell of Table 1 holds the disaggregated (either group or individual) principled values—the desire of groups or individuals who interact with the police to be treated fairly, and to see police operations both in the large and small as legitimate and justified. The important value here is the extent to which groups of citizens—small-business owners, minority youths, women—feel that they are treated fairly by the police. Equally important is the extent to which individuals who are obliged by the police—to be arrested, to aid in a criminal investigation, to pay a traffic or parking fine—*feel* that they have been fairly treated. Together, these concepts define what might be considered the *perceived legitimacy* of the police. Perceived legitimacy is important as an end in itself. All other things being equal, we would like the police force to be widely perceived as fair in the way it operates. It is also important as a means to the end of building cooperative relationships with citizens who share with the police the responsibility for controlling crime.

The lower right-hand cell of Table 1 holds the disaggregated (either group or individual) instrumental values. It is here that the idea of "customer service" holds sway. This cell focuses our attention on the extent to which groups who make requests of the police, and individuals who call the police, feel that they receive high-quality, responsive service.

Focusing on the Future: Monitoring Strategic Adaptation and Working Relationships

Table 1 identifies the key dimensions of police performance that constitute the public value that police ought to be trying to produce—in effect, policing's complex "bottom line." Beyond these measures, however, citizens should expect police to make investments that will allow them to improve their performance in the future. This is the lesson of the "balanced scorecard."

There should be measures that allow citizens to know whether the police department is learning to do old jobs better, and adapting to deal with new problems as they arise. They should expect the police to get better at handling the common problems that they face such as domestic violence, gang violence, street-level drug markets, responding to people with mental illnesses on the streets, barroom fights, and the identification and arrest of serial rapists and murderers. They should also expect the police to get better at making important resource allocation decisions that pay closer attention to the value they get from sustaining particular capabilities and specialized product lines, including SWAT teams, K-9 units, horse patrols, juvenile delinquency units, and so on. To the extent that local police have committed themselves to shifting their basic strategy from the reactive model of the past to the proactive community problem-solving strategy of the future, citizens should expect the police to account for the progress they are making in implementing this new strategy—the investments they have made in building the technological infrastructure to support this new strategy, the changes they have made in their recruitment and training efforts, and so on.

There should also be measures that reveal the strength of the key relationships the police rely on to produce their valuable results. Surveys of citizen/customers that ask about their experiences and views of the police department would reveal the strength of the department's relations with its key "customers." The same survey, asking questions of citizen/suppliers about their self-defense efforts and their willingness to help the police, would reveal important information about key "suppliers." A different survey focusing on the police department's officers and civilian employees could reveal much about the organization's morale. Other data on the level of training and experience of those in particular positions in the force could indicate the overall quality of the human resources that are relied on to deliver high-quality service.

A Simple List of Seven Important Dimensions of Police Performance

While Table 1 sets out a comprehensive way of thinking about the values that a political community might want to achieve through the activities of its po-

lice department, it is far too complex and utopian to be of much use in the short run to guide current decisions about measuring police performance. We need something that lies between the simple, current view that the police should be responsible only for reducing crime, and the complex, utopian view that the police should be held accountable for the many dimensions of police performance presented in Table 1.

I want to emphasize that while reducing the complexity of Table 1 has some important practical advantages, simplifying Table 1 also entails some significant costs. It requires one to decide that there are some dimensions of police performance that are plausibly important, but will nonetheless be ignored (at least in the short run) for purposes of measuring performance. I also want to note that this decision about the valued dimensions of police performance should be made by local political communities as a philosophical and strategic judgment, not by a professor as a proposed technical solution to the problem of complexity. After all, the whole reason to develop the complexity of Table 1 was to help communities understand what might be at stake in the way they measure their police department's performance, and to facilitate a discussion of what values they think are important to express and achieve through police operations.

Still, in the interest of cutting through the complexity and getting on to some other important subjects, I tentatively and respectfully suggest that it would be useful for the next decade or so to think about measuring police performance along seven key dimensions, each dimension with a variety of indicators. To help keep these dimensions of performance in mind, I have created a particular image or icon that is meant to capture the general idea of the performance measure. The dimensions and their associated icons are presented in Table 2.

The first dimension is the familiar one of *reducing crime and criminal victimization*. It is symbolized by the image of an angry fist and a victim with a black eye. Indicators of this dimension include reported crime rates, or victimization rates discovered through victimization surveys.

The second dimension is the idea that the police ought to be able to *call criminal offenders to account*. This is important both to achieve a certain kind of justice, and to help achieve the first goal of reducing crime and criminal victimization. This dimension is symbolized by the image of an offender with his hands raised submitting to arrest. It is measured reasonably well by the fraction of crimes reported to the police that are solved by the police.

The third dimension is the idea that the police ought to contribute to *reducing fear and enhancing personal security*. This is symbolized by the image of a safe hearth

Table 2. Valuable Goals of Policing

Reduce criminal victimization

Call offenders to account

Reduce fear and enhance personal security

Guarantee safety in public spaces

Use financial resources fairly, efficiently, and effectively

Use force and authority fairly, efficiently, and effectively

Satisfy customer demands/
achieve legitimacy with those policed

and home. It is measured reasonably well by asking citizens how safe they feel, whether their perceptions of safety have been going up or down, and what level and kind of investments they make in private security measures.

Related to reduced fear and enhanced security is a fourth dimension—*guaranteeing safety in public spaces*. This is symbolized by a park bench and tree. This dimension recognizes that managing disorder in public places is an important goal that can reduce fear and victimization, and enrich the quality of our individual and collective lives. This dimension also recognizes the police role in keeping public roads and thoroughfares safe for many different kinds of public uses, and holding public spaces open for people to exercise political rights to free speech and voting. This police role is probably best measured by surveys that ask citizens about their perceptions of public spaces, and the ways in which they use them. An alternative approach would be to send out monitors with standardized methods who could patrol public locations and describe levels of disorder they observed as they traveled the public thoroughfares. There is also a widely available set of statistics that focus on traffic safety as a particularly important way that police keep public spaces safe.

So far, the dimensions of performance have identified the important, valued *results* of policing. In keeping with our discussion of gross vs. net value, however, we must recognize that the value of the police depends not only on how much they produce, but also on how much it *costs* to produce those things. To focus attention on the costs of producing the results, I suggest two dimensions to remind us of the two important assets the police use to accomplish their goals. I use the familiar image of the piggy bank to remind us of our interest in economy, or the *fair, and efficient, and effective use of financial resources*. All other things being equal, we would like to achieve valuable results of policing at the lowest possible financial cost. We would also like the police to exercise *fair, efficient, and effective use of force and authority*. To illustrate this dimension, I use the image of a nightstick.

In principle, of course, we would like to compare the value of the results the police produce with the costs incurred in producing the results. That is, we would like to be able to subtract the amount of money and authority we used from the amount of crime reduction, just accountability, and public security we produced to give us a true "bottom line" for policing. In practice, however, this is impossible. What we can do, however, is observe movements in these various dimensions of performance. We can see whether crime is going up or down, and whether we are spending more or less money and authority to produce the results. Because we know the direction in which we value these

different movements (crime down, security up, money spent down, authority and force used down), we can tell whether a police department's performance is improving or not, without knowing exactly the net value that is being produced. I think that it is at least as important to know whether things are improving or not as to know the net value of the operation.

The last dimension of police performance is *citizen satisfaction* with the responsiveness and fairness of the police. This includes both the satisfaction that those who call the police have with the police response, and the perceived legitimacy of the police among those who are obligated by the police. It is symbolized by the image of a smiling face. In principle, this is an *output* or *outcome* of policing rather than an *input*, and therefore ought to be grouped with the other indicators of police output—reduced crime, offenders called to account, and enhanced security of public spaces. I put this last, however, to remind us that the aggregate, socially mandated purposes of a police department may be more important than the satisfaction of individual clients. It is important to satisfy the clients of public police forces, of course, both as an end in itself, and as a means of gaining citizens' cooperation in achieving the other valued objectives of the police. But it is even more important to be sure that police departments are achieving the important purposes that the community as a whole has set for the organization, including the idea that the individuals who call the police should be treated well. I also include in this idea of customer satisfaction the idea that citizens perceive the police to be legitimate and fair as well as responsive to their particular needs, and that those who have been cited or arrested by the police believe themselves to have been treated fairly and appropriately. Measures of customer or client satisfaction are best obtained through surveys that ask either the general population, those who have called the police, or those who have been cited or arrested by the police about their experiences.

Broadly speaking, then, I suggest that these are the seven values that citizens ought to demand from their police forces. Whether they do so or not, and how citizens really express themselves about their ambitions for policing is the subject of the next section.