This might sound bizarre, but it is worth noting that private companies use such techniques to test their points of contact with citizens. For example, many companies listen to conversations between their agents and customers, both to measure the overall quality of customer service, and to provide coaching to individual customer representatives. Similarly, some banks have tested for discrimination in mortgage markets by having two citizens identical in all respects but race apply for mortgages, and describing their different experiences.

In the context of policing, one could have black and white, rich and poor people drive around a district in the same car on similar routes and count the number of times each was stopped to determine whether the police are acting on race and class characteristics in deciding who to stop. Or, one could set up "sting" operations in which undercover police acting as drug dealers would flash a great deal of money in public locations, or would offer bribes to officers once they were arrested.

If one presented these "challenges" frequently enough, randomly enough, and did them over time, one could observe whether the levels of abuse and corruption were going up or down for the department as a whole. Unfortunately, such systems are very expensive to operate. Police also consider them unfair, and police unions oppose them, even when the operations are not to be used to develop evidence to press charges against the police.

Without measures such as these, one is limited to a small number of other options for investigating the procedural rectitude of the police in deploying their authority to stop, to question, to arrest, and so on. First, one can rely on examinations of policies and procedures, and check the knowledge of both supervisors and officers of those policies and procedures. Second, one can examine the character of the police department's administrative systems for controlling discretion and corruption—the way they train, the way they supervise, the way they discover instances of misconduct, the way they investigate the incidents they hear about, and the way they discipline officers in cases where charges are substantiated.

It is obvious, I think, that these measures are pretty inadequate as measures of the aggregate fairness in the way that the police use their authority. Unfortunately, this is what is now available. New measures are now being developed to gauge the extent to which the culture of a police department is supportive of or hostile to abuses of discretion and corruption (Klockars et al. 1997). And these may, over time, become appropriate for routine use. In the meantime, however, we are limited to these very inadequate measures to monitor a very important aspect of police performance. On grounds that something that is worth doing at all is worth doing badly, it would be better to measure this aspect of police

performance badly rather than not at all. That would at least keep the pressure on for improving our capacity to measure this aspect of performance.

Measuring the Amount of Authority and Force the Police Use. Third, while it is important to examine the *aggregate fairness* with which the police use their authority, it is also important to analyze the overall *amount* of authority the police use. We often confuse the *fairness* with which the police use authority with the *amount* they use. The reason is that we have in our minds an idea about the "proper use" of force and authority in each particular situation. If our idea about the proper use of force and authority is reliably executed in particular situations, then that idea will determine both the aggregate overall *level* and the aggregate overall *distribution* of the use of police force and authority (i.e., who gets stopped and arrested, as well as how many people get stopped). Each case that deserves attention will get it. And the amount of attention it gets will be exactly what it deserves. There will no cases that the police investigate that they shouldn't. (In that sense there will be a proper distribution of the use of authority.) And there will be no cases in which the police use more force and authority than they are entitled to use. (In that sense, the amount of force and authority used in each particular case will have been appropriate, and so will the overall level of force and authority.)

As a practical matter, however, it seems useful to distinguish the aggregate *fairness* with which the police distribute obligations and duties across the society from the aggregate *amount* of force and authority they use in accomplishing their mission. After all, it is possible to imagine a police force in a totalitarian state that was scrupulously fair in the way it treated individuals in the society, but was oppressive in the overall level of control and surveillance it exercised. Equally, it is possible to imagine a lazy force that was avowedly racist in the way it operated, but didn't do much policing except against a minority population. So, we are interested in the *aggregate level* of authority and force that the police use as well as the *aggregate distribution* of its use. (This, in addition to being interested in the way that force and authority are being used in individual cases.)

The important measures indicating the overall level of force and authority used by the police must begin with individual instances of *abuses* of police force and authority. Abuse in an individual case means both that too much force and authority was used, and that it was unjustly used against that individual.[26] If it

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[26] See Alpert and Dunham (1997) for an interesting discussion of how police use of force can be measured by the difference between the level of force used by police and the level of suspect resistance.

turns out that excessive force occurs more often to people in a certain group, that group (as well as the individuals) might have reason to be concerned. Thus, a community would want to keep track of citizen complaints against the police.

Note that we could be interested in two different aspects of citizen complaints. On one hand, consistent with our interests in ensuring the overall *fairness* of policing, we could determine whether the frequency of citizen complaints against the police varied much across different segments of the population. Did rich people complain more about mistreatment by the police, or poor people? Young people or old people? Men or women? White or black? On the other hand, consistent with our interest in the overall *level* of the use of force and authority, we could examine whether the number of complaints was going up or down.

Of course, complaints against the police have many problems as measures of the extent to which the police misuse their force and authority. For one thing, complaints about police misconduct have the same problems as a measure of police misconduct that crimes reported to the police have as measures of criminal victimization. In both cases, the number of reports is influenced by the ease with which complaints can be made, and the enthusiasm with which they are followed up, as well as the true underlying rate of incidents (Sviridoff and McElroy 1988, 1989). If citizens are discouraged from filing reports, or if they have little confidence that their complaints will produce any action, complaints filed against the police will be artificially lowered.

The problem can be rectified to some degree in the same way that the problem of reported crime is rectified—we can conduct a survey of those who had an "involuntary" contact with the police, and find out how they were treated.[27] By an "involuntary contact," I mean someone that the police stopped, or cited for a traffic offense, or arrested for a misdemeanor or a felony. We should not expect such individuals to feel very happy about their encounter. But it would be important to learn from them what kind of force or authority was used in the course of the encounter, and how they felt about it. (How they *felt* about it belongs more properly to our discussion below on perceived legitimacy). Because this method rests on testimony from citizens, it suffers from many of the same difficulties that crime victimization surveys do—namely, that those interviewed may have many motives other than reporting the truth of what occurred. But, again, if we do not take any individual report too seriously, but

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[27] I am indebted to the Vera Institute of Justice for this idea.

do take the aggregate pattern of reports observed over time as a rough measure of how the police are generally behaving in a community, the data will probably serve decently well.

Another important question in using citizen complaints as a performance measure, however, is whether one should look at *all* complaints, or only those that are substantiated. Or, even more narrowly, only those that result in successful civil suits by citizens against the police.

A strong case can be made for limiting our attention to substantiated complaints and/or successful civil suits. It is only in these cases that we can be reasonably sure that the police did what they were accused of doing. Because complaints against the police could be motivated by many purposes other than imposing a just claim against an individual officer and the department, we should not take the mere fact of a citizen complaint as evidence of misconduct. That would be unjust and unfair to the department as a whole as well as to the individual officer(s) cited in the complaint. A good department could be made to look bad if enough unfounded complaints were filed against it.

Importantly, however, the distinction between successful civil suits and substantiated complaints on one hand, and all complaints on the other, may mirror the distinction made above between procedural rectitude on one hand, and perceived legitimacy on the other. What the courts are doing when they find for or against the police in a civil case, and what the internal affairs division is doing when it substantiates or fails to substantiate a complaint against the police, is partly testing the strength of the evidence against the police in a given case. But they are also relying on an established standard of procedural rectitude that defines what the police may do. That, of course, may be the right standard to enforce against the police when they are accused of misconduct. But that standard might be different than the standard of perceived legitimacy. It is quite possible that many of those who feel they have complaints against the police either do not know, or do not agree with the standards that govern police conduct. In these respects, we might want to keep track of the nature and number of unsubstantiated complaints as a rough indicator of the extent to which the police enjoy legitimacy with the population that they police.

Note that the data on successful civil suits are interesting for two somewhat different reasons. On one hand, they provide relatively convincing evidence that the police did misuse their force in a particular situation. Consequently, citizens should probably take an increase in the number of civil suits as an important indicator of the level of force that the police are using. On the other hand, the civil suits establish a direct link between the misuse of authority, and

expenditures by the community. The size of the settlements tell us how much misuses of authority cost in financial terms, and thus allow us to impute a financial cost to the city of all the instances of misconduct that occurred.

The weakness of the data on civil suits is that there are usually only a small number of such events. As a result, movements in this number will not allow us to discover small improvements in the way the force is conducting itself. For this reason, it would be desirable to rely on substantiated complaints as well. Again, it is important to distinguish between the truth or falsity of any given claim against the police on one hand, and what an aggregate pattern of complaints might be telling us about the overall performance of the force (Sparrow et al. 1990).

While concerns about the levels of force and authority have to start with concerns about excessive or unjustified use of force and authority, our interests do not end there. After all, measures of unjustified and/or excessive use of force and authority depend on whether or not a certain level of force or a certain use of authority was or was not consistent with a particular standard that sets the outer limit for the use of force and authority. It is important to know how *many times* the police cross that line, of course. But it might be equally important to know by *how much* the line was crossed. We might do well to think of the use of force and authority as a continuum, in which legal standards set outer limits, but where our interests include knowing not only whether a given limit was exceeded, but also by how much. It might also be important for us to take an active interest in how often the police departments that we entrust with our lives, our physical well-being, and our liberty use *less* force and authority than they were entitled to use in accomplishing their mandated law enforcement purposes. This would be equivalent to noticing when a given corporate entity used less money than it had budgeted to achieve a particular result—certainly something that would be important for the company's owners and managers to notice and reward.

The proposal, then, is to think of the use of force and authority as a kind of continuous variable. While we are interested in ensuring that force and authority are never used improperly, we might also be interested in minimizing the force and authority used to accomplish law enforcement objectives. The assumption is that, all other things being equal, we would like to achieve the same level of enforcement effectiveness with less use of force and authority. For example, if we could achieve the same crime control impact with fewer arrests rather than more arrests, we should prefer that result. If we could achieve the same degree of success in solving crimes with less use of electronic surveillance,

or less use of informants persuaded to testify against their colleagues through threats of exceptional prosecutorial efforts if they do not cooperate, then we should prefer that result.

Note that I am not saying that we should not use force and authority to achieve law enforcement objectives. That would be absurd. The whole reason we have a police force is precisely to *use* force and authority to control crime, enhance security, and ensure justice. The argument is simply that a good police department will achieve these important results with less use of authority and force than others, even if none of the departments ever use *excessive* force and authority. It is quite easy for a police department to get lax with the use of authority, just as it is easy to become lax in the use of public funds. They will spend authority up to the limit to accomplish their objectives, even when they could have achieved the same result with less use of force and authority. To keep the police focused on the use of force and authority as assets, it is important to pay attention to how much they use force and authority, even when it is authorized.

Important measures of the police use of force and authority could include the following: 1) the frequency with which the police initiated a contact with a citizen that involved a stop, a question, or a search; 2) the number of citations they issued; 3) the number of times they used physical force to subdue arrestees; 4) the number of times they fired their weapons; 5) the number of search warrants they received; 6) the number of wiretaps they fielded; etc. In effect, it would be important to get a measure of how proactive and intrusive the police were as they did their work. Again, this is important not because the police shouldn't be proactive and intrusive to achieve their objectives. It is important simply because if they could achieve their objectives and use their authority less intensively and intrusively, that would be an indication of a superior capacity to police.

Note that one extremely interesting and important indicator of the extent to which the police misuse their authority would be the frequency with which judges support motions to throw out evidence in criminal cases that had been improperly gathered. The police often see such instances as infuriating, because they often seem to sacrifice substantive justice (convicting those who deserve to be convicted of crimes) to procedural justice (accepting the results of a rule-governed process). Or, to put the matter more colloquially, the courts let the offender "walk on a technicality." Citizens can and do sympathize with the police frustration in these circumstances. But it is worth noting that when the police fail to play by the rules enforced by the courts, the police impose

significant costs on society. They have wasted the efforts that went into making a case against the suspect, undermined the rights of the particular suspect, and undermined the fixed structure that protects the rights of all citizens to be free from unauthorized intrusions by the state. In addition, it is ethically wrong (as well as economically wasteful) for the police to break the law in their efforts to enforce the law.

In assessing how well the police force uses its authority, then, it would be important to know how often a court agreed with a defendant's claim that he or she had been the victim of an unlawful search and seizure, been "entrapped" into committing an offense, or been wronged by false police testimony. If that number is going up, then it should be a cause for concern. If it is going down, it should be a cause for celebration, and a reason to congratulate the force for its improvement in economizing on the use of force and authority, even as they use these assets to accomplish important public objectives.

Measuring Perceived Legitimacy. So far, we have been discussing the use of force and authority largely (but not exclusively) in terms of procedural rectitude as judged by the standards of the law. Thus, for example, we have focused on *abuses* of force and discretion—instances in which the police use their force and authority in ways that are not allowed by law. We have also focused on those investigative procedures that result in the court dismissing evidence gathered by the police, or voiding cases brought by the police.

In contrast, we have given less systematic attention to the *perceived* legitimacy of the police use of force and authority. We have noted that there might be a difference between the procedural rectitude of police actions on one hand, and the perceived legitimacy of their actions on the other. Further, we have noted that the difference in these concepts might explain some of the wide difference between the number of citizen complaints filed with the police, and the number that are substantiated and proceed to disciplinary action. We have also noted that it would be important to examine differences in the perceived legitimacy of the police among different parts of the population: rich and poor; middle-aged, young, and elderly; white, African American, and Hispanic; native-born citizens and immigrants; men and women.

Still, we have not given sufficient emphasis to the importance of measuring the perceived legitimacy of the police in the way that they use their force and authority. Nor have we said how such a thing could be measured.

There are several important reasons for citizens who wish to evaluate the performance of their police department to be concerned about the perceived legitimacy of the police. One reason is simply that trusting one's police depart-

ment is a valued end in itself. It is one of the important ways in which security is produced. After all, it is not just criminals that can make life dangerous and unsettled for citizens. If the police themselves are out of control, or even if they are perceived to be so, then citizens' security has been degraded by the police rather than enhanced. If, on the other hand, the citizens believe that they can trust the police not only to protect them from criminal offenders, but also to be disciplined and restrained enough to resist attacking citizens themselves, then citizens will enjoy the kind of security they hoped for themselves when they surrendered their hard-earned money and cherished liberty to the police.

A second reason to be concerned about perceived legitimacy is that it may be important as a means to other police ends, such as effective crime prevention and control. A crucially important thing to understand about policing is that police departments remain fundamentally dependent on citizen cooperation for their success in controlling crime. This is true despite the fact that we created public police departments at least partly as a way of shifting the burden of deterring and apprehending offenders from private citizens to a public agency. A police department's elaborate systems of patrol and rapid response cannot work effectively to control crime unless citizens direct police officers to crimes as they are happening. The elaborate systems of criminal investigation typically do not work well unless citizens help police with their inquiries by pointing to suspects, or providing other kinds of evidence about motivations and relationships among people. Unless citizens "support their local police," and join with the police in enforcing the law, the police cannot hope to succeed.

Note that this is particularly true in a liberal society that loves privacy and freedom as much as ours does, and that is deeply suspicious of state intervention. Our system of policing is based on Anglican-American traditions that have eschewed the widespread use of covert surveillance by informants or police agents of various kinds (Moore and Kelling 1983). These traditions limit the police largely to the somewhat superficial surveillance of public rather than private spaces. The only time when the police are allowed to take a more intrusive and intensive look into private spaces is when they are called in by private citizens to help them deal with a crime—that is, when they have probable cause to enter, to search, to make an arrest. This means that the police are often held to a *reactive* role, and that citizens must often make the first effort to mobilize them. This means, in turn, that police efforts will be both initiated and guided for the most part by private citizens. If private citizens fail to take on this responsibility, or do it badly, the police will fail.

Because legitimacy is an end in itself as well as a means for producing other important results, it is important to measure the extent to which the police enjoy legitimacy with heterogeneous citizens. As in the case of fear, the only way to find out how much legitimacy the police actually have with citizens is to ask them. Thus, an additional use of the survey of the population to determine levels of criminal victimization would be to discover the nature of the police department's reputation with citizens. It would be important to ask citizens whether they thought the police treated people like them fairly, and whether they thought the police generally behaved in a fair and appropriate way. It would also be important to understand whether the views that they hold come from concrete experience with the police, from discussions with friends and neighbors about their experiences, or from more remote sources such as newspapers, television, and radio.

Summary. In sum, it is important for police to measure the fairness and economy with which they use their force and authority to accomplish their law enforcement objectives. Again, the reason to do this is not because the police shouldn't use force and authority to accomplish their objectives. We give them a badge, a nightstick, and a gun precisely because we want them to have and to use force and authority to control crime and produce justice. They cannot do their job without using these assets, any more than Sears can deliver products and services without spending money. The point is, however, that just as Sears would like to spend as little money as possible in its efforts to make money for its shareholders by selling products and services to customers, so the police ought to be interested in spending as little of our privacy and freedom as possible in achieving the goal of producing security and justice for citizens by delivering both services and obligations to those they encounter on the streets. To create the functional equivalent of cost consciousness in a police department, it is important to develop performance measures that indicate how fairly and how economically they are using the force and authority we entrust to them.

Key concepts to try to measure include 1) the extent to which the police spread their protection across the population according to need and desert rather than ability to pay or political power; 2) the extent to which police impose the burdens of crime control fairly across the population; 3) the extent to which the police avoid abuses of discretion and excessive force, and more generally economize on the use of force and authority; and 4) the extent to which the police enjoy legitimacy and support among the citizenry as a whole, and among specific groups.

The first concept can be measured through an examination of the resource allocating processes that assign officers to districts, and that establish priorities for dispatching patrol cars to calls for service, and an evaluation of the extent to which these resource allocation decisions are guided by reasonable concepts of "need."

The second concept can be measured (quite imperfectly) by an examination of 1) the organization's operational policies and procedures designed to ensure that they do not intentionally, unintentionally, or as a consequence of practice rather than formal policy impose special burdens on some segment of the population; and 2) the methods that the police department relies on to receive complaints from citizens and control corruption. It would also be possible to design a measurement system that challenges the police on a systematic basis, and uses the results of those challenges to determine the extent of abuses of authority and corruption in the department, and whether bad conduct is spreading or diminishing over time.

The third concept can be measured by recording information about 1) successful civil suits against the police, 2) substantiated citizen complaints, 3) all citizen complaints, and 4) instances where the courts threw out evidence and cases due to improper police investigative methods. It can also be measured by the extent to which the police rely on proactive methods of patrol and investigation, and the frequency with which they make arrests, use physical force, and/or fire their weapons. In addition, information from administrative records can be supplemented by survey data from those citizens who have had "involuntary contact" with the police regarding what their experience had been, and how they felt about that contact.

The fourth concept can be measured through a general population survey that asks citizens about their perceptions of the police; particularly, whether they think the police act fairly in dealing with the situations they confront. All of these are important measures of the fairness and restraint the police exhibit in using their substantial powers. None of them is entirely unfeasible to do, but all would take a certain amount of technical invention, and no small amount of political courage.

Measuring Economy and Fairness in the Use of Public Funds

The police use public money as well as public authority to produce their valuable results. They spend money on salaries and pensions to recruit and sustain the motivation of an able work force. They buy automobiles and gasoline to keep the cars running. They pay for radios and computers to guide the cars

toward crimes and emergencies. They pay to maintain an elaborate set of records that allows them to account for their expenditures and activities on one hand, and that keeps track of offenders and evidence in ways that allow them to be effective in solving crimes and prosecuting offenders. Of course, we don't begrudge the police the money. We are glad to spend the money if they are effective in producing the results we want—namely, reduced crime, enhanced security, and sturdier justice. But still, if it were possible to save some money on the effort, we would like to do so. We hope, therefore, that the police will be careful with our money as well as with our liberty, and that they will economize on their use of both.

Being careful with our money means several things. First, we want to be sure that our money doesn't get lost, stolen, or diverted to objectives and activities we didn't intend. We could describe this as "financial integrity." Second, we expect the police to stay within agreed-upon spending limits, and to give us an accounting to show us that the money was spent the way that was planned, or if not, that there were good reasons for the different pattern of spending. We could describe this as "financial accountability." Third, we expect the police to keep searching for improved ways of doing their work—that is, to find ways to produce the same result at a lower cost, or to produce an improved result with the same cost. We could describe this as a commitment to "productivity" or "continuous improvement" or "learning."

The police have long been under pressure from the usual fiscal watchdogs to produce these different kinds of financial or cost-effectiveness results. They rely on the usual public sector accounting, control, and audit systems to make sure that the money is not stolen or diverted to inappropriate uses. They rely on the usual cost accounting methods and financial reporting systems to ensure that they stay within preset spending limits. And they have long been under pressure to produce cost savings through such things as making more effective use of officers on disability status, controlling overtime expenditures, altering schedules to fit demands for police services more reliably, or "civilianizing" the police force (i.e., substituting lower cost civilian workers to do jobs now performed by highly paid and highly trained police officers). All these things are important, but do not need much discussion here because they are familiar parts of the administrative responsibilities of running a police department.

For our purposes, only two things are worth emphasizing when talking about the economy and fairness with which the police use public funds. The first is to reiterate that *fairness* is an important value to pursue when one is using public money, as well as *efficiency* and *effectiveness*. The reason is that public

money is raised through the use of public authority, and therefore must be used for the common good rather than for the benefit of particular individuals. The most important aspect of fairness in the use of public money has already been discussed—namely, the idea that the police should allocate their efforts in response to "need" (as both the collective defines it, and individual clients experience it) rather than ability to pay or political influence.

But there are three other aspects of fairness that are worth noting. One is that jobs in the police department should be open to all, and awarded on the basis of merit. The second is that procurements made by the police should rely on competitive bidding, with contracts awarded according to merit. These basic principles support the goals of both fairness and economic efficiency, because open competition for jobs and contracts helps the government buy high-quality resources at the lowest possible price.

The third important idea is that we really are interested in securing pro-ductivity gains in the way that the police operate; that is, we are interested in reducing the costs of existing levels of performance and service, and/or in increasing the quantity and quality of police service without increasing costs. This follows from the fact that what really interests us about policing is not just the gross value that the police produce, but the *gross* value they produce *minus the costs of producing it*. The fact that we want to drive down costs per unit of output, or drive up valued outputs vs. units of cost, has two very important implications for the police.

First, it suggests that the police should be engaged in a continuing search for better, lower cost ways to achieve their results. Like other modern, produc-ing organizations, they have to learn how to put a premium on innovation. They have to examine how they do their work in all phases of their opera-tions—how they staff and schedule dispatch operators, how they recruit and train officers, how they respond to a proliferating number of burglar alarms, how they handle domestic violence complaints, and what can best be done to close down street-level drug markets, to describe just a few of the literally thousands of "business processes" that exist in a modern police department. They have to find out how their current procedures are working, and imag-ine and test alternative ways of producing the same results. When they find a superior method for performing a particular task, they have to deploy that new method quickly and widely to take full advantage of the opportunity they have created for themselves.

This sets a standard for innovation that is well beyond what most police departments are currently able to do. Much of the innovation that now occurs

in police departments is financed by grants from the federal government or foundations. The total amount of innovative experiments that such grants can sustain is usually not enough either to find all the possible ways of improving, or to create a culture of innovation in a police department. Moreover, because there is so much pressure on the police to use tried and true methods, and to use them consistently, there is often a resistance to any changes in operational procedures and methods.

The idea that the police need to be curious about their effectiveness, and creative in exploring new ways to deal with both old and new problems, is consistent with the current police drive toward improved "problem solving" (Goldstein 1990). The aim of problem-solving police departments is to produce results, and to do so through a self-conscious effort to invent and evaluate plausible solutions to a given problem. Further, it is to do this over and over again as new problems arise (Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman 1997). The idea that the police can and should be analytic, inventive, and resourceful in trying to deal with problems is new. So is the idea that they should decide whether something is worthwhile or not by seeing what results it produces, rather than simply by monitoring the effort.

If one were an investor evaluating a police department as an investment opportunity, one would look not only at its current performance in well-established missions with well-established procedures, but also at its capacity to invent new methods to deal with new situations as they arise, or to deal better with old situations than current methods can do. While organizations that have large research and development (R and D) budgets often look more expensive than organizations that eschew such investments in the short run, the organizations with the big R and D budgets often become incredibly profitable in the future. The reason is that they have continued to learn how to do their work better through investment, invention, and innovation. This suggests that, in evaluating the performance of a police department, we should look closely not only at current costs, but also at the investments they make in innovative efforts that make them flexible and adaptable.

The second implication of a focus on police productivity is that the police should take seriously the various efforts that have been made to develop productivity measures for policing, and use them to set "benchmarks" that could be used for comparisons of one department with another. We have, of course, made many efforts to construct useful productivity measures for police, and even to try to obtain comparative information about these measures by looking across departments (ICMA and Urban Institute 1997). For example, we

have looked at measures of police spending, such as expenditures per capita for police services, or the total number of police fielded per capita, or the total number of police fielded per square mile of territory to cover (Pate and Hamilton 1991).We have also looked at numbers that claim to say something important about how efficient the police are.We have, for example, looked at the number of arrests per officer, or at the ratio of the force that is on patrol at any given moment to the total number of officers in the department.We have sometimes tried to attach cost numbers to such things, and calculated such things as the cost of sustaining one patrol car in the field 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, or the average cost of an arrest.

Despite these efforts, however, it is not at all clear that police departments and police managers have fully accepted the responsibility for controlling costs and searching for productivity gains. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that they are accustomed to dealing with important matters of life, death, and justice. When such things are at stake, it seems wrong to worry about how much money is being spent. It is more important to focus on producing the valued result than trying to maximize the difference between the value of the result and the costs incurred to produce it.

Another part of the problem may be that police departments are more strongly committed to staying with standard, tried-and-true measures than most other organizations.This is not simply because the police are more traditional and conservative, or less imaginative or risk-taking than other organizations. Indeed, when one observes the police planning complex operations under pressure, one discovers that they are incredibly resourceful, imaginative, and bold.The greater problem is that the police are expected to be highly consistent in what they do both over time and across different situations.They are also supposed to already know how to do their jobs.That is what it means to be professionally competent.They aren't supposed to be trying to learn how to do their jobs, or to run risky experiments where individuals' lives and properties are at stake.Taken together, this suggests that the police are rewarded for staying with tradition and punished for adaptations and experiments (Moore 1994).

Perhaps the most important reason that these productivity measures have never done much to stimulate productivity gains in policing is that they have always seemed so obviously inadequate as measures of police performance that it was hard for the police, or indeed, most citizens or elected representatives to take them seriously. To some, they seemed too small and unimportant. Who cared much if a new scheduling system for dispatchers reduced the cost of maintaining a 24-hour dispatching capacity by 10 percent? Or, they tried to

address an important issue, but did so in an unconvincing way. It is clear that, all other things being equal, we would like the costs per arrest to be lower. But all other things are never equal. If we concentrate on increasing the number of arrests, can we be sure that that would reduce crime and enhance security? What would happen to other important police activities, such as preventing crime through problem solving rather than making arrests, or providing emergency medical and social services? And what would happen to the legitimacy the police enjoy with citizens?

These obvious limitations of proposed productivity measures make such measures seem useless from the outset. And so they are, if they constitute the only or even the primary means we use to assess police performance. If, however, they are used as part of a searching investigation of how the police actually do their work, and what impact different pieces of their work have on the broadest objectives of the police, then productivity measures may finally have their day. By focusing attention on how inputs are translated into outputs, the police may find and exploit new ways to do their work that cost less both in terms of money and authority, and that do more.[28] As a spur to innovate, and as a guide to innovations that could genuinely add value to policing by reducing costs or increasing the quantity and quality of outputs, productivity measures focusing on particular police processes may have some important strengths. The strengths would be magnified if the costs could be benchmarked reliably across departments, because then most departments would discover that there was at least one department that was outperforming them in some specific function, and they could go and find out how that department was achieving the desired result.

Measuring the Quality of Police Service to Clients and Customers

We come last in policing to what might have been first in the assessment of private sector operations—the measurement of the quality of services the police provide to the "customers" with whom they interact. The police and those who oversee them should be interested in "customer satisfaction" for at least two different reasons. First, producing customer satisfaction in those who interact with the police is valuable in and of itself. It is one of the goals toward which the police ought to be working. Second, to the extent that the police are responsive to the concerns of their clients and customers, and give

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[28] This is the point of much total quality management. See Senge 1990.

them what they want, the police might well be rewarded with the loyalty and affection of the public. That loyalty and affection may help the police acquire additional resources. It might also ward off a tendency to rely increasingly on private rather than public security. Even more important, the public support and trust earned through quality services may help the police succeed in controlling crime. For all these reasons, in measuring police performance, it would be important to discover something about the experience of those who interact with the police.

The difficulty in constructing these measures lies in knowing exactly who the customers of policing are, and what they should be asked about their experiences. On one hand, it is a pretty straightforward idea that the police might want to find out how their work is evaluated by the individual citizens who call on them for assistance, e.g., those who call the 911 system, those who show up in police stations to seek help in dealing with a problem or to get one kind of permit or another, or those who stop a police officer on the street to ask for some kind of help. To the extent that the police are in the business of serving citizens who are afraid, have been victimized, are in serious medical or emotional distress, or who simply need some particular permissions from the police, it seems clear that the police ought to be evaluated by those who use their services in the same way that forward-thinking private sector service companies are evaluating the quality of their services. They should ask their customers about the experience they have had with their organization, and their evaluation of that service encounter.

One way to obtain this information would be through the addition of some questions to the general population survey that has been proposed previously as a way to get accurate information about criminal victimization, levels of fear, self-defense, and private security efforts undertaken by citizens. We could ask citizens whether they have called on the police for service over the last year or so, and if so, what their experience has been. Answers to such questions could provide lots of useful information. For example, we could learn what fraction of the population actually calls on the police in any given year. We could also learn whether there are important differences in the attitudes that people have toward the police between those who have had actual concrete experience with the police, and those whose ideas about the police have been based on secondary sources, such as the reported experience of friends and neighbors, or accounts given in newspapers. This would all be in addition to getting accurate information about how a representative sample of the population perceives the quality of police services they received.

The difficulty with relying on a general population survey to capture information about the quality of customer service, however, is that only a small number of people included in the general population survey will have had this direct experience with the police. A far more direct method for obtaining information about customer satisfaction would be to take a representative sample of those who actually call the police or ask for assistance. This approach is much closer to the practice of business firms. Instead of taking a random sample of the general population and asking them how they liked their stay at a Marriott Hotel (knowing that many would report that they had not stayed at a Marriott), they ask a sample of their guests about their experiences. Alternatively, they leave a card in each room inviting those who stay at the hotel to give them their feedback.

Such efforts have two beneficial effects. First, they do capture information about the level of service provided, and the satisfaction it generates. Second, they are an indication that the organization is concerned about customer satisfaction. A similar approach could be used by police departments to discover the extent to which those who call the police, stop in at the station houses, or apply for licenses of various kinds feel they have been well-served by their police department.

Surveys of those who call the police for assistance focus on *individuals* who want particular things from the police. A somewhat different kind of customer are the "interest groups" that surround police departments, and press their *collective* interests on the department. Some of these groups are organized around the interests of particular geographic neighborhoods. They band together to demand more police services, or to insist that the police do something about particular problems in the community such as drug houses, fast driving in the streets, or noise late at night. Still other times, they have ideas about the means of policing as well as the ends; for example, they want a different response to minor offenses committed by juveniles. In either case, they make demands on how the police allocate their effort and do their work. Other groups are less focused on neighborhood interests and more interested in shaping the police response to certain kinds of crimes on a citywide basis. The merchants associations may want crackdowns on street vending, streetwalkers, and shoplifters. A women's group may want the police to take a tougher stance against rape or domestic violence. A child advocacy group may want the police to make a different response than they are making to runaway children on the street, or to adolescents caught up in drug trafficking.

These demands differ from individual requests for service in that they come from a *collective* group of citizens, not just an individual. The police view these

collective demands in two quite different ways. To a degree, these views are rooted in a department's overall philosophy of policing. In the professional model of policing, demands from interest groups are viewed with great suspicion. They are regarded as efforts to exercise political influence over the police, and to demand that the police deal with "special interests" rather than to stay focused on achieving the "common good." Under this model, it is important for police departments to *resist* group demands, and to stay focused on achieving the department's professional mission—to reduce serious crime and enforce the law. That mission remains inviolable, and unresponsive to the efforts of particular groups of citizens to change either the focus or the methods of policing.

In the community policing model, however, the demands from citizen groups are viewed quite differently. On one hand, far from being viewed as special interest claims that need to be resisted, the demands of citizen groups are taken as important guides about the goals that are important to citizens, and that a police department should, as a matter of principle, try to help them achieve. In effect, the police allow the citizen groups to guide them as to the value they should produce, rather than assume that all the important information about the value to be produced lies in the organization's established mission statement. In addition, being responsive to the expectations and demands of community groups is understood to be an important means for establishing an effective working partnership with community groups who are in a good position to help the police. They can help the police by supporting their demands for increased money and authority to help them do their work. And they can concretely help the police achieve their law enforcement objectives not only by cooperating with the police in investigations, but also by exercising their own forms of informal social control. That is, they can decide to use the streets for their own social and recreational purposes, rather than allow them to be used by drug dealers, gangs, and streetwalkers who attract strangers into the neighborhood.

So, the question of whether a police department should view interest groups and those who represent them as important customers of policing turns out to be an important ethical and practical question. If a city embraces the professional model of policing, it will tend to view the status of these groups with suspicion, and be uninterested in measuring their level of satisfaction with the police. If a city embraces the community policing model, it will view such groups both as important customers to satisfy, and as important co-producers of justice and security. As a result, a community policing department would be quite interested in keeping track of the strength of the partnerships between these groups and the police department.

In making the decision about which strategy to embrace, and in searching for the means to measure police performance in responding to the demands of groups, a business model might be helpful. Businesses have figured out that their future success depends on maintaining strong relationships with key stakeholders (Kaplan and Norton 1996). The stakeholders include more people than the customers to whom they sell products and services. They also include key elements of the investment community that supply them with the capital they need to continually improve and adapt their operations. And they include key suppliers of the materials they need to produce their products and services.

To monitor their standing with important customers, investors, and suppliers, many companies have developed "account management systems" (Cespedes 1989). These systems recognize particular individuals, groups, or firms as entities with whom the organization needs to establish and maintain an ongoing relationship. Each such group enters the consciousness of the organization as an "account" that needs to be managed. For each account, in turn, there is a reason why the relationship is important, and a judgment made about how important the relationship is. There might also be some explicit objectives the firm has with respect to that particular relationship. Finally, there is a record of activity and exchanges between the firm and the account. All this is monitored closely by an account management information system that keeps track of the character of the organization's relationship with specific, key stakeholders.

In principle, an organization committed to community policing could set up a similar system. It could identify the key individuals and groups with whom it wanted to maintain an ongoing relationship.[29] It could set out the ambitions it had for the relationship, and maintain a record of interactions with those who represented that particular "account." It could record the contacts, interactions, and exchanges executed within that account.

These are the *operational* uses of the account management system. But the system could also be used for *evaluative* purposes. For example, the department could review the overall set of accounts to discover the extent to which the police were closely tied to some parts of the community, and largely isolated from others. If they were linked closely to business groups and not at all to community groups, for example, they might decide to make a concerted effort to develop additional accounts with community groups. And, more to the point of our discussion here, the account management system could be used

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[29] The Vera Institute developed something like this and called it the "Beat Book."

as a basis for regular surveys of the satisfaction of various collective customers of the police, as well as individual customers. Through that device, we could discover whether the police were getting better or worse at maintaining relationships with and being responsive to groups that represented interests and purposes that were larger than individual needs, but smaller than overarching citywide goals.

There is one last "customer" of the police whom it might be important to query about the quality of their encounters with the police. The group I have in mind are not those individuals or groups that come to the police with requests for help in accomplishing their goals, but instead those individuals whom the police seek out on an involuntary basis. This includes those people whom the police stop, question and search; those whom they cite for traffic violations; and those whom they arrest for misdemeanor quality-of-life offenses and for felonies. As noted above, these individuals resemble customers in the sense that they interact with the police as individuals at the operational end of policing. But they differ from customers in that their satisfaction is not necessarily the goal of the enterprise. They interact with the police through what I have called obligation encounters rather than service encounters. An important question, then, is how obligation encounters should be evaluated, and particularly, to what extent the police should be concerned about the "satisfaction" of those who were questioned, cited, or arrested by the police.

Recall that one of the important features of an obligation encounter in which state authority is being deployed against particular individuals is that such encounters should, in principle, be evaluated both from the point of view of the "obligatee," and from the point of view of citizens who have an interest in how state authority is being deployed. Their interests are joined to a great degree in ensuring that the rights of "obligatees" are protected in the obligation encounter. Indeed, this is the way in which attending to civilian complaints can be understood not only as a service we supply to individuals who are subjected to police authority, but also to the society as a whole in its efforts to ensure that justice is done in situations where state authority is used. Indeed, we could think of the establishment and maintenance of a complaint system as a way of monitoring the satisfaction of those who are subjected to state authority.

In addition to being interested in protecting citizens' rights in obligation encounters as a valuable end in itself, we might well be interested in the satisfaction of obligatees in such encounters as a valuable means to important ends. Presumably, the instrumental goal of an obligation encounter is to secure

compliance from the obligatee. We want the person whom the police stopped to have the rights we have guaranteed to all citizens. But we would also (for somewhat different ethical reasons) like that person to cooperate with the police investigation. We would like the person arrested by the police to "come along quietly" rather than resist, and force the police to use more force and authority than is desirable. We know from important research conducted by Tom Tyler that people are more likely to comply with authoritative claims against them when they believe that the claims made are legitimate ones (Tyler 1990). Compliance is also aided when the person in authority shows respect and courtesy to the person against whom authority is being used. So, society as a whole has both a *principled* reason to ensure that the rights of obligatees have been respected in police encounters, and a *practical* interest in ensuring compliance by establishing the legitimacy of the demand that is being made, and treating obligatees with respect and courtesy.

Note that our interests in evaluating the quality of obligation encounters as a dimension of "service quality" in policing aligns very closely with the interests we have in gauging the extent to which the police are using their force and authority fairly and economically. When we ask a sample of those who had different kinds of involuntary contact with the police what their experience has been, we are also evaluating how force and authority were used in individual encounters. We are not waiting for people to complain, and have their cases substantiated or not. We are actively investigating the day-to-day interactions that the police have with citizens who are being obliged by the police rather than served by them. These measures can, therefore, be used to supplement the measures described previously, which assess whether the police are using force and authority economically and fairly. It might even turn out that such measures could be used to tell us something important about how well the complaint system is working, or reveal problems with brutality and corruption in particular parts of the police department where we did not expect it. (This happened, for example, when a pattern of complaints about sexual harassment of women in traffic stops turned up in a police department that was doing a survey of those who had been stopped. The pattern allowed the department to discover a particular officer who was using his authority to sexually molest women he stopped—an unexpected operational benefit of a more general performance measurement system.)

For all these reasons, then, it might be important for those who oversee police departments to undertake surveys not only of those who ask the police for help and assistance, but also those whom the police obligate in

various ways. It would not be hard to develop a sampling frame for undertaking such surveys. Nor is it difficult to imagine what questions one would want to ask. What is hard is 1) deciding that a polity really wants to know how the police are behaving in situations where they are using the force and authority we entrust to them, 2) deciding that the information one got back from citizens who had been exposed to enforcement action would be sufficiently accurate about what occurred to support judgments about how the police really were behaving on the street, and 3) coming to believe that the perceptions of those who had been obligated by the police are of some importance in deciding whether the police are or are not performing well.

Initially, it might seem crazy to survey those whom the police stop or arrest about what happened and whether the encounter was "good for them." One might imagine that all such people would use the opportunity to complain bitterly about the police. Yet, even if they were all bitter, there might be different degrees of bitterness that could be detected in the trends of the reports. Presumably, less bitter is better than more bitter, and that might be an effect of policing that would be worth evaluating. Indeed, I was once heartened by the response of a very experienced, tough police manager to the idea that police departments ought to survey those arrested about their experience and satisfaction with that process. He said, "You know, when I was a district commander, there were some guys who, no matter who they arrested or in what circumstances, the guys they brought in were bloody and mad. There were other guys, no matter who they arrested, whose arrestees came in clean and calm. I think that difference matters in the quality of the policing we supply." I couldn't agree more. It is important to find out how many people are coming in "bloody and mad," relative to how many are coming in "clean and calm." The best way to find out is to ask them.

INVESTING IN THE FUTURE OF POLICE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: A SCHEDULE FOR INVESTMENT

In the previous pages, I have made many suggestions about how the different important dimensions of policing could, as a technical matter, be measured. This is designed to persuade people that it is possible to improve the way in which we measure police performance. We can do so not only by elaborating our ideas about what constitutes value in policing, but also by investing in the improvement of existing or in the development of new measurement and systems.

No doubt, the suggestions were covered too briefly even to understand them fully, let alone form clear ideas about whether they were both desirable and practically feasible. It is difficult to form a clear idea of which among the various suggestions were the most important and easiest to do (therefore, high priorities for managerial attention), and which were less important and/or much more expensive and difficult to implement (therefore less urgent).

In addition, I think it should have become apparent that the different conceptual ideas we are relying on to evaluate police—reduce crime, call offenders to account, reduce fear/enhance security (particularly in public spaces), use force and authority economically and fairly, use tax dollars economically and fairly, and produce customer satisfaction—overlap and interact with one another in complicated ways. For example, for many people, three of the most important purposes of the police—reduce crime, call offenders to account, and enhance security—seem like the same idea, not three different ideas. Similarly, we can be interested in the overall economy and fairness with which the police use their authority from the viewpoint of somewhat disinterested citizens who are witnesses to how the police are operating and compare it with some abstract standard, or from the viewpoint of a particular obligatee against whom the state's force and authority is being used, who uses his or her own subjective ideas about fairness to evaluate his or her treatment. Or, we can be interested in both the fairness with which public money is being spent, as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of the expenditures. These facts create some uncertainty about how many major dimensions of police performance should be embraced, and which particular ideas belong under which of the more general concepts.

It should also have become apparent that no neat relationship exists between a particular methodology of data collection on one hand, and particular dimensions of performance on the other. We could examine police effectiveness in controlling crime by relying on existing administrative records. Or, we could supplement existing administrative records by conducting a general population survey designed to reveal criminal victimization not reported to the police, or by evaluating the impact of specific crime control programs initiated by the police. Similarly, we could examine the economy and fairness with which force and authority are being used by examining administrative records on civil suits and substantiated complaints filed by citizens. Or, we could supplement the existing administrative records by a general population survey that asks individuals who have involuntary contacts with the police about the nature of those contacts, or a more specific, focused survey of those who we know have had such contacts with the police.

Because the concepts tend to cross boundaries and blur into one another, and because different kinds of measurement systems could be used to measure police performance on different dimensions of value, it is difficult to get a clear sense of the priorities a community should have in sustaining, improving, or developing particular measurement systems. That is unfortunate, because the key question I am trying to answer in this paper is not only what should, ideally, be measured, but also, what should be the highest priorities for moving toward an improved measurement system.

To answer that "bottom line" question, I take four last steps. First, in Table 2 (see page 79), I set out not only the seven major dimensions along which police performance should be measured, but also the more specific dimensions of performance that are included in these larger ideas. The reader should note that the idea of "police legitimacy" (as a perceived judgment by citizens) appears in different ways, in two different parts of this table. It appears as part of "the economical and fair use of authority and force," and also as a component of "customer satisfaction." When this concept appears in the first category, I am using it to mean the perceptions that members of the general citizenry have of the police in general. When it appears in the second category, I am using it to mean the more specific views that individual citizens who are stopped, cited, or arrested by the police hold about their particular treatment. In principle, there ought to be some relationship between these measures; overall legitimacy ought to be connected to the experience that individuals have with the police. But we do not know this to be the case until we begin measuring these things.

Second, in Table 3 (see page 80), I describe the different means that now exist or could be constructed to allow the measurement of the different dimensions of performance. I indicate which of these are fine the way they now are, which would require nothing more than new forms of analysis and reporting, and which would require new data collection efforts.

Third, in Table 4 (see page 83), I set out my judgments about what should be the highest priority investments that should be made in sustaining, improving, or developing performance measurement systems for policing.

I should note that these tables reflect my particular judgments. These judgments, in turn, are based on knowledge of both what is technically possible, and the relative costs of the different kinds of systems. But they are also based on more subjective judgments about what is (normatively) important in policing, and what is culturally, politically, and administratively feasible to do.

I have to emphasize, however, that these are just my judgments. Groups of citizens in different cities have the right and the responsibility to decide

what kind of policing they want. They also have the right and responsibility to decide how police performance should be measured. Therefore, they are perfectly entitled to disagree with my judgments. They can and will make different decisions about what is important in policing, how what is important should be measured, and what priorities they would establish for expenditures to sustain, improve, and create systems for measuring police performance. In short, I set out my ideas in some detail as a starting point for discussion within America's communities, not as a scientifically based imperative that all right-thinking people have to accept. There are too many important values at stake to imagine that science or the academy is in a position to answer the question of what constitutes value in policing. My most fervent hope is that this work will occasion the political, administrative and technical discussions that will lead not only to an improved understanding of what constitutes the important public value produced by a public police department, but also serious efforts to recognize that value when it is produced through reliable performance measurement systems.

Table 2. Important Dimensions of Police Performance

Reduce Crime and Victimization

Crimes Reported to Police
Crimes Not Reported to Police
Violent Crimes (Reported or Not)

Call Offenders to Account

Solve Crimes
Arrest Offenders

Reduce Fear/Enhance Personal Security

Subjective Experience of Fear
Level and Kind of Self-Defense

Ensure Civility in Public Spaces (Ordered Liberty)

*Protect Safety and Utilization of
Public Infrastructure*

Traffic Safety
Parking Enforcement
Park Safety
School Safety
Public Transit Safety

*Maintain Space for
Political Activity*

Fair Response to Applications for
Parades and Demonstrations

Effective Response to
Civil Disturbances

Use Force and Authority Fairly, Efficiently and Effectively

Fair Distribution of Police Services and Protection
Fair, Unbiased Operational Policies
Controlling Corruption
Reducing the Use of Force and Authority
   Minimizing Excess Force and Authority
   Reducing Routine Use of Force and Authority
Perceived Legitimacy* (See Obligation Encounters Below)

Use Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently and Effectively

Financial Integrity
Financial Accountability
Productivity Gains/Innovation
Equal Employment Opportunity
Fair Contracting

Quality Services/Customer Satisfaction

Individuals Who Call the Police
Organized Petitioners
Obligation Encounters* (See Perceived Legitimacy Above)

Table 3. How to Measure the Dimensions of Policing

✔	=	Okay As Is
↻	=	Changes in Reporting and Analysis Only
?	=	New Data Collection

Dimensions of Value	Measurement Systems	Current State
Reduce Crime and Victimization		
Crimes Reported to Police	Uniform Crime Reports/NIBRS	✔
Crimes Not Reported to Police	Victimization Surveys (General Population)	?
	One-Shot: Citywide	
	Repeated: Citywide	
	Repeated: District Level	
Violent Crimes (Reported or Not)	Public Health Surveillance	
	Coroners/Violent Deaths	↻
	Emergency Room	↻
	Trauma	
	Stabbings	
	Gunshot Wounds	
Call Offenders to Account		
Solve Crimes	Crimes Cleared by Arrest	
	Current System	✔
	Audited	?
	Focused	?
	Quality Cases Produced (Principal Charge or All Charges)	
	Success Prosecuted	↻
	Quality Investigation	?
Arrest Offenders	Warrant Enforcement	
	Outstanding Warrants	↻
	Arrests on Warrants	↻
Reduce Fear/Enhance Personal Security		
Subjective Experience of Fear	Fear Surveys (General Population)	?
	One-Shot: Citywide	
	Repeated: Citywide	
	Repeated: District Level	
Level and Kind of Self-Defense	Self-Defense Surveys (General Population)	?
	One-Shot: Citywide	
	Repeated: Citywide	
	Repeated: District Level	

Ensure Civility in Public Spaces
(Ordered Liberty)

Protect Safety and Utilization of
Public Infrastructure

Traffic Safety	Auto Accidents	⟳
	Traffic Citations	⟳
Parking Enforcement	Parking Citations	⟳
	Traffic Reports	?
Park Safety	Reported Crime in Parks	⟳
	Perceived Safety in Parks	?
	Utilization of Parks	?
School Safety	Reported Crime in Schools	⟳
	Perceived Safety in Schools	?
Public Transit Safety	Reported Crime in Public Transit	⟳
	Perceived Safety in Public Transit	?
	Utilization of Public Transit	?

Maintain Space for Political Activity

Fair Response to Applications for Parades and Demonstrations	Survey of Applicants	?
Effective Response to Civil Disturbances	After-Action Reports/Evaluation	?

Use Force and Authority
Fairly, Efficiently and Effectively

Fair Distribution of Police Services and Protection	Allocation of Resources by Need	⟳
	Service Levels by Neighborhood	⟳
Fair, Unbiased Operational Policies	Examination of Operational Policies to Determine Neutrality on Face and in Effect, and Effective Compliance	?
Controlling Corruption	Examination of Systems to Control Bribery and Extortion	?
	Survey of Police to Discover Values Regarding Police Corruption	?

Reducing the Use of Force and Authority

Minimizing Excess Force and Authority	Citizen Complaints	
	Successful Suits	⟳
	Corroborated Complaints	⟳
	All Citizen Complaints	⟳

Use Force and Authority
Fairly, Efficiently and Effectively (cont.)

Dimensions of Value	Measurement Systems	Current State
	Surveys of Obligatees	(?)
	Those Stopped and Queried	
	Those Investigated	
	Those Cited for Traffic Violations	
	Those Arrested for Misdemeanors	
	Those Arrested for Felonies	
Reducing Routine Use of Force and Authority	Cases Where Evidence Excluded	(↻)
	On-view Street Stops	(↻)
	On-view Citations Issued	(↻)
	Use of Physical Force to Subdue Arrestees	(?)
	Use of Weapons	(↻)
	Search Warrants Issued	(↻)
	Wiretaps Authorized	(↻)
Perceived Legitimacy★	Legitimacy Surveys (General Population)	(?)
(See Obligation Encounters Below)	*One-Shot: Citywide*	
	Repeated: Citywide	
	Repeated: District Level	

Use Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently and Effectively

Dimensions of Value	Measurement Systems	Current State
Financial Integrity		✓
Financial Accountability		✓
Productivity Gains/Innovation	Productivity Measures/Benchmarks	(↻)
	Problem Solving Initiatives	(?)
	Number	
	Assessment/Evaluation	
	Program Evaluations	(?)
	Operational Experiments	(?)
Equal Employment Opportunity	Minority Representation on Force	(↻)
Fair Contracting	Survey of Bidders	(?)

Quality Services/Customer Satisfaction

Dimensions of Value	Measurement Systems	Current State
Individuals Who Call the Police	Customer Satisfaction Surveys	(?)
Organized Petitioners	Account Management System	(?)
Obligation Encounters★	Survey of Obligatees	(?)
(See Perceived Legitimacy Above)	*What Happened*	
	Perceived Fairness/Quality	

Table 4. Priorities for Investment in the Development of a Comprehensive Police Performance Measurement System

◉ = High Value/Priority
◉ = Medium Value/Priority
◉ = Relatively Low Value/Priority

Dimensions of Value	Measurement Systems	Development Priority
Reduce Crime and Victimization		
Crimes Reported to Police	Uniform Crime Reports/NIBRS	◉
Crimes Not Reported to Police	Victimization Surveys (General Population)	
	One-Shot: Citywide	◉
	Repeated: Citywide	◉
	Repeated: District Level	◉
Violent Crimes (Reported or Not)	Public Health Surveillance	
	Coroners/Violent Deaths	◉
	Emergency Room	◉
	Trauma	◉
	Stabbings	◉
	Gunshot Wounds	◉
Call Offenders to Account		
Solve Crimes	Crimes Cleared by Arrest	◉
	Current System	◉
	Audited	◉
	Focused	◉
	Quality Cases Produced (Principal Charge or All Charges)	
	Success Prosecuted	◉
	Quality Investigation	◉
Arrest Offenders	Warrant Enforcement	
	Outstanding Warrants	◉
	Arrests on Warrants	◉
Reduce Fear/Enhance Personal Security		
Subjective Experience of Fear	Fear Surveys (General Population)	◉
	One-Shot: Citywide	◉
	Repeated: Citywide	◉
	Repeated: District Level	◉
Level and Kind of Self-Defense	Self-Defense Surveys (General Population)	◉
	One-Shot: Citywide	◉
	Repeated: Citywide	◉
	Repeated: District Level	◉

Ensure Civility in Public Spaces
(Ordered Liberty)

Protect Safety and Utilization of
Public Infrastructure

Traffic Safety	Auto Accidents	◉
	Traffic Citations	◉
Parking Enforcement	Parking Citations	◉
	Traffic Reports	◉
Park Safety	Reported Crime in Parks	◉
	Perceived Safety in Parks	◉
	Utilization of Parks	◉
School Safety	Reported Crime in Schools	◉
	Perceived Safety in Schools	◉
Public Transit Safety	Reported Crime in Public Transit	◉
	Perceived Safety in Public Transit	◉
	Utilization of Public Transit	◉

Maintain Space for Political Activity

Fair Response to Applications for Parades and Demonstrations	Survey of Applicants	◉
Effective Response to Civil Disturbances	After-Action Reports/Evaluation	◉

Use Force and Authority
Fairly, Efficiently and Effectively

Fair Distribution of Police Services and Protection	Allocation of Resources by Need	◉
	Service Levels by Neighborhood	◉
Fair, Unbiased Operational Policies	Examination of Operational Policies to Determine Neutrality on Face and in Effect, and Effective Compliance	◉
Controlling Corruption	Examination of Systems to Control Bribery and Extortion	◉
	Survey of Police to Discover Values Regarding Police Corruption	◉

Reducing the Use of Force and Authority

Minimizing Excess Force and Authority	Citizen Complaints	
	Successful Suits	◉
	Corroborated Complaints	◉
	All Citizen Complaints	◉

Use Force and Authority
Fairly, Efficiently and Effectively (cont.)

	Surveys of Obligatees	
	Those Stopped and Queried	◉
	Those Investigated	◉
	Those Cited for Traffic Violations	◉
	Those Arrested for Misdemeanors	◉
	Those Arrested for Felonies	◉
Reducing Routine Use of Force and Authority	Cases Where Evidence Excluded	◉
	On-view Street Stops	◉
	On-view Citations Issued	◉
	Use of Physical Force to Subdue Arrestees	◉
	Use of Weapons	◉
	Search Warrants Issued	◉
	Wiretaps Authorized	◉
Perceived Legitimacy★	Legitimacy Surveys (General Population)	◉
(See Obligation Encounters Below)	*One-Shot: Citywide*	◉
	Repeated: Citywide	◉
	Repeated: District Level	◉

Use Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently and Effectively

Financial Integrity		◉
Financial Accountability		◉
Productivity Gains/Innovation	Productivity Measures/Benchmarks	◉
	Problem Solving Initiatives	◉
	Number	
	Assessment/Evaluation	
	Program Evaluations	◉
	Operational Experiments	◉
Equal Employment Opportunity	Minority Representation on Force	◉
Fair Contracting	Survey of Bidders	◉

Quality Services/Customer Satisfaction

Individuals Who Call the Police	Customer Satisfaction Surveys	◉
Organized Petitioners	Account Management System	◉
Obligation Encounters★	Survey of Obligatees	◉
(See Perceived Legitimacy Above)	*What Happened*	
	Perceived Fairness/Quality	

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ABOUT PERF

THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM (PERF) is a national professional association of chief executives of large city, county and state law enforcement agencies. PERF's objective is to improve the delivery of police services and the effectiveness of crime control through several means:

- the exercise of strong national leadership,
- the public debate of police and criminal issues,
- the development of research and policy, and
- the provision of vital management and leadership services to police agencies.

PERF members are selected on the basis of their commitment to PERF's objectives and principles. PERF operates under the following tenets:

- Research, experimentation and exchange of ideas through public discussion and debate are paths for the development of a comprehensive body of knowledge about policing.
- Substantial and purposeful academic study is a prerequisite for acquiring, understanding and adding to that body of knowledge.
- Maintenance of the highest standards of ethics and integrity is imperative in the improvement of policing.
- The police must, within the limits of the law, be responsible and accountable to citizens as the ultimate source of police authority.
- The principles embodied in the Constitution are the foundation of policing.

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Managing Innovation in Policing:
The Untapped Potential of the Middle Manager
(William A. Geller and Guy Swanger, 1995), 204 pp.
ISBN#: 1-878734-41-5
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The conventional wisdom holds that middle managers are sometimes obstacles to strategic innovation, including community policing. In *Managing Innovation in Policing,* however, authors Geller and Swanger argue that, when properly motivated and supported, police middle managers have been and can be key players in policing reform. This book includes case studies of successful middle managers and suggestions for how police senior leaders, city officials and others can help position middle managers to voluntarily, proactively and effectively help implement community policing. *Managing Innovation in Policing* has become a popular text for community policing training courses.

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Mapping Across Boundaries: Regional Crime Analysis
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boundaries or identify serial crimes by offenders operating in neighboring juris-dictions. This book provides guidance through case studies on a range of regional mapping models—from central archiving systems to ambitious multiagency consortia with common database structures and GIS platforms. This practical guide outlines for each case model how the mapping effort began; how it was implemented; decisions regarding software, hardware, data sharing and privacy agreements; and how the cross-agency mapping has been used in practice. It highlights issues to consider in cross-agency collaborations and provides sources for additional resources, information, sample Memoranda of Understanding and other guidance on emerging regional crime analysis efforts.

Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement Managers
(John E. Eck and Nancy La Vigne, 1994), 180 pp.
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Price: $19.00
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Problem-Oriented Policing: Crime-Specific Problems, Critical Issues and Making POP Work (Volume 3)
(Corina Solé Brito and Eugenia E. Gratto, eds., 2000)
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Price: $30.00
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Deadly Force: What We Know—A Practitioner's Desk Reference
on Police-Involved Shootings
(William Geller and Michael Scott 1992), 656 pp.
ISBN#: 1-878734-30-X
Price: $25.50
Published in 1992, *Deadly Force* remains one of the most comprehensive volumes of information about police-involved shootings, compiling data from hundreds of research studies conducted over the past 30 years. Its 187 detailed graphs and tables highlight the most important findings from prior landmark research and present such previously unpublished information as national FBI data on justifiable homicides by police and data from a dozen major American cities on all shots fired from 1970 through 1991. The book also provides data and practical advice on such critical issues as shootings of cops by "friendly fire," justifying actions to local officials, averting a civil disorder after a controversial shooting, creating sound policies and reducing civil liability.

Solving Crime and Disorder Problems:
Current Issues, Police Strategies and Organizational Tactics
(Melissa Reuland, Corina Solé Brito and Lisa Carroll, eds. 2002), 210 pp.
ISBN: 1-878734-75-x
Price: $29.00
Solving Crime and Disorder Problems: Current Issues, Police Strategies and Organizational Tactics is PERF's latest publication dedicated to innovations in police problem solving. The 11 chapters each use a case study to identify effective problem-solving strategies to deal with issues such as racially biased policing, sexual assaults, drug and disorder problems, field training, crime mapping, response to people with mental illness, and more. Using strategies from the United States, Canada and Europe, this book is written for police professionals, criminal justice academicians and students looking for innovative ways in which the problem-solving model has been applied. The book is broken down into three sections that deal with applying problem-oriented policing to current issues, police strategies and organizational tactics. Each case study offers a successful approach for how law enforcement departments can address seemingly intractable problems within their communities. Reviewed and edited by problem-solving experts, *Solving Crime and Disorder Problems* is appropriate for police professionals interested in community problem solving and for classroom, promotion exam and training uses.

Command Performance: Career Guide for Police Executives
(William Kirchoff, Charlotte Lansinger and James Burack, 1999). 225 pp.
ISBN #: 1-878734-68-7
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