Confidential Report for Mayor Dixon

on the Status and Potential

of the Metropolitan Police Department

[Draft I]

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April 12, 1991

Executive Summary

1.0 The Assignment

In the last part of February, Mayor Dixon asked me to review the Metropolitan Police Department's current capabilities and plans for the future. Of particular interest were the Department's plans for implementing the philosophy of Community Empowerment Policing, and the relationship between that effort and actual levels of violence and fear in the city. She was also interested in any other ideas I might have about how to improve the performance of the Police Department in the short or long run.

2.0. The Method

To fulfill this assignment, I have spent eight working days interviewing people inside and outside the department, and reviewing documents that have been made available to me. I have interviewed virtually all of the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of the Departments, and many Inspectors who have important roles to play in the planning and management of the Department, and in the implementation of Community Empowerment Policing. In addition, I have interviewed officials beneath the level of Inspectors who are responsible for and intimately involved with the implementation of Community Empowerment Policing including the members of the CEP Policy Unit, the "facilitators" who have been selected to provide peer guidance and support to the concept of CEP across the Department's field operations, and the officials and officers in the Department's officially recognized "experimental districts" (i.e Districts One and Seven). [A list of those interviewed is presented in Appendix A of this report.]

3.0 Principal Findings

My principal findings based on this review are the following:

3.1 The Department is well positioned to implement Community Empowerment Policing; rapid progress in implementing this strategy of policing is feasible:

3.2 The strategic planning capabilities of the Department seem weak; consequently, it is not clear that the potential of the Department can be fully and reliably exploited.

3.3 While the organization's top managers seem to have a good general grasp of the ideas of CEP, their tactical imagination seems to be limited primarily to directed patrol operations rather than to more sophisticated problem-solving methods. Moreover, they remain a little unclear about whether and how they are to respond to community concerns. This means that some of the potential of CEP policing may not be fully realized.

3.4 The Department's ability to develop, control and deploy its human resources is weaker than it should be; this is a serious weakness in terms of the Department's capacity to implement the flexible schedules required in Community Empowerment Policing.

3.5 There is no systematic way for the Metropolitan Police Department to be held accountable for their effectiveness in dealing with the substantive problems the citizens are relying on them to address, or their progress in developing and implementing Community Empowerment Policing.

4.0 Recommendations to the Mayor

Based on these findings, I have three principal recommendations for the Mayor.

4.1 The principal short run need that must be addressed is to develop some device to help the Chief and his principal managers formulate and become accountable for the execution of a strategic plan that promises rapid implementation of the strategy of Community Empowerment Policing, and successful operational results in controlling drugs, violence and fear.

4.2 To help develop and oversee the execution of the strategic plan, the Mayor and the City Council should establish a Police Commission that would include the Chief of Police as a member, but would also include several prominent citizens who could be expected to define the values to which the Department should be committed, and to work with the Chief in developing and reviewing the strategic plan. The Commission should be empowered to review the Department's strategic plan, and its efforts to execute it. It might even be advisable to give this Commission some powers (with the Chief) over the appointment of the organization's top managers.

4.3 The Department's managers should immediately be tasked with the job of developing an organization

wide strategic plan to be presented at the first
meeting of the new Commission. Responsibilities for
doing the planning work should be distributed across
the top managers of the Department. Those
responsible for given areas, should make the
presentations to the Commission. They should
identify the key managerial and substantive issues
that must be addressed, and the various options for
addressing them. They should be prepared to
recommend a plan for action, and to define
milestones that would indicate progress in their
areas of responsibility. Those with the
responsibility for planning should also be
responsible for implementing the plans.

Such actions, taken now, will help to exploit the
significant potential that now exists in the Department.

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A Report on the Status and Potential

of the Metropolitan Police Department

1.0 The Assignment

In the last part of February, Mayor Dixon asked me
to review the Metropolitan Police Department's current
capabilities and plans for the future. Of particular
interest were the Department's plans for implementing the
philosophy of Community Empowerment Policing, and the
relationship between that effort and actual levels of
violence and fear in the city.

Although she recognized that a thorough study of
these issues would take a great deal of time and effort, her
immediate need was for a relatively quick, strategic
assessment of the Department. She wanted me to focus on the
big issues and to get those approximately right rather than
to work out any detailed plans for action. In effect, the
task was to figure out as best I could in the limited amount
of time available what she could reasonably expect from the
department over the next few years, and where the limited
attention she and her office could give to the Department
might best be focused.

2.0 The Methods

To fulfill this assignment, I have spent eight working days interviewing people inside and outside the department, and reviewing documents that have been made available to me. I have interviewed virtually all of the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of the Departments, and many Inspectors who have important roles to play in the planning and management of the Department, and in the implementation of Community Empowerment Policing. In addition, I have interviewed officials beneath the level of Inspectors who are responsible for and intimately involved with the implementation of Community Empowerment Policing including the members of the CEP Policy Unit, the "facilitators" who have been selected to provide peer guidance and support to the concept of CEP across the Department's field operations, and the officials and officers in the Department's officially recognized "experimental districts" (i.e Districts One and Seven). [A list of those interviewed is presented in Appendix A of this report.]

Of necessity, I have had to take what I was told at face value. I have not had the time to check on the status of various activities that were described apart from the comments and reports of the officials I interviewed. I spent one night patrolling with a Lieutenant in Disrict One, and

observed a working meeting that Chief Fulwood held with the
CEP facilitators, but these were the only times I really saw
the organization "at work." All the rest of the data I
collected were either oral descriptions of how the
organization worked, or documents used to guide the work of
the department.

In judging whether the information I received was
accurate, all I can say is that I was impressed by the
openness and candor of the people I interviewed. While my
access to the department was controlled, I did not have the
sense that it was limited, or that I was being steered away
from problem areas. Indeed, I was impressed by the level of
co-operation and access I was granted. It is also true that
the number of different people I talked to offers some
reassurance that I was learning how the organization
actually works, for, if a discrepency showed up in the
interviews, I asked for clarification in that interview and
others. For the most part, I got a very consistent picture.

The information I received from the interviews and
documents was filtered through my knowledge of police
departments in general, and the process of implementing
community policing more particularly. Given the limitations
of the study, I could easily be wrong about both facts and
interpretations. Still, this report reflects my best
judgment based on the data available to me. That is what I
contracted to provide.

3.0 Principal Findings

My principal findings based on this review are the following:

3.1 The Department is well positioned to implement Community Empowerment Policing; rapid progress in implementing this strategy of policing is feasible:

In general, I was quite favorably impressed by the Department as I encountered it. I would place its overall capabilities relatively high among the departments that I have seen. In particular, I was impressed by its potential for making rapid progress in implementing the strategy of Community Empowerment Policing. I base this judgment on three key observations.

First, the managers I encountered in the Department seemed to me to be relatively talented, resourceful, energetic and thoughtful. Their morale seemed very high. They felt a strong sense of loyalty and commitment to the department, but did not minimize the problems they had, or the challenges they faced. They understood that they could not rely on the Mayor to take their reassurances at face value, and did not object to the idea that they might be reviewed by outsiders, and held accountable for the

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performance of the department. All had enjoyed their careers in the Police Department, and hoped that they could continue to contribute to the organization's future development. Among police managers I have met, I would rate the group as well above average for large city police departments.

Second, many of the pre-conditions required for community-oriented policing that become important stumbling blocks for many departments have alread been created in the Metropolitan Police Department. Specifically, the following features were observed:

1) The Department has long been operating with an organizational structure that is relatively decentralized, and with a powerful geographic (rather than functional) structure. This is often a crucial first step in shifting to community-oriented policing

2) It long ago decentralized much of the investigative function to patrol units, and through that device reduced the influence of the "detective culture" in the organization in favor of a strengthened "patrol culture". (Indeed, it was difficult to find anyone in the top management structure of the department who would admit to being a detective or investigator rather than a patrol manager!). This is often a bloody organizational struggle in organizations shifting to a strategy of community policing.

3) The Department has a relatively long tradition of working closely with neighborhood groups, and the patrol commanders at District, Sector, and Beat levels feel comfortable with this responsibility. It also helps that many such neighborhood groups already exist, and that there is also a widely decetnralized political and governmental structure in the city with which the police can work (e.g the ANC's.) In police organizations lacking this history and pre-existing political infrastructure, the idea that the police and the community should form working partnerships seems far more distant and abstract.

4) Compared to many other urban departments, the Metropolitan Police Department has ample resources. As a result, the department is better positioned to maintain rapid response to calls for service and engage in foot patrol and pro-active problem-solving than many other departments. The department does not have to face the painful choice between these methods of policing as sharply as other departments.

Third, among the top managers of the Department, there seemed to be a relatively sophisticated understanding of the concepts of community-oriented policing, and enthusiasm for pursuing its various possibilities. The strongest evidence for this fact was that many of the

District Commanders who were not in the officially

authorized experimental districts were nonetheless

initiating activities that they thought were consistent with

the spirit of Community Empowerment Policing, and adapting

their administrative systems to support these operations.

Interestingly, the concept was better understood by the

District Commanders than by many of the Headquarters

Commands.

Given these observations, I think it would be

reasonable for the Mayor to expect (and demand) relatively

rapid progress in implementing Community Empowerment

Policing. The Department is relatively far along, and poised

for success.

> 3.2. <u>The strategic planning capabilities of the
> Department seem weak; consequently, it is not clear
> that the potential of the Department can be fully
> and reliably exploited.</u>

One of the strongest impressions I got from

interviewing the top management team of the department is

that no-one in the Department really believes in the

capacity of the Department to formulate a broad strategic

plan and then actually execute it. One gets the sense that

the attention of top level managers (and the staff that

could be expected to co-ordinate the policy-making

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activities of the organization) is scattered. There is a great deal of creativity and imagination stimulated by the Chief and the general resourcefulness of the top management, but there is little capability for co-ordinating these efforts, or ensuring effective follow-through. The top managers operate as a set of individuals with their own ideas who are unsure about their authorizations to proceed rather than as a team that has a coherent vision of what they are trying to achieve, and a sense of accountability to one another for implementing the particular assignments they receive.

Of course, many organizations have these problems. And it is difficult to document that the problems are more severe in the Metropolitan Police Department than in other organizations. But one still has the sense that the weaknesses in the strategic planning capabilities of the organization are an important obstacle to realizing the organization's full potential. The specific evidence I rely on to form these judgments are the following:

1) In the course of my conversations with the top managers, I routinely asked them what problems they were working on that were crucial to the organization's future capacity to perform. If the organization had a high performing strategic planning system, they would know the answer to that question, and so would everyone else in the

top management team. Almost none of the managers could answer that question easily.

2) Often, in my conversations with the top managers, they would spontaneously nominate an issue that they thought should receive the high priority attention of the organization, or they would complain about an initiative that had been undertaken with high level authorization without adequate planning. I would then ask them how the organization worked on issues like the one they identified as important. They would shrug their shoulders and say that someone would send a memo to the Chief, or that someone would raise the issue in a staff meeting. What happened after that seemed unclear. Sometimes, the new program would be authorized by the Chief, and the person would charge ahead. Other times, the initiative would die, but without explanation. Generally, there seemed to be relatively little discussion or analysis of the issues in advance of decisions. Follow-up for decisions that were made existed, but was erratic. Many issues simply died, or proved to be too difficult for the organization to resolve.

3) The principal staffers in the organization were extremely busy, and were working very long hours. They seemed to have an excellent grasp of both the issues the department was facing, and the history of the organization's work on the issue. But their view was not necessarily known

to or shared by others on the management team. I asked about the frequency and character of staff meetings; who set the agendas; what mechanisms were established for follow-up; and what files existed to record the deliberations of these meetings. I got the distinct impression that meetings tended to be ad hoc rather than systematic. Certainly none of the top managers acted as though staff meetings were important in the overall management of the organization. These are the common characteristics of an organization in which much of the initiative and planning in an organization have become centralized in the person of the Chief Executive, and not widely distributed. Routine operations may well be decentralized, but strategic initiatives and external accountability for the overall performance of the department seem tightly centralized not only in the office of the Chief, but in the Chief himself.

4) The document entitled "A Briefing for the Mayor and the City Administrator" submitted to the Mayor on February 12, 1991 as an account of the organization's activities and plans was not widely known in the Department. Indeed, it seemed that few people had seen it in its finished form. Morever, it became clear that it had been produced simply by tasking particular elements of the organization to submit materials, and then was stapled together. The Chief and his staff have this comprehensive view of the organization's efforts, but no-one else does.

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There is no other document that could be considered the strategic plan of the department. The CEP implementation plan concerns only a portion of the organization's activities, although admittedly a strategically important piece.

5) There were several specific issues that had recently arisen and been resolved in ways that seemed ad hoc and unco-ordinated with the overall thrust of the Department. For example, the organization had recently responded favorably to an initiative suggested by a Night Supervisor that a Rapid Deployment Unit be created to respond more quickly to scenes of violence, and to conduct pro-active patrols against violence when there were no incidents to which they would respond. This may well be valuable, but there was little explanation of how such measures would work to control violence, and what they added to the department's overall efforts in this domain. Moreover, the concept seems somewhat at odds with the idea of CEP which encourages District Commanders to be generally responsible for conditions in their districts, and to resist the use of centralized squads.

Another example: the Department has created a centralized crime analysis unit so that the Chief and the Chief of Operations can have timely, comprehensive information about crime trends. That seems fine, but it

comes at the expense of developing crime analysis capabilities at the District or Sector or Beat levels. Again, the goal of CEP is to motivate and authorize pro-active efforts at the local level, it is probably valuable to give them the vital crime analysis capabilities before the center has them simply to empower them vis-a-vis the center of the organization.

Still another example: the Department seems to be committed to a complex ADP procurement that will combine enhancements in the Computer Aided Dispatching System with the purchase of Mobile Digital Terminals. It has taken a long time for this procurement to emerge from the bureaucratic processes inside the Department that required effective co-ordination of the Communications and Automated Data Processing Divisions of the Technical Services Bureau, and the Office of Finance and Resource Management, and the Procurement Section of the Administrative Services Bureau. Once out of that process, however, there is no confidence that there will be enough money for such a complex procurement; no fall-back position to take if the money is not available; no sense that it will move expeditiously through the City's Administrative Services Agency; and no one with any clear responsibility for making it happen other than the Chief who seems to feel a deep commitment to supplying MDTs to the troops as the "police environment of the nineties."

6) There were at least two issues that came up over and over again as strategically important issues but about which the organization had no overall plan. One concerned the increasing inexperience of the patrol force, and the worry that the department would be losing a great deal of experience as those who were hired in the build-up from 1968 to 1972 reached retirement eligibility. Some seemed to view this as a major problem for the organization. Others tended to see it as an opportunity to recruit and develop a new kind of police officer. There was no consensus on this issue, and no plan either to keep and use the experience of the force, or to move it out quickly lest it contaminate the new recruits.

The other concerned the issue of efficiency in the overall deployment of the organization's manpower. There was a pervasive sense that the organization did not have enough of its officers on the street at times and places where problems were likely to occur, but a sense of powerlessness in dealing with this problem.

Again, it might be a mistake to make too much of these problems, for it is common for organizations to have difficulty in developing and executing strategic plans. But, in a world in which there is a great deal of potential to be exploited, and a great deal of urgency about doing so, the

fact that the systems for creating a coherent management team focused on key strategic objectives, with continuing accountability for achieving them is worrisome.

> 3.3. While the organization's top managers seem to have a good general grasp of the ideas of CEP, their tactical imagination seems to be limited primarily to directed patrol operations rather than to more sophisticated problem-solving methods. Moreover, they remain a little unclear about whether and how they are to respond to community concerns. This means that some of the potential of CEP policing may not be fully realized.

The ideas of problem-solving and community-oriented are not easy to fully grasp. One main reason is that many of the elements of these concepts seem closely related to concepts that have long been part of police operations.

For example, if one asks the District Commanders what they are doing to implement CEP, they will commonly talk about such things as: 1) the establishment of priority foot beats to be manned even at the expense of doubling up some scout car sectors; 2) the creation of mini-police stations located in particularly troublesome areas; 3) the identification of conditions that give a disorderly appearance to an area, and the efforts made to encourage

other city agencies to respond to those conditions; 4) the creation of special directed patrol operations to deal with emergent crime trends; and/or 5) attending meetings with community groups. These are all right as far as they go. And they are relatively easy for the police to do since they have long been part of the repertoire of police responses. But, in some important ways, they miss the essential points of problem-solving and community policing.

The core idea that lies behind the notion of problem-solving policing is that some creative intelligence should be brought to bear on identifying and resolving the operational problems that the police confront. The police should not respond mindlessly to calls for service; they should look behind the incidents to identify the problems that are triggering the calls for service. Sometimes the problems are crime problems, and arrests and prosecutions are the proper response. But other times, the problems are not crimes, and they require a different response, often drawing not only on the resources of the police, but also on other governmental and community agencies. What exactly the response should be is the tactical challenge to which the organization must respond; and it is in the imaginativeness and resourcefulness of these responses that the quality of the department must eventually be found.

What the department has picked up of this concept so far is that there should be a "proactive" approach to policing; that in the case of crime trends, that response should typically be the deployment of a directed patrol operation carried out either by the regular patrol units or the special tactical unit; and that in the case of non-crime problems, the challenge will be to make other government organizations respond. Again, this is all fine as far as it goes, and represents an important advance over the capabilities of other police departments. But there are several things missing from this conception.

First, among many of the managers with whom I talked, there is little sense that problem solving methods and the mobilization of other agencies might be useful in dealing with crime problems as well as disorder problems. Indeed, there seemed to be little existing capability for doing imaginative problem-solving in dealing with either crime or disorder problems. For example, given the recent history of the city, one might think that the organization would have been concentrating quite closely on what they could do to deal with both drugs and homicides. Yet, the responses that the organization was making to these problems at both central and district levels seemed very conventional: street sweeps for drug problems, and more effective homicide investigations for murders.

The Department isn't worse than any other department
in these areas; it is just that it isn't yet very
imaginative. Although data is available about the nature of
the offenses, it is not being used very much for analysis.
Indeed, outside proposals to help with the analysis have
routinely been rejected. In talking with the managers, I did
not have the sense that the managers felt committed to
experimenting with new methods to solve these pressing
problems. Instead, they were committed to doing what they
thought they could to improve the current functioning of
their units in traditional operational methods.

Second, the organization seemed to be confused about
the level of the organization at which operational and
tactical imagination was both authorized and expected. There
was certainly a lot of imagination in the Chief's Office
about new programs that ought to be tried. The various
Assistant and Deputy Chiefs also clearly felt authorized to
propose new tactical approaches on either a city-wide or
district level according to their positions. And some Deputy
Chiefs were pushing the authorization and responsibility for
tactical planning even lower in the organization to Sector
Captains, or Lieutenants, or Sergeants or Officers.

In the theory of problem-solving policing, the
organization should be able to conceive of and execute
problem-oriented tasks at all of those levels of the

organization. The greatest gains, however, are thought to be at the very low levels where officers might develop detailed knowledge of the problems on their beats, and figure out appropriate responses. In other departments implementing problem-oriented or community policing, many different "success" stories begin to appear at this level, and that serves both to train and motivate other officers. Giving mid-level managers such as Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains the right and the responsibility to initiate pro-active, problem-solving operations also tends to reduce their hostility to this new style of policing. So, it is important that the Department be clear about a system for authorizing and encouraging tactical imagination at different levels of the organization.

At the moment, the responsibility for operational and tactical imagination and planning seems to lie principally at the top two or three levels of the department. In establishing sectors as an important operational unit, and in encouraging sector Captains to assume 24 hour responsibility for conditions within a given geographic area rather than 8 hour responsibility for supervising operations, there is an effort to drive operational planning one level lower in the organization. And some Districts have dispersed and re-distributed District tactical units, and through that device, encouraged and facilitated the development of pro-active operations at

the Sector or even Beat level. But it still remains true that if one asks who is responsible for defining and solving the different sized operational problems the Department faces, no one quite knows the answer. And it is quite clear that Captains and Lieutenants in the Department have generally been used more for supervision of operations than the design and execution of police operations to deal with specific problems.

Third, one of the main reasons that the Department remains unclear about who is responsible for initiating problem-solving operations is that there is no current system that accounts for such activities. The Department, like many others, has an elaborate capacity for analyzing their responses to calls for service. And, one of the most important responsibilities of Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains is to make sure that their officers answer the calls and do so promptly and well. There is no comparably exacting system that monitors their "pro-active" police efforts. The tactical units set up operations, and score their successes in terms of arrests. But there is no filing system that records the initiation, execution, or results of particular problem solving activities. Without that accountability, it is hard for any individual in the department no matter what his or her level to be recognized for such activity.

Fourth, the department remains unclear about the value of problem-solving efforts -- particularly when they get outside the domain of crime control. They are deeply skeptical of their ability to mobilize other city agencies to help them deal with the problems they face, and view the Mayor's willingness to support them in their efforts to do so as an important indicator of her commitment to CEP. Even when they are successful, they are not sure of the value. They have not heard (or are not yet convinced) by the arguments that justify these activities in terms of reduced fear, or stronger relationships with the community that can lead to more effective crime control in the future. They view problem-solving as an additional task they have been given that has no important relationship to police work.

The core idea of community policing is that the community is an asset in controlling crime, and that in order to mobilize that asset (as well as for an end in itself) it is desireable to be responsive to the problems that the community rather than the police nominate as important. Central to this notion is that the police have to escape from the prison of their own views and perceptions. They have to get out of their cars and talk to citizens about what worries them rather than run from call to call. They have to go to community meetings to find the big problems rather than simply tote up radio runs and crime statistics.

The Metropolitan Police Department has clearly gotten the idea that it would be valuable to mobilize the community to help achieve police crime control objectives. To a far more limited degree, the managers and officers have accepted the idea that dealing effectively with disorder and the "signs of crime" is as important as dealing with crime. But what they don't get is the idea that regular interaction with citizens in setting the agenda for proactive police work. They still want to design the proactive work on the basis of what _they_ perceive to be the problems on the basis of their priorities and observations.

Even more importantly, they do not get the idea that they might have to work particularly hard at helping to mobilize and then be responsive to the least advantaged neighborhoods. There is a risk in community policing that the police, in their desire to work with communities, will end up working with the most competent and able communities, and the ones that have the same values as the police themselves. This could leave the poorest and most desperate communities without an effective partner. To overcome this potential, it is important that the police recognize the potential dilemma, and make special efforts to help develop effective partners in the most disadvantaged areas. This is extremely difficult. But it is also very important, and there is little sense of this (outside the Community

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Relations Division) inside the organization. This is not
surprising, since no other police Department has yet solved
this problem. But it is a worry for the future value of the
overall strategy.

So, to fully exploit the potential of the ideas of
problem-solving and community policing, the Metropolitan
Police Department needs to make larger and more effective
investments in education of officers and managers, and to
develop administrative systems that recognize contributions
made by managers and officers to these purposes. It is
important that, despite much discussion and explicit
educational efforts, few managers could identify anything
new in the ideas of community and problem-solving policing.
It is also significant that many of the District Commanders
were nonetheless working on developing administrative
devices for directing the activities that they took to be
mandated by CEP -- namely, foot patrols, mini-stations,
problem-solving efforts directed at "signs of crime",
directed patrol operations focusing on crime trends in their
areas, and increased attendance at community meetings.

3.4 <u>The Department's ability to develop, control and
deploy its human resources is weaker than it should
be</u>.

A police department is largely people. Salaries typically account for more than 80% of the organization's total budget. Thus, it becomes crucial to the organization's success that it be able to efficiently and effectively use this resource. All the managers I spoke to were aware of these facts. Despite this, most of the managers were also pessimistic about the department's ability to manage its human resources. They pointed to the following specific problems:

First, as noted above, everyone in the Department was aware of the prospect that the Department was likely to lose a significant portion of its experienced officers over the next few years. Despite this broad awareness, there was no agreement about the significance of this fact. To some, it represented an opportunity to change the culture of the organization. To others, it represented a significant reduction in the skill base of the organization with disastrous implications for future operational effectiveness. In any case, there was no plan for dealing with the problem. Indeed, many said the Department had been saved from disaster by the unplanned increases in the overall level of the force over the last few years.

Second, there was concern that there was not enough in-service training. There were some concerns about the quality of the recruit training, but what worried most

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managers was the inability to keep training officers in the field. That seemed particularly important given the fact that the force was increasingly inexperienced, and that the officers were being asked to assume additional complex duties. But there was no real powerful tradition or capability for such training.

Third, there were the usual concerns about the inability of the department to have officers on the street at the times when crime was likely to occur. I was told several times that there were fewer officers on the streets over the weekend than during weekdays due to the fact that most officers preferred weekends off! (It goes without saying that there are also fewer officers available in the summer than in the winter because that is the preferred vacation period.) I'm not sure to what extent the Department is constrained in its scheduling by union agreements since I did not have a chance to meet with union officials. But my impression was that the schedulling inefficiencies were greater in D.C. than in other departments. This was described to me as the longest running unresolved problem in the department's operations.

Fourth, there are also some problems in being able to keep officers productively employed, and to account accurately for their time. Some managers expressed the view that they were losing time and effort to officers who

remained too long in unwarranted "limited duty" status.
Others complained that there were too many special
assignments that drained officers from their basic tasks.

But what became most clear was that the
organization's actual ability to account for the officers
time was very weak. The computerized system that accounted
for officer time was viewed as a "joke." The system that the
organization really relied on to tell them who was working,
who was available for emergency operations, and how much
each person should be paid was largely a manual system that
worked off a daily log that recorded who showed up for work.
This was also used by District Commanders to send reports to
Headquarters about manpower deployment. As far as I could
tell, there were no specific targets indicating an
"efficient deployment" that the managers were expected to
reach. They were reporting what was happening; not trying to
manage to any particular objectives.

The difficulties associated with scheduling and with
the systems that control officers' time for pay purposes are
common enough in police departments. But what is important
in the particular context of the Metropolitan Police
Department is that these weaknesses may cripple any serious
effort to develop Community Empowerment Policing. At the
heart of these ideas is a capacity for flexible scheduling
of officers outside the boundaries of fixed, regular shifts.

This is possible now among officers assigned to foot beats, to tactical units, and to detective units. It needs to become more possible among those now assigned to regular patrol. The principal current device that allows for flexibility for these officers is overtime, but that is now being curtailed due to concerns about the budget and worries about abuse of the system. In order to be able to provide more flexibility in the system, and yet maintain a high degree of control over the time of officers, the Department must develop a more sophisticated manpower control system than it now has.

> 3.5 There is no systematic way for the Metropolitan
> Police Department to be held accountable for their
> effectiveness in dealing with the substantive
> problems the citizens are relying on them to
> address, or their progress in developing and
> implementing Community Empowerment Policing.

The last and in many ways most important finding about the Metropolitan Police Department is that the reporting mechanisms that make it accountable to the overall government of the City are quite weak and attenuated. Of course, the Chief reports to the Mayor, and all the subordinate managers in the Department report to the Chief so it appears that all is in order. But the real problem is the anemic flow of information and expectations back and

forth between the Mayor, the Chief and the principal
managers of the Department. The Mayor has not yet
established a clear set of expectations for the Chief. The
Chief has not yet identified the particular things for which
he is willing to be held accountable, and what help he needs
from the Mayor to be successful. And, as noted above in the
section on strategic planning, it is not clear what
expectations the Chief has of the top managers of his
organization. As a result, there is a disconnect between the
Mayor's aspirations and the department's performance. It is
hard for the Mayor to measure the rate of progress that is
being made in dealing with drugs, violence and fear, and in
re-orienting the Department toward Community Empowerment
Policing.

No doubt, this situation is the result of several
different factors. The administration is new, and working
out its relationship with Department heads. Over the last
several years, the relationship between the Department and
the previous Mayor had become quite strained due to his drug
involvement. There is a long tradition in policing of
seeking to distance the Department from undue political
influence.

Even so, the current lack of accountability is
gradually eroding public confidence in the Department and
its managers. It is also making it hard to manage the

department, for, without strong external demands for performance, it is hard for the Chief and his principal managers to focus on the key performance issues, and to demand performance from their troops. Consequently, if faster progress is to be made in facing the problems of drugs, violence, and fear, and in implementing Community Empowerment Policing, some stronger system of accountability must be established that can clearly mark out the path toward success.

4.0 Recommendations to the Mayor

Based on these findings, I have three principal recommendations for the Mayor.

4.1. The principal need that must be addressed in the short run is to find some device to help the Chief and his principal managers formulate and become accountable for the execution of a strategic plan that promises rapid implementation of the strategy of Community Empowerment Policing, and successful operational results in controlling drugs, violence and fear.

This recommendation is based on my belief that the department is well positioned to implement Community Empowerment Policing, and to deal effectively with the

substantive crime problems now facing the city. What it
lacks is a sharp focus on the tasks, and a commitment to
success. It has resources and talent. It has the right
general idea. It needs a focused plan that distributes
authorizations and responsibilities for achieving its goals.
It may also need some help from the Mayor's office in
achieving its results (for example, in motivating other city
departments to contribute to problem-solving efforts; or in
helping push ADP procurments through the bureaucracy). A
coherent strategic plan, developed within the Department and
negotiated with the Mayor, is the best device for exploiting
the Department's potential.

> 4.2. <u>To help develop and oversee the execution of
> the strategic plan, the Mayor and the City Council
> should establish a Police Commission that would
> include the Chief of Police as a member, but would
> also include several prominent citizens who could be
> expected to define the values to which the
> Department should be committed, and to work with the
> Chief in developing and reviewing the strategic
> plan. It might even be advisable to give this
> Commission some power with the chief over the
> appointment of the organization's top managers. The
> Commission should be empowered to review the
> Department's strategic plan, and its efforts to
> execute it.</u>

The reasons for recommending the creation of a Police Commission are several. First, it strengthens the mechanisms of accountability for the police, without involving the Mayor too closely in that process. Second, if properly constituted and staffed, a Commission can help achieve the first objective -- which is to get a focused plan out of the Department for which it is prepared to be accountable. Third, unlike a study commission charged with the task of developing a "management blueprint" for the department, an on-going Commission working with the Police Chief can start producing results earlier, and make more extensive use of the Department's internal capabilities. The goal of the Commission would be to use the Department's existing capabilities to produce the plan rather than to rely on outsiders to do this work. It would also be to use the Commission's continuing oversight and influence over future appointments to ensure effective execution. In both these respects, the on-going, oversight Commission idea seems preferable to more common proposals to establish a temporary "blue ribbon study committee" to prepare a management plan for the Department.

> 4.3. The Department's managers should immediately be tasked with the job of developing an organization wide strategic plan to be presented at the first meeting of the new Commission. Responsibilities for

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doing the planning work should be distributed across the top managers of the Department. Those responsible for given areas, should make the presentations to the Commission. They should identify the key managerial and substantive issues that must be addressed, and the various options for addressing them. They should be prepared to recommend a plan for action, and to define milestones that would indicate progress in their areas of responsibility. Those with the responsibility for planning should also be responsible for implementing the plans.

The reasons for this recommendation are four: First, to begin moving quickly toward improved performance and accountability rather than wait for the establishment of a Commission; Second, to ensure that the challenge and opportunity of contributing to the organization's development falls broadly across the Department, and that the talents of the managers are fully challenged and utilized; Third, to give the Commission a chance to observe the Department's managers in operation; Fourth, to reduce slippage between planning and improved operations.

Appendix A:

A List of Those Interviewed for This Report

Chief Isaac Fulwood

Assistant Chief Melvin High, Operations

Assistant Chief M. J. Krupo, Technical Services

Assistant Chief Rodwell Catoe, Investigative Services

Assistant Chief Addison Davis, Administrative Services

Deputy Chief Gary Abrecht, District Commander, First
District

Deputy Chief Roland Perry, District Commander, Second
District

Deputy Chief Edward Spurlock, District Commander, Third
District

Deputy Chief Frederick Raines, District Commander, Fifth
District

Deputy Chief Jimmy Wilson, District Commander, Sixth
District

Deputy Chief James R. Lee, District Commander, Seventh
District

Deputy Chief Joyce Leland, Director, Community Relations
Division

Inspector Charles Collins, Director, Community Empowerment
Policing Office

Inspector David W. Bostrum, Director, Planning and
Development Division

Inspector Kenneth Hutson, Director, Data Processing Division

Inspector William B. Riley, Director, Communications
Division

Charles Brown, Planning and Development Division

Thomas Blagburn, Office of Community Empowerment Policing
Office

Sergeant Alvita Dennis, Office of Community Empowerment
Policing

Janice Sullivan, Office of Community Empowerment Policing

Officer Raymond F. Danelli, Office of Community Empowerment
Policing

Officer George Bellinger, Office of Community Empowerment
Policing

Captain Robert Noyes, First District

Officer Wallace Randall, First District

Inspector Louis Widawski, Director, Training Division

Lieutenant George Schuman, Training Division

Sergeant Charmaine Howard, Training Division

Inspector Martin Nivreth, Chief of Detectives, Criminal
Investigation Division

Captain Alfred J. Broadbent, Commander, Homicide Branch,
Criminal Investigation Division

In addition, I participated in two group meetings -- one
with the officers of the Seventh District, the other with
the "Facilitators" of Community Empowerment Policing.